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Abstract 
 
 
µ:H GRQ¶W GR *RG¶ $ODVtair Campbell famously said of UK government 
policy-making.  In contrast, Anglican Bishops at the 2008 Lambeth Conference 
committed themselves to reflect on contextualising their faith, and pursue their 
conclusions in public ethical discourse.     
This thesis proposes that the Bishops (and others) may justifiably pursue this 
two-fold course, through the application, reinterpretation and development of Alasdair 
MacIntyre's tradition-based moral reasoning.  I contend that the validity of a 
MacIntyrean approach in contextualising Christianity is readily apparent; and can shed 
light on Anglican differences around human sexuality.   
7KURXJK GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ EHWZHHQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V µXWRSLDQ¶ WKHRU\ DQG KLV
SUDFWLFDO UHTXLUHPHQWPHUHO\ WREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶ WR µJRRQDQGJR IXUWKHU¶ ,DUJXH
that we find effective resources for extensive moral rational engagement with other 
traditions, and, more surprisingly, within liberal democracy.  This, I agree with Jeffrey 
Stout, has the potential to operate, to a useful degree, as akLQWRDµWUDGLWLRQ¶ 
I then outline how the Bishops can best pursue substantive, rational, ethical 
dialogue, first, with other communities of tradition;  second, with those groupings, 
widespread throughout society, which, though not fully-fledged communities of 
tradition, nonetheless sufficiently reflect them to be able to sustain some degree of 
PRUDO GHEDWH  DQG WKLUG WKURXJK GHYHORSLQJ0DF,QW\UH
V DSSURSULDWLRQ RI $TXLQDV¶
work on Natural Law, in circumstances that, or among those who, uphold no tradition.  
In each case, I argue the potential is greater than MacIntyre allows, and, importantly, 
is enhanced by constructive engagement, which it is therefore generally a morally 
rational obligation to pursue.   
With examples drawn primarily from the work of Dr Rowan Williams, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, I point to practical ways in which my proposed 
0DF,QW\UHDQSUD[LVFDQERWKVWUHQJWKHQWKH&KXUFK¶VHQJDJHPHQWLQSXEOLFGLVFRXUVH
and enhance the nature of the public space as a place for pursuing the common good. 
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Chapter 1 ± Why MacIntyre? 
Introduction  
 µ:H GRQ¶W GR *RG¶ $ODVWDLU &DPSEHOO IDPRXVO\ UHEXNHG D 9DQLW\ )DLU
journalist interviewing Tony Blair;1  while he, on retirement, himself told the BBC 
that he had been wary of talking about religion while Prime Minister for fear of being 
VHHQµDVDQXWWHU¶.2   
 A very different stance was taken by the Anglican Bishops at the 2008 
decennial meeting of the Lambeth Conference.  They committed themselves to reflect 
on their faith and how it should be lived within contemporary contexts, and then to 
bring to bear their conclusions within the wider world through lobbying and advocacy, 
engaging as appropriate with every dimension of public life.3     
The aim of this thesis is to propose, through the application, reinterpretation 
and development of Alasdair MacIntyre's work on tradition-based moral reasoning, 
how the Anglican Bishops (and others like them) may justifiably pursue this two-fold 
course they set themselves.  I hope to make the case that it is relatively straightforward 
to show the validity and value of a MacIntyrean approach to the first task, of 
contextualising Christianity with integrity for their own community of tradition, 
through their commitment to consider the interplay of gospel, culture and society.   
However, the applicability of MacIntyre's work to the second task ± of 
bringing the voice of faith, thus understood, into the public space ± might at first seem 
more tenuous, given the limitations he places on the possibility of substantive rational 
engagement with those of other traditions, and, even more so, within the context of 
liberal democracy.  I shall argue that, contrary to this impression, MacIntyre's work 
provides extensive and effective resources on which to draw.  In doing so, I shall offer 
                                                             
1
 FRUDQDFFRXQWRIWKLVHQFRXQWHUVHH&ROLQ%URZQµ&DPSEHOOLQWHUUXSWHG%ODLUDVKHVSRNHRI
KLVIDLWK³:HGRQ¶WGR*RG´¶The Telegraph, 4 May 2003, accessed 15 May 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1429109/Campbell-interrupted-Blair-as-he-spoke-of-
his-faith-We-dont-do-*RGKWPO+RZHYHUVLQFHOHDYLQJJRYHUQPHQWKHKDVDUJXHGWKDWµDOO
OHDGHUVZKHWKHURIUHOLJLRXVIDLWKWKHPVHOYHVRUQRWKDYHWR³GR*RG´¶6HH7RQ\%ODLUµ:K\
ZHPXVWDOOGR*RG¶The New Statesman, 19 March 2009, accessed 15 May 2011, 
www.newstatesman.com/religion/2009/03/world-million-faith-god. 
2
 6HHµ%ODLUIHDUHG³QXWWHU´ODEHO¶%%&1HZV1RYHPEHUDFFHVVHG0D\
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7111620.stm for a report of this interview.  
3
 In place of the resolutions of earlier meetings, the 2008 Conference produced the less formal 
µ/DPEHWK,QGDED&DSWXULQJ&RQYHUVDWLRQVDQG5HIOHFWLRQVIURPWKH/DPEHWK&RQIHUHQFH
¶DOVRNQRZQDVµ,QGDED5HIOHFWLRQV¶ZLWKSDUDJUDSKQXPEHUVFLWHGKHUHE\§.  Available 
at www.lambethconference.org/vault/Reflections_Document_(final).pdf.  See §56 and §58. 
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justificatLRQ IRU -HIIUH\ 6WRXW¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW 0DF,QW\UH µERWK XQGHUHVWLPDWHV WKH
level of the agreement on the good actually exhibited by our society and overestimates 
the level required for us to reason coherently with each other in most matters of moral 
concerQ¶4 DQG,VKDOOLQGLFDWHZK\,FRQVLGHUKLPULJKWWRDVVHUWWKDW0DF,QW\UHµGRHV
not exclude, it seems to me, the possibility that moral discourse in our society can 
itself be understood as held together by a relatively limited but nonetheless real and 
sigQLILFDQWDJUHHPHQWRQWKHJRRG¶5   
On this basis, I shall commend to the Anglican Bishops and those they lead an 
approach by which best to pursue substantive and rational ethical dialogue, first, with 
those of other communities of tradition (where I argue that in practice there is far 
greater opportunity than the limited scope MacIntyre appears to allow);  second, with 
those groupings, widespread through society, which, though not fully-fledged 
communities of tradition, nonetheless enjoy a sufficient breadth and depth of those 
characteristics to be able to sustain some degree of moral debate;  and third, through 
GHYHORSLQJ 0DF,QW\UH
V DSSURSULDWLRQ RI $TXLQDV¶ ZRUN RQ natural law, with those 
who belong to no tradition, or in circumstances that uphold no tradition (which I argue 
are far more limited than MacIntyre asserts).   
Here I shall propose that each context gives rise, even in vestigial form, to a 
VSHFLILFµODQJXDJH¶IRUFRQGXFWLQJHWKLFDOGLDORJXH.  This is, in all three cases, a very 
different language from the ostensibly neutral and objective discourse rooted in the 
Enlightenment which MacIntyre rightly condemns as a chimera.  Rather, it reflects 
and expresses the instantiation within those particular circumstancHV RI $TXLQDV¶
primary precepts of natural law, being the vehicle for conducting and promoting 
debate around what constitutes the common good and how it might best be pursued in 
this time and placeDIXOO\GHYHORSHGµODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶DV0DF,QW\UHWHUPVLWLQWKH
first instance;  a more limiWHG µPRUDO ODQJXDJH¶ WR ERUURZ 6WRXW¶V XVDJH LQ WKH
VHFRQGDQGZKDW,SURSRVHWRFDOODµFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH¶WKHPRVWEDVLFIRUPLQWKH
third.   
In addition, I shall argue that shaping public secular debate in accordance with 
such an approach provides the most fruitful context for participants in pluralist 
democracies to pursue the common good (as well as for freely following their own 
beliefs and practices).  Therefore, unless overridden by other considerations, for 
                                                             
4
 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed (London: Duckworth, 1985), 215. 
5
 Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
211. 
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example political or tactical, there should be a general presumption that to engage in 
dialogue to the fullest degree possible is the best means to promote and strengthen the 
processes of authentic moral reasoning, as well as their content, whereas to withdraw 
is to be complicit in the erosion of both.  In doing this, I shall implicitly make a case 
against those who claim that a faith-based perspective, together with the language and 
arguments derived from it, has no legitimate place in civil debate. 
I shall concentrate, though not exclusively, on the United Kingdom, with 
particular attention to the writing and speaking of the current Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Rowan Williams  0LNH +LJWRQ KDV GHVFULEHG KLV µPRVW SHUYDVLYH «
SROLWLFDO FRPPLWPHQW¶ EHLQJ µWR negotiation in pursuit of the common good; the 
FRPPLWPHQW WR ZKDW KH HOVHZKHUH FDOOV µWKH SUREOHP RI UHVWRULQJ DQ DXWKHQWLFDOO\
SXEOLFGLVFRXUVH´¶6  Though he professes to be consciously influenced rather more by 
the writing of Charles Taylor,7 in my view his work illustrates to a considerable degree 
WKHEHVWRIWKHEUHDGWKRIWKHµ0DF,QW\UHDQ¶$QJOLFDQSUD[LVDFURVVYDU\LQJDXGLHQFHV
which I propose.  Assessing his writing and speaking from this perspective can also 
point to ways in which this approach may be strengthened, and more widely adopted 
and developed.  
After saying a little more about the Anglican context, this chapter will turn to 
Alasdair MacIntyre and his work, and then describe in greater detail the themes of this 
thesis and outline its arguments. 
Anglicanism, Culture and Politics 
 Anglicanism, my own tradition, has a considerable history of engagement 
with public debate and the wider political and social culture of the day.  Alongside the 
long experience of Establishment of the Church of England, the resolutions of 
successive Lambeth Conferences, particularly since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, demonstrate how the world-wide Anglican Communion has habitually 
addressed matters of public concern, from war and the conduct of international 
relations and global economics, through to domestic political and socio-economic 
                                                             
6
 Mike Higton, Difficult Gospel:  The Theology of Rowan Williams (London:  SCM Press, 
2004), p. 125 ± emphases in original ± citing Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 36. 
7
 Private conversation, Lambeth Palace, December 2009. 
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questions.  Furthermore, the need to take appropriate account of cultural context has 
EHHQDUHFXUUHQWWKHPHVLQFHWKH&RQIHUHQFH¶VLQDXJXUDOPHHWLQJRI8    
In 1920, the Lambeth Conference enunciated what might be called the 
beginnings of a global Anglican theology of political engagement at both institutional 
DQGLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOV,WUHVROYHGWKDWµ7KH&KXUFKFDQQRWLQLWVFRUSRUDWHFDSDFLW\EH
DQ DGYRFDWH RU SDUWLVDQ ³D MXGJH RU D GLYLGHU´ LQ SROLWLcal or class disputes where 
moral issues are not at stake; nevertheless in matters of economic and political 
controversy the Church is bound to give its positive and active corporate witness to the 
Christian principles of justice, brotherhood, and the equal and infinite value of every 
KXPDQSHUVRQDOLW\¶5HVROXWLRQ$V,VKDOODLPWRVKRZWKHYDOXHRIWKHKXPDQ
person is one of the most central elements in the praxis I propose for the twenty-first 
century.  The Conference also affirmed extensive public engagement by Christian 
LQGLYLGXDOV DORQJVLGH WKDW RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKXUFK VWDWLQJ WKDW µ0HPEHUV RI WKH
Church are bound to take an active part, by public action and by personal service, in 
removing those abuses which depress and impoverish human life.  In company with 
RWKHUFLWL]HQVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQVWKH\VKRXOGZRUNIRUUHIRUP«¶5HVROXWLRQ 
 William Temple (Bishop of Manchester, Archbishop of York and then 
Archbishop of Canterbury from 1942 until his death in 1944) enlarged upon this 
approach in Christianity and Social Order.  In response to criticism both from within 
the Church of England and from politicians for taking stands on political and 
HFRQRPLFTXHVWLRQVKHDUJXHGWKDWWKHFKXUFKZDVµERXQGWR³LQWHUIHUH´EHFDXVHLWLV
by vocation tKHDJHQWRI*RG¶VSXUSRVHRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIZKLFKQRKXPDQLQWHUHVW
RU DFWLYLW\ FDQ IDOO¶9  ,WZDV WKHUHIRUH WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\RI WKH FKXUFK WR µDQQRXQFH
Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in 
conflict with them.  It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic 
capacity, the task of reshaping the existing order in closer conformity to the 
SULQFLSOHV¶10   2QWKLVEDVLVVDLG7HPSOH µQLQH-WHQWKV¶11 of the so-called interfering 
would be done through the influence of individual Christians acting outside the 
                                                             
8
 The recommendations and resolutions of all the Lambeth Conferences from 1867 to 2008 are 
available at www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/index.cfm. 
9
 William Temple, 1942, Christianity and Social Order (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1942), 16. 
10
 Temple, Christianity, 35. 
11
 Temple, Christianity, 17. 
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LQVWLWXWLRQDO OLIHRIWKHFKXUFKIRUµLWLVUHFRJQLVHGWKDW&KULVWLDQPHQDQGZRPHQLQ
WKHYDULRXVZDONVRIOLIHVKRXOGEULQJWKHVSLULWRI&KULVWWREHDUXSRQWKHLUZRUN¶12   
Though primarily addressing a British audience, this writer of both philosophy 
DQG GHYRWLRQDO ZRUNV µUHPDLQV D ILJXUHKHDG IRU &KULVWLDQV VHHNLQJ WR FRPELQH
SHUVRQDOUHOLJLRQZLWKVRFLDODFWLRQ¶13 even if some of the details of his approach have 
proved less applicable in later, more multicultural, societies.14  Subsequent Lambeth 
&RQIHUHQFH UHVROXWLRQV KDYH WKXV FRQWLQXHG WR UHIOHFW 7HPSOH¶V DVVXPSWLRQV RI
Anglican engagement as they addressed issues of public concern.  One further 
H[DPSOH LV FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH &RPPXQLRQ¶V µ)LYH 0DUNV RI 0LVVLRQ¶ GHYHORSHG
WKURXJK WKH V ZKLFK LQFOXGH D FRPPLWPHQW WR µWR VHHN WR WUDQVIRUP XQMXVW
VWUXFWXUHVRIVRFLHW\¶15  
 Against this background, Bishops of the global Communion met most recently 
in 2008.16  They focussed their discussions around the twin themes of Anglican 
Identity and Equipping Bishops for Mission.  In other words, we might say that their 
debate was significantly shaped by their understanding on the one hand of their faith 
as expressed within their own community of tradition, and on the other of the 
relationship between this faith and the wider world.  The two themes were recognised 
as inseparable and interwoven, as was indicated in the µ,QGDED5HIOHFWLRQV¶ document 
produced at the end of the Conference.  Thus they saw encounter with the wider world 
DVVKDSLQJWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHIDLWKDWWKHKHDUWRI$QJOLFDQLGHQWLW\VLQFHµFXOWXUDO
DQG VRFLDO LVVXHV « LPSLQJH XSRQ RXU LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH *RVSHO¶   $W WKH
same time, they viewed this faith as finding expression within the wider world, for 
µWDNLQJGXHUHJDUGRIORFDOFRQWH[WVZHFRPPLWRXUVHOYHVWRDGYRFDWLQJDQGOREE\LQJ
(government, agencies, business, ecumenical, inter-faith partners and any other 
                                                             
12
 Temple, Christianity, 20. 
13
 Alister E. McGrath, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1993), 637. 
14
 John +DEJRRGµ&KXUFKDQG6RFLHW\¶LQCelebrating the Anglican Way, ed. Ian Bunting 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996), 39. 
15
 Available at www.anglicancommunion.org/ministry/mission/fivemarks.cfm.  It should be 
noted that Anglicans have a broad understanding of what mission encompasses, which includes 
DOODVSHFWVRIVRFLDOMXVWLFH7KLVLVVXPPDULVHGLQWKHVHµ)LYH0DUNVRI0LVVLRQ¶to proclaim 
the Good News of the Kingdom; to teach, baptise and nurture new believers; to respond to 
human need by loving service; to seek to transform unjust structures of society; to strive to 
safeguard the integrity of creation and sustain and renew the life of the earth.  A sixth Mark, 
addressing peace-making and reconciliation, is under consideration. 
16
 Though a number of Bishops did not attend the Conference, I am proceeding on the basis 
that this absence and related disagreements have no material implications for the subject matter 
of the thesis ± though it may be that the conclusions of the thesis can offer some resources in 
addressing these disagreements. I shall return to this question in the next chapter. 
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appropriate agencies or bodies) on the many issues of social justice we find in our 
ZRUOG¶7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKLVGXDOIRFXVZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUZKHQZHFRQVLGHU
the relevance of Alasdair MacIntyre's work.   
+RZHYHU :LOOLDP 7HPSOH EHJDQ KLV ERRN E\ REVHUYLQJ µ7KH FODLP RI WKH
Christian Church to make its voice heard in matters of politics and economics is very 
widely resented.  It is commonly assumed that Religion is one department of life, like 
Art or Science, and that it is playing the part of a busybody when it lays down 
principles for the guidance of other departments, whether Art and Science or Business 
DQG 3ROLWLFV¶17  Over sixty years later, the resentment faced by Anglican Bishops 
entering public debate is often far greater, particularly within the United Kingdom and 
RWKHUµ:HVWHUQLVHG¶DQG LQFUHDVLQJly secular societies; and for many reasons beyond 
that of playing the busybody.  While some consider faith to be entirely a private 
matter, and irrelevant to the ordering of the wider life of society, others argue that all 
religions are irrational and worse:  being the well-spring of the most heinous atrocities 
against humanity over the centuries and of various continuing abuses.  On this account 
religion should be explicitly excluded from the widest possible interpretation of the 
public space.  Not only is God a delusion, he is a pernicious delusion.18  
This is the context in which many Anglican Bishops and those they lead are 
required to operate, both in addressing contemporary questions within their churches, 
and in engaging in public debate.  My contention is that Alasdair MacIntyre's work 
offers significant resources for more than meeting these criticisms and challenges ± 
resources that are far more encouraging and extensive than the majority of MacIntyre's 
interpreters, or even he himself, appear to realise. 
My search for such resources has been a long one.  Prior to training for 
ordination within the Church in Wales in 1999, I was a British diplomat for 15 years, 
holding a number of appointments in which I was expected to contribute advice to 
government ministers on the shaping of policy.  I certainly did not believe that my 
faith was an irrelevance, as I sought to produce analyses and recommendations with 
the greatest integrity I could muster.  But in parish teaching and church bookshops I 
                                                             
17
 Temple, Christianity, 7. 
18
 See, for example, Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (London: Black Swan, 2007), 52; or 
WKHLPSDVVLRQHGEORJJLQJRQDUWLFOHVFDUULHGE\WKH*XDUGLDQ¶Vµ&RPPHQWLVIUHH%HOLHI¶
pages, at www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief; or the responses to the article by Nicholas 
:DWWµAlastair Campbell diaries: How Blair's Bible reading prompted Iraq 'wobble,' The 
Guardian, 14 January 2011, accessed 15 May 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jan/14/tony-blair-alastair-campbell-diaries. 
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was only able to find resources that were superficial or tangential to the sort of 
questions I faced.  The focus of the Christian network within the Foreign Office, 
generally on opportunities for evangelism or mutual support in the face of teasing or 
cynicism, did not help with addressing more substantive questions.  For example, my 
last posting was to Budapest, from 1992 to 1996, where, once it was known that I was 
leaving for ordination training, I found myself deliberately sought out by Hungarians 
active in the political sphere who wanted to discuss questions around the rebuilding of 
SXEOLF HWKLFV IROORZLQJ ERWK FRPPXQLVP DQG WKH IDVFLVP RI +XQJDU\¶V LQWHU-war 
period.  Had I known then what I have discovered through this research, my responses 
would have been markedly more adequate.   
Since 2003 I have worked as the Research and Ecumenical Advisor to 
successive Anglican Archbishops of Cape Town, who are expected to have a 
significant public voice which contributes to shaping this multicultural and pluralist 
nation in the post-apartheid era.  To a considerable degree, the methodological 
TXHVWLRQV UDLVHGE\ P\ ZRUN LQ VXSSRUWRI WKH $UFKELVKRSV¶SXEOLF HQJDJHPHQW DUH
those which are addressed from a more theoretical perspective in this thesis, and so 
KDYH SURYLGHG D µOLYH FRQWH[W¶ LQ ZKLFK WR ZHLJK WKH SUDFWLFDO DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH
theory I have pursued.  Its relevance to other areas of inter-Anglican, ecumenical, and 
inter-faith dialogue has also been brought into particular focus through my 
experiences as a member of the Inter-Anglican Standing Commission on Ecumenical 
Relations, from 2000 to 2008, and of the Inter-Anglican Standing Commission on 
Unity, Faith and Order since 2009. 
For reasons of space, though my prime interest is in an approach to 
discernment in any and every part of life and its effective communication (and I 
believe MacIntyre offers this), I have made the role of the institutional church and its 
leaders in the public sphere the particular focus of this thesis.  However, in my 
conclusions I shall indicate where I see the potential for further work specifically to 
assist Christian individuals such as I was as a diplomat, in appropriating Alasdair 
MacIntyre's work in order to live out their faith with integrity in their professional 
lives and more broadly beyond their own front doors. 
Why MacIntyre? 
$ODVGDLU 0DF,QW\UH LW KDV EHHQ VDLG µKDV DOPRVW PRUH WKDQ DQ\ RWKHU
philosopher, shaped the course of contemporary moral philosophy and social 
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FULWLFLVP¶19  6LQFH  KH KDV PDGH KLV µVLQJOH SURMHFW¶20 answering what he 
FRQVLGHUV WKH µFHQWUDO GHOLEHUDWLYH TXHVWLRQV¶21 RI OLIH QDPHO\ µ:KDW VKRXOG ZH GR
KHUH DQG QRZ"¶ RU LQ RWKHU ZRUGV µ+RZ WKHQ VKRXOG ZH OLYH"¶ 7KLV FRQFHUQ ZLWK
rational morality at its most fundamental lies at the centre of his three major works, 
After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry, and is variously developed in his subsequent volume Dependent Rational 
Animals and his extensive other writings.22   
,Q SXUVXLW RI WKLV HQG 0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN is, as Mark Murphy puts it, 
GRPLQDWHG E\ WKH WZLQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI µERWK ZKDW WKH VXEVWDQFH RI DQ DGHTXDWH
morality would be like and what a conception of rationality needed to show the 
VXSHULRULW\RIWKLVVXEVWDQWLDOPRUDOLW\ZRXOGKDYHWREHOLNH¶7KLV twin consideration 
UXQVWKURXJKERWKKLVHDUOLHUZRUNDQGKLVµPDWXUHSKLORVRSK\¶ZKLFKKDVµGHYHORSHG
DQG FRQQHFWHG¶23 these two themes.  And we should not be surprised to find them 
UXQQLQJLQSDUDOOHO)RUWKHYDOXHRIDQµDGHTXDWHPRUDOLW\¶WKDWFRXOG not demonstrate 
its superiority beyond its own community of adherents would be questionable at best.  
From a theoretical perspective, such an inability would undermine its claims to 
superiority, and lay itself open to accusations of relativism and perspectivism.  
Therefore this hurdle must be also overcome.  For a tradition that believed itself to 
have an adequate rationality of which it could not persuade others would be tempted to 
withdraw into itself.  %XWLQSUDFWLFDOWHUPVLQWRGD\¶VLQFUHDVLQJO\LQWerconnected and 
globalised society, it is not feasible to pursue the radical withdrawal of a faith 
community from the rest of human society.24   
                                                             
19
 P. J. 0HKOµ,QWKH7ZLOLJKWRI0RGHUQLW\0DF,QW\UHDQG0LWFKHOORQ0RUDO7UDGLWLRQVDQG
7KHLU$VVHVVPHQW¶The Journal of Religious Ethics 19.1(1991):51. 
20
 Alasdair MacIntyrHµ$Q,QWHUYLHZIRU&RJLWR¶LQThe MacIntyre Reader, ed. Kelvin 
Knight (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 269. 
21
 Alasdair 0DF,QW\UHµ$TXLQDVDQGWKH([WHQWRI0RUDO'LVDJUHHPHQW¶LQEthics and Politics:  
Selected Essays, Volume 2, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 72. 
22
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice?  Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988) hereafter WJWR; Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry:  Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1990) hereafter TRV; Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals:  Why Human 
Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), hereafter DRA. 
23
 Mark C. 0XUSK\µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQAlasdair MacIntyre, ed. Mark C. Murphy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7. 
24
 Though certain streams of Christianity have advocated withdrawal at various times, most 
have acknowledged that the church is inevitably found in, even if not of, the world.  As 
illustrated above, Anglicanism has, in contrast, tended to assume extensive engagement beyond 
the institutional church.  A full consideration of the arguments around this question lies outside 
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It is the extent to which MacIntyre is successful in pursuit of this dual goal, 
and how far his theoretical approach can be instantiated within contemporary 
Anglicanism, particularly within the United Kingdom, which lies at the heart of this 
WKHVLV,QWKLV,UHODWH0DF,QW\UH
VSXUVXLWRIDQµDGHTXDWHPRUDOLW\¶Wo the desire of 
the Anglican Bishops to enunciate with integrity contextualised understandings of 
WKHLUIDLWKZLWKLQWKHOLIHRIWKHFKXUFKDQGOLQNKLVµGHPRQVWUDEOHVXSHULRULW\¶WRWKHLU
persuasive ability within public debate.  For the Bishops as for MacIntyre, the two 
remain inextricably linked. 
In a nutshell, MacIntyre argues for D µSUDFWLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\¶ IRXQG DQG
VXVWDLQHG ZLWKLQ D µFRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ¶  7KXV VRFLDOO\ HPEHGGHG LQGLYLGXDOV
pursue the just and moral life, through a tradition aimed at the flourishing of both 
individuals and their community among whom it finds expression (this being 
KXPDQLW\¶VSURSHUtelos), taking appropriate account of the context and circumstances 
in which they find themselves, honing their praxis25 through intentional dialectical 
engagement with other perspectives.  ,QFKDSWHU,GHVFULEHWKLVµSUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\¶
and review the extent to which it has been acknowledged to provide the sort of non-
relative, non-SHUVSHFWLYDO µDGHTXDWH PRUDOLW\¶ WR ZKLFK0DF,QW\UH DVSLUHV 7KURXJK
offering a detailed account of MacIntyre's work, I lay foundations on which to build 
my subsequent interpretations and developments of his approach, with particular 
DWWHQWLRQ WR WZRNH\FRQFHSWV 7KHILUVWRI WKHVH LVZKDWKH WHUPVµVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶
DQG GHILQHV DV µDQ\ FRKHUHQW DQG FRPSlex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
V\VWHPDWLFDOO\H[WHQGHG¶26  7KHVHFRQGFRQFHSWLVKLVSDLULQJRIµLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDO
JRRGVRIH[FHOOHQFH¶ZKHUHLQWHUQDOJRRds are those which result from the pursuit of 
excellence for its own sake, while external goods are those gains which are a by-
product of our ability to achieve excellence.  Thus one can strive to play the piano 
well for the sake of beautiful music, or for adulation and financial reward.27 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the scope of this thesis, though the related issue of the extent to which it is feasible for faith 
communities to engage substantively with those of other faiths and none is one of its more 
central themes. 
25
 ,WDNHµSUD[LV¶DVHQFRPSDVVLQJWKHLQWHUSOD\DQGVXPRIPXWXDOO\LQIRUPLQJWKHRU\DQG
practice, rather than merely practice alone, as the term is sometimes used. 
26
 AV, 187. 
27
 AV, 188ff.  
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MacIntyre asserts that a contemporary contextualisation of thoroughly realist 
Thomistic Aristotelianism most fully succeeds in meeting the demands of an adequate 
morality sustained through such practical rationality.  This account of tradition-based 
reasoning has been broadly appropriated within Western Christian Tradition, for 
example, by his United Methodist interpreter Stanley Hauerwas in extensive writings, 
as well as by others including the Reformed Epistemologist Nicholas Wolterstorff.28  
After addressing various caveats ± for example, the relationship between the need to 
uphold the orthodoxy of a religious tradition and MacIntyre's requirement for 
unconditional readiness to learn from others ± I shall draw attention to some particular 
resources offered to WKH $QJOLFDQ %LVKRSV LQ DGGUHVVLQJ KRZ µFXOWXUDO DQG VRFLDO
LVVXHV«LPSLQJHXSRQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH*RVSHO¶DQGKRZWR WDNHµGXHUHJDUGRI
FRQWH[W¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR FXUUHQW GLVDJUHHPHQWV ZLWKLQ WKH $QJOican 
Communion over issues of human sexuality.29  Later in the thesis, I shall comment 
further on what insights and advice my interpretation of MacIntyre might offer in 
practice.   
It must be noted, however, that MacIntyre is not himself an Anglican, having 
returned to his Roman Catholic roots after a period as an atheist Marxist.  Yet 
$QJOLFDQLVP XQGHUVWDQGV LWVHOI DV ODUJHO\ µ5HIRUPHG DQG &DWKROLF¶ DQG $TXLQDV
(especially his work on moral theology and natural law) has had a persisting influence 
across the centuries, not least with such significant Anglican theologians as Richard 
Hooker30 and William Temple.31  Therefore, notwithstanding the many strands within 
Anglicanism, I shall proceed with the assumption of a general compatibility between 
the sort of broadly Thomistic-Aristotelian approach MacIntyre espouses and 
contemporary mainstream Anglicanism, especially of the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
                                                             
28
 Interestingly, both have strong Anglican / Episcopalian links:  Hauerwas (who has 
VRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGKLPVHOIWRQJXHLQFKHHNDVDµKLJK-FKXUFK0HQQRQLWH¶DQGKDVDOso 
worked or worshipped in Lutheran and Roman Catholic settings) currently attends an 
Episcopalian church, where his wife, an ordained Methodist, is licenced; and Wolterstorff is 
married to an Episcopal priest.  See Stanley Hauerwas, +DQQDK¶V&KLOG (London, SCM Press, 
2010), 254. 
29
 µ/DPEHWK,QGDED&DSWXULQJ&RQYHUVDWLRQVDQG5HIOHFWLRQV¶ 
30
 ,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWLQWKHODVWFHQWXU\WKHUHZDVJURZLQJDSSUHFLDWLRQRI$TXLQDV¶
influence not only on the work of Richard Hooker, but more widely among Anglican 
Reformers ± see Paul Avis, Anglicanism and the Christian Church (London: T & T Clark, 
2002), 32, 343.   
31
 $GULDQ+DVWLQJVµ:LOOLDP7HPSOH¶LQThe English Religious Tradition and the Genius of 
Anglicanism, ed. Geoffrey Rowell (Oxford: IKON, 1992), 213. 
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MacIntyre and Dialogue 
 The questions then arise of whether, how, and to what extent, a MacIntyrean 
approach can also assist in the second goal of effective lobbying and advocacy within 
public debate.  An initial reading of MacIntyre's argument points to tensions and 
ambiguities in his descriptions of communication between members of a community 
of tradition and those of another community or none, particularly in his descriptions of 
WKH µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ WKDW LV QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKLV  )XUWKHUPRUH 0DF,QW\UH DSSHDUV
pessimistic about the possibilities for Christians, whether on behalf of churches, or as 
individuals, to engage in substantive rational dialogue with those outside the church, 
and particularly within the public discourse of liberal democratic society.  While he 
sees some grounds for genuine exchange with those of similarly constituted 
communities of tradition ± particularly where there is some agreement both on 
KXPDQLW\¶V telos, our common good, and on standards and procedures for rational 
evaluation ± he is considerably more negative about the ability of those who belong to 
no such tradition even to participate in reasoned debate.  Further, he views liberal 
democratic society as falling critically short of the characteristics required to 
FRQVWLWXWH D µWUDGLWLRQ¶ ZLWK DVVRFLDWHG FRPPXQLW\ DQG VR GHOLYHU WKH QHFHVVDU\
context for the pursuit of practical rationality, ethical living, and human flourishing 
rightly conceptualised.  Chapter 3 begins with a consideration of these limitations, 
from MacIntyre's perspective.   
I then evaluate the relationship between MacIntyre's theory and his 
descriptions (still largely offered in abstract terms, or through theoretical cases) of its 
practical instantiation, and identify certain ambiguities that arise largely from the 
disjunction between the ostensible DEVROXWHV RI DEVWUDFW WKHRU\ DQG ZKDW LV µJRRG
HQRXJK¶WREHYDOLGLQSUDFWLFH± an apparent conflict which he acknowledges.  At first 
WKHVH PLJKW DSSHDU WR EH SUREOHPDWLF WR 0DF,QW\UH¶V DVVHUWLRQV RI DQ DGHTXDWH
morality.  However, I do not believe this is the case, as there are grounds for arguing 
that this malleability can, on MacIntyre's own terms, provide effective justification for 
applying his approach in the specific contexts of ethical dialogue within Western 
society, and for going considerably further in overcoming the limitations he sees.   
 I shall take up this issue by askiQJ µ+RZJRRGGRHV ³JRRGHQRXJK´KDYH WR
EH"¶ DQG VKDOO VXSSRUW WKH YLHZ WKDW such inevitable intrinsic discrepancies between 
WKHRU\ DQG SUDFWLFH GR QRW QHFHVVDULO\ XQGHUPLQH 0DF,QW\UH¶V FODLPV WR UDWLRQDOLW\
However, they have crucial implications for his assessment of the potential for 
dialogue with others.  A particular area of importance is his description of 
16 
 
µELOLQJXDOLVP¶DVDQHFHVVLW\IRU WUXHGLDORJXHEHWZHHQ WZRGLIIHUHQWFRPPXQLWLHVRI
tradition, for which he seems to require significantly lower standards in practice than 
his theoretical argument allows.  Having first described such bilingualism in ways that 
VXJJHVW IXOO IOXHQF\ KH ODWHU UHTXLUHV RQO\ WKDW RQH NQRZV µKRZ WR JR RQ DQG JR
IXUWKHU¶ LQ WKHVHFRQGODQJXDJH32  Further, he admits the possibility of achieving an 
adequate degree of competence in a second language in practice without the individual 
having made a commitment to the community of tradition in which it is the language-
in-use, which he had elsewhere made an apparent requirement for linguistic fluency 
ZLWKLQRQH¶VKRPHWUDGLWLRQ 
 This has important practical consequences for determining the conditions 
under which it is possible for Christians to communicate substantively with those of 
other traditions.  In particular, the extent of agreement on MacIntyre's two key areas 
RI KXPDQLW\¶V telos, and the nature of rational evaluation) that is necessary, or, we 
might say, sufficient or adequate, for effective dialogue may not be as extensive as 
initially inferred, and so may offer greater optimism than MacIntyre himself concedes.  
This is a point, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, made by Stout.  I shall 
illustrate what this might mean in practice by considering examples of the Archbishop 
RI&DQWHUEXU\¶VHQJDJHPHQWILUVWZLth Anglican diversity and with other branches of 
Christian tradition; and then with representatives of Islam and Judaism, being the two 
RWKHUµ$EUDKDPLFIDLWKV¶ZLWKZKLFK WKHUHPD\EH WKRXJKW WREHDJUHDWHUGHJUHHRI
shared perspectives than with other religious traditions. 
7KLV ZD\ LQ ZKLFK 0DF,QW\UH¶V WKHRULHV RIWHQ H[SUHVVHG LQ VWDUN DQG
uncompromising terms, find ± even in his own writings ± a far more pliant application 
in practice, is the central issue around which the main argument of this thesis pivots.  
)RUQRWRQO\LQDUHDVRIµELOLQJXDOLVP¶LV LWQHFHVVDU\ merely to meet his criterion of 
µZHOOHQRXJK¶,QLQGLFDWLQJWKHEURDGHULPSRUWDQFHRIWKLVDSSOLFDWLRQRIµ0DF,QW\UH
DJDLQVW KLPVHOI¶ VR WR VSHDN , RIIHU DW WKLV SRLQW VRPH LQLWLDO FRPPHQts on how, 
similarly, there may be greater flexibility and potential in dealing with contemporary 
liberal democratic society than MacIntyre allows.  This is given substantive 
consideration in chapters 4 and 5.  Here the key question is how one may determine 
whether or not a society falls so short of MacIntyre's criteria for a community of 
tradition as to render dialogue impossible, or whether sufficient commensurability 
H[LVWV WR DWWHPSW WR µJR RQ DQG JR IXUWKHU¶ LQ WKH ODQJXDJH-in-use of such society 
sufficiently adequately to sustain a degree of rational justification.  I shall argue that it 
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 WJWR, 382. 
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LVRQO\WKURXJKDWWHPSWLQJWRµJRRQ¶DQGIDLOLQJWKDWRQHFDQGLVFRYHUWKHOLPLWVDQG
that therefore the appropriate strategy should generally be, all other things being equal, 
to attempt the fullest possible dialogue. 
MacIntyre and Public Debate 
Chapter 4 tackles in more detail the specific challenges of instantiating 
MacIntyre's approach within western society. 
In this, I consider MacIntyre's own account of what he terms the 
µ(QOLJKWHQPHQW3URMHFW¶DQGKRZKHVHHVWKLVILQGLQJH[SUHVVLRQZLWKLQFRQWHPSRUDU\
liberal democratic society:  a society that, he says, falls far short of what constitutes a 
µFRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ¶ EHLQJ EDVHG XSRQ WKH IDOVH DVVXPSWLRQV WKDW there are 
context-neutral and objective perspectives and processes for evaluating how we should 
live.  Incoherence and irrationality follow, and those who are part of such a milieu ± 
being thus outside any community of tradition ± are cut off from the possibility of 
participating in genuine rational enquiry, including on moral and ethical issues.  They 
have, he argues, no means of weighing with integrity the claims of any tradition which 
they encounter, and their own attempts to make rational and moral sense of life are 
little better than incoherent.   
A corollary of this is that public debate, including on ethical questions, 
conducted according to the norms of such a society, is similarly incoherent since there 
DUHQRµVWDQGDUGVRI UDWLRQDOLW\DGHTXDWH IRU the evaluation of rival answers to such 
questions, equally available, at least in principle, to all persons, whatever tradition 
WKH\PD\KDSSHQWRILQGWKHPVHOYHVLQDQGZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\LQKDELWDQ\WUDGLWLRQ¶33  
The conclusion MacIntyre draws is that there is little value, if any, in participating in 
such discourse.  
More than this, and in significant part as a consequence of its Enlightenment 
inheritance, MacIntyre sees the contemporary westernised nation state as primarily 
constituted through its need to balance competing economic and social interests, too 
often expressed through the pursuit of external goods such as money and power 
together with instrumental criteria such as bureaucratic efficiency, and its 
responsibility for the provision of public VHFXULW\$VDUHVXOWµWKHUHLVDOZD\VWHQVLRQ
and sometimes conflict between the demands of state and market on the one hand and 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIUDWLRQDOORFDOFRPPXQLW\RQWKHRWKHU¶6LQFHLWLVRQO\WKHODWWHU
which can, in MacIntyre's view, effectively deliver (even if always imperfectly) the 
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 WJWR, 393. 
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FRPPRQ JRRG WKDW LV KXPDQLW\¶V telos, it is at the local community level that we 
should direct our energies, preserving our independence from the state as far as 
SRVVLEOHDQGUHJDUGLQJLWVDJHQFLHVµZLWKXQUHPLWWLQJVXVSLFLRQ¶34 
6WDQOH\ +DXHUZDV ODUJHO\ VKDUHV 0DF,QW\UH¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG DSSOLHV LW
explicitly to Western Christian experience within public discourse, particularly in the 
United States of America.  If they are correct in their analysis, the prospects for the 
Anglican Bishops effectively to pursue lobbying and advocacy on moral and ethical 
issues in the public arena at government and international level are slender, and they 
are misguided in setting themselves this task.  (It should be noted that their 
responsibility to continue engagement on a more local level, for example through 
dioceses and parishes, is not in question, this being the scale of engagement MacIntyre 
argues is most effective for promoting rational moral dialogue.) 
However, the obvious criticism arises that Hauerwas effectively contradicts 
his own position, through having persisted over many years in arguing his views 
within the public sphere, and MacIntyre does much the same within the academy.35  
This point has been made by, among others, Stout on whose writing, particularly in 
Ethics after Babel and Democracy and Tradition, I draw through this and subsequent 
chapters.36  An ethicist and philosopher of religion, though not a theist, he has some 
V\PSDWKLHV ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V FULWLFisms of a hubristic version of enlightenment 
OLEHUDOLVPWKRXJKH[SUHVVHVµGRXEWVDERXWERWKWKHGHWDLOVDQGWKHJHQHUDOWUDMHFWRU\
RI 0DF,QW\UH
V KLVWRULFDO QDUUDWLYH¶37  In particular he believes MacIntyre (and 
Hauerwas with him) is far too pessimistic in the account he gives of the possibilities 
for substantive ethical discourse within contemporary western society.  Instead, he 
contends that there are substantial grounds for viewing democratic discourse as an 
effective tradition by MacIntyre's own standards.  He also asserts that MacIntyre 
SURYLGHV µFRQFHSWXDO WRROV¶ IRU SURPRWLQJ HIIHFWLYH GHEDWH ZLWKLQ FRQWHPSRUDU\
society, particularly through a development of his concepts of social practices and the 
goods that are internal to these.  While largely agrHHLQJZLWK6WRXW¶V UHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
and development of MacIntyre's work, I shall draw out in greater detail than he makes 
                                                             
34
 Alasdair 0DF,QW\UHµ7ROHUDWLRQDQGWKH*RRGVRI&RQIOLFW¶LQThe Politics of Toleration in 
Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 142-3.  See 
also DRA, Chapter 11. 
35
 AV, 342. 
36
 EaB, and Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) ± hereafter generally referred to as DaT. 
37
 EaB, 266. 
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explicit how justification for his views can be found within the MacIntyrean corpus on 
which he draws.  
Going On and Going Further 
  The thesis then brings MacIntyre's descriptions of theory and practice into 
dialogue with the specific circumstances of Anglican engagement with contemporary 
Western liberal democratic society. 
 Chapter 5 begins by returning to the implications of his varying descriptions 
RIµELOLQJXDOLVP¶DQGZKDW LWPHDQVDOZD\V WRDWWHPSW WRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ not 
only with those whom we can clearly recognise as being from other communities of 
tradition and with whom we can therefore have expectations of substantive exchange 
(as discussed in Chapter 3), but also with those of no such commensurate tradition; 
and similarly what it means to engage in debate within the public arena of 
contemporary society, particularly that of the UK.   
 As noted above, when it comes to the practice (rather than theory) of dialogue, 
MacIntyre seems to have loosened his requirement to make a commitment to a 
particular world-view and its practices as a sine qua non of being able to speak its 
µODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶  2QH important implication of this is that it is possible to have 
genuine exchange with others without any requirement to accept their position.  I 
argue that this should encourage exploratory engagement with all others, for, where no 
other overriding considerations apply (such as the need not to give succour to 
abhorrent perspectives, for example), it is likely that we have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain, including through encountering resources that can help us better 
KRQHRXURZQµDGHTXDWHPRUDOLW\¶ 
Here I build on the assertion LQ&KDSWHUWKDWLWLVRQO\E\DWWHPSWLQJµWRJR
RQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶WKDWZHFDQHVWDEOLVKWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKRWKHUVHIIHFWLYHO\LQKDELW
communities of tradition commensurate with ours, with similar standards of rational 
evaluation, and similar concepWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\¶Vtelos or common good, allowing for 
substantive exchange.  Members of a community of tradition should therefore always 
be open to seeing quite how far they can get, being ready to pursue whatever 
opportunities present themselves for genuine communication and then to develop 
WKHVHDVIDUDVFDQEHGRQH7KXVZKHUHZHILQGWKDWZHFDQµJRIXUWKHU¶DQGWKDWZH
can actually communicate substantively, there we can then attempt in dialogue to 
HYDOXDWHHDFKFRPPXQLW\¶VYLHZVRIUDWLRQDOHYDOXDtion and telos.  The extent of this 
common ground can also be explored through communication that aspires to move on 
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WRZKDW0DF,QW\UHIRUPDOO\ WHUPVµGHEDWH¶ZKLFKIROORZVRQIURPKLVSURFHVVHVIRU
ZHLJKLQJWKHUHODWLYHPHULWVRIHDFKRWKHU¶VDSSURDFKHV to then considering together 
KRZHDFKVLGHDQVZHUVTXHVWLRQVRIµKRZWKHQVKDOOZHOLYH¶ 
 My contention is that making assessments between both communities of 
WUDGLWLRQDQGWKRVHDVVRFLDWLRQVWKDWIDOOVKRUWRI0DF,QW\UH¶VKLJKFULWHULDIRUWKHVHLV
easier, and more widespread in practice, than MacIntyre's descriptions suggest.  As 
MacIntyre himself points out, most of us have overlapping membership in all manner 
of groupings (unions or professional bodies, sports clubs, neighbourhood 
organisations and so forth).  Many of these operate to a greater or lesser degree as 
FRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ :HEHFRPH VNLOOHG HQRXJK WR µJR RQDQG JR IRUZDUG¶ LQ
handling all their differing languages-in-XVH DQG µWUDQVODWLQJ¶ EHWZHHQ WKHP  0RUH
than this, we develop skills in weighing the relative merits of, and prioritising, our 
own various commitments, as we pursue an overarching unity of life, directed towards 
a wider-reaching sense of human flourishing or telos ± such as that which is provided 
by our faith community, being a more fully realised community of tradition.  
Furthermore, we also manage (as we so choose) to weigh sufficiently well to take 
informed decisions about which groupings we are not going to join.  Some of these 
options, at least, we will be able to recognise as approximating towards a community 
of tradition, with something akin to a language-in-use ± and yet, without becoming 
members, we can judge that they do not warrant our allegiance: they are not part of 
RXU PRUH FRPSUHKHQVLYH DQVZHU WR µ+RZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH"¶  7KXV , MXGJH
MacIntyre's own approach in practice offers far wider possibilities for this rich form of 
dialogue with those who have some level of training in a community of tradition, even 
if not fully realised.  We should show greater optimism than he allows.   
 $QGZKLOHLWLVWKHFDVHWKDWQRQHRIWKLVPD\EHGRQHµSHUIHFWO\¶LWVHHPVLW
FDQ RIWHQEH GRQH µZHOO HQRXJK¶ 0RUH WKDQ WKLV ZLWK LQFUHDVHG LQWHQWLRQDOLW\ DQG
reflection, not only can we do this better, we can encourage others in improving their 
practices:  engagement contributes to a virtuous circle.  The corollary also holds:  that 
E\IDLOLQJWRDWWHPSWWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶WKRVHZKRDUHVNLOOHGLQWKHFRQGXFWRI
practical rationality are depriving others of the chance of encountering and learning 
from them:  to withdraw is to contribute to a vicious circle. 
 As Stout notes38, drawing on MacIntyre, at the heart of most such groupings 
and networks are social practices which inter alia uphold internal goods of intrinsic 
excellence over external goods such as status, power and wealth, though some have 
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far narrower scope and far less depth than a fully-fledged community of tradition.  
Broad concepts of internal and external goods and some apprehension of the tensions 
between them are pervasive across society (as Stout argues39), even among those who 
are less well trained in social practices or the pursuit of rational moral living.  This, I 
shall argue, in rather fuller detail than Stout supplies, is what provides both possibility 
and justification for members of communities of tradition to engage in debate (which 
Stout terms µVWHUHRVFRSLF VRFLDO FULWLFLVP¶40) that draws attention to the competition 
between internal and external goods in the pursuit of social practices ± particularly as 
these become institutionalised and so susceptible to the demands of instrumentalist 
criteria ± and promotes internal goods.   
 In the conduct of this, Stout contends that there may be (as is the case, he 
VD\V LQ WKH 86 D µILUVW PRUDO ODQJXDJH¶ that is rooted within these groupings and 
QHWZRUNV DQG WKHLU VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV  ,W LV µYDULHG DQG VXSSOH¶ EXW LW LV PRUH WKDQ
merely a pidgin or creole, and is, or certainly has the potential to be, sufficiently rich 
and coherent to sustain moral discourse.41  Such is the variedness that elsewhere he 
speaks of many moral languages, and acknowledges the difficulties of resolving 
differences between them, yet asserts that disagreement between such moral languages 
even on the concept of the common good or telos does not necessarily render 
impossible debate between their speakers.  One can therefore attempt to broaden 
stereoscopic social criticism beyond particular contexts towards more general 
application.  The means by which best to further the flourishing of µDJRRGKXPDQOLIH¶ 
is, says Stout, through acknowledging such pluralist discourse between these moral 
languages as a tradition in itself, and promoting its best practice.42  
 In the light of this, I consider how Christians might exploit such opportunities, 
ZKHUHYHUWKH\DUHDIIRUGHG$WWHPSWLQJµWRJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ is to maximise our 
communication of our own perspectives and practices:  it is only in making this 
DWWHPSW WKDWZH ILQG RXW ZKHUH ZH FDQQRW µJR IXUWKHU¶ DQG VR VKRXOG ORRN WR RWKHU
strategies (which are considered in subsequent chapters); and, furthermore, through 
doing so we also maximise our potential to promote and encourage open honest debate 
which supports internal over external goods, and the virtuous following of the social 
practices in which they are embedded.  To fail to engage is to fail in our obligations to 
share and realise to the fullest that part of human flourishing that is promoted through 
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pursuit of internal goods of excellence, and undermined by the dominance of external 
goods and instrumentalist pressures ± it is to be complicit with these negative 
tendencies, which (and here Stout concurs) MacIntyre rightly identifies as being all 
too influential within contemporary society, particularly in its institutional 
expressions. 
 *LYHQWKDWE\6WRXW¶VDFFRXQWZHDUHRSHUDWLQJLQDFRQWH[WZKHUHWKHµYDULHG
DQG VXSSOH¶ VKDUHG PRUDO ODQJXDJH LV OLNHO\ to be considerably less fully formed or 
coherent than the moral language honed within our own Anglican community, what 
sort of discourse should we employ?  I aim to demonstrate that our engagement should 
be primarily conducted using our own language-in-use ± WKRXJKZHPD\DVVLVWRWKHUV¶
FRPSUHKHQVLRQ DW WLPHV WKURXJK µELOLQJXDOO\¶ HPSOR\LQJ WKH ZLGHU HYHQ LI PRUH
primitive, moral language(s) rooted in the social practices of our society.  Through 
doing this, we not only promote their ability to use and develop µWKLFNHU¶ moral 
languages, we also assist them in developing their own latent skills in bilingualism, 
which are at the heart of effective democratic pluralist debate.  Through giving our 
own reasons, on our own terms, for promoting excellence, contextualising them within 
our concepts of telos and human flourishing, we can with intentionality both explain 
and model our own practices, in the expectation that this is the best means for others 
to learn from our praxis.  For, as MacIntyre has set out in describing the functioning of 
practical rationality, this is fundamentally the same means we use (within our 
traditions) for training younger members of our community in what it means to live, 
and to know how to live, rationally and virtuously and well.  Ultimately, it is this 
which we want to communicate to others.   
 In practice, I contend, this means that Christians should not be hesitant in 
employing Christian language and Christian reasoning, contextualised within our own 
consistent Christian lifestyle and practices.  It is this which will most persuasively 
FRPPXQLFDWHRXUµDGHTXDWHPRUDOLW\¶ WR WKRVHRWKHUVZKRKDYHVRPHXQGHUVWDQGing, 
even if not fully-fledged, of communities in tradition, and best educate their ability to 
have some degree of bilingualism with us.  Such a process would equally apply not 
only to those who wish to understand us, or whom (for example) we wish to persuade 
of our perspective when it comes to lobbying on social justice questions, but also to 
those who wished to join our community. 
 The conclusion of chapter 5 (illustrated with examples drawn from British and 
South African Anglicanism) is thus that, for reasons based in MacIntyre's own 
descriptions of how communities of tradition operate and may engage in substantive 
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discussion, we should be optimistic that even those with only very thin experiences of 
tradition, social practice and internal goods of excellence, and who do not want to join 
our community, may nonetheless often potentially be brought into some level of 
fluency in our language-in-use (including greater understanding of the praxis of a 
community of tradition).  In practice, this will include a far greater proportion of 
Western society than MacIntyre allows in his caricature of liberalism.  And while it is 
WKH FDVH WKDW QRQH RI WKLV PD\ EH GRQH µSHUIHFWO\¶ LW VHHPV LW FDQ EH GRQH µZHOO
HQRXJK¶0RUHWKDQWKLVZLWKLQFUHDVHGLQWHQWLRQDOLW\DQGUeflection, not only can we, 
as Anglican Christians, engage in dialogue more effectively, we can also encourage 
others in improving their social practices and moral discourse, and so contribute to the 
sustaining of democratic debate ± wherever it has a toe-hold ± as an effective tradition.  
Here too, engagement contributes to a virtuous circle.  The corollary also holds:  that 
E\IDLOLQJWRDWWHPSWWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶WKRVHZKRDUHVNLOOHGLQWKHFRQGXFWRI
practical rationality are depriving others of the chance of encountering and learning 
from them, and weakening democratic practices.  To withdraw is to contribute to this 
vicious circle. 
Back to Basics 
 Though I argue, with Stout, for rather greater optimism than MacIntyre 
generally allows over the possibilities for substantial moral discourse within pluralist 
societies, it may nonetheless be the case that our attempts to go on and go further fail.  
We may find ourselves in contexts where moral language is too fragmented or 
incoherent to be functional, where sharing of interests falls far short of social 
practices, where external goods and instrumentalism overshadow internal goods, and 
where much of what MacIntyre decries within modern liberal systems does indeed 
hold sway.   
 In chapter 6 I consider how MacIntyre himself , for all that he asserts that 
those who belong to no tradition-bearing community cannot with any integrity tackle 
questions of how we should live, being deprived of any ability to comprehend the 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHµSUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\¶that is only internal to traditions,43 does not leave 
us resourceless in our attempt to promote effective debate around moral and ethical 
questions in such situations.  For in his occasional writings, he develops his arguments 
in directions that might come as a surprise to those reading only his major volumes.  
He argues that practical reasoning ultimately turns on questions of the means for 
achieving a good human life, and reaching an impasse here should direct us instead to 
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what he terms µWKHRUHWLFDO HQTXLU\¶44  This, in contrast, is focussed on ends, namely 
our telosDQGZKDWPLJKWDFWXDOO\FRQVWLWXWHDµJRRGKXPDQ OLIH¶ +HSURSRVHV WKDW
$TXLQDV¶ SULPDU\ SUHFHSWV RI natural law offer two avenues for conscious 
engagement.   
Firstly, MacIntyre insists, wiWK$TXLQDVWKDWDOOµSODLQSHUVRQV¶RQWKHEDVLVRI
natural law, inferentially known to all, possess the capacity to judge their rulers and 
call them to account on matters of justice and how this reflects the pursuit of the 
common good.  Therefore, it is always possible to engage around questions of the 
common good in whatever circumstances we find ourselves (for the primary precepts 
are always experienced through instantiation within a particular context).  In practice, 
I contend, asking whether life might be better than it is here and now will rarely elicit 
WKHDQVZHUµQR¶DQGtherefore from this we can go on to explore what we mean by a 
better life, why it matters, how we can understand and pursue it, and how we 
instantiate it in our lives.     
  Yet to embark seriously on debating what it means for human beings to 
IORXULVK VD\V 0DF,QW\UH UHTXLUHV DJUHHPHQW RQ D FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK WKLV µWKHRUHWLFDO
HQTXLU\¶FDQEHSURSHUO\FRQGXFWHG7KLVWKHVHFRQGDSSOLFDWLRQRI$TXLQDV¶SULPDU\
precepts of natural law, directs us towards shared commitments that include truth-
seeking and readiness to learn; honesty and transparency; setting aside ulterior 
motives (including external goods and instrumentalist goals); keeping promises; and 
mutual assurances of physical safety and respect on every level.  MacIntyre gives the 
example of academic discourse as evidence of how the primary precepts are in 
practice widely upheld in this way, here being presupposed non-inferentially by those 
who would generally have no truck with Aquinas RU 0DF,QW\UH¶V VLWLQJ RI PRUDO
reasoning within communities of tradition.   
  This is not to say that debate upon this basis will be straightforward or easily 
yield constructive results.  Often the reverse will be true.  Nonetheless, I suggest, 
Anglicans desirous of public engagement can find here tangible possibilities for 
making a positive contribution.  In particular, I see MacIntyre's analysis as guiding not 
just the content of our engagement, but also encouraging us intentionally to work to 
shape the arenas of public debate in this direction.  Through this two-pronged 
approach, tackling both the essence of human flourishing and how it is we debate it, 
we can address basic aspects of statehood ± and the specific statehood of the nation to 
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which we belong ± with its purposes, responsibilities and obligations, and how it can 
best provide a secure context in which we, its citizens, in an atmosphere geared to 
promoting trust and honesty between ourselves, one another, and government, can 
pursue internal goods of excellence directed towards our flourishing as human beings, 
through theoretical enquiry, and in actual practice.  
 However, the question then arises as to the nature of our discourse in 
discussing our common good and the appropriate shape of public space we inhabit (as 
the context both for this debate and for pursuing the common good we discuss), for 
0DF,QW\UH ULJKWO\ DUJXHV WKDW WKHUH LV QR µQHXWUDO¶ RU µREMHFWLYH¶ SXEOLF ODQJXDJH DV
some forms of modernism or liberalism may assert.  Though I find no hint of this 
within his writings (unlike previously explored areas where the resources for going 
forward are already present even if not fully recognised or spelt out), I argue that in 
fact MacIntyre implicitly allows for a very different shared language for public 
GLVFRXUVH)RULIWKHSULPDU\SUHFHSWVDUHLQIHUHQWLDOO\DYDLODEOHWRDOOµSODLQSHUVRQV¶
WKHQ WKHVHµSODLQSHUVRQV¶PXVWKDYHVRPHPHDQVRI H[SUHVVLQJ WKHP (YHQ LI RQO\
barely more than in embryonic form, there must, I argue, be a language-in-use for the 
articulation of the primary precepts of natural law within each specific context ± a 
µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ ZKLFK ILQGV HYHU IXOOHU H[SUHVVLRQ LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH
SDUWLFXODU µFRPPXQDO SUDFWLFHV¶ VWUXFWXUHG DURXQG VXFK SUHFHSWV ZLthin our own 
circumstances.   
And such fuller expression must be one of our goals of engagement ± for, as 
0DF,QW\UH DUJXHV WKH FDSDFLW\ RI µSODLQ SHUVRQV¶ WR KROG WKRVH ZKR UXOH WKHP WR
account on matters of ethical justice and the common good, is best educated by and 
expressed through participation in communal practices structured in accordance with 
natural law.  Therefore, the participation of those who have such skills ± as we believe 
we do within the community of tradition that is Anglicanism ± should in part be 
directed to promoting these communal practices.  Indeed, such discourse, when in 
promotion of the instantiation of the first principles of natural law within communal 
practices appropriate to our context, may be seen as an internal good ± an argument 
Stout makes, though without explicating its justification.  Thus democratic debate of 
this sort can be considered as at least a latent social practice embedded in tradition, or 
tradition-in-the-making, as we pursue ever more fully realised communal practices:  
RQH LQZKLFKZHFDQDW OHDVWVRPHWLPHVµJRRQDQGJRIRUZDUG¶DGHTXDWHO\ HQRXJK
even from this very basic starting point.  
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 As before, optimistic engagement can always potentially strengthen what is 
present, and promote a continuing dynamic from the less adequate to the more 
adequate in public debate around moral questions, rooted in concepts of human 
flourishing.  Conversely, pessimistic disengagement contributes to the undermining of 
the possibilities and practices of discourse, weakening demoFUDWLFGHEDWH¶VDELOLW\ WR
function as a tradition, and leaving internal goods unsupported in the contest over 
external goods.   
 Therefore, within our own public life, those of us who are skilled in the 
practices of a community of tradition should see it as an obligation to use these skills 
for promoting the development of communal practices, and of a communal language 
for expressing them, so that the primary precepts of natural law can indeed thus be 
increasingly instantiated ± even though this is likely to be a less fully realised 
community of tradition than full-blown Thomistic Aristotelianism, and we are likely 
to find ourselves in long, uphill, struggles.  Those of us who belong to such a 
community will also work to draw our fellow-citizens into increasing bilingualism, 
and from there, into substantive moral debate, and thence, we would hope, to convince 
them through our moral reasoning and praxis. 
Shaping Democracy and Political Debate 
 In my final chapter I explore what such an approach to engagement within 
secular pluralist democracy might look like in practice.  I begin by considering 
1LFKRODV:ROWHUVWRUII¶VDUJXPHQWVLQDQ exchange of essays with Robert Audi on the 
place of faith commitments in public discourse, which consider the forms of liberal 
democracy and secularism within the United States.45  In acknowledging, in different 
ways, the particular ambiguities and shortcomings of ostensible neutrality in relation 
to religions, the two come close to agreeing an approach that reflects some of the 
Thomistic elements of the previous chapter.  I then address the examples offered by 
the former and current Anglican Archbishops of Cape Town, in their engagement in 
public debate within the context provided by the post-apartheid South African 
Constitution.  This presents a very particularly shaped secular context, providing for 
LQGLYLGXDOV WR HQJDJH LQ SXEOLF GHEDWH RQ WKH EDVLV RI HDFK RQH¶V SDUWLFXODULWLHV RI
culture, language, race, faith and so forth.  The two archbishops have addressed both 
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the instantiation of these constitutional provisions in the shaping and conduct of public 
discourse, as well as tackling more specific moral questions.   
 The nature of the public space within the United Kingdom is rather more 
contested than in South Africa.  I reflect in some detail on the extent to which Rowan 
Williams is to a considerable degree justified by the arguments outlined above, in his 
SURPRWLRQ RI D SDUWLFXODU IRUP RI FRPPXQDO SUDFWLFH ZKLFK KH WHUPV µSURFHGXUDO
VHFXODULVP¶± a mode of democratic tradition that best allows for the debate, and the 
pursuit, of the common good by all.46  This, importantly, allows for the flourishing of 
faith-based communities of tradition, in that it upholds a neutrality between religions 
and also those of no religion, while expecting each to participate and contend on the 
basis of their own perspectives.  This is precisely the sort of context appropriate for 
every level of encounter considered above, from dialogue between highly 
commensurate communities of tradition through to fundamental theoretical enquiry 
about the common good.  (Thus not only does this provide the best context for the 
human flourishing of the wider society of which we are a part, it also is the best 
context within which communities of tradition, including the faith communities, can 
flourish, and can express our own commitments within the public space on our own 
WHUPV:LOOLDPVFRQWUDVWVWKLVZLWKµSURJUDPPDWLFVHFXODULVP¶ZKLFKGHQLHVDSODFH
for religion in the public space, and gives rein to an instrumentalism of bureaucratic 
efficiency that promotes external goods over internal.  In his engagement he seeks to 
move the United Kingdom away from programmatic secularism and closer to 
procedural secularism (which is the form which South African public debate more 
nearly follows).   
Furthermore, I argue that, in the way he addresses secular audiences, Williams 
appears to be developing an appropriate language-in-use for this community of 
tradition that is procedural secularism within the British context.  He repeatedly 
returns to questions of the meaning and pursuit of human flourishing and the common 
good, and to the importance of a context of mutuality in trust, patience, acknowledged 
vulnerability and limitation, truthfulness and so forth ± the marks of Aquinas¶SULPDU\
SUHFHSWV +HDOVRSRLQWV H[SOLFLWO\DQG LPSOLFLWO\ WRYDULRXVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VEXLOGLQJ
blocks of the practices of communities of tradition, using both (procedural) secular 
DQG &KULVWLDQ YRFDEXODU\ DQG H[SOLFDWLRQ DW WLPHV DOPRVW LQ µSDUDOOHO WUDQVODWLRQ¶
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Thus he offers his hearers possibilities for increasing understanding of the practices of 
the best communities of tradition, as well as for increasing bilingualism with 
Christianity.  He also speaks to educate and encourage those within the Church to 
have confidence to engage with the secular world in the same way, as we would 
expect to happen within a community of tradition. 
In considering these examples, I aim to draw out various guidelines for 
helping Christians initiate and develop a faith-based engagement within secularised 
political contexts.  Though this may be easier in many ways for those, like these 
Archbishops, who speak formally for the Church, Christian individuals are equally 
justified in speaking from their own perspective, and theQµELOLQJXDOO\¶ZLWKDSXEOLF
language so constituted, in every public arena, to promote the common good.  All this 
LVQRW WRVD\ WKDW µJRLQJRQDQGJRLQJIXUWKHU¶ZLOOEHHDVLO\DQGVZLIWO\SRVVLEOH RU
even possible at all, in every context.  But, I propose, the theoretical possibility always 
exists and we should be open to the possibility of exploring it (subject to 
considerations on other grounds, for example political or tactical).  To fail to engage 
always risks missing valuable opportunities for expanding on, and improving on, 
rational moral discourse.  For Anglicans, at least, this is good enough reason to 
continue persevering in our attempts by various means to engage from a faith 
SHUVSHFWLYH LQ PRUDO GHEDWH µLQ VHDVRQDQGRXW RI VHDVRQ¶ 7LP), in line with 
longstanding tradition. 
 I also aim to indicate how this approach is not only true of the political arenas 
of public life.  As previously noted, MacIntyre himself has argued that liberal 
secularised academics understand the primary precepts of natural law as the necessary 
basis for rational enquiry, even if they do not recognise them as such.  In the arena of 
academic philosophy, in his own writing, is he not promoting a communal practice of 
debate that instantiates these precepts, and to some degree developing and employing 
an appropriate common language as he does so?  Though it will doubtless often be a 
tough grind, there is no reason why a similar approach cannot be attempted in other 
forums, even where MacIntyre's worst caricatures of liberalism largely hold sway.  As 
I illustrate, there are many openings in contemporary discourse which offer potentially 
fruitful starting points for engagement.  Nor should we assume lost ground can never 
be reclaimed and is not worth fighting for.  In this way, we can have confidence in 
:LOOLDP7HPSOH¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW µQLQH-WHQWKV¶ RI WKH H[HUFLVHRI&KULVWLDQ LQIOXHQFH
would be via individuals, as citizens, through their work ± though in this thesis, with 
its primary focus on the institutional engagement of the church within the public 
space, it is not possible to spell out in great detail what this might mean.  
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Final Reflections   
 0DF,QW\UH¶V HIIRUWV WR DQVZHU WKH TXHVWLRQ RI µ+RZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH"¶
suitably applied and, where necessary, developed thus provide twofold resources for 
the Anglican Bishops.  They are helped both to enunciate with integrity contextual 
expressions of the Christian faith, and to promote effective debate within the world on 
moral concerns (of social justice broadly interpreted), ZLWKLQWRGD\¶VZRUOGLQFOXGLQJ
within increasingly pluralist and secularised societies such as that in the United 
Kingdom.   
At every level of encounter, those of us who have the competences of trained 
members of communities of tradition can choose, and choose how far, to share them 
with others.  Whether debating moral questions with members of another, fully 
commensurable, community, or furthering bilingualism, or upholding social practices 
and internal goods of excellence, or promoting communal practices and language 
rooted in the primary precepts of natural law, there is everything to be gained by 
DOZD\VDWWHPSWLQJWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶:HFDQQHYHUWHOOKRZIDUIXUWKHUZHFDQ
go unless we try.  And where we find we can go no further, we can always drop a gear 
and attempt another strategy, with the ultimate fall-back of the far from insubstantial 
question of the common good, and the context in which this can best be debated ± 
ZLWK SURPRWLRQ RI D FRQWH[WXDOO\ DSSURSULDWH IRUP RI WKH VRUW RI µSURFHGXral 
VHFXODULVP¶WKDWLVHVSRXVHGE\5RZDQ:LOOLDPV 
 2SWLPLVWLFFRPPLWPHQWDOZD\VWRDWWHPSWWRµJRRQDQGJRIRUZDUG¶RSHQWR
DOO RSSRUWXQLWLHV LV D W\SLFDOO\ $QJOLFDQ DSSURDFK LQJUDLQHG LQ WKH µLQGHFHQW
LQFOXVLYLW\¶WKDWKDVLWVURRWV LQWKH(QJOLVK Parish system, that seeks to draw anyone 
and everyone closer to the centre that is Christ, through the centripetal impulse of 
VDOYDWLRQ$OZD\VDQGHYHU\ZKHUHZHKDYHJRRGHQRXJKWRROVIRUµGRLQJ*RG¶ZLWK
integrity and confidence. 
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Chapter 2 - Starting with MacIntyre 
7KLVFKDSWHULQWURGXFHV$ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UHDQGKLVDUJXPHQWIRUDµSUDFWLFDO
UDWLRQDOLW\¶ IRXQGZLWKLQDµFRPPXQLW\RI WUDGLWLRQ¶ DVGHYHORSHG IURPD7KRPLVWLF
Aristotelian perspective.  In line with MacIntyre's insistence that our understanding 
cannot be separated from our personal circumstances, I begin by offering some 
background on the man himself.  I then describe and discuss the comprehensive 
account he offers of socially embedded individuals pursuing the just and moral life, 
through a tradition which aims at the flourishing of both individuals and their 
community, and how it is that they hone their praxis through taking account of their 
context and intentionally engaging with other perspectives.  I end with some 
reflections on how his approach can be appropriated by the Anglican Bishops in their 
first objective, of reflecting on their faith and how it should be lived within 
contemporary contexts, and, by way of illustration, outline in broad terms how it 
might offer resources for tackling the  current disagreements around issues of human 
sexuality. 
MacIntyre is often described as a moral philosopher.  His most famous work 
is After Virtue, which publicly launched the project on the moral life that has 
dominated his work from 1977.  However, from Whose Justice?  Which Rationality? 
onwards, it has been from the perspective of rationality rather more than the virtues 
that he has more often than not provided detailed accounts of and justifications for his 
proposals.  So much is this the casHWKDW-HIIUH\6WRXWZDVOHGWRH[FODLPµ,DPKHUH
speaking of a language of the virtues, while Hauerwas and MacIntyre, the official 
champions of virtue ethics, are theorizing about the formal requirements of rational 
GLVFRXUVH¶47  It is primarily from this perspective of rationality ± a rationality that 
encompasses moral integrity ± that I shall consider his work, and the extent to which it 
provides the sort of non-relative, non-SHUVSHFWLYDO µDGHTXDWH PRUDOLW\¶ WR ZKLFK KH
aspires.  Such a standpoint is of particular help to the Anglican Bishops, since one of 
the primary criticisms they have to overcome in embarking on moral and ethical 
dialogue in the public square is that faith perspectives lack rational justification.   
Various aspects of MacIntyre's account have been considered problematic, 
and in considering these, I shall highlight for later attention those which relate to the 
ability of a community of tradition to engage with those of other traditions or none.  I 
shall also focus on aspects around which I shall subsequently aim to construct my 
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reinterpretation and development of his work, including particularly his concepts of 
µVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶DQGµLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOJRRGVRIH[FHOOHQFH¶ 
Introducing MacIntyre 
Alasdair MacIntyre was born in Scotland in 1929 and grew up in a remote 
Gaelic speaking fishing and farming community.  After studying at London and 
Oxford, pursuing classics before turning to philosophy, he taught at Manchester, 
Leeds, Essex and Oxford universities.  He moved to the United States in 1969, and 
held positions at Brandeis University, Boston University, Wellesley College, Notre 
Dame, Vanderbilt University and Yale.  He returned to Notre Dame from 1989 to 
1994, and from 1995 until his retirement in 1997 was the Arts & Sciences Professor of 
Philosophy at Duke University, where he is now Professor Emeritus.  From 2000 he 
has been the Rev. John A. O'Brien Senior Research Professor at Notre Dame, and in 
2010 took up a post as Senior Research Fellow at London Metropolitan University 
where he is pursuing a project on the implications of his work in ethics for political 
theory and practice.48   
Looking back on his career, MacIntyre divides his life as an academic 
philosopher into three periods: 
The twenty-two years from 1949, when I became a graduate student of 
philosophy at Manchester University, until 1971 were a period, as it now 
appears retrospectively, of heterogeneous, badly organized, sometimes 
fragmented and often frustrating and messy enquiries, from which nonetheless 
I learned a lot. 
 )URP  « XQWLO  ZDV DQ LQWHULP SHULRG RI VRPHWLPHV SDLQIXOO\
self-critical reflection, strengthened by coming to critical terms with such very 
different perspectives on moral philosophy as those afforded by Davidson in 
one way and by Gadamer in quite another.  
 From 1977 onwards I have been engaged in a single project to which After 
Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rational Versions of 
Moral Enquiry DUHFHQWUDO«49 
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During the first phase, he gave up the Catholicism of his upbringing and for much of 
this time was a Marxist with Trotskyite leanings, though by the late 60s he had 
µEHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLVLOOXVLRQHG ZLWK DOO IRUPV RI 0DU[LVW SROLWLFV¶50  He also 
began turning his back on analytic philosophy, and rejected the then widely held view 
of moral concepts as timeless, increasingly arguing they must be studied historically 
and contextually.51 
 During the second period, MacIntyre faced more fully what he had already 
come to realise, saying subsequently, with the benefit of hindsight:   
I set out to rethink the problems of ethics in a systematic way, taking seriously for 
the first time the possibility that the history both of modern morality and of modern 
moral philosophy could only be written adequately from an Aristotelian point of 
YLHZ«,>DOVR@KDGRFFDVLRQWRUHWKLQNWKHSUREOHPVRIUDWLRQDOWKHRORJ\WDNLQJ
seriously the possibility that the history of modern secularisation can only be 
written adequately from the standpoint of Christian theism, rather than vice versa.52 
Though some of the implications of this line of reasoning only became clear some 
time after writing After Virtue, by 1977 (when he began to write the final draft of the 
book) he had, he says, grasped the outline and general content of the project which has 
occupied him since.53  He also returned to the Roman Catholicism of his upbringing 
ZKLFK LV D YHU\ SDUWLFXODU µFRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ¶ DFFRUGLQJ WR KLV GHILQLWLRQ
though he has since noted that his philosophical embrace of Thomistic Aristotelianism 
came first.54 
After Virtue focussed mainly on Aristotle, and ended with a call for a new St 
Benedict.  However, thereafter it was to Aquinas that he turned, and it has since 
remained MacIntyre's position that a Thomistic Aristotelianism most fully succeeds in 
meeting the demands of his practical rationality.  In his Preface to a 2006 collection of 
essays written between 1985 and 1999, he notes that these postdate his recognition 
WKDW KLV µSKLORVRSKLFDO FRQYLFWLRQV KDG EHFRPH WKRVH RI D 7KRPLVWLF $ULVWRWHOLDQ
                                                             
50
 .HOYLQ.QLJKWµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQHG.QLJKWMacIntyre Reader, 2. 
51
 John +RUWRQDQG6XVDQ0HQGXVµ$ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UHAfter Virtue DQG$IWHU¶LQAfter 
MacIntyre:  Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, eds John Horton and 
Susan Mendus (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 2. 
52
 0DF,QW\UHµ,QWHUYLHZIRU&RJLWR¶7KLVLQWHUYLHZZDVJLYHQLQ 
53
 0DF,QW\UHµ,QWHUYLHZIRU&RJLWR¶ 
54
 Another interview from 1991:  Alasdair 0DF,QW\UHµ$Q,QWHUYLHZZLWK*LRYDQQL%RUUDGRUL¶
in Knight, MacIntyre Reader, 266. 
33 
 
somethLQJ WKDW KDG LQLWLDOO\ VXUSULVHG¶ KLP  55  He describes the collection as 
FRQVLVWHQWO\JLYLQJµH[SUHVVLRQWRWKDW7KRPLVWLF$ULVWRWHOLDQVWDQGSRLQWDOEHLWLQYHU\
GLIIHUHQW ZD\V¶ DQG WKRXJK VHYHUDO HVVD\V UHIHU QHLWKHU WR $ULVWRWOH QRU $TXLQDV
µQRQHWKHOHss, each arrives at conclusions that are supportive of, derived from, or 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKD7KRPLVWLF$ULVWRWHOLDQVWDQFH¶ 
Most of his work since the mid-1980s is concerned with broadening and 
deepening the scope of what he addresses, or with presenting clarifications and more 
balanced expressions of earlier work, in response to questions and criticisms.  In the 
2007 Prologue to the third edition of After Virtue KHZURWH µ, KDYHDV\HW IRXQGQR
reason for abandoning the major contentions of After Virtue « DOWKRXJK , KDYH
learned a great deal and supplemented and revised my theses and arguments 
DFFRUGLQJO\¶56 
MacIntyre and Christian Faith 
In the previous chapter, I said I expected to find a broad compatibility 
between MacIntyre's Thomistic-Aristotelian approach and contemporary mainstream 
Anglicanism, especially of the Anglo-Saxon world, and I noted the appropriation of 
his work by a broader span of explicitly Christian writers from mainstream protestant 
traditions such as Hauerwas and Wolterstorff.  The question arises of MacIntyre's own 
personal faith, and his representation of faith within his writings.   
 As already noted, his philosophical embrace of Thomistic Aristotelianism, 
somewhat prior to 1985, preceded his return to the Roman Catholic Church.  
Interviewed in 1991, he said:   
What I now believe philosophically I came to believe very largely before I 
acknowledged the truth of Catholic Christianity.  And I was only able to 
respond to the teachings of the Church because I had already learned from 
Aristotelianism both the nature of the mistakes involved in my earlier 
rejection of Christianity, and how to understand aright the relation of the 
philosophical argument to theological enquiry.  My philosophy, like that of 
many other Aristotelians, is theistic; but it is as secular in its content as any 
other.57 
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In 1994 he made it clear that, in his development of Thomistic Aristotelianism, he was 
ZULWLQJDV DSKLORVRSKHU DQG µQHLWKHU DELVKRS QRU D WKHRORJLDQ¶58  This led David 
Fergusson to comment, perhaps wiWK VRPH IUXVWUDWLRQ µ:KDW « RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V
understanding of God?  Here he is uncharacteristically reticent.¶59  Yet MacIntyre's 
1986 article µWhich God ought we to Obey and Why"¶60 had focused on the identity 
DQG WKH QDWXUH RI *RG  +HUH KH ZURWH RI µWKH *Rd of the Jewish and Christian 
VFULSWXUHV¶DVKHFRQVLGHUHG divine will, and characteristics such as goodness, justice, 
mercy and faithfulness (not least in covenant relationships); and of our need to move 
XOWLPDWHO\WRµIULHQGVKLSZLWK*RG¶DVXQGHUVWRRGby Aquinas.  He concluded that our 
FDSDFLW\WRµMXGJH¶*RGDQGWKHDSSURSULDWHUHODWLRQVKLSZHRXJKWWRKDYHZLWKKLPµLV
LWVHOIDZRUNRI*RG¶7KDWVDLGWKHDUJXPHQWVRIDSKLORVRSKHUSUHGRPLQDWHDQGWKLV
is also the case, for example, in his later engagement with two papal encyclicals by 
John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor and Fides et Ratio.61   
 Despite this criticism, Fergusson saw considerable potential within 
0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK IRU D PRUH IXOO\ H[SOLFDWHG &KULVWLDQ VWDQFH QRWLQJ WKDW
µ0DF,QW\UH¶V position has the capacity to recognise that dependence upon divine 
revelation for Christian perception is not incompatible with a certain style of 
DSRORJHWLFDUJXPHQW¶SRLQWLQJ WRRQHSDUWLFXODUVHQWHQFHIURP Three Rival Versions 
WKDWµLVUHPDUNDEOHIRULWVWKHRORJLFDOSRWHQWLDO¶62 namely:  
The self-revelation of God in the events of the scriptural history and the 
gratuitous grace through which that revelation is appropriated, so that an 
individual can come to recognize his or her place within that same history, 
enable such individuals to recognize also that prudence, justice, 
temperateness, and courage are genuine virtues, that the apprehension of the 
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natural law was not illusory, and that the moral life up to this point requires to 
be corrected in order to be completed but not displaced.63 
For while MacIntyre may have comparatively little to say about the nature of God, this 
quote is illustrative of the increasing attention he pays to the components of the life of 
faith, and the interrelationship of faith with reason.  Fergusson notes with approval his 
FDSDFLW\ WRDGGUHVVµQRWLRQVRI WKHZLOOVLQDQGJUDFHZKLFKDUH ODFNLQJ LQFODVVLFDO
SKLORVRSK\ EXW ZKLFK DUH DGHTXDWH WR RXU PRUDO SUHGLFDPHQW¶  *LYHQ 0DF,QW\UH
V
insistence not merely on believing correctly, but in living morally, we should probably 
not be surprised by his insistence on faithful philosophical enquiry finding expression 
LQ OLYHV µWUDQVIRUPHG E\ JUDFH¶ DQG µJURZWK LQ KROLQHVV¶ DV KH VHHV H[HPSOLILHG E\
Thomas Aquinas and others.64    
 For MacIntyre, the proper task of philosophy ± the task he sees Aquinas 
pursuing, and to which he commits himself ± is to help human reason move from less 
to more adequate understandings of truth, where truth, grounded in Thomistic realism, 
ultimately means to see things as they truly are, when viewed from the standpoint of 
God, and to think of them as God thinks of them.65  Such enquiry, MacIntyre insists, 
must be in the service not only of those who are philosophers and philosophers of 
UHOLJLRQEXWDOVRRIµSODLQSHUVRQV¶DVWKH\WRRVHHNWRDQVZHUTXHVWLRQVRIKRZWKH\
should live.66  Faith is certainly far more than cognitive acceptance of certain 
theological assertions, in the company of those who give similar allegiance.  It is the 
lived life of discipleship, encompassing prayer, worship, and experiential encounter of 
*RG¶VVHOI-revelation.   
 This is spelt out most explicitly in MacIntyre's recent writings, notably his 
2009 volume, God, Philosophy, Universities, his Selective History of the Catholic 
Philosophical Tradition (as it is subtitled) in which he unequivocally identifies 
himself as a Catholic philosopher within the Thomist tradition.67  Here he concludes 
that the task of the Catholic philosopher relates to both truths about the existence and 
nature of *RGDQGDERXWZKDWLWLVWREHKXPDQZLWKµDFUXFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
metaphysic and ethics.  For it is only insofar as we understand the universe, including 
ourselves, as dependent upon God for our existence that we are also able to understand 
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ourselves as directed toward God and what our directedness toward God requires of us 
E\ZD\RIFDULQJ¶68  Thus relationship with the God of compassion is expected to bear 
fruit in compassionate relational living. 
 Of course, this still leaves major, central, theological areas, including 
christology and soteriology, largely untouched.  But concerns around these, and other 
question-marks raised by MacIntyre's account of faith, I shall address as they arise. 
MacIntyre's Method 
0DF,QW\UH¶V GHYHORSPHQW DQG UHILQHPHQt of his own position through 
engagement with alternative viewpoints ± whether of his choosing, or in response to 
questions and criticism ± is both characteristic of his own approach, and at the heart of 
the processes he advocates.  From After Virtue onwards, as I shall describe, 
MacIntyre's general mode of working is to consider possible alternative perspectives 
on morality and practical rationality, while at each point aiming to show the 
superiority of his own viewpoint through employing the very means which he is 
developing and honing over and against the alternatives.  In other words, he is doing 
himself what he directs others to do, should they wish to be justified in their praxis.69   
Therefore I shall proceed on the general basis that there is considerable 
internal consistency, in both content and methodology, running through MacIntyre's 
work.  In doing so, I concur with Nancey Murphy, who argues that there is significant 
coherence between the processes that MacIntyre espouses and follows, between the 
Thomistic and Aristotelian sources on which he draws and his own formulations, and 
between his earlier and later writings.70  (I shall comment further on this relationship 
between sources in due course, given its significance for MacIntyre's claims to rational 
justification, and to himself belong to a tradition that evolves in faithfulness to its own 
origins).  Where it appears that there has been some shift in his position, it is my 
contention that, on closer inspection, far more often than not the fundamental 
assertions remain little changed, but have rather been viewed from different 
perspectives, or developed in relation to some specific external stimulus.  
Furthermore, particular expressions of his views may also seem to vary because of the 
different contexts to which they are addressed.  This is a necessary consequence of the 
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situatedness which he espouses, and another example of his own practice illustrating 
the approach he offers. 
MacIntyre's methodology is marked by a comprehensive and dense 
interconnectedness, in which the entire breadth of human apprehension and 
experience, and their interrelationships, are grist to his mill; and his evaluative 
processes themselves are also continually open to evaluation and revision.  There is no 
single linear path to be followed.  And while this allows him to launch his writing, or 
tackle alternative viewpoints, from whatever starting point he considers most 
pertinent, it means that any description inevitably leaves many questions initially 
begging, until a sufficiently comprehensive account has been given to begin provide a 
structure in which the various pieces can come together.  This is particularly the case 
within this chapter as it sets out the fundamentals of MacIntyre's work, while 
subsequent chapters take forward various of the loose ends that are encountered here. 
MacIntyre's Project  
 MacIntyre embarked on his major project in moral philosophy convinced that 
contemporary Western ethical discourse had become fragmentary and incoherent, 
RIIHULQJQRµUDWLRQDOO\and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and act 
± and in terms of which to evaluate various rival and heterogeneous moral schemes 
ZKLFK FRPSHWH IRU RXU DOOHJLDQFH¶71  Insistent that moral philosophy cannot be an 
abstract intellectual pursuit, WR EH FRQGXFWHG µ2[IRUG DUPFKDLU VW\OH¶72 but must 
DGGUHVVSUDFWLFDOTXHVWLRQVRI KRZ ZH VKRXOG OLYH D µJRRG¶ OLIH KH VHWRXW WR ILQGD
solution through the rediscovery and appropriate reapplication of historic traditions, 
with first Aristotle and subsequently Thomas Aquinas coming to dominate.   
In the solution he has subsequently developed, MacIntyre contends that we 
cannot with integrity engage the practical questions that life raises without upholding 
rationality ± though he draws this concept of rationality very broadly indeed.  He 
asserts that such a practical rationality is fundamental to our ability to know how we 
ourselves, as we actually are, and in the specificity of the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves, can aspire with integrity to live morally and virtuously, and can defend 
our position to others.  We will thus persistently find morality and rationality 
inextricably linked in his work, and his repeated assertion that one cannot be rational 
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without also being moral, just, and virtuous.73  I shall indicate why and how this is so, 
while, as noted, taking rationality as my primary point of departure.   
The Case for Rationality 
7RFRQVLGHU WKH H[WHQW WRZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶VSURMHFW LV UDWLRQDO ILUVW UHTXLUHV
some conception of what rationality is, against which to evaluate it.  Yet there is no 
universal agreement on what this might be, in relation to human living.74  MacIntyre 
DUJXHV WKDW µQHXWUDO¶ µREMHFWLYH¶DQGµLPSHUVRQDO¶DUJXPHQWVDUHQRWKLQJRI WKHVRUW
when it comes to practical rationality, dismissing them, along with foundationalism 
and analytical philosophy in general, in his persistent critique of the broad swathe of 
ZKDW KH YDULRXVO\ WHUPV µWKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW 3URMHFW¶ µ(QF\ORSDHGLD¶ DQG OLEHUDO
theory as he portrays it.75  While there are problems with his accounts of these, 
including in his historic narrative and his tendency to set up caricatures as straw men 
to be sweepingly demolished (which will be considered in further detail in Chapter 4), 
there is nonetheless a general wider acceptance that there is no context-neutral 
standard or process for judging the rationality of human belief and behaviour.    
What is at stake here is highlighted by the two somewhat tongue in cheek 
definitions offered by Stout (who on this subject aligns himself fairly closely with 
MacIntyre):  
µRational, objectiveHWFJRRGVHQVH:KDW\RX¶UHDLPLQJIRUZKHQ\RXWDNH
all relevant considerations into account and exhibit all the appropriate 
LQWHOOHFWXDOYLUWXHVZKDW\RXEHFRPHLI\RX¶UHOXFN\DIWHUEHLng exposed to 
exemplars of excellence and acquiring extensive experience in a truth-oriented 
social practice. 
Rational, objectiveHWF EDGVHQVH :KDW\RX¶UHDLPLQJ IRUZKHQ\RX WU\
per impossibile, to have your judgment determined purely by the matter under 
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consideration and by reason itself without relying on anything inherited, 
assumed, or habitual.¶76   
However, if we accept that it is indeed the case that context-neutral means are not 
available to us, the question then arises of whether all attempts at asserting rationality 
µLQ WKH JRRG VHQVH¶ DUH LQHYLWDEO\ RSHQ WR WKH FKDUJHV RI UHODWLYLVP DQG  RU
perspectivism.   
MacIntyre argues that this is not necessarily the case.  We are not, he says, left 
resourceless in the face of the claims that we are then left with nothing more than what 
KH WHUPV µHPRWLYLVP¶ ± µWKH GRFWULQH WKDW DOO HYDOXDWLYH MXGJPHQWV DQG PRUH
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, 
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
FKDUDFWHU¶77  An alternative label which he gives to arguments that this is in fact the 
case LV µ*HQHDORJ\¶ D WHUP ZKLFK KH GUDZV IURP 1LHW]VFKH¶V Zur Genealogie der 
MoralVHHLQJKLVDQDO\VLVRIWKHµZLOOWRSRZHU¶DVDSDUWLFXODUO\SHUVXDVLve, if flawed, 
account of such emotivism.78  Instead, MacIntyre argues that it is possible to develop 
criteria and processes for judging first, whether the rationality asserted within a 
particular context meets its own standards, and, secondly, whether it can meet the 
challenge of alternative formulations.  Where both are achieved, rationality may 
justifiably be claimed. 
 It is this he aims to demonstrate through his writings, particularly in the 
narrative unfolding of his arguments through his three major volumes.  He develops 
and hones his own case in dialogue with others of differing views, with the intention at 
each point of overcoming their objections through the very means which he himself 
espouses and elucidates ± that is, demonstrating on his own terms, he contends, not 
only his own internal rationality, but the superiority of his own position against the 
challenges other perspectives raise.79 
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 AV, Chapters 1-3; and, contra Nietzsche specifically, TRV, Chapter 7.  As with the 
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 µ«HYHU\VWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUSKLORVRSKLFDOHQTXLU\LVLQLWLDOO\TXHVWLRQ-EHJJLQJ«WKHUHLVQR
presuppositionless point of departure.  What vindicates this or that starting point is what comes 
next, the enquiry thus generated and its outcome in the achievement of some particular kind of 
understanding of some subject matter.  One mark of adequate understanding is that it explains 
retrospectively why enquiry well-designed to achieve it could have begun from some types of 
starting point but not from others.  It is only by arriving at an adequate formulation of the 
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 This, in a nutshell, is MacIntyre's account of how we should understand 
rationality.  In describing and assessing this, I shall follow a similar course, in 
expounding in some detail MacIntyre's arguments and how he has developed them, 
and considering whether his account is rational by his own standards, including in its 
ability to meet the criticisms he has encountered along the way.  In the course of doing 
this I shall discuss questions of relativism and perspectivism, as well as circularity ± 
and, if such circularity is unavoidable, the further issue of whether it might be 
considered virtuous or inescapably vicious 
The Human Dimension 
Being Human ± the Agents of Rationality 
MacIntyre insists that we take the common sense view that to be rational in 
relation to questions of human living requires us to take account of what it is to be 
human beings, the agents of this rationality, as we really are.  It should be equally 
clear, though academic philosophy has not always grasped this, that to assume we are 
other ± for example that we operate entirely as detached adult rational minds ± is to 
build on flawed assumptions, unless we are considering certain narrowly 
circumscribed fields of, for example, mathematics.  The rationality we seek for 
ourselves cannot be abstract or impersonal, since it relates to actual lives pursued by 
real human beings, who are specific individuals in various relationships with others, 
living in particular contexts; and it finds expression within the realities of these 
SHRSOH¶VOLYHV 
 From this starting point, MacIntyre began, in After Virtue, to consider what it 
means to be human from within the FRQWH[WRI$ULVWRWOH¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\7KRXJK
UHSXGLDWLQJPXFKRI$ULVWRWOH¶VELRORJ\KHDIILUPHGWKHFDSDFLW\IRUPRUDOUHDVRQLQJ
H[SUHVVHGE\LQGLYLGXDOKXPDQSHUVRQVZLWKLQVRFLHW\DQGUHWDLQHG$ULVWRWOH¶VWHUPLQ
GHVFULELQJ XV DV SRVVHVVLQJ D µPHWDSK\VLFDO ELRORJ\¶80  He subsequently came to 
realise that his repudiation, though not wholly wrong, had gone too far.  Though he 
KDGEHHQULJKWWRUHMHFWIRUH[DPSOH$ULVWRWOH¶VVROHIRFXVRQWKHPHQRIWKHpolis,81 
he had failed to see other consequenceVRIRXUDQLPDOQDWXUHVXFKDVVRFLHW\¶VQHHGWR
care for the very young and others unable to look after themselves, including the very 
                                                                                                                                                                 
relevant set of first principles in the end that our initial assumptions and procedures are 
vindicDWHG¶DRA, 77-8. 
80
 AV, 148. 
81
 For example, in The Politics, Book I, 5 ± see Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of 
Athens, edited by Stephen Everson (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16-7. 
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old and disabled.  His later writings, particularly in Dependent Rational Animals, have 
insisted that our answer to the fundamental question of µ+RZWKHQVKDOOZHOLYH¶PXVW
be capable of addressing all such issues in practice, within our actual circumstances.  
+DYLQJUHDOLVHGKHZDVµLQHUURULQVXSSRVLQJDQHWKLFVLQGHSHQGHQWRIELRORJ\WREH
SRVVLEOH¶82 he has since argued explicitly for an unavoidable interrelationship between 
ethics and how humanity is biologically constituted.  Recognition that this was both 
more fundamental to his approach and wider in its implications than he had initially 
recognised, has broadened WKHVFRSHRIKLVµSURMHFW¶DQGVRVWUHQJWKHQHGKLVFODLPWR
be addressing his fundamental question comprehensively. 
 (It is worth noting that, as he readily acknowledges, he revised and refined his 
opinions through engaging with criticism of his appropriatLRQ RI $ULVWRWOH¶V ZRUN
This illustrates his own application of the methods he advocates for honing our 
understanding.)   
Human Flourishing ± the Goal of Rationality 
Having begun by considering what it is to be human, MacIntyre turns to the 
question of what it means for humans to flourish.  The concept of human flourishing, 
ZKLFK KH UHWDLQHG DQG GHYHORSHG IURP $ULVWRWOH E\ ZD\ RI $TXLQDV¶ VXSHULRU
understanding, entails the flourishing of the individual within flourishing society.  
This, says MacIntyre, is the goal, the telos, to which our practical rationality and 
morality are properly directed, for flourishing is the consequence of answering well, in 
ZRUGVDQGLQDFWLRQWKHIXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQRIµ+RZWKHQVKDOOZH OLYH"¶$QGZH
can only know what it is to flourish, if we know what it is to be fully, properly, 
human.    
While, in After Virtue, MacIntyre explored this question primarily through 
sociological and practice-based examples, in later writings his broadened view of the 
biological nature of humanity led him to take into greater account such aspects as 
dependence and vulnerability, as noted above.  Thus our aspirations to rationality 
require us to have a teleology that is both sociological and practice based, on the one 
hand, and biological on the other.83   
Just as our understanding of what it is to be human must be open to revision 
and improvement, so too, by way of automatic corollary, should we expect our 
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 See DRA, x, 77, and also Jean 3RUWHUµ7UDGLWLRQLQWKH5HFHQW:RUNRI$ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UH¶
in Murphy, Alasdair MacIntyre, 43.  
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 J. L. A. *DUFLDµ0RGHUQ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0RUDO3KLORVRSK\DQG0DF,QW\UHDQ&ULWLTXH¶LQ0XUSK\
Alasdair MacIntyre, 103, citing AV, 196 and DRA, x. 
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apprehension of what human flourishing entails to evolve.  Our reflective processes, 
intentionally undertaken, should always be leading us towards more adequate 
comprehension of our telos.  And the fuller our understanding of our telos, the 
potentially greater our rationality in pursuit of it ± though other factors also come into 
play.   
That this is always a ZRUNLQSURJUHVVLVHYLGHQWLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDGPLVVLRQWKDW
he himself has not done all that is required to give a full account of what it means to 
be human.  Having begun to address not only our mental and relational capacities, but 
also our physical, emotional and spiritual dimensions, writing in 1999 he saw scope 
IRU IXUWKHUZRUN WKDW LQFOXGHG µKXPDQ LGHQWLW\ SHUFHSWLRQ«DQG WKHSV\FKRORJLFDO
UHDOLW\RIFHUWDLQW\SHVRIFKDUDFWHUWUDLW¶.84  Gradually tackling these topics and others 
in his subsequent writings, he has, for example, subsequently developed his reflections 
RQHPERGLPHQWLQDQHVVD\SXEOLVKHGLQµ:KDWLVDKXPDQERG\"¶85   
Flourishing and Failing 
 However, MacIntyre brings further caveats to the assumption that to be 
rational requires a right conception of what it is to be human and to flourish; and that 
we should continually be aiming to understand both, to the best of our ability, as part 
of our pursuit of practical rationality.  For, he insists, no matter how hard we try, our 
understanding of humanity and of our telos will inevitably be constrained and 
distorted in various ways.   
First, we are inevitably limited by our finitude and therefore also by the 
particular perspectives delivered by our specific experiences.  We are thus limited by 
our own context and by our own circumstances, and how we choose to live within 
them.  The consequence of this is that whatever we claim to know, we must recognise 
as inevitably being a partial and provisional understanding; and we must always be 
striving for a fuller, more accurate apprehension.  Nonetheless, he argues that it is 
SRVVLEOH IRU LQGLYLGXDOV DQG FRPPXQLWLHV WR KDYHDJRRG HQRXJKXQGHUVWDQGLQJ µIRU
QRZ¶WKDWFDQEHMXGJHGVXIILFLHQWO\UDWLRQDOIRUWKDWWLPHDQGSODFH± a critical point to 
which I shall return shortly.   
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 Alasdair MacIntyrHµ:KDWLVDKXPDQERG\"¶LQThe Tasks of Philosophy.   Another 
example of his broad explorations of what it is to be human is contained his essay on the brain 
and aspects of neuroscience in Alasdair 0DF,QW\UHµ:KDW&DQ0RUDO3KLORVRSKHUV/HDUQIURm 
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Yet even beyond these constraints of finitude, MacIntyre insists that human 
knowledge is additionally and inevitably bedevilled by cultural, intellectual, and moral 
blinkeredness, errors and distortions of understanding.  Human failings compound the 
consequences of finitude.86  To be human means to be imperfect, individually and 
corporately.  We are born into flawed and imperfect communities; as we grow up we 
learn in flawed and imperfect ways how we should live, from flawed and imperfect 
teachers, who themselves were flawed and imperfect learners and who now live 
flawed and imperfect lives:  the whole undertaking is inevitably flawed and imperfect, 
and this must be taken into account at every stage of our reflection on rationality.87  To 
fail to try to identify these shortcomings and to overcome them, or to accede in what 
we know to be deficient or defective, is certainly to render us irrational.  Yet even 
here, vitally, with all our flaws and imperfections, it is nonetheless possible in practice 
WRGRµZHOOHQRXJKIRUQRZ¶ 
For all that he writes as philosopher not bishop, MacIntyre is nonetheless not 
shy of referring to aspects of the human propensity to error in terms of sinfulness.88  
He does so, reminding us that in the Summa Aquinas characterises sin as 
µWUDQVJUHVVLRQV RI UHDVRQ¶89  Yet such failure of reasoning entails far more than 
making cognitive mistakes, and is rooted in infringement of the precepts of natural 
law, an important context to which I shall return later in this thesis.90  ,Q0DF,QW\UH¶V
Thomistic Aristotelianism, a failure to reason well is inexorably linked to a failure to 
live well the moral and virtuous life. 
This human capacity to error and self-deception (including wilful self-
deception) demands the virtue of humility from us, says MacIntyre, which we must 
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Theologiae Ia-IIae 73, 2 ± see St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol 25, edited by John 
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 In WJWR, 177-82 MacIntyre gives a broader account of AquinaV¶YLHZRIPRUDOIDLOXUH
EHJLQQLQJZLWKQDWXUDOODZWKDWLQFOXGHVRXUFDSDFLW\IRUµWKHFROOXVLRQRIRXUZLOOVLQPRUDO
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0DF,QW\UHMXGJHV$TXLQDV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRUDOIDLOXUHLVFUXFLDOO\GLIIHUHQW
and superior, to that of Aristotle, in its capacity to address both sin and grace.  MacIntyre 
draws here extensively on the Summa Theologiae Ia-,,DHµ7KHQDWXUDOODZ¶DQG
µ+XPDQODZFRQVLGHUHGLQLWVHOI¶6HH6DLQW7KRPDV$TXLQDVPolitical Writings,edited and 
translated by R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 114-136.  Here 
$TXLQDVEXLOGVRQYDULRXVHOHPHQWVRI$ULVWRWOH¶VWKRXJKWZLWKTXRWDWLRQVDQGDOOXVLRQVGUDZQ
widely from Metaphysics, Nichomachean Ethics, Politics, Physics, Rhetoric), finessing their 
interpretation through bringing them into dialogue with Augustine, Basil the Great, Isodore of 
Seville, John of Damascus and others, to developing his own conclusions.    
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show not only in respect of our own understanding, but in relation to the views of 
RWKHUVZLWKZKRPZHHQJDJHµ3UDFWLFDOUHDVRQUHTXLUHVRIXVZKHQZHGRHQFRXQWHU
systematic and apparently irresolvable disagreement with our own point of view, that 
we do not assume that we are in the right, that it is our claims that we are well 
grounded and our account of human nature that is right.  We have initially no grounds 
for judging.  It may be thDWZHDUH LQ WKH ULJKWRU LW PD\EH WKDWQHLWKHURIXV LV¶91  
Later in the chapter I return to the question of what it means for Christians to have 
VXFKµKXPLOLW\¶LQWKHIDFH of counter-claims that challenge belief.    
A Social Practice for Everyone 
It would be wrong to imagine that the rational moral life which MacIntyre 
proposes is confined to those who possess particular expertise in moral philosophy and 
LQWKHDUWRIµUHDVRQLQJ¶± akin to the Aristotelian view, excluding women and all but 
WKHµKLJKHVW¶ classes of men, which MacIntyre rejects.  Rather, one aspect of human 
reality on which he insists is that the rationality he espouses is essentially for 
HYHU\RQH7KXVKHVSHDNVRI µSODLQSHUVRQV¶DQGFRQFXUVZLWKWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQYLHZ
WKDW µWKH TXHVWLRns posed by the moral philosophers and the questions posed by the 
SODLQSHUVRQDUHWRDQLPSRUWDQWGHJUHHLQVHSDUDEOH¶92 not least since it is for everyone 
WR UHIOHFW RQ WKH FRPPRQ JRRG QDPHO\ µZKDW LV WKH JRRG IRU PH DQG ZKDW LV WKH
JRRGIRUXV"¶ 
Of course, some individuals may be more conscious of the theoretical aspects 
of such enquiry than others, but, apart from those who have some particular disability, 
it is potentially open to all young people to be brought up to learn to reason (including 
about ZKDWLVµJRRGIRUXV¶WROHDUQWRUHIOHFWRQRXUUHDVRQVDQGWR OHDUQWRUHIOHFW
on our process of reasoning.93  This is not a matter for abstract study, requiring 
particular levels of intelligence.  Rather, children learn gradually how to become 
practical reasoners as they develop emotional and mental capabilities, and are brought 
up and trained in what he terms the social practices of communities.94  Though 
untutored humanity needs training and instruction in practical reasoning, in order to 
become what it might be, the great majority of us potentially can to a considerable 
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degree be inculcated into good habits of continuing learning and refining our beliefs 
and judgments, and the ways we form them and live them out.   
Ultimately, the pursuit of the rational moral life is essentially a social practice, 
D FUDIW ZKLFK ZH IROORZ LQGHHG µSUDFWLVH¶ DV WKH IRXQGDWLRQDO PRGH RI RXU OLYHV
This is one of the fundamental building blocks of MacIntyre's approach, to which we 
shall return throughout this thesis.  It is one on which others, such as Stout and 
Wolterstorff, have found particularly valuable to build, as I shall discuss later.  
Further, it is on the basis of this inherent capacity to acquire facility in 
practical reasoning that MacIntyre insists, folloZLQJ$TXLQDVWKDWDOOµSODLQSHUVRQV¶
have the capacity to judge their rulers on matters of justice and the pursuit of the 
common good.95  This also is an essential point when it comes to developing a praxis 
for Christian engagement in moral discourse within pluralist liberal democracy ± 
given that democracy, properly exercised, should be open to the full participation of 
all ± as will become clearer later in this thesis. 
+XPDQLW\¶VTelos 
 MacIntyre, in describing human endeavours and reasoning as directed towards 
RXU µIORXULVKLQJ¶ FRQFHSWXDOLVHV WKLV FRQFHSW RI ZKDW KXPDQLW\ µPLJKW EH¶ LQ
teleological terms.  This teleology, as we shall see, is a significant component of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSURMHFW  one of the anchors of rationality, and one of the two essential 
markers (together with shared evaluative processes and standards) of communities of 
tradition which are key in determining the possibilities for substantive debate around 
moral questions within and between communities.96 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre begins by deriving his conception of telos and its 
FHQWUDOLW\ZLWKLQDµPRUDOVFKHPH¶IURP$ULVWRWOH¶VNichomachean Ethics, drawing on 
WKHFRQWHQWLRQWKDWµ7KHV\OORJLVPVRISUDFWLFHKDYHDVWKHLUILUVWSUHPLVH³6LQFHWKH
end (telos) and the best is of such and suFK D NLQG «´.¶97  As MacIntyre asserts 
throughout his subsequent writings, our ability to answer the fundamental question of 
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µ:KDW LV RXU JRRG¶ LV GHSHQGHQW XSRQ RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW ZH KDYH DQ HQG DV
conceptualised to a considerable degree in Aristotelian terms.98  
 7KDW VDLG 0DF,QW\UH DOVR PDNHV LPSRUWDQW GLVWLQFWLRQV EHWZHHQ $ULVWRWOH¶V
teleology and that which he develops, in rejecting not only his metaphysical biology 
and social setting restricting the good life to the elite men of the polis (as mentioned 
above), but also, inter alia, his view that conflict only arises from flawed character.99  
MacIntyre argues these aspects can be set aside without damage to the fundamental 
Aristotelian approach,100 and it is then to Aquinas that he turns for a superior and more 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHDFFRXQWRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVKXPDQLW\¶Vtelos, and the unified nature of 
the good, within which a variety of heterogeneous goods can be accommodated.101 
 0DF,QW\UH¶V YLHZ WKDW ZH FDQ UHMHFW DVSHFWV RI $ULVWRWOH¶V µPHWDSK\VLFDO
ELRORJ\¶ while preserving his teleology102 is shared by others.  Charles Taylor concurs 
WKDW µWKH QRWLRQ WKDW KXPDQ EHLQJV KDYH VRPHWKLQJ OLNH D WHORV TXD KXPDQ FDQ EH
separated from the thesis that everything in nature belongs to some class or other, 
whose behaviouU LV H[SODLQHGE\VRPH)RUPRU,GHD¶103 and Haldane affirms that in 
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GRLQJVRZHUHWDLQµWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQLGHDWKDWDQHWKLFVRIYLUWXHUHTXLUHVDWHleology of 
DJHQF\¶.104 
 MacIntyre insists that his teleology, framed in relation to the human person, 
should be conceived of in terms of the flourishing of human beings within a 
flourishing society that takes due account (as already noted) of the biological 
dimension of humanity, including aspects such as dependence and vulnerability.105  
(Similarly, though this is less central to the question before us, it is worth noting that 
in later work on the nature of embodiment, he argues that to answer adequately the 
TXHVWLRQ µ:KDW LV D KXPDQ ERG\"¶ UHTXLUHV QRW RQO\ VFLHQWLILF UHVSRQVH EXW DOVR
philosophical reflection on the ends to which we are directed, within which 
teleological perspectives, beginning with, but going beyond, Aristotle, are 
unavoidable.106)   
6XFK µVHOHFWLYH UHWULHYDO¶ E\ 0DF,QW\UH PLJKW OHDG XV WR DVN WR ZKDW H[WHQW
MacIntyre is being true to Aristotle, a topic which he himself addresses, through 
considering various alternative interpretations of Aristotle, in the two essays derived 
IURP WKH %ULDQ 2¶1HLO 0HPRULDO /HFWXUHV IRU 107  His self-understanding on 
this point is evident in the conclusions which he draws in these essays.  In the first, in 
considering what of Aristotle continues to survive while certain Renaissance 
interpretations did not, MacIntyre concludes we are left with the challenge that:  
on the one hand Aristotle insisted that the kind of knowledge of our ultimate 
end that is provided by his philosophical enquiries is of practical relevance 
and importance.  It is no piece of mere theory.  On the other hand he made it 
equally plain that what directs us towards that end in our particular practical 
judgments and actions is not theoretical reflection, but a kind of habituation.108   
7XUQLQJWRWKLVTXHVWLRQLQWKHVHFRQGHVVD\KHDUJXHVWKDWµUHIOHFWLRQRQWKHXOWLPDWH
JRRG IRU KXPDQ EHLQJV PXVW SOD\ VRPH SDUW LQ >SUDFWLFDO@ UHDVRQLQJ¶109 about what 
should be done here and now, and that this is true both in public and private reasoning, 
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QRWOHDVWJLYHQµWKHXQLW\RIWKHPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOOLIH¶110  This relationship between 
practical reasoning (rather than theoretical enquiry) and ultimate end runs through 
0DF,QW\UH¶VZULWLQJ 
 $VNLQJµZKLFK$ULVWRWOH"¶JLYHVULVHWRDVHFRQGTXHVWLRQJLYHQ0DF,QW\UH¶V
widespread assertion that it is Thomistic Aristotelianism which best instantiates the 
approach for which he argues.  Though in essays such as the two just considered 
MacIntyre may appear to focus exclusively on Aristotle without reference to any 
subsequent Thomistic interpretation of his works, MacIntyre is at pains to point out 
that this is not his intention.  As previously noted, in the Preface to his 2006 collection 
of selected essays, Ethics and Politics, he wrote that these were written after he had 
µUHFRJQL]HG WKDW >KLV@ SKLORVRSKLFDO FRQYLFWLRQV KDG EHFRPH WKRVH RI D 7KRPLVWLF
$ULVWRWHOLDQ«¶ DQG DVVHUWHG WKDW µDOO RI WKHP JLYH H[SUHVVLRQ WR WKat Thomistic 
$ULVWRWHOLDQVWDQGSRLQW¶DQGµHDFKDUULYHVDWFRQFOXVLRQVWKDWDUHVXSSRUWLYHRIGHULYHG
IURPRUDWOHDVWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKD7KRPLVWLF$ULVWRWHOLDQVWDQFH¶$FNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW
µWKHJUHDWPDMRULW\RISDVWDQGSUHVHQW$ULVWRWHOLDQVDUHRIFRXUVHQRW7KRPLVWV¶DQG
WKDWµVRPH7KRPLVWVKDYHEHHQDQ[LRXVWRVWUHVVWKHH[WHQWRIZKDWWKH\WDNHWREHWKH
SKLORVRSKLFDODVZHOODVWKHWKHRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ$TXLQDVDQG$ULVWRWOH¶KH
QRQHWKHOHVVXQGHUOLQHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPDNLQJµWKHFDVHIRr understanding Aristotle 
LQDZD\WKDWDFFRUGVZLWK$TXLQDV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶.111  The implication is that when 
ZHUHDG0DF,QW\UH¶V$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPZHVKRXOGDVVXPHZHDUHUHDGLQJ0DF,QW\UH¶V
Thomistic Aristotelianism ± and there is no reason to assume this is not the case in 
writings outside this collection.  Specifically on the particular subject of telos, 
sometimes he links the two explicitly, for example writing of the consequences of the 
UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH µWHOHRORJLFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI HQTXLU\ LQ WKH PRGe of Aristotle and 
$TXLQDV¶112 while sometimes he refers only to one or the other.113  
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 One consequence arising from MacIntyre's all-embracing human teleology is 
the role our ultimate end plays as a touchstone for our discerning the more proximate 
objectives, WKH µJRRGV¶ RQ ZKLFK PRUH EHORZ ZH SXUVXH ERWK LQGLYLGXDOO\ DQG
corporately, in the business of life.  MacIntyre draws on Aristotelian principles in 
arguing for a teleologically-anchored rationality that enables us to make judgments 
and rankings between the various goods that it is open to us to pursue at any point of 
our lives, and to do so within RXUSXUVXLWRIWKHEURDGHUTXHVWLRQµ:KDWLVWKHRYHUDOO
JRRGIRUP\OLIH"¶7KLVLVLWVHOILQIRUPHGE\DVNLQJµ:KDWLVWKHRYHUDOOJRRGRIWKH
community of wKLFK,DPDPHPEHU"¶ZKLFKLQWXUQLVVKDSHGE\WKHZD\ZHDQVZHU
WKHXOWLPDWHTXHVWLRQRIµ:KDWLVWKHXOWLPDWHJRRGIRUKXPDQEHLQJV"¶114  
 While this raises questions about the autonomy of individuals within wider 
society, on which I shall comment shortly, in this way MacIntyre's teleology (coupled 
with narrative unity, on which see below) provides a directedness against which we 
FDQZHLJKWKHVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUHRIOLIHWKURXJKSUHVXSSRVLQJµDJRRGWKDWWUDQVFHQGV
WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶ DV -HDQ 3RUWHU QRWHV115  If there were no (justifiable) goal in mind, 
choices would become arbitrarily based in the desires of the moment, or become 
guided by considerations of money, power, status, and other forms of what MacIntyre 
would see as unjustifiable self-gratification.  Certainly, they would not be directed 
towards what is virtuous, moral and excellent.  Well-formed teleology enables us to 
evaluate the relative merit of various courses of action, either our own or those of 
others, and also both speculatively and retrospecWLYHO\µ:LOOWKLVGLGWKLVEHVWIXUWKHU
P\RXUDELOLW\WRGLUHFWOLIHWRZDUGVLWVSURSHUHQG"¶DQGWKXVVWUHQJWKHQVWKHFODLP
to be pursuing rational justification.116  
 0RUH WKDQ WKLVEHFDXVH0DF,QW\UH¶V WHOHRORJ\ LV URRWHG LQKLVFRQFHSWLRQRI
humaQIORXULVKLQJDQGUHIOHFWVDµULJKWQHVV¶LQGRLQJZKDWIXUWKHUVVXFKIORXULVKLQJLW
adds a moral dimension to practical reasoning.  Abstract rational enquiry whose end is 
the truth is not merely a matter of logical argument.  This too MacIntyre develops 
IURP $ULVWRWOH DUJXLQJ WKDW KLV VWDWHPHQW WKDW µ7UXWK LV WKH telos of theoretical 
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HQTXLU\¶117 (a view which Aquinas followed118) should be understood as applying to 
the truthfulness of what we view as goods, rules, virtues, duties and so forth, and thus 
to the truthfulness of how we direct our lives ± WKDWLVWKHµULJKWQHVV¶RIKRZZHOLYH
7KXV0DF,QW\UHFODLPVWRRYHUFRPHWKHFRQFHSWXDOGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQµLV¶DQGµRXJKW¶
*DUFLD FRQFXUV WKDW KH KDV VXFFHVVIXOO\ EULGJHG WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µIDFWV¶ DQG
µYDOXHV¶VLQFHµZHHYDOXDWHDPRUDOVXEMHFWDQGKHUDFWLRQVDOZD\VLQUHODWLRQWRVRPH
kind of telos ± the kind of fact that incorporates the basis of certain value 
MXGJHPHQWV¶119   
Teleology, Rationality, and Moral Debate 
 Teleology thus conceptualised helps provide the directedness and 
purposefulness that is necessary for the pursuit of truthfulness at all levels of rational 
enquiry.120  MacIntyre goes on to argue that not only is an appropriate telos intrinsic to 
the rational justification of the life well-lived,121 but that since this telos is grounded in 
a context of Thomistic realism, it contributes to the avoidance of the pitfalls of 
relativism and perspectivism.122  For, though our understanding of our telos is open to 
continuing revision and refinement, and this entails a certain kind of ineliminable 
circularity,123 it is nonetheless one of the elements that ensures that the practice of 
dialectical enquiry is virtuous rather than vicious.124  Our telos finds expression in the 
common good towards which we must always strive.  
When it comes to wider ethical debate, agreement on the common good is 
DOVRLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VYLHZDPDUNHUIRURXUSRWHQWLDODELOLW\IUXLWIXOO\WRSXUVXHPRUDO
questions with those of other communities.  He argues that considerable agreement on 
a telos, on a shared conception of the common good, is necessary if those who differ 
are to move beyond mere communication to genuine moral exchange with the 
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possibility of evaluating options and so reaching agreement on specific moral 
questions, or even on the overall superiority of one or other competing traditions, or 
some enhanced version of one or other thereof.  It also follows that where there is no 
agreement on the common good, or even on the central place of such a concept in 
moral debate, he is (or, at least, initially appears) extremely sceptical about the 
possibility of engaging in substantial rational enquiry. 
 However, some, like Stout, believe that MacIntyre sets, or appears to set, the 
bar of agreement too high, and in fact when viewed more carefully the case is 
different.125  In chapter 4, ZKHQZHLJKLQJ0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHVLVDJDLQVW6WRXW¶VFULWLFLVPV
and alternative proposals, I shall devote further attention to the question of an 
appropriate telos, the goods in which it finds expression, and its position in public 
debate on moral questions.126 
 A failure in rationality in relation to teleology arises from our failure to pursue 
the most truthful conception available to us, and has analogous consequences to a 
failure in rightly conceiving human identity and flourishing.  To have an unjustifiable 
telos is to have a flaw at the centre of our processes of practical reasoning and rational 
HQTXLU\  0DF,QW\UH QRWHV WKDW µ$TXLQDV FDWDORJXHV DW OHDVW D GR]HQ GLIIHUHQW
conceptions of what the human good is, each of which would dictate a different way 
RIOLIHHOHYHQRIZKLFKKHWDNHVWREHLQHUURU¶127  Here MacIntyre acknowledges that 
he shares with Aquinas the belief that it is only in lives directed towards a perfected 
relationship to God that our true telos is found.128   
The immediate implication of this might appear to be that Christians can only 
engage in substantive moral debate with other Christians, or perhaps other theists who 
have a largely similar conception of God.  A further implication that Christians might 
be tempted to draw would be that the rational processes of those who have no 
appropriate telos are likely to be so flawed as to make genuine debate impossible.  
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Further, they might even be rendered incapable of comprehending the Christian 
tradition in all its fullness and so of grasping its superiority ± requiring instead the 
radical conversion of the Holy Spirit, untouched by logical argument.  On this basis, 
Christians should not waste energy on engaging on moral and ethical questions in the 
public arena.  I shall explain why I consider these conclusions flawed in chapters 6 
and 7. 
There are also implications for our claim to a rationality that avoids criticisms 
RISHUVSHFWLYLVP )RU HYHQ LI0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSURDFKKDVDQ LQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\ What 
allows us to claim rationality, is it the case that others are DEOHWRVD\µ<HV,VHH\RX
are rational from your own perspective, and that is fine, but I do not accept your telos 
DQGVR WKHUHVW RIZKDW\RXVD\KDVQRIXQGDPHQWDOEHDULQJRQP\OLIH¶"  This is in 
part a matter of meeting the relativist challenge, on which more below.   
Individuals and Community 
   As already touched upon, for MacIntyre the social dimension of life is another 
vital aspect of our humanity.  This means considerably more than that we are 
inevitably situated within some specific social context.  Rationality, MacIntyre argues, 
is found only within traditions, which are constituted within communities.129  
Individuals are trained into skilled performance of the rational practices of the 
tradition by more experienced members of the community.  This necessitates 
wholehearted allegiance to the community, its beliefs and values, and its practices, 
owning them for oneself and sharing in the common life of the community, as 
appropriate tRRQH¶VDELOLWLHV7KHRQJRLQJSURFHVVRISUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\LVKRQHGE\
dialectic between members of the community, as well as with others.130 
 The converse is also true.  An individual cannot pursue practical rationality 
alone, for one cannot be part oIDWUDGLWLRQRUDSUDFWLFHRQRQH¶VRZQ± and without 
the resources of rational enquiry provided by a tradition or practice, one cannot even 
begin to reflect on what it is to be rational.131  One needs sustained commitment to the 
tradition, the community, the training, the practices, and the continuing dialectic, not 
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least as without them we are particularly prone to self-deception.  As MacIntyre says, 
µ:HVKRXOGDOZD\VWKHUHIRUHWUHDWVROLWDU\GHOLEHUDWLRQDVSHFXOLDUO\OLDEOHWRHUURU¶132 
 That said, rationality requires a community which is directed towards true 
human flourishing, reflecting an adequate conception of the right human end, and 
which upholds the highest standards of enquiry in pursuit of this.  As MacIntyre says, 
µRWKHUV DUH VRPHWLPHV D VRXUFH not of deliberative correction but of deliberative 
corruption.  We need from others, as they need from us, the exercise of the virtues of 
objectivity.  Lacking that objectivity, others may reinforce our phantasies and 
FROODERUDWH LQ RXU PLVFRQFHSWLRQV¶133  Such objectivity is of course not that of the 
µFRQWH[W-QHXWUDO¶VWDQGSRLQWRI WKHµ(QOLJKWHQPHQW3URMHFW¶ZKLFK0DF,QW\UHUHMHFWV
but rather in the deliberate commitment continually to work at identifying and 
stepping back from cultural, intellectual and moral errors and distortions, not least 
those arising from the pursuit of pleasure, power, status and money ± characterised in 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQFHSWRIµH[WHUQDOJRRGV¶ 
 Though insisting that the community plays a central role in the upholding of 
ratiRQDOPRUDOOLIH0DF,QW\UH LVDGDPDQWWKDWKH LVQRWDµFRPPXQLWDULDQ¶DVWKLVLV
generally understood.134  This he characterises as being defined by its exponents over 
and against liberal theorists, and though he accepts that his description tends to 
overVWDWHPHQWKH FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH WZRSRVLWLRQVDUHµQRWRQO\QRW LQRSSRVLWLRQ WR
HDFKRWKHUEXWQHDWO\FRPSOHPHQWRQHDQRWKHU¶ZLWKFRPPXQLWDULDQLVPµDGLDJQRVLV
RIFHUWDLQZHDNQHVVHVLQOLEHUDOLVPQRWDUHMHFWLRQRILW¶+HWKHUHIRUHUHMHFWVERWKLQ
his pursuit of a better option.135  Stout also sees liberalism and communitarianism, 
certainly as espoused by theorists, as denoting two sides of the same coin to a 
considerable degree.  Though he tends to consider MacIntyre close to the 
communitarian perspective, he too is wanting to postulate an alternative approach to 
engagement with the contemporary political world.136  I consider these issues in 
greater detail in chapter 4.    
MacIntyre insists that rationality for the individual and for the community go 
hand in hand, and such goals are mutually reinforcing rather than in competition.  
Some critics would argue that the goods of the individual and of the community are 
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bound to clash,137 but, while acknowledging that this may happen, MacIntyre still 
asserts that in general, and over time, the greatest good of all will be found in this 
symbiotic relationship.138  This may be somewhat utopian, but we may still conclude it 
is more rational to retain this aspiration than otherwise ± certainly within a community 
of tradition, even if questions then remain over the flourishing of a particular 
community of tradition in relation to the wider community ± which we might take as 
nation or even the entire human family.  Furthermore, as MacIntyre rightly stresses, 
ZKLOHµH[WHUQDOJRRGVDUH«FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\REMHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQ LQZKLFK WKHUH
PXVWEHORVHUVDQGZHOODVZLQQHUV¶LQFRQWUDVWLWLVµFKDUDFWHULVWLF¶RILQWHUQDOJRRGV
that µtheir achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the 
SUDFWLFH¶139  Pursuit of internal goods, and all this entails, can therefore far more 
readily deliver win-win rather than zero-sum outcomes. 
The Substance of Rationality 
+DYLQJ EHJXQ ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW ZH WDNH WKH FRPPRQ VHQVH
view that for human beings to live rationally requires us to take account of what it is to 
be human beings, as we really are, I now consider the form such rationality takes.  
Narrative Unity and Coherence 
Just as MacIntyre wants fully to reflect what human beings actually are like, 
he also wishes to address the totality of life:  for each individual to discover nothing 
OHVV WKDQ WKH QDUUDWLYH XQLW\ RI WKDW SHUVRQ¶V OLIH.140  This, he says, is to be found 
ZLWKLQµDFRKHUHQWDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHIRUPRIVRFLDOO\HVWDEOLVKHGFRRSHUDWLYHKXPDQ
aFWLYLW\¶141  It is conceived against a background account of a social practice, and 
directed towards a moral tradition142 and thus is rooted in a community directed 
towards human flourishing, teleologically conceived.   
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 Stout is concerned that MacIntyre has not made an adequate case for 
HPSOR\LQJQDUUDWLYHDVµWKHSULYLOHJHGPRGHRUXOWLPDWHFRQWH[WRIUDWLRQDOLW\¶143  But 
SHUKDSV GHSLFWLQJ LW DV µWKH¶ SULYLOHJHG PRGH LV SODFLQJ RQ LW D JUHDWHU ZHLJKW WKDQ
MacIntyre asserts (for all his tendency to overstatement).  Others are more 
V\PSDWKHWLF WR KLV XVDJH IRU H[DPSOH 3HWHU -RKQVRQ ZKR DUJXHV WKDW 0DF,QW\UH¶V
approach fosters a strong link between narrative, accountability and the practice of 
democracy.144  Though he admits WKHUHDUHµVHULRXVGLIILFXOWLHV¶LQKHUent in narrative in 
JHQHUDO DV µD VXLWDEOH PRGH IRU YLUWXRXV FRQGXFW RU SROLWLFDO GHFHQF\¶ KH SRLQWV WR
ZD\VWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VVSHFLILFFRQFHSWLRQRIQDUUDWLYHGUDZLQJLQ$ULVWRWOHDGGUHVVHV
these, through its integral relationship with practical wisdom and the virtues. 
To put it in other words, MacIntyre is wanting to argue that the rational life is 
RQHWKDWµPDNHVVHQVH¶DVZHMRXUQH\IURPELUWKWRGHDWK± a journey on which we, like 
the heroes of the past, pursue our goal of discovering and living out tKHµJRRG¶± for 
ourselves and the wider FRPPXQLW\  /LIH LV WR EH XQGHUVWRRG DV µD WHOHRORJLFDOO\
ordered unity, a whole the nature of which and the good of which I have to learn how 
WRGLVFRYHU¶6ROLIHµKDVWKHFRQWLQXLW\DQGXQLW\RIDTXHVWDTXHVWwhose object is to 
discover that truth about my life as a whole which is an indispensable part of the good 
RIWKDWOLIH¶145   
 MacIntyre, again making sweeping reference to Aquinas,146 argues that to be 
truly rational, there must be some overarching coherence and singleness of purpose 
that runs through the whole of life, even though we may to some extent find ourselves 
as members of various overlapping communities (for example through our work or 
leisure activities).  This is in stark contrast to the stance he describes John Rawls as 
holding, which is to argue that this is neither possible nor desirable ± which, for 
MacIntyre, is further evidence of the arbitrariness of the life of both individuals and 
society that is ordered by no more than individual preferences and bargaining, that 
results from living by liberal norms.147  Gary Gutting considers that MacIntyre sets the 
EDU RI UDWLRQDOLW\ IDU KLJKHU WKDQ LV QHFHVVDU\  7KRXJK VWRSSLQJ VKRUW RI 5DZO¶V
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version of liberalism,148 he argues that we can and do live within a number of spheres, 
DOORFDWLQJWLPHDQGHQHUJ\DPRQJWKHPWKURXJKRXURZQµSUDJPDWLVP¶,WLVHQWLUHO\
up to us to decide whether we want any such coherence, and if so, whether to seek it 
IURPD WUDGLWLRQ RU µFRQVWUXFW >RXU@ RZQ GLVWLQFWLYH FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH RYHUDOO JRRG¶
that decision being good enough to require no further justification.  But a conception 
of the good based on no more than our personal choice falls far short of the rationality 
to which MacIntyre aspires.  Gutting says that MacIntyre RIIHUV µQR UHDVRQ IRU
WKLQNLQJ WKDW >KLV DSSURDFK@ LV LQFRKHUHQW RU RWKHUZLVH LQDSSURSULDWH¶ EXW *XWWLQJ¶V 
assertion is undermined by his admission that he approaches the question as a 
µSUDJPDWLFOLEHUDO¶ which leaves his entire stance susceptible to MacInW\UH¶VFULWLFLVPV
of a lack of coherent rationality.149 
 
Excellence in Social Practice ± Internal and External Goods 
Alongside a narrative ordering of human life, MacIntyre, as already noted, 
SRVWXODWHVDµEDFNJURXQGDFFRXQW¶ of a µpractice¶150 as a necessary component of the 
OLIHZHOOOLYHG+HGHILQHVµSUDFWLFH¶DV 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.151 
The narrative continuity of the social practices within a community are what form the 
EDVLVRILWVµWUDGLWLRQ¶7UDLQLQJLQH[FHOOHQFHLQWKHFUDIWRIUHDVRQLQJZHOO± pursing 
practical rationality and rational enquiry ± is itself a social practice, and is essential to 
a comPXQLW\¶VDELOLW\WRVXVWDLQ LWVHOI LQWKHIDFHRILQHYLWDEOHFKDOOHQJHV)URPWKLV
GHULYHV0DF,QW\UH
V XVDJHRI µFRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ¶ DVRQH RI KLV PRVW IUHTXHQW
descriptions of the locus of moral, rational, living.  
In spelling out the details of thLV µVRFLDO SUDFWLFH¶ 0DF,QW\UH GUDZV WKH
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHµLQWHUQDO¶DQGµH[WHUQDO¶UHZDUGVZKLFKH[FHOOHQFHPD\EULQJ
The former are those which result from the pursuit of excellence, the good, high 
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standard, for its own sake.  The latter are those gains which we make as a by-product 
of our ability to achieve excellence, such as the pursuit, for their own sake, of the 
material wellbeing, power, or status of some individual or group (often at the expense 
of others).  A rather simplistic example of this would be if we play the piano well, but 
perform for the sake of adulation rather than the joy of producing beautiful music.  
More fundamentally, MacIntyre's concern is the development of a way of living that 
promotes the internal goods of excellence which bear fruit in virtuous, ethical living 
that furthers human flourishing. 
0DF,QW\UH VWUHVVHV WKDW H[WHUQDO JRRGV DUH JHQXLQH JRRGV DGGLQJ WKDW µQRW
only are they characteristic objects of human desire, whose allocation is what gives 
point to the virtues of justice and of generosity, but no one can despise them altogether 
ZLWKRXWDFHUWDLQK\SRFULV\¶+RZHYHUXQOLNHLQWHUQDOJRRGVWKH\QHLWKHUDULVHIURP
nor are shaped by, the virtues.  Therefore, though it is possible to pursue both (to 
become rich and famous through some excellence), there is always the risk that 
H[WHUQDOJRRGVZLOOFRPHWRGRPLQDWHDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIZKLFKµWKHFRQFHSWRIWKH
virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near total 
HIIDFHPHQW¶152    
 The distinction between internal and external goods of excellence is central in 
MacIntyre's damning critique of contemporary society.  Here, he argues, external 
goods have taken centre stage, and, with them, instrumentalist market mind-sets and 
bureaucratic convenience increasingly dominate.  In contrast, internal values, in which 
virtue rests, are progressively marginalised.   
While I shall return in chapter 4 to the question of how far MacIntyre 
overstates his case, nonetheless, the ability to distinguish between internal and 
external goods is essential to our ability to reason well ± though of course the ability 
then to choose to act in accordance with the internal goods of excellence, rather than 
what are often the more immediately gratifying external goods requires the will to act 
well, in addition to believing well.  As I shall discuss more fully, in chapters 4 and 5, 
while this distinction has an important bearing on the rationality pursued within a 
particular community of tradition, it also provides particularly powerful tools to assist 
those from communities of tradition ± such as the Anglican Church ± in engaging with 
both other communities and wider society.  The unmasking of the role played by 
external goods is of fundamental importance in debate around ethical questions within 
the public arena. 
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 Related to this is MacIntyre's warning not to confuse the institutions that 
uphold standards of excellence with the practices themselves.  Indeed, competition 
EHWZHHQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ¶VGHVLUH WRVXVWDLQDQGSURPRWH LWself, and its commitment to 
that which it is designed to serve, can often arise.  Nonetheless, MacIntyre notes that 
µQRSUDFWLFHVFDQVXUYLYHIRUDQ\OHQJWKRIWLPHXQVXVWDLQHGE\LQVWLWXWLRQV¶DQGDGGV
WKDWµWKHDELOLW\RIDSUDFWLFHWRUHWDLQLWVLQWHJULty will depend on the way in which the 
virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which are the 
VRFLDOEHDUHUVRIWKHSUDFWLFH¶153   
 Despite noting the necessity of some form of institutional life to the sustaining 
of social practices that deliver genuine internal goods and the inevitability of 
competition between internal and external goods, together with instrumentalism, in 
such institutions, MacIntyre gives comparatively thinner theoretical consideration to 
how this competition should be handled than is generally characteristic of the detailed 
analyses he develops in other areas of his work.  While, as Stout notes, both he and 
Hauerwas do give some consideration to these tensions in practice, for example within 
medical ethics around the cost of treatment, they do not make the same connections as 
Stout does to the implications for dialogue within the political arena.154  Stout argues 
WKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VLQVLJKWVRQWKHULVNVWKDWFRPHIURPLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQDQGIURPWKH
interplay of internal and external goods can and should be applied to the practice of 
democracy (which he asserts is a tradition, in essentially the MacIntyrean sense, not 
OHDVW LQ WKDW LW µLQFXOFDWHV FHUWDLQ KDELWV RI UHDVRQLQJ¶155  6WRXW VD\V WKDW µWKH
advantage of MacIntyre's distinctions is that they make possible a stereoscopic social 
criticism, one which brings social practices and institutions, internal and external 
goods, into focus at the same time.¶156  As I shall consider in greater detail in chapter 
5, StouW¶V VWHUHRVFRSLF VRFLDO FULWLFLVP KDV the potential to enable a far more 
comprehensive and balanced account of both the context and the content of public 
debate.   
 This has important consequences for the pursuit of an effective praxis for 
Anglican engagement within a pluralist world.  First of all, churches themselves ± 
particularly institutional churches such as the Church of England ± are not immune to 
the pressure of external goods.  This can be seen for example in General Synod 
debates around tensions EHWZHHQµPDQDJHPHQW¶LVVXHVDQGZKDWPD\EHFKDUDFWHULVHG
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as the primary objectives of mission and ministry.  For Church leaders to present 
themselves as coming from a moral, rational, tradition, they must show that they are 
honestly grappling with these issues internally.  (MacIntyre may be accused of letting 
the Roman Catholic Church off the hook, in his acquiescence to the obedience it 
requires of its faithful, questioning only within the parameters it itself sets.157)  
6HFRQGDV5RZDQ:LOOLDPV¶SXEOLFVSeaking demonstrates, debate around the relative 
import of internal and external goods, and the influence of instrumentalism in policy 
PDNLQJ DQG LQ VRFLHW\¶V ZLGHU RUGHULQJ, is a fruitful point of entry for public 
discourse.158   
I shall explore these important issues further, and argue that further rational 
justification for such an approach can be found within MacIntyre's appropriation of 
$TXLQDV¶Srimary precepts of natural law, in chapter 6. 
Rationality and Right Living 
As already noted, MacIntyre stresses that practical rationality does not result 
in understanding and good reasoning alone.  Practical rationality results in, and 
requires, the action of right living ± echoing the view of Aristotle, followed by 
Aquinas, that we only become just by first identifying, and then performing, just 
actions.159 
One consequence of this is that practical rationality considers what one can do 
LQ RQH¶V DFWXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV ± it is not rational to decide that one should do 
something that circumstances do not allow.  It is person and situation specific ± 
though neither perspectivist nor relativist.   
 Practical rationality thus also requires that we not only reason well what to do, 
but also carry this out.  To do otherwise is to be less than fully rational, from both the 
viewSRLQW RI WKH QDUUDWLYH RI RQH¶V OLIH DQG WKH telos at which it aims.  It is also a 
IDLOXUH WR OLYH YLUWXRXVO\ VLQFH µZLWKRXW WKH YLUWXHV ZH FDQQRW DGHTXDWHO\ SURWHFW
ourselves and each other against neglect, defective sympathies, stupidity, 
acquisitiveness and malice.¶160  In other words, it is a moral failing, a falling into 
sinfulness.   
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 Right living is pursued by both the individual and the community, and is 
focussed towards a shared concept of the good, which directs both towards their 
common telos.  To be rational is to pursue the life well lived, singly and corporately, 
and to flourish insofar as one is able. 
The Rationally Mature Human Person 
Through our lives we should grow in maturity, both rationally and morally.  In 
Dependent Rational Animals, MaF,QW\UH QRWLQJ WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RXU µPHWDSK\VLFDO
ELRORJ\¶DVKHVHHVLWUDWKHUWKDQDVIRUPXODWHGE\$ULVWRWOHPDNHVWRWKHUDWLRQDOLW\
of our lives, identifies three components in our upbringing and our continuing 
relationships that are necessary to our ability to acquire a mature rationality, which 
add detail to the process of training in the social practices that deliver the true 
excellence of the internal good: 
What we need from others, if we are not only to exercise our initial animal 
capacities, but also to develop the capacities of independent practical reasoners, 
are those relationships necessary for fostering  
x the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask, 
that is, whether what we take to be good reasons for action really are 
sufficiently good reasons,  
x and the ability to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as to be 
able to make rational choices between them,  
x and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to enquire 
rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our 
desires must be directed and, if necessary, reeducated, if we are to attain it.161 
In this way, MacIntyre gives an account of the place of our emotions and desires, in 
balance with purely cognitive reason.  His is a rationality that can acknowledge and 
encompass both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of our humanity.  Note too 
the importance of the context provided by the community, and the implication that 
each individual who so receives should likewise give, according to their ability. 
 MacIntyre also stresses the importance of growing self-knowledge (entailing 
also the virtues of honesty and humility) as necessary for mature reasoning.  This can 
only be well-developed within an effective community.  Furthermore, we need to keep 
learning, with the assistance of other members of the community, to the end of our 
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lives.162  Friendship and collegiality are, he asserts, the best protection against both 
moral and intellectual errors.163  
The Process of Practical Rationality 
 
It is within this framework, of maturing individuals rooted within a particular 
community of tradition that pursues the goods of excellence of the moral life, that the 
process of practical rationality is pursued.  MacIntyre spells out in some detail how 
this process operates. 
Practical Rationality 
 In the first instance, our reasoning in pursuit of daily practical rationality is a 
dynamic, and corporate, undertaking.  There is a continual dialectical consideration by 
community members, especially those particularly skilled in the practice, of how the 
common good is to be understood, pursued and given practical expression within the 
evolving life of individuals and community, as we all face the many daily choices 
about how we should live our lives.   
To a considerable degree, says MacIntyre, this becomes an automatic part of 
WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIHZLWKLQWKHFRPPXQLW\(DFKRIXVOLYHVRXUOLYHVDFFRXQWDEOHWR
the community:  everyone can question me, and so force me to consider further and 
refine, as necessary, the understandings and actions of my own narrative story; and 
second, I too am able, indeed, expected, to solicit a similar account from others, both 
individually and in relation to our shared community life.164  Such questions can also 
be raised about the corporate understandings and life of the community.   
Much of this constitutes what MacIntyre generally calls µHYHU\GD\ SUDFWLFDO
UHDVRQLQJ¶LQWRWKHµVRFLDOSUDFWLFH¶RIZKLFKWKHFRPPXQLW\EULQJVXSLWVFKLOGUHQWR
becomH KDELWXDWHG 0DF,QW\UH GHVFULEHV WKLV LQ WHUPVRI $ULVWRWOH¶V phronesis µWKH
virtue of those who know how to do what is good, indeed, what is best, in particular 
VLWXDWLRQVDQGZKRDUHGLVSRVHGE\WKHLUFKDUDFWHUWUDLWVWRGRLW¶165  In a community 
that upholds this virtue, it may not be necessary for every individual always to 
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undertake a full reasoned theoretical analysis of every choice, not least because within 
the context of the community, it may often be readily apparent what the right thing is 
to do.  It comes naturally to the good character we seek to develop in ourselves and in 
each following generation. 
Yet there must be some who ensure that more fundamental reflection is 
sustained.  Within the community as a whole there must be continuing engagement in 
refining our understanding of the common good, and recontextualising what this 
means in practice on both individual and corporate levels, in the light of changing 
circumstances.   
The stimuli for this come from several quarters.  First, we must respond to the 
inevitable changes of life through time.  Second, challenges may come from outside 
the community, to which we need to give an adequate account or response. Third, we 
are also required to seek out all possible alternate views and counter-arguments, 
insights from which can further hone our understandings and practices.166  MacIntyre 
SRLQWVWR$TXLQDV¶FRPSUHKHQVLYHHQJDJHPHQWZLWKDYDLODEOHDOWHUQDWLYHRSLQLRQDQG
his intention to synthesise a comprehensive approach, with interdependence between 
its various elements, as indicators of his intrinsic rationality.167 
)XUWKHUPRUHµLWLVRQO\E\EHLQJRSHQWRREMHFWLRQVSRVHGE\RXUFULWLFVDQG
DQWDJRQLVWVWKDWZHDUHDEOHWRDYRLGEHFRPLQJWKHYLFWLPVRIRXURZQSUHMXGLFHV¶168  
One mark of the vindication of a tradition is its ability on its own terms to address, 
analyse and overcome both internal and external challenges, through evolving in this 
way.169  When a tradition passes the tests provided by all possible challenges, it is 
strengthened in its claim to be rational.   
The Development of Tradition 
 This raises the important question of the extent to which all aspects of our 
own tradition are open to potential revision and development when confronted with 
challenge.  There is of course the continuing subjection of beliefs and practices to 
systematic and deliberate refinement, as described above.  But sometimes 
circumstances or challenges call for a more thorough-going review, which may lead to 
                                                             
166
 WJWR, 358. 
167
 WJWR, Chapter 10, notably 164-5, 172. 
168
 0DF,QW\UHµ7DVNVRI3KLORVRSK\¶Preface, p. xii. 
169
 WJWR, 251. 
63 
 
PRUH µDEUXSW¶ FKDQJHV  0DF,QW\UH GHVFULEHV WKUHH VWDJHV IRU Whis process of 
development of a tradition:170 
x First, the relevant beliefs, canonical texts and their interpretation, and so forth, are 
accepted without question 
x Second, inadequacies are identified, without yet being remedied 
x Third, reformulations and re-evaluations are found to provide those remedies. 
Thus all tenets, including the core commitments, are permanently open to question.  
$V ORQJ DV µVRPH FRUH RI VKDUHG EHOLHI FRQVWLWXWLYH RI DOOHJLDQFH WR WKH WUDGLWLRQ,¶ 
survives, they can be said to remain within that same tradition, even if they have 
passed through something of an epistemological crisis en route.  However, as 
MacIntyre notes, sometimes more radical revision of core commitments and how they 
should be lived out is demanded ± or adherents recognise that the discontinuity with 
previous tradition outweighs continuity.171   
Gutting argues that MacIntyre's claim for rationality to be located within a 
tradition is undermined by his insistence on non-dissenting membership of a 
community, and that its core commitments are not subject to critique.172  However, 
Gutting bases this argument on selective quotations from Three Rival Versions, where, 
in fact, MacIntyre is describing, respectively, the arguments of Plato (p. 60) and 
Thomas Aquinas (p. 125), rather than his own approach, which requires continuing, 
honest and unconstrained, critique from within the community. 
7KDW VDLG *XWWLQJ ULJKWO\ QRWHV WKDW WKHUH LV D µFRUH RI WUXWK QRW VXEMHFW WR
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ GHYHORSPHQW RU UDWLRQDO UHMHFWLRQ¶ IRXQG µLQ WKH &Dtholic tradition 
ZKLFK 0DF,QW\UH HPEUDFHV¶ ZKLFK LV µYHU\ H[WHQVLYH¶173  This is an important 
FKDOOHQJHIRUIDLWKFRPPXQLWLHV¶DVSLUDWLRQVWRUDWLRQDOLW\ How far are Christians, for 
example, prepared to lay open to question such central tenets as the existence of God, 
or the formulations of the Creeds, or doctrines of the Trinity, or the nature of the 
incarnate Christ?  What of the status and interpretation of Scripture, or longstanding 
practices of church Order?  I return to these questions at the end of this chapter, and 
later in the thesis. 
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In a similar vein, Porter notes some ambiguity, even inconsistency, in 
0DF,QW\UH¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHUROHRIDXWKRULW\LQVDIHJXDUGLQJWUDGLWLRQ.  She asks how, 
given his account of GalileoµFan we escape the conclusion that, in this case, authority 
IXQFWLRQHG WR XQGHUPLQH UDWKHU WKDQ SURPRWH UDWLRQDOLW\"¶  6KH FRQFOXGHV µ,W PD\
well be that MacIntyre can answer these questions through a more extended analysis 
of the warrants and scope of authority within a traditionEXWKHKDV\HW WRGRVR¶174  
This underlines the need for continued reflection on our reflective processes, and the 
need to ensure an adequate degree of openness to refinement even of centrally held 
tenets and processes, and the way we understand and handle them.  
Rational Enquiry 
Pursuing and refining practical rationality, and in consequence refining 
DVSHFWVRIDFRPPXQLW\¶V WUDGLWLRQ, is essentially something we undertake within the 
community ± RQRQH¶VRZQWHUPVVRWRVSHDN+RZHYHUVRPHWLPHVFKDOOHnges arise 
ZKLFKUHTXLUHDGHHSHUSURFHVVRIHQJDJHPHQW0DF,QW\UHWHQGVWRFDOOVWKLVµUDWLRQDO
HQTXLU\¶175 ZKLFKµH[WHQGVDQGDPSOLILHVRXUHYHU\GD\SUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJ¶176 
 In the first instance, this is still conducted within the community of tradition ± 
for example when situations have arisen or challenges have been presented (including 
through deliberate search for alternative views) for which the existing formulation of 
the tradition does not have an adequate response or cannot provide an agreed 
resolution.   
 0DF,QW\UHRIIHUVIRXUµFUXFLDO¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHVWDJHVWKURXJKZKLFKWKH
community will have to progress in order for the enquiry to achieve satisfactory, and 
rational, results.  This is primarily an intellectual undertaking, though the situation 
which gave it rise need not be: 
x Evolving stages of the enquiry will take account of earlier stages, for example in 
providing insights to those stages that were not then available and offering the 
means for moving forward. 
x Later stages should be able to provide explanations for situations of disagreement 
which arose previously, and the reasons that they then lacked the means for 
resolution. 
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x (DFK VXEVHTXHQW VWDJH RI WKH HQTXLU\ VKRXOG SURYLGH D µVXFFHVVLYHO\ PRUH
DGHTXDWHFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHHQTXLU\¶QRWMXVWµFRQFHSWXDOO\ULFKHU¶DQGSURYLGLQJ
a fuller account of the goal pursued, but also enabling the enquiry to be better 
directed towards that goal. 
x )LQDOO\µWKLVJUDGXDOO\HQULFKHGFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHJRDOLVDFRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWLW
would be to have completed the enquiry.  One and the same conception is to 
provide both the enquiry with its telos and the subject matter of the enquiry with 
its explanation.  So that to arrive at it would involve being able to provide a single, 
unified, explanation of the subject matter and of course of the enquiry into that 
VXEMHFWPDWWHU¶177 
Thus the particular issue which gave rise to the process of enquiry finds 
contextualisation within the wider telos of the community, even if its solution may in 
turn provoke further refining of that telos or its instantiation within the community.  
Traditions in Dialogue 
5DWLRQDOLW\¶VUHTXLUHPHQWIRUHQJDJHPHQWZLWKDOOSRVVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHYLHZV
from both within and outside a tradition, necessitates a basis for engagement with 
other perspectives, whether offered by other traditions or from those from no tradition. 
 MacIntyre considers in some detail whether, under what circumstances, and to 
what degree, true dialogue is possible between different perspectives, whether with 
another tradition, or with those outside what he understands a tradition to be.  The 
implications of these questions of translatability and commensurability are complex, 
not least in the application in the messy practical world of the rather more clear-cut 
analysis MacIntyre offers.  I shall address these more fully in the next chapter and 
consider the consequences for Christian engagement in a pluralist, multicultural, and 
often increasingly secularised world.  In what follows below I shall outline 
MacIntyre's account more briefly, primarily in terms of the ability of a tradition to 
assert its rationality. 
Translation and Commensurability 
In order to consider the perspective of others, we need to be able to access the 
views of those who do not share our community of tradition, together with its 
contextual assumptions and practices, in order to embark on a proper assessment.  
First, I shall consider the perspectives of those of other communities of tradition, as 
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defined along the lines already outlined, before considering the perspectives of those 
outside such a community. 
(DFKVXFKFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQKDVVD\V0DF,QW\UHLWVRZQµODQJXDJH-in-
XVH¶, reflecting its conceptual world view.178  MacIntyre affirms that, given the nature 
of what it is to be a community of tradition, there will always be something in 
common between the languages or sets of thoughts of any two such communities.  
However, this should not be taken as indicating there is necessarily any deeper 
commensurability between the two traditions.  When first considering in detail what 
was required for effective communication between communities, as he did in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? 0DF,QW\UH IRFXVVHGRQ ZKDWKH WHUPHG µWUDQVODWDELOLW\¶
He posited that such communication required someone to be fully µELOLQJXDO¶ LQKLV
usage), that is, able to speak the two languages that reflect two rival traditions of 
enquiry as if each were a first language, in order to understand fully the precise 
contextual usages of words, concepts, evaluative practices and so forth.  (The ability 
RI SHRSOH LQ SUDFWLFH WR VSHDN D µVHFRQG ILUVW ODQJXDJH¶ UDLVHV ERWK OLQJXLVWLF DQG
philosophical questions, to which I shall return in chapter 3.) 
Such a person may find ± and recognise ± that the language of one tradition 
µODFNVFRQFHSWVLGLRPVDQGPRGHVRIDUJXPHQWQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHVWDWHPHQWRI¶FHUWDLQ
claims of the other tradition.179  What is then required for the perspectives of the first 
language to be considered by the community of tradition of the second, is for the 
second langXDJH µWREH HQULFKHG¶180 so that what was previously unsayable becomes 
sayable.  The bilingual person can then express these perspectives in ways that can be 
fully understood within, and then assessed by, the second community, employing its 
own standards of evaluation.     
Dialogue between Traditions 
Rather more is required to move from mere communication to substantive 
discussion between traditions.  I have just described how one community of tradition 
may, in its internal deliberations, weigh alternative perspectives from another 
community of tradition.  But often the need is for two such communities then to go on 
to debate with each other possible answers to some moral question which both face.   
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For this to happen effectively there is a fundamental requirement for the 
emergence of common standards of evaluation.  This requires rather more than merely 
a shared concept of what constitutes logic, which, on its own, is insufficient grounds 
for arbitrating between competing views.181  Only where the two sides agree on the 
criteria for weighing rational morality, can the contentions of one or other side 
(perhaps expressed through the hermeneutical enrichment outlined above) be shown to 
be, and be acknowledged by both parties to be, superior.   
 This is made possible, says MacIntyre, (and made possible in a non-relativist 
ZD\ RQ ZKLFK VHH IXUWKHU EHORZ ZKHQ WKHUH LV µVKDUHG SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ RI WKH
contending enquiries in respect of truth¶182 that is truth as exposed to dialectical 
testing against all possible questions and objections.183  The traditions must share such 
standards of rational evaluation in relation not only to particular enquiry on certain 
subjects184 but also to the incorporation of such enquiries within the pursuit of the 
overall life of human beings and communities.  This therefore requires agreement on 
an appropriate telos towards which enquiry and human life are directed.185  
 Subject to these conditions, MacIntyre proposes a two-step approach for 
traditions to engage in substantive dialogue:186 
x (DFK VLGH µcharacterizes the contentions of its rival in its own terms, making 
explicit the grounds for rejecting what is incompatible with its own central theses, 
although sometimes allowing that from its own point of view and in the light of its 
own standards of judgment its rival has something to teach it on marginal and 
VXERUGLQDWHTXHVWLRQV¶7KLVUHTXLUHVWKDWVRPHPHPEHUVRIHDFKWUDGLWLRQVKRXOG
EH µELOLQJXDO¶ WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ZKLFK WHUP I shall consider in the next 
chapter).  
x Then each should ask whetheUWKHDOWHUQDWLYHULYDOWUDGLWLRQµPD\QRWEHDEOHWR
provide resources to characterize and explain the failings and defects of their own 
tradition more adequately than they, using the resources of that tradition, have 
EHHQDEOHWRGR¶ 
The degree to which the two traditions are able to complete these steps demonstrates 
their relative strengths.   
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Further, this also points to the ways in which one tradition should accept, 
reject or refine their own practices (including on specific issues within the lived moral 
life, and the way these are understood) and tradition, in the light of the other tradition.   
Rationality, and the claim to rationality ± and, concomitantly, living, and the 
claim to be living, a virtuous, moral life ± is strengthened through this continuing 
process of engagement and refinement.   
It is MacIntyre's contention that Aquinas, through his training in Paris under 
Albertus Magnus, understood the importance of each of these steps, and followed 
them in his engagement with both Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions, though he 
was in effect in dialogue with himself as he considered each on its own terms and then 
VHW WKHP DORQJVLGH HDFK RWKHU  ,Q WKLV ZD\ KLV µILUVW VWHS ZLWK XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
$ULVWRWOH¶V WH[WV  ZDV WR OHW $ULVWRWOH VSHDN LQ his own voice, so far as possible 
XQGLVWRUWHG E\ LQWHUSUHWDWLYH FRPPHQWDU\¶187  Gutting points to the inevitable 
limitations of this endeavour, given that Aquinas did not know Greek188 but 
nonetheless, his intention appears to have been to understand the two WUDGLWLRQVµIURP
ZLWKLQ¶DVIDUDVSRVVLEOHDQGFHUWDLQO\WRDGHJUHHWKDWZDVXQSUHFHGHQWHG 
However, to follow this process does not always guarantee straightforward 
agreement between the two traditions that one, or other, or some development that 
draws from both, is superior and should be adopted by all.  For example, it may be 
beyond the resources of one tradition to grasp the superiority of the other:  to a greater 
RUOHVVHUGHJUHHRQHWUDGLWLRQPD\EHLQHIIHFWµXQWUDQVODWDEOH¶LQWRWKHµODQJXDJH-in-
XVH¶ RI D VHFRQG WUDGLWLRQ QR PDWWHU KRZ VNLOIXO WKH DWWHPSWV RI WKRVH ZKR DUH
µELOLQJXDO¶189 
Yet for those who are bilingual, the superiority of the second tradition will be 
evident, and it may well be that the superiority lies precisely in those areas that are 
untranslatable.  MacIntyre insists that to be rational, a tradition has to be open to the 
possibility of encountering a superior tradition in this way, and in consequence finding 
its own stance, its own tradition, radically overthrown.  As he puts it:  
Only those whose tradition allows for the possibility of its hegemony being 
put in question can have rational warrant for asserting such a hegemony.  And 
only those traditions whose adherents recognize the possibility of 
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untranslatability into their own language-in-use are able to reckon adequately 
with that possibility.190 
Thus, to be rational, members of a community of tradition must be open to the 
possibility that they may be required to accept they are mistaken at a very basic level, 
entailing drastic abandonment of their tradition, and wholesale transferral to some 
VXSHULRU WUDGLWLRQ  $V 0DF,QW\UH SXWV LW LW LV IXQGDPHQWDO WKDW D WUDGLWLRQ¶V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ µEH IRUPXODWHG VR WKDW LW LV PD[LPDOO\ RSHQ WR WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
UHIXWDWLRQ«>IRU@ LIDVWDndpoint is not able to be shown, by its own standards, to be 
discordant with reality, it cannot be shown to be concordant either.  It becomes a 
scheme of thought within which those who give it their allegiance become imprisoned 
and also protected from the realities about which their beliefs were originally 
IRUPXODWHG¶191  As already noted, this potentially poses a significant challenge to 
Christian claims to rationality. 
Communication beyond Traditions 
It follows from MacIntyre's contention that rationality is only to be found 
within properly constituted communities of tradition, that only those who are members 
of such a community can assess the strength of one tradition over another.  It also 
follows that the theses of a tradition must be weighed on that traGLWLRQ¶VRZQWHUPV± 
ZKHWKHU E\ WKH WUDGLWLRQ¶V RZQ FRPPXQLW\ RU WKRVH ZKR DUH PHPEHUV RI DQRWKHU
tradition, but effectively bilingual in respect of the first.   
However, even the process for debate between traditions outlined above 
assumes some degree of empathetic consideration, which is not automatically 
guaranteed.  The extent of this, particularly in relation to shared standards of enquiry 
and conceptions of the common good, has significant bearing on how far true debate is 
possible.   
Where two traditions have considerably different values and presuppositions 
(which may extend to being unable jointly to establish a basis for defining the essence 
of their disagreement or how it might be addressed), the possibilities for true dialogue 
are greatly reduced.  This is even more the case when engaging with someone from a 
perspective, such as liberalism, which MacIntyre regards as less than a tradition, or 
someone who is ostensibly from no tradition at all, as, MacIntyre claims, are a 
considerable proportion oILQGLYLGXDOVZLWKLQWRGD\¶VZHVWHUQIUDJPHQWHGVRFLHWLHV 
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While all these corollaries flow logically from MacIntyre's approach, strictly 
interpreted and applied, they have a range of serious practical implications for the 
ability of any community of tradition to operate within wider contemporary society.  
Not least of these is the question of how a tradition can be shown to be superior ± one 
of the goals at the heart of this project ± to those who are, on MacIntyre's terms, 
incapable of assessing or even grasping its rationality.  These are matters which are 
the focus of the following chapter, which I shall set to one side while continuing to 
consider the basis for MacIntyre's claim to rationality from the more narrowly drawn 
perspective of his communities of tradition.   
The Role of Dialectic 
MacIntyre insists that a dialectical approach is vital to the pursuit of tradition-
based reasoning, claiming that here he is following both Aristotle and Aquinas.192  As 
KHSXWV LWµLWLVQRWULYLDOPDWWHUWKDWDOOFOaims to knowledge are the claims of some 
particular person, developed out of the claims of other particular persons.  Knowledge 
LVSRVVHVVHGRQO\LQDQGWKURXJKSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDKLVWRU\RIGLDOHFWLFDOHQFRXQWHUV¶193  
Only through debate with others ± both within and beyond our own tradition ± can we 
know that we know, and what it is that we know. 
Dialectic also contributes to the strength of what MacIntyre describes as the 
µGRXEOHPRYHPHQW¶194 WKURXJKZKLFKRQH¶VLQLWLDOFRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWLVJRRGIRURQH 
can lead to more fruitful reflection on what is the general good, from which one can 
WKHQUHIOHFWPRUHIXOO\RQRQH¶VLQGLYLGXDOJRRG± and so on again.   
 7KXVZH IORXULVKEHVWZKHQ WKHUH LV µD UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW HDFK PHPEHU RI WKH
community is someone from whom we may learn and may have to learn about our 
common good and our own good, and who always may have lessons to teach us about 
WKRVHJRRGVWKDWZHZLOOQRWEHDEOHWROHDUQHOVHZKHUH¶195  MacIntyre gives examples 
of what we stand to learn, not least from those we might regard as being in some way 
disabled.  This includes being faced starkly with false value systems (e.g. making 
prejudicial judgements about other people on the basis of superficial appearance) and 
other errors of which we would otherwise be XQDZDUH VXFK DV RXU µLQDELOLW\ WR
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separate ourselves from and to stand in judgment upon our own desires, lack of 
adequate self-NQRZOHGJH DQG IDLOXUH WR UHFRJQLVH RXU GHSHQGHQFH RQ RWKHUV¶196  
Implicit in this is the important moral affirmation of the value of each community 
member in pursuit of the task of answering the question µ+RZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH?¶
rather than privileging those with particular ability, expertise or other status, influence 
or power. 
 A similar openness to learn from those of other traditions, or none, is also 
required.  For it is dialectical engagement with challenges from both within and 
without the community of tradition which allows for escape from what might at first 
appear to be vicious circularity.197  This LV IDUPRUH WKDQ WKH µSXlling oneself up by 
RQH¶V RZQERRWVWUDSV¶RI DGHGXFWLYH DSSURDFKZKHUH HDFK VWHS LV UHOLDQW VROHO\ RQ
earlier ones and the same essential content-matter.  Dialectic introduces new material 
to the process, new footholds to aid our climb towards our telos, even as we 
acknowledge its inevitable provisionality.  Further, it is rooted in thorough-going 
realism.   
 0DF,QW\UHDFFHSWVWKDWZHKDYHKHUHDQµLQHOLPLQDEOHFLUFXODULW\¶EXWDUJXHV
WKDW LW LV QRW WKH µVLJQ RI VRPH IODZ LQ $ULVWRWHOLDQ RU 7KRPLVWLF FRQceptions of 
enquiry.  It is, I suspect, a feature of any large-scale philosophical system which 
HPERGLHV D FRQFHSWLRQ RI HQTXLU\ DOEHLW DQRIWHQXQDFNQRZOHGJHG IHDWXUH¶198  The 
nub of his argument is that if one rejects, as he does, both foundationalist analytical 
philosophy, and aspirations to any neutral objective methodology or starting point, 
then there is no starting point to any enquiry that is not in some way internal to the 
issue at stake:  to ask the first question requires addressing the situation in terms which 
reflect how it is at that point apprehended.  There is no way of standing outside.  
Circularity is inevitable, but, says MacIntyre, it has the potential to be virtuous, if we 
fulfil our obligations to pursue the rational, moral, life. 
It is WKLV YLUWXRXVQHVV WKDW 0DF,QW\UH VHHV LQ $TXLQDV¶ XVH RI GLDOHFWLF ± in 
which various other important aspects of MacIntyre's approach are also evident.  
While the essence of dialectic (certainly as understood by Aristotle) is to be 
incomplete ± and this reflects MacIntyre's insistence on the provisionality of our 
understanding at any point ± KH DUJXHV WKDW $TXLQDV¶ KDQGOLQJ FDQ JLYH SDUWLFXODU
strength to what is deduced: 
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$TXLQDV¶SURFHGXUHV HQWLWOHGKLPRQPDQ\RFFDVLRQVDW OHDVW WRSODFHPRUH
rational confidence in the answers which he gave to particular questions than 
is provided for by the particular arguments which he adduces, and this for two 
distinct reasons.  First, Aquinas was engaged in an overall work of dialectical 
construction in the Summa in which every elementary part finds its place 
within some larger structure, which in turn contributes to the order of the 
whole.  Thus conclusions of one part of the structure may and do confirm 
conclusions reached elsewhere.  Second, Aquinas was careful in each 
discussion to summon up all the relevant contributions to argument and 
interpretation which had been preserved and transmitted within the two major 
traditions.  So biblical sources are brought into conversation with Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, and all of them with Arab and Jewish thinkers, as 
well as with patristic writers and later Christian theologians.  The length and 
detail of the Summa are not accidental features of it, but integral to its purpose 
and more particularly to providing both Aquinas himself and his readers with 
the assurance that the arguments adduced for particular articles were the 
strongest produced so far from any known point of view.199 
And so MacIntyre commends the same approach. 
The Relativist and Perspectivist Challenges 
Alongside refuting the claim to a flawed circularity, MacIntyre also asserts 
that he can refute the relativist and perspectivist challenges to his claim to pursue the 
PRUDOUDWLRQDOOLIH+HGHILQHVWKHVHFKDOOHQJHVDVIROORZVµ7KHUHODWLYLVWFKDOlenge 
rests upon a denial that rational debate between and rational choice among rival 
traditions is possible; the perspectivist challenge puts in question the possibility of 
making truth-FODLPVIURPZLWKLQDQ\RQHWUDGLWLRQ¶200  
In the first case, MacIntyre argues that to issue the relativist challenge, one 
must be a member of a tradition.  For if one is not a member of a tradition, one lacks 
WKH UHVRXUFHV IRU µUDWLRQDO HYDOXDWLRQ¶ EHLQJ µD VWUDQJHU WR HQTXLU\ « LQ D VWDWH RI
intellectual and moral destituWLRQ¶201  Such an individual is incapable of weighing the 
rationality of any tradition, let alone comparing various traditions.  Conversely, if one 
is a member of a tradition, one can follow the processes described above for 
communication between traditions, which, where there is translatability, will provide 
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clarity over the superiority of one tradition in relation to another.  While translatability 
may be difficult or impossible in certain cases, that is an entirely different question 
from asking whether or not it is ever possible to weigh one tradition against another.202 
 0DF,QW\UHDUJXHVWKDWWKHSHUVSHFWLYLVW¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWµQRFODLPWRWUXWKPDGH
in the name of any one competing tradition could defeat the claims to truth made in 
WKH QDPH RI LWV ULYDOV¶ also falls on similar grounds.  It is, he says, rooted in the 
µPLVWDNH « ZKLFK FRPPRQO\ DULVHV EHFDXVH WKH SHUVSHFWLYLVW IRLVWV RQ WR WKH
defenders of traditions some conception of truth other than that which is theirs, 
perhaps a Cartesian or an Hegelian conception of truth or perhaps one which 
DVVLPLODWHV WUXWK WR ZDUUDQWHG DVVHUWLELOLW\¶203  The perspectivist has failed to grasp 
that the conception of truth is integral each to its own tradition-constituted form of 
enquiry ± and that it is fallacious to seek some free-floating, context free definition of 
truth.204  0DF,QW\UH DGGV WKDW OLNH UHODWLYLVP SHUVSHFWLYLVP LV D µGRFWULQH RQO\
SRVVLEOH IRU WKRVH ZKR UHJDUG WKHPVHOYHV DV RXWVLGHUV¶ ± and he characterises this 
SRVLWLRQDVµQRWVRPXFKDFRQFOXVLRQDERXt truth as an exclusion from it and thereby 
IURPUDWLRQDOGHEDWH¶205   
The Nature of Truth 
MacIntyre rejects the understandings of truth of these critics, arguing (as 
noted above) first for an Aristotelian concept rooted in the telos of rational enquiry,206 
WRZKLFKKHDGGV$TXLQDV¶VWKHRORJLFDOUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQWQDPHO\WKDW
µLQ GLUHFWLQJ RXUVHOYHV WRZDUG WUXWK ZH GLUHFW RXUVHOYHV WRZDUG *RG¶207  Living 
truthfully entails being as faithful as possible to the best conceptualisation one can 
attain of how it is one ought to live:  µKXPDQ EHLQJV DFKLHYH WUXWK LQVRIDU DV WKHLU
judgments as to how things are are determined by now things are rather than by their 
SK\VLFDOFRQVWLWXWLRQRUWKHLUSV\FKRORJLFDOPDNHXS¶208    
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 As Fergusson points out, MacIntyUH
V µQRWLRQV RI WUXWK UHDOLVP DQG UDWLRQDO
MXVWLILFDWLRQ VWDQG RU IDOO WRJHWKHU¶209  He characterises MacIntyre's stance as 
µRQWRORJLFDOO\UHDOLVWEXWHSLVWHPRORJLFDOO\UHODWLYH¶ +RZHYHUKHVD\V WKLV LVQRWD
µUDGLFDO UHODWLYLVP¶ EXW LQVWHDG RQH LQ ZKLFK µWUXWK LV QRW UHODWLYH WR D SDUWLFXODU
framework, though knowledge thereof is available only to those who inhabit the 
IUDPHZRUN¶210  Concepts of truth and rational justification find grounding in this 
realism,211 and, as noted above, overcome the false dLFKRWRP\ EHWZHHQ µLV¶ DQG
µRXJKW¶It is within this context that MacIntyre writes: 
7KHWHVWIRUWUXWK«LVDOZD\VWRVXPPRQXSDVPDQ\TXHVWLRQVDQGDVPDQ\
objections of the greatest strength possible; what can be justifiably claimed as 
true is what has sufficiently withstood such dialectical questioning and 
framing of objections.  In what does such sufficiency consist?  That too is a 
question to which answers have to be produced and to which rival and 
competing answers may well appear.  And those answers will compete 
rationally, just insofar as they are tested dialectically, in order to discover 
which is the best answer to be proposed so far.212    
7KLV µVR IDU-QHVV¶ VD\V 0DF,QW\UH UHIXWHV DQ\ +HJHOLDQ FRQFHSWLRQ RI D ILQDO WUXWK
actually to be reached: WKLVLVµDFKLPDHUD¶213 VLQFHµSKLORVRSKLFDOHQTXLU\XQGHUVWRRG
as the development of a tradition, has no eschaton¶214  +HDGGVµ+HJHOWRZKRPWKLV
conception of enquiry owes so much was mistaken in supposing that anyone can ever 
KDYH WKH ODVW ZRUG¶  7KLV is another argument why concepts of objective truth as 
employed by the so-called Enlightenment project fail.   
 MacIntyre describes the relationship between truth, the social practices and 
the evaluative processes of a community as follows: 
We flourish, or fail to flourish, live or die, as our theses, arguments, and 
doctrines live or die.  And in asserting them we assert that it is they which are 
true or sound and so attempt to establish and succeed or fail in establishing the 
adequacy of our minds as judged by a measure which we did not make.  Truth 
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as the measure of our warrants cannot be collapsed into warranted 
assertibility.215 
He goes on to add: 
There is then an acknowledgment of truth as a measure independent of the 
tradition which aspires to measure itself by truth, but there is nonetheless no 
thesis, argument, or doctrine to be so measured which is not presented as the 
thesis of this particular historically successive set of tradition-informing and 
tradition-directed individuals and groups in whose lives the dialectical and 
confessional interrogation have gone on. 
In Porter¶V DVVHVVPHQW WKLV DFFRXQW RI µD WUDGLWLRQ LQ LWV ODWHU VWDJHV¶ EHLQJ DEOH WR
µSURYLGH D PRUH DGHTXDWH IUDPHZRUN ZLWKLQ ZKLFK WR DWWDLQ WKDW DGHTXDWLRQ RI WKH
mind with its objects that MacIntyre takes to be the authentic meaning of a 
FRUUHVSRQGHQFH WKHRU\ RI WUXWK¶ LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW µPDUNV DQ LPSRUWDQW LQWHOOHFWXDO
advance because, at this point, one can no longer equate the truth of a given judgment 
with its adequacy by the best stDQGDUGVRIRQH¶VWUDGLWLRQ,QRWKHUZRUGVDWWKLVSRLQW
WUXWK FDQQR ORQJHUEH HTXDWHG ZLWK ZDUUDQWHGDVVHUWLELOLW\¶216  The claims that one 
can make are considerably stronger.  Fergusson concurs that MacIntyre has described 
an effective correspondence theory of truth.217  
In this way, therefore, insofar as a tradition succeeds in giving a superior 
account of the way the world is, in the face of competing claims, it has the right to say 
it is the best understanding available so far of the truth, and with it, the most rational 
way of life. 
MacIntyre has thus provided an impressively comprehensive account of how 
ZHPLJKWDQVZHUWKHRYHUULGLQJTXHVWLRQRIµKRZWKHQVKDOOZH OLYH?¶7KLVLVQRWWR
discount the various concerns raised in the course of this chapter, particularly those 
which relate to the practical instantiation of his arguments and to which we shall turn 
in the next chapters.  While there are problems with the way his approach can be 
applied in practice, his critics have also focussed on the ways in which he has rooted 
his abstract theory in historic and contemporary contexts.  Thus, for example, his 
historic narratives and interpretations, and his political characterisations (particularly 
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of liberalism), are strongly contested.  His espousal of the Christian faith, particularly 
as practiced by the Roman Catholic Church, is also a source of criticism.218     
 )HUJXVVRQZULWLQJLQVDLGµ0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLVRIPDMRUVLJQLILFDQFHLQ
reintroducing the discourse of the Christian faith to moral philosophy at the highest 
level.  In this respect, he has achieved more than any theologian.  The theological 
deficiencies in his work are more in the nature of lacunae than fatal flaws.  We see as 
yet only the outline of a theological position.  But, if MacIntyre can continue to 
advance and develop his argument, one of the benefits to theology will ironically be a 
PRUHSURPLQHQWSODFHLQSXEOLFGHEDWH¶219  
 It is this place within public debate to which this thesis increasingly turns, by 
way of considering first interactions with other Christian and faith communities, and 
other bodies within contemporary society which, at least to some degree, exhibit 
characteristics of communities of tradition.  Though at no point am I intending to 
address systematically questions of doctrine and ecclesiology, aspects of these will 
nonetheless arise from time to time.  My hope is that through focussing on the 
resources offered by MacIntyre for discerning and communicating how we ought to 
live, the practical examples that illustrate what can be achieved will also demonstrate 
WKH WKRURXJKJRLQJ FRPSDWLELOLW\ WKDW , DP DVVHUWLQJ EHWZHHQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK
(developed appropriately in the ways I propose) and Anglican understandings of faith 
and order.  In the first instance, I now offer an excursus intended to show how 
0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN RIIHUV WDQJLEOH UHVRXUFHV IRU D GHHSHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH URRW
differences in current disagreements over human sexuality, from which practical 
recommendations can be made for finding possible ways forward.         
Excursus:  Tradition-Based Reasoning, Anglican Tradition and Human Sexuality 
 As set out at the beginning of chapter 1, the stated focus of this thesis is to 
explore the potential resources that can be drawn from MacIntyre's tradition-based 
reasoning to assist the Bishops of the Anglican Communion in their twin commitment 
first, to reflect on their faith and how it should be lived within contemporary contexts, 
and, second, to bring to bear their conclusions within the wider world through 
lobbying and advocacy, engaging as appropriate with every dimension of public life.  
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While it is the second objective ± moral reasoning within a pluralist world, and 
particularly the difficult questions of how faith communities engage in debate with 
those of other faiths, or state their case effectively within the public arena ± which will 
take up the greater part of the thesis, let me here offer some comments on the 
relevance of MacIntyre's description of the life of a community of tradition for the 
current strains within Anglicanism around homosexuality.   
 There are a number of elements which, as I shall now indicate, provide 
valuable starting-points for understanding the nature of the current disagreements ± 
which is itself a necessary step towards any solution.  In doing so I am not attempting 
to propose any solution, but rather to point to areas where enquiry guided by 
MacIntyre's approach might prove productive.    
 The first is the question of loyalty to tradition.  Gutting has rightly pointed to 
the predicament that faith communities face over the degree to which their core 
commitments are open to critique, and the implications of this for any claim to rational 
integrity ± a claim Anglicans make in some sense, in describing Anglicanism as being 
built on the IRXQGDWLRQV µKDPPHUHG RXW¶E\ WKH VHYHQWHHQWK DQG HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\
GLYLQHV RI µ6FULSWXUH 5HDVRQ DQG 7UDGLWLRQ¶220  Tradition in this sense is not of 
FRXUVHZKROO\V\QRQ\PRXVZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ ± µ$OLYLQJWUDGLWLRQWKHQ
is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely 
DERXW WKH JRRG ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWH WKDW WUDGLWLRQ¶221 ± though there are important 
parallels.  The former Archbishop of Cape Town, Njongonkulu Ndungane, in 
reflecting on Anglican identity, has offered this description: 
Tradition is not a dispassionate history of institutional life, the dry and dusty 
account of some external observer.  If that were the case, it would be hard to 
see why we should pay tradition more than limited attention.  No.  Tradition is 
holy remembering ± remembering as Scripture teaches us to remember.  
³5HPHPEHUKRZWKH/RUGEURXJKW\RXRXWRI(J\SW´LV*RG¶VZRUGWRIXWXUH
JHQHUDWLRQVLQWKH3URPLVHG/DQG³'RWKLVLQUHPHPEUDQFHRIPH´DUH-HVXV¶
words to us, as we meet Sunday by Sunday, breaking bread and sharing wine, 
and finding ourselves joined with him and all that he has won for us through 
his one self-giving sacrifice for the sins of the world.  Holy remembering is 
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far more than casting our mind across a widening gulf of years.  Holy 
remembering is both to recall and to participate.  It is to be caught up into the 
XQIROGLQJ QDUUDWLYHRI*RG¶V LQYROYHPHQW ZLWK KLVSHRSOH LQ HYHU\ WLPHDQG
place.  It is to recognise God at work in our church throughout the centuries, 
and to know ourselves in living continuity with his faithful people in every 
DJH  7R UHPHPEHU LV WR WDNH RXU SODFH ZLWKLQ *RG¶V VWRU\ RI UHGHPSWLRQ
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ WUDGLWLRQ DV WKH LQYLWDWLRQ WR OLYH LQ FRQWLQXLW\ ZLWK *RG¶V
actions through his church shapes our understanding of the task before us 
now.  It challenges us to see the fingerprints of God upon our history, and to 
HQVXUH WKDW ZH WRR FDQ VD\ WKDW ³ZKDW ZH KDYH UHFHLYHG IURP WKH /RUG ZH
KDYHSDVVHGRQ´FI&RU222 
In this way he stresses many of the same elements as MacIntyre, particularly the 
centrality of reflecting on an evolving, coherent, narrative unity in both belief and 
praxis of individual and community that reaches towards an ultimate telos.   
Yet in current Anglican disagreements, the question of loyalty to tradition is 
particularly problematic in relation to the status and interpretation of the Bible, which 
may be seen as having primary place among this triad.223  This is specifically so in 
relation to passages that may be taken to address questions of human sexuality and 
same gender relationships.   
That said, the historic churches, while remaining faithful to the constituted 
canon of Scripture, have nonetheless been aware for a considerable time of the need 
for some degree of careful openness to changing interpretation of its content, for 
example in relation to slavery and to usury, on which there is now a generally held 
consensus.224  Matters such as contraception, remarriage after divorce, and the role of 
women remain rather more contested.  The Anglican Bishops at the Lambeth 
Conference in 2008 described their approach to biblical interpretation in the following 
WHUPVµZHEHOLHYHWKHVFULSWXUHVWREHSULPDU\DQGZHUHDGWKHPLQIRUPHGE\UHDVRQ
and tradition and with regard for our culWXUDOFRQWH[W¶225  That a fuller account needs 
WREHSURYLGHGRIZKDWWKLVPHDQVLQSUDFWLFHLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHODXQFKRIWKHµ%LEOHLQ
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WKH /LIH RI WKH &KXUFK 3URMHFW¶226  In setting the outcome of this important project 
alongside the current debates around the interpretation and application of passages in 
Scripture relating to homosexuality, Anglicans might profit by taking from 
0DF,QW\UH
VZRUNDQLQYLWDWLRQWRDVNZKHWKHUWKRVHRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµFRQVHUYDWLYH¶
DUHKROGLQJWRRWLJKWO\WRKLVWRULFµFRUHFRPPLWPHQWV¶LQVFULSWXUDOH[HJHVLVDQGWKRVH
ZKRDUHµOLEHUDO¶WRRORRVHO\227   
 This looseness of which liberals are accused applies not only to what might 
narrowly be understood as interpretation of Scripture, but also to their attitudes 
towards the status of Scripture and the handling of biblical texts, as well as wider 
practices of reviewing doctrine, ecclesiology and the ordering of the life of the church.  
Tradition (in MacIntyrean understanding) entails not only central beliefs but also ways 
of believing and behaving ± including the processes of practical reasoning and debate 
within a tradition.  From a MacIntyrean perspective, it is therefore welcome that there 
has been a realisation within the wider Anglican Communion of the need for greater 
understDQGLQJDQGDJUHHPHQWRIZKDW LW LV WREH$QJOLFDQDQGZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµWKH
$QJOLFDQZD\¶DQG$QJOLFDQLGHQWLW\228  This must be clarified if there is to be debate 
around the breadth of internal diversity that is justifiable across all that might be taken 
to constitute Anglican tradition (again, in the MacIntyrean sense), and about how far 
this can and should be open to evolution.  But considerable work remains to be done, 
and taking forward this task now lies before the Inter Anglican Standing Commission 
on Unity, Faith and Order.229  IASCUFO is also the body likely to be tasked with 
advising the Instruments of Communion on the oversight and functioning of the 
Anglican Covenant, which outlines areas of core Anglican belief and practice.230  An 
awareness of MacIntyre's approach can help in this work. 
MacIntyre's contention that the theses of a tradition should first be weighed on 
that tradition¶s own terms is also pertinent.  The Archbishop of Canterbury has 
KLJKOLJKWHG WKLV QHHG VSHFLILFDOO\ DVNLQJ µ+RZ GR ZH Ds Anglicans deal with this 
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LVVXH ³LQ RXURZQ WHUPV´"¶231  Liberals are often accused of having abandoned both 
historic tenets, and established standards and processes of enquiry around them, and in 
consequence, it is said, they cannot claim still to be in continuity with Anglican 
tradition.  It is asserted they have adopted, too comprehensively and too uncritically, 
both the perspectives and the evaluative methods of the surrounding culture ± an 
accusation that they need to answer in ways that are recognisably speaking from 
within Anglican tradition.   
MacIntyre does require traditions to engage with alternative cultures, and the 
necessity of taking seriously challenges from this quarter is a persistent thread within 
Anglicanism ± even if it is acknowledged that often there are no easy answers as to 
KRZµWKH OLQHEHWZHHQIDLWKIXO LQFXOWXUDWLRQDQGIDOVH DFFRPPRGDWLRQ WR WKHZRUOG¶V
ways of thinking (note Romans 12.1-2) [is] WR EH GLVFHUQHG DQG GHWHUPLQHG¶232  
Further, as long ago as 1886/8, the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral recognised the 
QHHG IRU WKH KLVWRULF HSLVFRSDWH WR EH µORFDOO\ DGDSWHG LQ WKH PHWKRGV RI LWV
administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the 
XQLW\RI+LV&KXUFK¶233  The consequence is that different contexts may legitimately 
require different instantiation of Anglican practices, in ways which may initially 
appear to be divergent, even contradictory, if context is not adequately taken into 
consideration.234  This adds an additional layer of difficulty to the task of discerning 
between appropriate inculturation and unjustifiable syncretism. 
It is also the case that, where a tradition has weighed alternative perspectives 
on its own terms, MacIntyre does advocate attempting to go further, and to 
characterise the perspectives of an alternative tradition on its own terms through 
µELOLQJXDOLVP¶DVDSUHFXUVRUWRZHLJKLQJWKHUHODWLYHPHULWVRIHDFKDSSURDFK%HLQJ
able to talk the language of wider culture, however, does not necessarily entail buying 
in to all its assumptions (a very significant point ± and why this is so I shall discuss in 
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the next chapter).  The arguments of the liberals would be made more persuasive if 
they were able to demonstrate greater clarity and transparency in the following of a 
two-stage process of dialogue between traditions, in the way MacIntyre proposes.   
However, there is the added complication that the surrounding culture of 
North America (and, to a lesser extent in terms of the divisions within the Anglican 
Communion, Western Europe) tends towards the sort of secular liberalism which 
MacIntyre denies constitutes a tradition with coherent and justifiable practices of 
moral rational enquiry (a matter for further consideration in later chapters).  The 
liberals would need to counter arguments that they are not supportive of societal 
QRUPV RI ODUJHO\ XQFRQVWUDLQHG LQGLYLGXDO FKRLFH IURP D VPRUJDVERUG RI µDQ\WKLQJ
JRHV¶GHUDFLQDWHGDQGFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHGRSWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHµOHDGLQJRIWKH6SLULW¶
becomes conflated with the sort of emotivisW µZKDW IHHOV ULJKW IRUPHKHUHDQGQRZ¶
approach which MacIntyre so derides.  (Suspicions that this is so are compounded by 
the complicating factor of whether, also, these liberals have a more inclusive or even 
universalist soteriology ± arguments for which have existed for centuries within 
orthodox theology, but which are generally rejected by conservatives.) 
 But a MacIntyrean approach also provides critique of the stance of the 
conservatives.  In addition to the charge, noted above, that they hold too narrowly to 
historic core beliefs and practices to sustain rational integrity, there are questions too 
about how they relate to the challenges of contemporary culture.  Thus they must 
answer criticism that they are more closed to these than is justifiable ± failing to give 
due consideration to the available evidence and continuing research around 
homosexuality;  or to the possibilities of evolution in their processes of enquiry 
(including openness to engage with developments in biblical studies and 
hermeneutical understandings) or other developments of context and circumstance.   
 A second challenge to conservatives in relation to culture is to require an 
account of whether they are unduly influenced by what MacIntyre calls the 
Enlightenment Project in their WHQGHQF\ WR FKDUDFWHULVH µREMHFWLYH WUXWK¶ µWKH IDLWK
RQFHIRUDOOGHOLYHUHGWRWKHVDLQWV¶WKHµSODLQ¶VHQVHRIELEOLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGVR
forth, in terms of absolutes not only from the perspective of an infinite omniscient 
God, but also in human understanding, that is uninfluenced by the finitude of our 
existence, experience and context.235  It is worth noting that historically the 
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Evangelical Movement is very much a child of the Enlightenment era, and could be 
depicted as an appropriate endeavour to enunciate the gospel in ways that connected 
with the mores of that time, for example in its emphases on propositional 
formulations.  However, there is nonetheless the obligation to show that such a self-
understanding is neither susceptible to the worst weaknesses of the Enlightenment 
mindset nor an historic anachronism; that there is appropriate openness to continuing 
necessary evolution in response to the changing contexts of subsequent centuries;  and 
that there is authentic enunciation of the gospel within the various global cultures of 
WRGD\¶VZRUOGUDWKHUWKDQDQH[SHFWDWLRQRIFRQIRUPLW\WRRQHSDUWLFXODUH[SUHVVLRQRI
Anglicanism frozen in the time and customs of the missionaries who spread it.   
 Another angle from which MacIntyre's approach might prove valuable would 
be to view liberals and conservatives as two distinct sub-traditions within 
$QJOLFDQLVPHDFKZLWKWKHLURZQµODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶7KLVZRXOGDSSO\QRWPHUHO\LQ
terms of the vocabulary they use, but also to a considerable degree in relation to their 
evaluative practices ± for example, in the differing weights each accords to the 
elements of Scripture, Reason and Tradition, the differences in their understandings of 
each of these terms, and the consequently differing processes by which they reach 
differing conclusions about both belief and practice.  My own view, generalising 
broadly, is that in the continuing disagreements of recent years, there has been 
inadequate acknowledgement that the two groups are to a considerable degree 
µVSHDNLQJGLIIHUHQW ODQJXDJHV¶DQG LQKDELWLQJYHU\GLIIHUHQWFXOWXUHV WKDW LV WKRXJKW
worlds, rather than, say, geographical cultures) in respect of what it means to be 
Christians and Anglicans, in ways that go far beyond merely questions of 
homosexuality.  The failure (whether conscious or deliberate) of each side to address 
the concerns of the other in ways that they find comprehensible has perpetuated and 
exacerbated the gulf between the two; and there has not always been adequate 
understanding by those such as the Archbishop of Canterbury of what it means to 
FRPPXQLFDWHHIIHFWLYHO\WRDOOSDUWLHVµLQWKHLURZQODQJXDJH¶ 
Therefore, both sides should be challenged to give an account of their own 
perspectives, priorities, conclusions and evaluative processes, not only in their own 
                                                                                                                                                                 
The Shape of Historic Anglicanism Today, available at 
www.gafcon.org/images/uploads/BeingFaithful_JD_Commentary.pdf.  See pp. 17ff of the 
ODWWHUIRUDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIZKDWLVXQGHUVWRRGE\µWUXWK¶DQG µUHDVRQ¶7KURXJKRXWWKLV
document the particular nature of the high priority given to historic tradition is evident.  That 
said, some elements of diversity are allowed for, for example in the acknowledgement that the 
)HOORZVKLSRI&RQIHVVLQJ$QJOLFDQVµis not claiming to be the sole representative of true 
$QJOLFDQLVP¶± p. 45. 
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WHUPVDVWKH\WHQGWRGREXWDOVRLQWKHWHUPVRUFRQFHSWXDOµODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶RIWKH
other.  As has been mentioned above, to do so should not be seen as connoting any 
OHYHORIDFFHSWDQFHRI WKHRWKHU WUDGLWLRQ¶VVWDQFH $VVXPLQJ WKis is possible (and it 
may be rather that this leads to the conclusion that the gulf is too wide to be bridged, 
and that there are in fact two distinct, separate traditions in operation which cannot 
meaningfully be held together under a single umbrella of unity), this, says MacIntyre, 
is the only way, first, to communicate, and second, to evaluate which approach is 
superior.  But one cannot leap to the second stage without adequately going through 
WKHILUVWRIGLDORJXHWKDWHPSOR\VHIIHFWLYH OHYHOVRIµELOLQJXDOLVP¶)RUWKLVUHDVRQ
the Anglican Communion is right to accord a high priority to the Continuing Indaba 
Project that takes forward and expands the Listening Project first endorsed at the 1998 
Lambeth Conference, promoting genuine conversations and intensifying relationships 
across the Communion.236  It is this ability to keep in close dialogue and vulnerable 
interpersonal sharing which the Anglican Bishops of Southern Africa claim has 
enabled them to hold together in unity, despite spanning the breadth of views within 
the Anglican Communion as a whole.237 
What is certain is that without such dialogue, the chances of overcoming 
current disagreements will remain slight at best.  MacIntyre, however, offers resources 
that would assist the Anglican Communion in finding clarity over, and providing 
rationally justifiable grounds for concluding, whether, and how, differences can 
indeed be overcome, or whether in fact they are insurmountable and that a parting of 
the ways is the only sensible outcome. 
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 6HHµ0LQLVWULHV± &RQWLQXLQJ,QGDED¶DFFHVVHG0D\
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 6HHWKH$UFKELVKRSRI&DSH7RZQ¶VDddress to the annual USPG conference:  Thabo 
0DNJREDµ$GGUHVVLQJ$QJOLFDQ'LIIHUHQFHV- 6SLULWDQG&XOWXUHDWWKH)RRWRIWKH&URVV¶
June 2010, accessed 15 May 2011, http://archbishop.anglicanchurchsa.org/2010/06/addressing-
anglican-differences-spirit.html. 
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Chapter 3 ± The Problem with MacIntyre 
In the previous chapter, I described the densely interconnected processes 
through which MacIntyre claims humanity can best live a rational moral life, and can 
comprehensively and coherently address the situations in which we find ourselves, by 
means of belonging to what he terms a community of tradition.  Such a living tradition 
he characterises as a historically extended, socially embodied argument about the 
internal goods of that tradition which we pursue within the context of pursuing, both 
in understanding and in practice, its overall telos.  I asserted that to a considerable 
degree this provided an effective basis upon which those such as the Anglican Bishops 
gathered at the 2008 Lambeth Conference could with rational integrity address how to 
express their faith, in word and action, in engagement with the contemporary contexts 
within which they found themselves, before going on to engage in substantive ethical 
dialogue with others.   
However, at various points I noted ambiguities and tensions within 
MacIntyre's account in relation to the capacity of members of a community of 
tradition to engage with those of other traditions or of none.  A question-mark against 
this ability to engage with others is potentially problematic on a number of levels, and 
WKLVDIIHFWVERWKVWUDQGVRIWKH$QJOLFDQ%LVKRSV¶DVSLUDWLRQVWRUDWLRQDOLW\ LQYDULRXV
ways. 
In the first instance, one of the requirements that must be met in any assertion 
of rationality in living an ethical life, let alone any assertion of rational and moral 
superiority, is that all alternative perspectives have been adequately considered and 
appropriately taken into account.  This requires them to have been rightly understood, 
not only from the perspective of the first community of tradition, but also on their own 
terms, particularly where they arise in a community of tradition with its own 
comprehensive understanding of rationality.  Consideration of how we rightly 
understand others (and know that we have rightly understood), and of how we rightly 
take their perspectives into account, begins this chapter. 
But the concern of the Anglican Bishops is not only to understand others in 
this way, but to have means, and grounds, for persuading others of the superiority of 
their claims to rational ethical living.  This requires communication in both directions 
± and further, a level of communication that can sustain substantive dialogue on 
questions of commensurability of both rational and ethical standards.  But an initial 
reading of 0DF,QW\UH¶V arguments appears to suggest that the possibilities for being 
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able to pursue such dialogue decrease to the point of becoming negligible, when one is 
in conversation with someone from a community of tradition with divergent standards 
of evaluation or telos, or from outside any community of tradition.  This question of 
how these apparent difficulties may be overcome is addressed in the second part of 
this chapter.   
Understanding Others 
MacIntyre's foundational description of how we hone our understanding (and 
hence our praxis) through engaging with the perspectives of others is set out in 
&KDSWHUV ;9,,, DQG ;,; µ7KH 5DWLRQDOLW\ RI 7UDGLWLRQV¶ DQG µ7UDGLWLRQ DQG
7UDQVODWLRQ¶LQWhose Justice?  Which Rationality?  It is this account which has been 
the focus of most debate among commentators. 
As described in the previous chapter, MacIntyre here puts forward the various 
steps that must be taken for a community of tradition to sustain best possible rational 
and moral living through engaging with all possible challenges and differing 
YLHZSRLQWV,QDGGLWLRQWRUHVSRQGLQJIURPZLWKLQWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VRZQUHVRXUFHVWR
unfolding circumstances as they arise, this entails engaging with alternative 
perspectives from outside the community, whether from members of other 
communities of tradition, or from those who are members of no such community.  
First, let us consider the challenges that are posed by another community of tradition.   
The capacity to engage with another tradition rests, says MacIntyre, on the 
ability of individuals from one tradition to speak, or learn to speak, not only their own 
language-in-XVHEXWDOVRWKDWRIWKHRWKHUWUDGLWLRQDVDµVHFRQGILUVWODQJXDJH¶238  The 
task then becomes to express the beliefs of each tradition and their justification not 
RQO\ LQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI RQH¶V RZQ WUDGLWLRQ EXW DOVR ± ZLWK QHFHVVDU\ µFRQFHSWXDO
HQULFKPHQW¶DVSUHYLRXVO\QRWHG± in the language of the other tradition.  Even if this 
is found not to be possible reciprocally (i.e. that it is beyond the capacity of the second 
WUDGLWLRQ WRXQGHUVWDQG WKH FRQFHSWVRI WKHILUVW µHQULFKPHQW¶QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ IRUD
tradition to claim rationality it must know that it has rightly understood the alternative 
perspectives of others, on their own terms, and overcome the challenges these might 
pose from within its own resources. 
MacIntyre considers what it means for concepts to be, as he puts it, 
µWUDQVODWDEOH¶ LQ WKLV ZD\  +LV ILUVW FRQFHUQ LV WR GUDZ D FOHDU GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
potential communication between traditions, and the ability to engage in substantive 
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 WJWR, 364. 
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evaluative dialogue.  Some level of communication is almost always present, he 
DUJXHVIRUWRDVVHUWWKLVLVµVD\LQJQRPRUHWKDQZKDWZRXOGEHFRQFHGHG,WDNHLWE\
anyone:  that there will always be something in common between any two languages 
RUVHWVRI WKRXJKWV¶239  Within reason, we can find approximate parallels for nouns, 
verbs, grammatical logic, and so forth, between any two languages.  At this level, 
translation from one language to another will require what MacIntyre calls either 
µVDPH-VD\LQJ¶RUOLQJXLVWLFLQQRYDWLRQ± the latter case being where ways are found or 
developed for enunciating something that was previously unsaid or unsayable within 
the language in question, in ways that it can be understood by monoglot speakers of 
WKDW ODQJXDJH  2QH H[DPSOH 0DF,QW\UH JLYHV RI WKLV LV WKH ZD\ WKDW WKH µ+HEUHZ
IRUPV FRQFHSWV DQG LGLRPV¶ RI WKH 2OG 7HVWDPHQW ZHUH UHQGHUHG LQWR *UHHN LQ WKH
Septuagint.240 
Translatability and Commensurability 
But having the capacity to enunciate, and from that to go on properly to 
DSSUHKHQG RQ RQH¶V RZQ WHUPV DQ DOWHUQDWLYH SHUVSHFWLYH GRHV QRW JXDUDQWHH WKDW
those who hold that second perspective can also come to apprehend on their own 
terms the views of the first party.  And even where that is achieved, it still does not 
follow automatically that there will be any agreement over questions that are under 
debate between the two linguistic traditions, nor even over how such questions are to 
be posited and addressed.  As MacInW\UH VWUHVVHV µ7R KDYH DFKLHYHG WKLV >EDVLF
communication] is of course not necessarily as yet to have achieved commensurability 
RIVWDQGDUGV¶241  This is a vitally important point:  being able to communicate is not 
the same as being able to find grounds for agreement, or even for agreeing how 
differences should be approached.  For the language-in-use of a community of 
tradition not only entails grammar, vocabulary, and so forth, but is embedded in the 
beliefs, presuppositions, values and practices of a particular tradition.  The concepts 
that hold sway in one tradition may be beyond the ability of another to grasp.242  
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 WJWR, 371. 
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 WJWR, 372. 
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 0DF,QW\UHµ3DUWLDO5HVSRQVH¶, 296. 
242
 Stout illustrates such a case by describing two imaginary groups, one with Kantian 
µPRGHUQLVW¶YLHZVDQRWKHUUDWKHUPDILD-like, and argues that they would find each otheU¶V
concepts of the virtues mutually incomprehensible.  For example, ideas of family loyalty and 
honour within the latter community would be unintelligible to the former ± the whole 
underlying motivation would be conceptually alien, even if such conventions of behaviour 
could be described within their language.  See EaB, Chapter 3.    
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This distinction, and its consequences, is evident in the disagreements within 
the Anglican Communion.  Too often those groups most opposed to one another seem 
to be occupying conceptually different universes, and, further, give the appearance of 
failing to realise ± or, perhaps, acknowledge ± that they tend talk at cross-purposes in 
this way.  This is particularly the case in relation to the handling of the Bible and of 
KLVWRULFGRFWULQDOWUDGLWLRQIRUZKDWWRRQHJURXSDUHWKHµSODLQDQGFDQRQLFDOVHQVH¶RI
6FULSWXUH DQG µWKH IDLWK RQFH DQG IRU DOO GHOLYHUHG WR WKH VDLQWV,¶ DUH QRW RQO\
understood differently by the other, but are apprehended upon different hermeneutical 
bases and through different approaches to tradition and its development.243  It is as if 
they are speaking different conceptual languages rooted in different premises, even 
where they have vocabulary in common.  Where such differences are acknowledged, 
this is often done through characterising differing approaches or conclusions as 
LOOXVWUDWLQJ WKH RWKHU¶V HYDOXDWLYH IDLOLQJV244  The amount of debate where one side 
DWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKHRWKHU¶VFRQFHUQVRQWKHRWKHU¶VWHUPVLVVPDll (and it is open to 
argument over the extent to which this is because the bulk of what is said is 
GHOLEHUDWHO\ GLUHFWHG WR WKH VSHDNHU¶V RZQ FRQVWLWXHQF\ DQG UHLQIRUFLQJ YLHZV KHOG
there, or whether it in fact reflects an underlying unwillingness to engage 
substantively with those holding differing views). 
On the basis of his analyses of translatability and commensurability, 
MacIntyre asserted in WJWR that Donald Davidson had not dealt adequately with the 
distinction between mutual comprehension and the possibilities for reaching 
agreement on substantive evaluative processes, when he argued for the existence of a 
far greater capacity for reciprocal understanding between differing traditions.245  
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 )RUH[DPSOHFRQWUDVWWKHDSSURDFKWDNHQWRERWK6FULSWXUHDQGWUDGLWLRQLQWKHµ)LQDO
6WDWHPHQWDQG-HUXVDOHP'HFODUDWLRQ¶*$)&21DFFHVVHG0D\
www.gafcon.org/news/gafcon_final_statement/, with that of Bishop Katharine Jefferts Schori, 
Presiding Bishop of The Episcopal Church, in an interview:  Bill Moyers Journal, 8 june 2007, 
accessed on 15 May 2011,  www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/06082007/transcript3.html. 
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 Thus, IRUH[DPSOHWKHµ-HUXVDOHP'HFODUDWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRYLHZLQJVDPHVH[UHODWLRQVKLSV
IURPDKXPDQULJKWVSHUVSHFWLYHDVµIDOVHJRVSHO¶ZKLOH%LVKRS-HIIHUWV6FKRULLPSOLHVDODFN
RIµVRPHYHU\VHULRXVVFKRODUVKLS¶DQGIDLOXUHWRWDNHDGHTXDWHDFFRXQWRIFRQWext, in the 
GUDZLQJRIµEODFNDQGZKLWH¶ELEOLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVZLWKZKLFKVKHGLVDJUHHV6RPHOLEHUDO
VFKRODUVKDYHRIFRXUVHDGGUHVVHGWKHSDVVDJHVRI6FULSWXUHWKDWDUHµGLIILFXOW¶LQUHODWLRQWR
same sex relationships (see, for example,  Brian RutWDQµTwo Studies on the Bible and 
Homosexuality¶LQThe Blessing of Same Gender Unions and Holy Scripture: Essays written 
for the Bishop of Niagara and as part of a conversation with Anglicans in Tanzania, compiled 
by The Diocese of Niagara Group, accessed 15 May 2011, 
www.niagara.anglican.ca/Niagara_Rite/docs/Same_Gender_Theology_2nd_Set.pdf, 10-19) but 
sustained consideration of these passages in dialogue, or exploration in evangelical terms of 
human rights concerns and specifically their relationship to human sexuality, are rare. 
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Haldane and Kelly take issue with this brief reference, prompting MacIntyre to spell 
out his position in greater detail; and to explain why the ability to disagree necessitates 
the existence of significant agreement, at least over what constitutes the point at issue 
± and that this requires a considerably greater shared framework than merely the 
DELOLW\WRµVDPHVD\¶246 
 +HUHLQOLHVWKHDQVZHUWRWKRVHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLFVZKRDVNKRZLWLVWKDWKH
can give such detailed analysis of other versions of moral enquiry, while 
simultaneously arguing against commensurability.  For MacIntyre in his own work 
can be seen as aiming to demonstrate the assertion that while linguistic enrichment 
µPD\KDYHPDGHSRVVLEOHDGLDOHFWLFDOH[FKDQJHEHWZHHQWKHWZRULYDOVWDQGSRLQWV¶247 
(which he claims he is doing in offering detailed analysis of the perspectives of both 
liberal/enlightenment and genealogist) it nonetheless offers no guarantee that this will 
lead to both sides being able to understand the other sufficiently adequately to engage 
on and resolve disagreements on moral questions (and thus he sets out his reasons why 
he believes that those of no community of tradition can truly understand his 
arguments).  It is, he asserts, rather the case that the superior tradition ± his own ± may 
well be able to understand the inferior on the terms of both, and also to give a 
comprehensive analysis of the weaknesses of the second, without the second being 
able adequately to apprehend the first. 
Furthermore, we may in this way come to understand why others reach a 
particular view on their own terms, and even to admit that this view is rationally 
justifiable from within their own context, but we may nonetheless still continue to 
believe (and offer good enough reasons for believing) they are wrong in their 
presuppositions and therefore wrong in what they conclude.  For example, we may 
have justifiable grounds for judging that their context or methodology may be too 
limited ± they may have failed to recognise, and so take note of, relevant alternative 
perspectives or approaches, in their own evaluative processes.  While this may be an 
unwitting error of omission, occasions may also arise where, says MacIntyre, one 
tradition simply does not have the capacity to comprehend the viewpoint of another 
without undergoing radical revision.248  The likelihood of disagreement increases with 
WKH GLVSDULW\ EHWZHHQ FRQFHSWLRQV RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV WKH µJRRG¶ DQG WKH µWUXWK¶ LQ
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Paul .HOO\µ0DF,QW\UH
V&ULWLTXHRI8WLOLWDULDQLVP¶LQ+RUWRQ	0HQGXVAfter MacIntyre, 
ZLWKUHSO\DW0DF,QW\UHµ3DUWLDO5HVSRQVH¶  294ff. 
247
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 WJWR, 387-8. 
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relation to human living.249  The other side of the same coin is that the greater the 
agreement on the nature of human flourishing or of our telos, and on the evaluative 
processes and criteria to be employed in considering these concepts, the greater the 
likelihood of substantive dialogue on moral and ethical questions, and the greater the 
likelihood that the two traditions can agree on which overall is superior.   
But, given MacIntyre's approving reference (cited in the previous chapter) to 
$TXLQDV¶YLHZWKDWWKHUHDUHµDWOHDVWDGR]HQ¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\¶VULJKWHQGRI
which all but one are false;  and his general disparagement of other traditions, 
including other long-lived branches of Christian tradition250 and let alone the views of 
those of other faiths or none, one might easily gain the impression that the possibilities 
for substantive dialogue, even among Christians, leading to agreement on ethical 
matters, are little better than slender at the best of times. 
Learning Another Language-in-Use 
Before turning to the question of how we judge where mere communication 
might, however rarely, move into substantive dialogue, there are other questions that 
need to be addressed in relation to MacIntyre's account of translatability and the 
ability of one tradition to understand another as part of its own pursuit of rationality.  
Two of these were raised by Alicia J Roque, who thus prompted important 
elucidations from MacIntyre.251   
 7KH ILUVW LVVXH LVSHUKDSVVRPHWKLQJRIDPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRQ5RTXH¶VSDUW
that she has interpreted MacIntyre's description of the need for members of one 
community of tradition to learn the language-in-use of another as something of a 
general methodology to be followed by everyone in all cases.  As she points out, in 
practice this is often easier said than done.  MacIntyre offers the clarification that 
µWKHUH LV QR task of understanding other cultures in general;  each particular culture 
presents to the inhabitants of each other culture its own specific range of obstacles to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGWKHVHDOVRYDU\ZLWKWKHFXOWXUHRIWKHDVSLULQJLQWHUSUHWHU¶252  Thus 
it is not the case that any and all members of one tradition can, let alone should, 
attempt to learn the language-in-use of any or all other traditions.  This is a task for 
those gifted with appropriate talents and opportunities, in relation to specific pairs of 
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traditions.  A particular individual from one culture, through long immersion in 
another ± µDQ LPPHUVLRQ RIWHQ UHTXLULQJ SURORQJHG UHVLGHQFH LQ WKH DOLHQ FXOWXUH¶ ± 
PD\EH DEOH WR DFTXLUH WKH DELOLW\ µWR FRQMHFWXUH LQ LW MXGJH LQ LW LPDJLQH LQ LW DQG
DUJXHLQLWMXVWDVGRWKRVHZKRVHILUVWODQJXDJHLWLV¶7KHUHLVQRµXQLYHUVDOFDSDFLW\
IRUHLWKHUWUDQVODWLRQRULQWHUFXOWXUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJOHWDORQHDQLQQDWHFDSDFLW\¶,WLV
perhaps a relatively rare occurrence, says MacIntyre, but it can and does happen, and 
this is sufficient justification for the workability of his schema.  Nevertheless, he 
appears to leave us in the position that what is theoretically possible is in practice 
difficult and atypical.      
The obligation upon a community to do its best to ensure rationality through 
engagement with alternative perspectives raises the question of the extent to which, 
first, those who have the capacity to sustain these levels of communication have a 
particular responsibility to consider devoting their time and energies to this work; and, 
second, the community as a whole has a duty to ensure that sufficient numbers of such 
people are adequately resourced (and compensated) for doing so.  The community also 
has an obligation to consider the extent to which it should nurture and develop a 
continuing capacity within its membership.  Failure to address these questions 
adequately undermines the claims of any community of tradition to rationality.   
The Anglican Communion follows such good practice in its devotion of 
resources to sustaining longstanding formal discussions with other communities of 
tradition, both within the wider Christian family, and with those of other faiths.  It 
does so both drawing on existing expertise and also encouraging its development in 
others through its appointments to these ecumenical and inter-faith dialogues.   
There are further lessons here also for inter-Anglican relations.  If efforts to 
hold the Communion together are to be made seriously, then there must be capacity 
IRU HIIHFWLYH µWUDQVODWLRQ¶ EHWZHHQ GLIIHULQJ FRQVWLWXHQFLHV DORQJ Zith a visible 
commitment to this.  It is therefore noteworthy that the membership of the Inter-
Anglican Standing Commission on Unity, Faith and Order, established in 2009, was 
decided only after a deliberate process of consultations around Provinces, with 
appointments then made to ensure representation from every region of the globe, and 
from across the breadth of church traditions.253  That said, the work of IASCUFO in 
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 6HHµ,QWHU-Anglican Standing Commission on Unity, Faith and Order ± ,$6&8)2¶, 
Anglican Communion News Service, 1 July 2009, accessed 15 May 2011, 
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2010 in relation to Anglican identity and the conduct of life within the Communion 
was hampered by the absence of Nigerian and Ugandan members, and the consequent 
lack of engagement with the perspectives they represented.  However, the value of this 
shared Communion-wide commitment has since been undermined in the membership 
of the Standing Commission.  On the one hand, various conservative members have 
withdrawn, arguing WKDWWKH6WDQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VPHPEHUVKLSZDVELDVHGLQIDYRXU
of liberals, with conservative perspectives being inadequately valued.  This has 
(perhaps deliberately?) been something of self-fulfilling prophecy, and strengthened 
grounds for such criticisms.  On the other hand, while remaining members expressed 
µUHJUHW WKDW WKHLU YRLFHV ZRXOG EH PLVVHG DQG WKDW WKH &RPPLWWHH¶V ZRUN ZDV
diminished when it lacked a range of opinion DVZHOODVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶± a view that 
reflects a MacIntyrean understanding ± nonetheless, the sincerity of this concern for 
breadth and representivity was brought into question by decisions on replacement 
members and how these were taken.254  Both actions raise concerns over the extent to 
which either conservatives or liberals are genuinely committed to true dialogue, and 
through this to the possibility of healing the divisions within the Communion.  The 
fundamental importance of mutual trust and genuine commitment to honest, truth-
seeking, dialogue is something which will be addressed in due course when 
considering WKH HVVHQWLDO UROH RI $TXLQDV¶ Srimary principles of natural law (as 
interpreted by MacIntyre) in providing a context for an authentic shared search for 
agreement. 
Language Use and Membership of its Community 
A second, more substantial, point raised by Roque is her identification of an 
apparent contradiction from a philosophical perspective within MacIntyre's account of 
communication through learning the language-in-use of other communities.  For, in 
writing that µ/HDUQLQJLWVODQJXDJHDQGEHLQJLQLWLDWHGLQWRWKHLUFRPPXQLW\¶VWUDGition 
is one and the same thing,¶255  MacIntyre has seemed to indicate that in order to 
become competent in the language-in-use of a community of tradition, one is required 
to become a committed member of that community.  This is so, since the world-view 
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of a tradition (including its understanding of rationality) is intrinsically bound up in 
the life lived out through participation in that tradition, which can only be experienced 
from within.   
On this account, one has, so to speak, both to talk the talk and walk the walk, 
to be able to claim to be living the rational, moral, life.  How is it, then, that one can 
competently learn another language-in-XVHZKLOHUHWDLQLQJDOOHJLDQFH WRRQH¶VKRPH
tradition?  (For 0DF,QW\UH KDV DOVR DVVHUWHG WKDW XQOHVV RQH¶V KRPH WUDGLWLRQ LV
H[SHULHQFLQJVRPHHSLVWHPLFFULVLVWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWRKDYHWRSXWRQH¶VµDOOHJLDQFH
LQ TXHVWLRQ¶ when engaging with another tradition.256  0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI
OHDUQLQJ D µVHFRQG-first-ODQJXDJH¶ WKXV DSSHDUV WR UHTXLUH WKH LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI
simultaneous commitment to two different communities and traditions, each with a 
different understanding of the good, directed towards a differing telos, and different 
lived-out rationalities.257    
In responding to Roque, MacIntyre admits to tension in this area.258  His 
solution, touched on but perhaps without adequate explanation in WJWR, and now 
spelt out in his Reply and subsequent writings, is to look to the example provided by 
anthropologists.  He writes 
«WKURXJKWKHH[HUFLVHRISKLORVRSKLFDODQGPRUDOLPDJLQDWLRQVRPHRQHPD\
on occasion be able to learn what it would be to think, feel and act from the 
standpoint of some alternative or rival standpoint, acquiring in so doing an 
ability to understand her or his own tradition in the perspective afforded by 
that rival.  The analogy here is with the ability of an anthropologist to learn 
not only how to inhabit an alternative and very different culture, but also how 
to view her or his own culture from that alien perspective.259   
7KXV LW LV HQRXJK VD\V 0DF,QW\UH KHUH PHUHO\ WR EH µDW KRPH¶ ZLWKLQ WKH VHFRQG
language and its tradition, and let it speak on its own terms.  Though this may require 
considerable sacrifices in terms of the level of immersion required and readiness at 
least to act in line with the practices of the second tradition, it does not necessitate one 
actually making a personal commitment to all that the second tradition affirms.    
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 It is important to note that even here, anthropologists cannot pretend to be 
viewing the culture they study IURPDQ\VRUWRI µREMHFWLYH¶RU µQHXWUDO¶SRVLWLRQEXW
can only start out from their own context.  They must be honest in admitting this is so, 
LQ RUGHU WR UHFRJQLVH WKHLU RZQ µEDJJDJH¶ DQG LWV LQIOXHQFH RQ KRZ WKH\ GHYHORS D
facility in the new language-in-use.  (Further, of course, if there is to be any dialogue 
between traditions, rather than merely one side attempting to get under the skin of the 
other, then this demands similar honesty in communication with the second tradition.)   
 The consequences of this ability of at least some people from within one 
FRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ WR µVSHDN DQRWKHU VHFRQG ILUVW ODQJXDJH¶ IURP RXWVLGH WKHLU
community are considerable.   
First, from the strict perspective of rationality, it means that there are no 
impediments to certain members of one community having contact and dialogue with 
members of a second community, no matter how reprehensible that community and its 
views may be ± though it may be decided on other grounds that this is inappropriate.  
For a member of one community to speak with another, even to be able to speak with 
DQRWKHU RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH ODWWHU¶V RZQ ODQJXDJH-in-use, carries no automatic 
implications at all about the level of WKHVSHDNHU¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRRUDSSURYDORIWKDW
VHFRQGFRPPXQLW\$UJXPHQWVDERXWµWDLQW¶RUDERXWµJLYLQJVXFFRXU¶WRRWKHUVPXVW
therefore be recognised and acknowledged as being rooted in other considerations, 
such as political or tactical concerns.  It will not do to claim to be rational while 
having blanket bans on all engagement with those of whom one disapproves ± not 
least, because, even in the most abhorrent cases, it is nonetheless possible that there 
may be arguments or perspectives from which the first tradition can stand to learn, and 
have its own claims to moral rational practice strengthened, and there is an obligation 
on the community at least to consider exploring this possibility. 
Furthermore, as MacIntyre argues, the best means of overcoming the 
intolerable is (as with educating the ignorant) through engagement with it and 
persuasion of a better way.  This is not to say that this will be easy, especially in the 
complexities of the public arena, and many other dynamics may come into play, 
including political and media manipulation.  But it does mean that, all other things 
being equal, our overall approach of pursuing the best possible answers to the 
questions of how we ought to live, through, inter alia, the basic assumption of always 
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promoting substantive rational moral debate as far as we are able, is not invalidated or 
threatened by the unacceptable views of those with whom we engage.260 
Yet it is not easy to make clear that this is an acceptable course of action in 
practice.  This is evident within Anglicanism, where some argue that differences have 
EHFRPH VR JUHDW DV WR UHVXOW LQ ZKDW DUH HIIHFWLYHO\ WZR GLIIHUHQW µFRPPXQLWLHV RI
WUDGLWLRQ¶.  Thus some conservatives refuse to participate in any Communion-wide 
meetings, as long as representatives of The Episcopal Church are not excluded.   
On the other hand, in µ7KH&KDOOHQJHDQG+RSHRI%HLQJDQ$QJOLFDQ7RGD\¶
5RZDQ:LOOLDPVGHVFULEHGZKDWKHVDZDVWKHµSROLWLFLVDWLRQ of a theological dispute 
WDNLQJ WKH SODFH RI UHDVRQHG UHIOHFWLRQ¶261  Here (as elsewhere262) he argues that 
fundamentally unity and truth are inseparable, and both will only be fully realised in 
the ultimate telos found in Jesus Christ.  We cannot pursue truth through turning our 
backs on one another, especially not on those with whom our lives are already bound 
up, through our shared unity with Christ.  He implicitly adviseVDJDLQVWJLYLQJWUXWKµD
KLJKHU YDOXH WKDQ XQLW\¶ DQG WKRXJK DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW LQ FHUWDLQ FDVHV µLW LV
understandable that [some] are prepared to risk the breakage of a unity they can only 
VHH DV IDOVH RU FRUUXSW¶, he cautionV WKDW µLW LV QHYHU HDV\ WR UHFRJQLVH ZKHQ WKH
moment of inevitable separation has arrived ± to recognise that this is the issue on 
ZKLFK\RXVWDQGRUIDOODQG WKDW WKLV LV WKHJUHDW LVVXHRIIDLWKIXOQHVV WR WKHJRVSHO¶
Further, he warns against separation as a constructive way of dealing with differences 
within what he considers ought to be a united (though by no means uniform) body: 
µRQFH\RX¶YHORVWWKHLGHDWKDW\RXQHHGWRWU\WRUHPDLQWRJHWKHULQRUGHUWRILQGWKH
fullest possible truth, what do you appeal to in the local situation when serious 
GLYLVLRQWKUHDWHQV"¶+LVLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKDWWKHUHLVQRZKHUHWKen to go.  (The former 
Archbishop of Cape Town has similarly argued for Anglicans to keep wrestling 
together ± pointing out how arguing face to face enabled his own Province to remain 
united even through life-threatening disagreements over apartheid, whereas historic 
divisions on other issues became irreversibly institutionalised.263) 
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But :LOOLDPV¶ conservative critics would argue that the point of inevitable 
separation has been passed, for disagreements on human sexuality are merely part of 
µWKH DFFHSWDQFH DQGSURPRWLRQ« RI«D IDOVH JRVSHO¶264 which is heterodox in its 
&KULVWRORJ\VRWHULRORJ\DQGPRUH7KHUHIRUHWRVD\WKH\DUHµRXWRIFRPPXQLRQZLWK
ELVKRSVDQGFKXUFKHVWKDWSURPRWHWKLVIDOVHJRVSHO¶LVPHUHO\WRUHFRJQLVHWKDWWKHUH
is such divergence in the construal of teleology (in the MacIntyrean sense) that they 
can no longer be considered as belonging to the same community of tradition.  If one 
accepts this judgement, then it could be argued that their decision to withdraw from 
dialogue is not so much a refusal to pursue rationality through maximising potential 
engagement with new perspectives, but rather an insistence that it is irrational to 
proceed with what purports to be substantial ethical debate when there is inadequate 
agreement on telos to sustain this.  Since this disagreement, from their perspective, 
largely arises from inappropriate handling of Scripture and attitudes to culture, it is 
also pointless to participate in the Continuing Indaba project, since this will never 
reach conclusions because of inadequate commonality ± indeed, considerable 
divergence ± in hermeneutics and so in evaluative processes.   
In other words, if all this is so, the two groups DUHQRWFDSDEOHRIµVSHDNLQJWKH
VDPH ODQJXDJH¶ WR DQ\ XVHIXO GHJUHH, and must engage as members of separate 
traditions, through pursuing bilingualism.     
Going On and Going Further:  Being Good Enough 
 $IXUWKHUSUREOHPSRVHG WR0DF,QW\UH¶V FRQFHSWRIELOLQJXDOLVPDULVHV IURP
the perspective of linguistic studies.  He concedes that, apart from the case of those 
who are brought up bilingually as children, very few, if any, adults are likely to 
develop true fluency in two first languages265.  He therefore must explain more 
carefully what the sufficient competence he requires in a second first language might 
LQ SUDFWLFH HQWDLO  ,W LV KH VD\V WKH DELOLW\ IXOO\ WR µLQKDELW¶ WKH VHFRQG FXOWXUH ± 
knowing what it would be to think, feel and act from the alternative standpoint.   
 The test of this, says MacIntyre, is being sufficiently at home within a 
WUDGLWLRQ WKDW RQH NQRZV µKRZ WR JR RQ DQG JR IXUWKHU¶ ± whether linguistically 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJµVXFKGLVWLQFWLRQVDVWKRVHEHWZHHQWKHOLWHUDODQGWKHPHWDSKRULFDOWKH
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joking, the ironic, and the straightforward, and later, when the going becomes 
theRUHWLFDOWKHDQDORJLFDOWKHXQLYRFDODQGWKHHTXLYRFDO¶266), or in terms of knowing 
how to behave appropriately in response to a particular situation.267  %HLQJDEOHWRµJR
RQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶LQWKLVZD\LVWKH LQGLFDWRURIZKHWKHURQH¶VDELOLW\ LQWKHVHFRQd 
language-in-use is good enough (my emphasis) for being able to engage not only in 
samesaying, but to embark on the substantive processes of considering questions of 
communication, translatability, commensurability and true dialogue with first-
language speakers of this language-in-use. 
 Being good enough is a far lower bar than MacIntyre at first appeared to set, 
ZKHQKHZURWHRIQHHGLQJWROHDUQDµVHFRQGILUVWODQJXDJH¶7KHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUWKLV
occurring are inevitably wider than under the narrower criteria for bilingualism as 
initially described.  Thus, when it comes to understanding another tradition on its own 
terms, and knowing that one has so understood it, the degree of competence in the 
second language-in-use which is required is considerably less than might have been 
supposed from MacIntyre's initial analysis.    
 It is my contention that this suppleness between the absolutes of stark theory 
and actual practice is fundamental to the capacity of MacIntyre's whole project to 
have tangible applicability in the actual situations of twenty-first century life.   
This is the key insight at the heart of this thesis.  Recognising this enables a 
IDUPRUHIUXLWIXOLQVWDQWLDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSURDFKWKDQLV generally assumed from 
his writing (in which he has a tendency to overstate what he asserts, setting it up 
against worst case scenarios of what he denies268).  It is what bridges the gap between 
WKH LGHDO IRUZKLFKZHVWULYHDQG WKHSUDFWLFDEOHµQH[WVWHS¶ WKDWZHPXVW WDNHIURP
whatever place we find ourselves in.  In developing this thesis, I shall aim to show that 
this not only applies in this particular case of engaging with the perspectives of 
another tradition, but far more comprehensively in our dealings with those of other 
traditions or, indeed, of none.  We should go forward, using MacIntyre against 
himself, so to speak, in this way, with far more optimistic expectation of the 
possibilities of fruitful outcomes, notwithstanding the often substantial difficulties that 
nonetheless have to be overcome in such dialogues. 
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Reality and Utopia 
Yet we should not be surprised at this apparent stepping back from the high 
standards of abstract theory, since there has been a similar implicit ± though largely 
unacknowledged ± DFFHSWDQFH RIEHLQJ µJRRG HQRXJK¶ RU µJRRG HQRXJK IRUQRZ¶DW
other points in MacIntyre's methodology   Thus, for example, I noted in the last 
chapter that while from the theoretical standpoint MacIntyre insists that each 
community is required to strive for the fullest possible realisation of morality and 
practical rationality, nonetheless this will always remain intrinsically partial, 
SURYLVLRQDO SHUVSHFWLYDO DQG IODZHG E\ KXPDQLW\¶V LQKHUHQW VKRUWFRPLQJV DQG \HW
still be good enough to be justifiable.   
Even so, the ideal and the reality must be held together in creative tension, 
argues MacIntyre.  Thus, while accepting that his account of fully functioning 
FRPPXQLWLHVRIWUDGLWLRQPD\EHLQVRPHVHQVH8WRSLDQKHVWLOODVVHUWVWKDWµWU\LQJWR
OLYH E\ 8WRSLDQ VWDQGDUGV LV QRW 8WRSLDQ¶269  In this way, though we must direct 
ourselves towards an aspirational telos, we do so recognising that we will never fully 
achieve it.  Furthermore, our apprehension of this goal is always to some degree 
inadequate and itself permanently in need of refinement, not only because of the need 
to respond to evolving circumstances, but also because of human finitude and failings.  
Yet, as noted in the last chapter, MacIntyre concludes that these inevitable 
shortcomings neither fatally compromise our pursuit of aQ µDGHTXDWH PRUDOLW\¶ QRU
our assertion of rationality:  given the reality of human limitations, both may be fully 
justifiable, if we are striving sufficiently towards our ideal standards. 
 MacIntyre's realistic appreciation of, and accommodation with, the disjunction 
between ideal and actuality is vitally necessary in helping inform how, in practice, we 
live out our commitment to a dynamic trajectory towards ever greater understanding 
DQG SXUVXLW RI µ+RZ WKHQ VKRXOG ZH OLYH"¶ ZKLFK UDWLRQDO MXVWLILDELOLW\ requires.  
MacIntyre asserts, and rightly, that while acknowledging that we never actually reach 
a full and final answer,270 ZH PXVW QRQHWKHOHVV DOZD\V µGR RXU EHVW¶ LQ SXUVLQJ WKH
truthfulness and rationality that find expression in just and moral living, directed 
towards human flourishing (all these being inseparable elements of the whole).  But 
ZKLOHZHPXVWHQVXUHZHµDFFRUGWRWKHJRRGRIWUXWKDSODFHWKDWGRHVQRWDOORZLWWR
EHRYHUULGGHQE\RWKHUJRRGV¶WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQVD\V0DF,QW\UHWKDWµWKH pursuit of 
truth always takes precedence over all other types of activity.  That would be absurd.  
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There is a time to enquire and a time not to enquire, but instead to catch fish or sing 
WKHEOXHVRUZKDWHYHU¶271   <HWZKLOH0DF,QW\UHJRHVRQWRVD\WKDWµa more adequate 
understanding in respect of truth is always to be preferred to a less adequate 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶LWVHHPVLPSOLFLWLQKLVZULWLQJWKDWDVORQJDVWKLVFRPPLWPHQWJXLGHV
our behaviour and our ordering of our priorities, adequate for the moment can actually 
be good enough.272   
 But how good is good enough?  This is a question of fundamental importance 
to our claims to justifiable, rational, morality, which poses itself in a number of ways ± 
not only in relation to speaking a second first language ± which I shall outline in the 
rest of this section, and then consider in further detail (including how we might reach 
answers) later in this and subsequent, chapters. 
 First, it is a question that a tradition must ask of itself.  Considering whether 
we are directing our time and our energies appropriately is, as has been noted, 
LQHYLWDEO\ DQ LQWHJUDO SDUW RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V RQ-going requirement to reflect on our 
reflective processes.  As one part of this, a tradition must ask itself whether it is 
engaging sufficiently, and sufficiently well, with others:  have we understood them 
enough to recognise and respond to the challenges they pose to us?   
 6HFRQG LW PXVW EH DSSOLHG LQ YDULRXV ZD\V WR D WUDGLWLRQ¶V DWWHPSWV WR
conduct substantive dialogue with others.  How closely aligned do communities of 
tradition have to be, what degree of agreement are we require to share in our 
understandings of human flourishing, the common good and our appropriate telos, and 
in our evaluative processes and standards, for us to be able to engage substantively on 
moral questions?  Or, to view it from the other side of the coin, how do we recognise 
when there is insufficient common ground between us and another tradition?  How 
closely is some human network or association required tR FRQIRUP WR 0DF,QW\UH¶V
criteria for a community of tradition, for us to have sufficient shared grounds for 
substantive dialogue? 
This is a particular problem in relation to contemporary democratic society.  
In Chapter XVII of WJWR µ/LEHUDOLVP 7UDQVIRUPHG LQWR D 7UDGLWLRQ¶ 0DF,QW\UH
appears to allow that, though seriously flawed, liberalism can indeed be viewed as a 
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tradition within his sense of the term.273  But later in the same book, and to a greater 
degree through other subsequent writings, he argues that, not least in its assertion of 
context-neutral standards of rationality and evaluation, it is an inimical environment to 
the sort of debate that moral rationality requires.  Insofar that this is the case, the 
consequence would be that those whose primary community is some form of 
liberalism are rendered incapable of engaging in such debate.274  What is more, the 
state as generally constituted in contemporary western democracies is also a context 
which impedes such debate, for reasons including its liberal presuppositions, its goals 
of power, economic gain and bureaucratic efficiency, its compartmentalisation and 
professionalisation of life, and the sheer scale of its operations.275  The questions of 
whether, how far, or under what circumstances, contemporary liberal democratic 
societies can be considered as communities of tradition for the purposes of substantive 
moral discourse are the focus of the following chapter.   
 A related issue is the language employed by those who are not members of a 
community of tradition, and how far this can be considered the sort of coherent 
language-in-use which MacIntyre considers necessary for rational moral discourse.  
Just as there is no context neutral perspective from which to discuss ethical issues, so 
too there is no neutral language-in-use which can be used for this purpose.  What 
0DF,QW\UHUHIHUVWRDVµLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHGODQJXDJHV¶VXFKDVWKHVLPSOLILHGYHUVLRQRI
English that is the common currency of much of international commerce, certainly do 
not have this capacity, he argues.  International English is generally not the mother 
tongue of those who employ it, who require only sufficient grasp of grammar and 
vocabulary necessary to transact exchanges within their specific area of interest.  It sits 
lightly to any particular tradition or culture, and its lack of depth indicates the 
shallowness of shared world view which its users require in order to conduct business 
VDWLVIDFWRULO\ 0DF,QW\UHGHVFULEHV WKLVDVUHIOHFWLQJ WKHµWKLQQHU¶VKDUHGZRUOGYLHZ
RIµPRGHUQLW\¶which, he argues is insufficiently developed to provide the foundations 
of a community of tradition or any debate of substance around matters of ethics and 
values.276  However, between such somewhat artificial language use and that of 
mother tongue speakers within the setting of their own community, language may be 
used in a variety of registers, for example, in professional settings such as law courts 
or medicine or, more pertinent to us, the conduct of politics and public life.  Some are 
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what Stout calls µPRUDO ODQJXDJHV¶, having at least some capacity to convey social 
practices and internal goods.277  The question of where, across this range, the capacity 
for commensurability in discussing rational morality can, and cannot, be sustained, is 
one to which I now turn.  These modes of speech bring their own challenges to 
translation to which we shall return when considering further the means for discussing 
ethical questions within such contexts. 
Good Enough for Ourselves 
 So then, how do members of a community of tradition judge, first of all, 
ZKHWKHU WKH\ KDYH EHHQ µJRRG HQRXJK¶ LQ WKHLU HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK DOWHUQDWLYH
perspectives, through an adequate approximation of bilingualism, to claim to have 
understood and overcome the potential challenges offered by another community of 
tradition?   
 Continuing reflection on whether we have understood another tradition 
adequately enough to recognise and respond to the challenges they pose to us, and also 
on the assessment process itself, is a necessary part of the wider requirement for on-
JRLQJ UHIOHFWLRQ RI RXU FRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ¶V HYDOXDWLYH SUDFWLFHV.  Questions of 
ZKHWKHUZHDUHµJRRGHQRXJK¶DSSO\QRWRQO\WRWKHGHJUHHRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJZHKDYH
of others, but to the whole conduct of our reflective processes and the way we live out 
our lives, including in the allocation of our resources, whether of time and energy, or 
of our material assets.   
 Fortunately, we are not obliged to resort to optimising complex calculations 
with potentially almost endless variables, each of which must be given carefully 
calibrated appropriate weight within this calculation!  In practice, learning how to be 
µJRRG HQRXJK¶ LV RQH DVSHFW RI WKH VNLOOV RISUDFWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ LQ ZKLFK FRPSHWHQW
members of the community train its children and new members.  In chapter 5, I return 
to the wider issue RIZKDWLWPHDQVIRUDFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQWREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶
in every respect, but in this chapter I continue to focus on questions of engagement 
with other perspectives, and what it means to be able tRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ 
 It is my contention that we have the clearest indication of the scope of 
adequacy at the point where we discover, for whatever reason, that we cannot go on 
and go further.   
                                                             
277
 AV, 3. 
101 
 
Herein lies the second key contention of my thesis.  Building on the earlier 
LQVLJKW WKDW LQ SUDFWLFH 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK SRWHQWLDOO\ KDV IDU PRUH IUXLWIXO
application than might at first be thought, I now argue that this additionally entails an 
obligation (subject to considerations that arise on other grounds) to endeavour to 
proceed as far as possible in engagement with others.  One has to keep on attempting 
WRJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHUXQWLOVRPHGLIILFXOW\RIIOXHQF\LVHQFRXQWHUHG$WUDGLWLRQ¶V
commitment to ensuring its members are trained in the craft of self-reflection, in 
pursuit of ethical rationality, would include requiring those who are engaged in these 
processes of translation to take continuing prudent care to check that they have rightly 
understood.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that, prior to meeting some point of 
difficulty, they are indeed good enough in their linguistic skills.  When difficulties are 
encountered, the first response should be to attempt more detailed or imaginative 
same-saying, innovation and enrichment (as MacIntyre has proposed), so that concepts 
from a second tradition can be rendered comprehensible in the first.  Perhaps 
inadequate resources have been given to the task (this is itself a failure in rationality).  
Perhaps the lack may lie in the ability of the individuals concerned ± and others can 
help them overcome the challenge.   
It is also possible to see the Continuing Indaba project as arising from a 
commitment to improve µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ within Anglicanism in precisely this way, 
following recognition that commXQLFDWLRQEHWZHHQ$QJOLFDQVZDVQRWµJRRGHQRXJK¶
For, as Williams has noted,278 $QJOLFDQLVPµKDVWULHGWRILQGDZD\RIEHLQJD&KXUFK
« WKDW LV VHHNLQJ WREH D FRKHUHQW IDPLO\ RI FRPPXQLWLHV« ZH KDYH WULHG WREH D
family of Churches willing to learn from each other across cultural divides, not 
assuming that European (or American or African) wisdom is what settles everything, 
opening up the lives of Christians here to the realities of Christian experience 
HOVHZKHUH «¶ ,Q WKHRU\ WKLV REMHFWLYH DOLJQV ZHOO ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V SURFHVVHV
However, as Williams acknowledges, the way that the Anglican Communion has 
pursued such exchanges through informal processes and relationships has proved in 
some respects inDGHTXDWHIRUFRSLQJZLWK WKH µGLYHUVLW\RIYLHZV WKDW will inevitably 
DULVHLQDZRUOGRUUDSLGJOREDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGKXJHFXOWXUDOYDULHW\¶:LOOLDPV¶
remedy is precisely in line with what MacIntyre would recommend ± to call for 
greater clarity around processes of understanding, of our telos and of our evaluative 
SURFHVVHV µ7KHWDFLWFRQYHQWLRQVEHWZHHQXVQHHGVSHOOLQJRXW± not for the sake of 
VRPHFHQWUDOPHFKDQLVPRIFRQWUROEXWVRWKDWZHKDYHZD\VRIEHLQJVXUHWKDWZH¶UH
still talking the same language,¶ in other words, ensuring mutual bilingualism.  For we 
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need to be µDZDUH RI EHORQJLQJ WR WKH RQH KRO\ FDWKROLF DQG DSRVWROLF &KXUFK RI
Christ,¶all of which are markers of how we see our ultimate identity and telos.  µ,WLV
becoming urgent to work at what adequate structures for decision-making might look 
like,¶he adds ± in other words, we must reflect on our evaluative processes.  That all 
WKLVUHTXLUHVDGHJUHHRIELOLQJXDOLVPLVUHIOHFWHGLQKLVFRQWHQWLRQWKDWµZHQHHGZD\V
of translating this underlying sacramental communion into a more effective 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOUHDOLW\¶279   
But the point may come where members of a community of tradition find that 
WKH\FDQQRWµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ LQ WKHLUDWWHPSWV WRXQGHUVWDQGDQGRYHUFRPHWKH
potential challenges of another tradition, despite all these efforts.  For inability to go 
RQDQGJRIXUWKHUPD\EHURRWHGLQGHHSHUVWUXFWXUDOLVVXHVDFFRUGLQJWR0DF,QW\UH¶V
DFFRXQW  ,Q WKH µZRUVW FDVH¶ a tradition may not have the capacity to grasp the 
perspectives and understandings of another, despite significant enrichment and 
adoption from the latter.  In some cases, bilingual members of the tradition will 
recognise the latter as superior, in which case the tradition will find itself at the point 
of epistemological crisis outlined in the previous chapter, where it must abandon much 
of its past and adopt the superior approach, if it is to continue to lay claim to moral 
rational living.  Or it may be that its bilingual members conclude that the degree of 
disagreement around both telos and evaluative standards are so great that there is 
insurmountable incommensurability and other strategies will have to be employed for 
communication and assessing moral rationality ± strategies to which I turn in chapters 
4 and 5.  
Where there has been inability to go forward together as Anglicans, some 
might argue that the problem is not so much bilingualism within the Communion as 
the question of whether divergence has been so great as to take us beyond questions of 
whether each group has made adequate efforts to understood the other on both its own 
DQGWKHRWKHU¶VWHUPVin order to substantiate its claim to rationality, and instead into 
the field of assessing whether there is potential for commensurability and effective 
communication.    
Good Enough Commensurability 
Take the case where a tradition is pursing rational moral living, able 
adequately to comprehend and respond to the challenges raised by alternative 
perspectives, and so is justifiable in its claims to superiority.  Its task then becomes to 
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persuade other traditions, which it believes it has overcome, of the superiority of its 
own viewpoint through substantive dialogue.  It is to such substantive dialogue that 
the Anglican Bishops are committed, once they have thus honed their understanding 
of their faith and how it should be instantiated within their own context.  For their aim 
is advocacy ± first, to inform others of their own perspectives, but then to go on to 
persuade them that these perspectives are superior, so that they may change attitudes, 
actions and policies, for the common good of all.  It would be irrational to be justified 
LQ EHOLHYLQJ RQH¶V WUDGLWLRQ WR EH VXSHULRU WR RWKHUV DQG WKen decline to attempt to 
persuade others of this. 
As has been noted, MacIntyre argues that to move from communication to 
substantive debate on moral questions requires both a shared understanding of an 
appropriate telos towards which enquiry and human life are directed, and common 
standards of evaluation:  D µVKDUHG SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ RI WKH FRQWHQGLQJ HQTXLULHV LQ
respect of WUXWK¶280 that is, truth as exposed to dialectical testing against all possible 
questions and objections.281 
 The question we must therefore ask is what level of agreement on standards of 
rational evaluation, and on telos is adequate in practice?  How do we judge?  My view 
is that, as with bilingualism, it is only through the attempt to move from 
communication to substantive moral dialogue that we will discover whether indeed we 
KDYHVXIILFLHQWVKDUHGUHVRXUFHVEHWZHHQWZRFRPPXQLWLHVIRUµNQRZLQJKRZWRJRRQ
and go IXUWKHU¶RUZKHUHRXUOLPLWDWLRQVOLH282  Indeed, analysis of the points at which 
we find we cannot go onward can, in my view, provide diagnostic tools for clarifying 
the nature of the difficulties of commensurability we face, and indicating the sorts of 
communicative strategies that can be pursued to maximise the potential level of 
substantive dialogue.   
 What this might mean in practice can be illustrated by some examples first 
from within Anglican pursuit of ecumenical relations, where one might expect it to be 
possible to assume a very high degree of agreement on KXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWHtelos and 
                                                             
280
 0DF,QW\UHµ3DUWLDO5HVSRQVH¶- emphasis in the original. 
281
 WJWR, 358. 
282
 Here I am assuming that when Stout asserts that a relatively limited agreement on the good 
± i.e. our telos ± can be understood as holding together moral discourse within society, he is 
aspiring not only to dialectical exchange, but the basis for considerable areas of agreement 
µRUGLQDU\MXVWLILFDWRU\ZRUN¶ZLWKLQGLYHUVHVRFLHW\HYHQWKRXJKWKLVPD\QRWµHOLPLQDWH
disagreement on many matters of iPSRUWDQFH¶AV, 213. 
104 
 
evaluative hermeneutical processes, and then from Christian-Muslim and Christian-
Jewish dialogue. 
Ecumenical Relations 
  :LOOLDPVFODLPHGLQµ7KH&KDOOHQJHDQG+RSe of being an Anglican Today¶ 
WKDW LQVRIDU DV WKH $QJOLFDQ &RPPXQLRQ VXFFHHGV LQ EHLQJ D µFRKHUHQW IDPLO\ RI
FRPPXQLWLHV « D IDPLO\ RI FKXUFKHV ZLOOLQJ WR OHDUQ IURP HDFK RWKHU¶ DFURVV WKH
breadth of our reflective engagement with Scripture, reason and tradition, drawing on 
our Catholic and Reformed heritages and practices, and culturally engaged across all 
the cultures in which we find ourselves, then this gives us a basis of some integrity for 
µXVHIXODQGQHFHVVDU\TXHVWLRQVWRH[SORUHZLWK5RPDQ&DWKROLFLVP«DQGWRSRVHWR
classical European Protestantism, to fundamentalism, and to liberal Protestant 
SOXUDOLVP¶<HWZHGRVRIURPDSRVLWLRQWKDWUHPDLQVµIUDJLOHDQG«SURYLVLRQDO¶± as 
MacIntyre would demand. 
 Within ecumenical dialogue, Williams assumes a considerable degree of 
mutuality and reciprocity, as should be expected where there is very close alignment 
of telos and evaluative practices ± indeed, considerable belief that though our 
proximate enunciation of our telos may differ, it is one that wHXOWLPDWHO\ VKDUH µLQ
&KULVW¶  µ7KHKHDUWRIRXUVHDUFKIRUXQLW\ LV YHU\VLPSO\ WKHVHDUFKIRU WKDWVLOHQFH
where we are able together to hear the voice of Jesus ... We try to listen to Jesus in one 
another, to hear what Jesus Christ is saying to us through the mouth of a stranger, 
VRPHERG\ ZLWK DQRWKHU OR\DOW\ DQRWKHU WKHRORJ\¶283  So alongside the 
acknowledgement that we are separate communities of tradition, there is expectation 
that we will be able to explore ultimate questions with considerable easeDVZHµWDON
DERXWWKHWKLQJVWKDWLQWHUHVWXVGLYLGHXVHQWKXVHXVDQGDWWLPHV«WDONRQHDQRWKHU
LQWR H[KDXVWLRQ¶ 0RUH WKDQ WKLV DVZH GR VRZH FDQ KHOS HDFKRWKHU OLVWHQ WR WKH
µYRLFHZKLFK LV GHYDVWDWLQJO\FULWLFDORI WKHVHOI-deceit of so many kinds of religion, 
devastatingly critical of self-righteousness and self-VDWLVIDFWLRQ¶  :LOOLDPV ULJKWO\
points to the need together to retain a healthy self-suspicion recognising that those 
who share similar perspectives may be particularly prone to reiQIRUFLQJRQHDQRWKHU¶V
blind spots. 
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 This starting point of considerable agreement is evident in the language of 
µZH¶ RI FRPPRQ LQWHUHVWV DQG SHUVSHFWLYHV VKDUHG YRFDEXODU\ DQG WKHRORJ\
HPSOR\HGDFURVV:LOOLDPV¶PDQ\HFXPHQLFDODGGUHVVHV284  Yet he also intentionally 
EULQJVWKHIRFXVRQWRTXHVWLRQVDURXQGDUHDVZKHUHWKHUHPD\EHGLIILFXOWLHVLQµJRLQJ
RQDQGJRLQJIXUWKHU¶LQRUGHUWRRSHQXSSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUGHHSHQLQJHQJDJHPHQW2QH
particular example of this is found in an address given at the invitation of the 
Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity.285  +HUHDIWHUDIILUPLQJWKHµVWULNLQJ
FRQYHUJHQFH¶ LQ WKH DJUHHG VWDWHPHQWV RI WKH 5RPDQ &DWKROLF &KXUFK DQG LWV
ecumenical partners since the Second Vatican Council, about the nature of the Church 
of God, he challenges Anglicans and Catholics to consider: 
whether in the light of that depth of agreement, the issues that still divide us 
have the same weight ± issues about authority in the Church, about primacy 
(especially the unique position of the pope), and the relations between the 
ORFDO FKXUFKHV DQG WKH XQLYHUVDO FKXUFK LQ PDNLQJ GHFLVLRQV « $UH WKH\
theological questions in the same sense as the bigger issues on which there is 
already clear agreement?  «7KHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUDQGKow we can 
SURSHUO\ WHOO WKH GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ³VHFRQG RUGHU´ DQG³ILUVW RUGHU´ LVVXHV
When so very much agreement has been firmly established in first-order 
matters about the identity and mission of the Church, is it really justifiable to 
treat other issues as equally vital for its health and integrity?286    
In this way, Williams encourages the parties to reflect together not only on content 
and practice of our faith traditions (the beliefs and social practices of our communities, 
WRXVH0DF,QW\UH¶VWHUPLnology), but also on the reflective processes we follow, both 
separately and in partnership.  This is precisely the way forward that a MacIntyrean 
approach would advocate with the recognition that deeper consideration of our 
reflective processes may well offer the key to overcoming apparent differences at the 
surface.  When we understand the reasons why others say and do certain things, 
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especially when we share similar reasoning processes, directed towards similar goals, 
within our own historically situated context, we may well find that their actions and 
utterances are far less in contradiction to our own than we had at first imagined. 
Lessons from Ecumenical Relations 
 Implicit in the approach Williams encourages is the presupposition that we 
should pursue HFXPHQLFDOGLDORJXHZLWKWKHH[SHFWDWLRQRIEHLQJDEOHWRµJRRQDQGJR
IXUWKHU¶  7KHUH DUH RI FRXUVH GHHS WKHRORJLFDO UHDVRQV RI HVFKDWRORJLFDO KRSH DQG
promise, for this.  As he puts it at the Willebrands Symposium, µWKHHFXPHQLFDOJODVV
is genuinely half-IXOO¶:HVKRXOGDOZD\VSURFHHGZLWKRSWLPLVP 
 To do so is also the most rational approach to take, in MacIntyrean terms ± 
though this does not appear to have been recognised explicitly by MacIntyre himself.  
For, first of all, attempting to go forward may often take us smoothly far farther than 
we had expected.  Second, it is only by going as far as we can that we discover 
whether and where we may encounter points of difficulty.  And then, it is through 
clarifying the points of difficulty, and working to understand why these have arisen ± 
singly and jointly, through attempting our analyses in our own language-in-use and 
also in that of our dialogue partner ± that we will find the best route to maximising 
mutual understanding:  both to recognising the extent of our shared perspectives, and 
to increasing our ability to learn from one another and draw on the best which we have 
to offer one another.  This is the third fundamental assertion of this thesis. 
 7RDWWHPSWWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶LQPRUDOUational dialogue with others is 
not only the best means of realising whatever potential exists for achieving agreement, 
it also offers the possibility of increasing the scope of moral rationality beyond that 
which existed prior to making the attempt.      
 The converse is also true.  If we refrain from attempting to go on and go 
further, or draw back at the prospect of encountering difficulties, we cut ourselves off 
from making whatever gains are open to us.  We fall short in our integrity, and we fall 
short in promoting a better answer, for ourselves and for those with whom we could 
RWKHUZLVHHQJDJHWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQRIµKRZWKHQVKDOOZHOLYH"¶ 
 Of course, the decision to engage in dialogue, and to attempt to go further 
together, especially where we know that we will encounter differences that may be 
difficult, challenging, even painful, to face and attempt to overcome, is not merely one 
of rational morality.  But knowing that rational morality is, so to speak, on our side, 
can be an encouragement to us to promote a context in which we can dare to attempt 
107 
 
going forward.  This would include such aspects as building mutual trust; committing 
ourselves to pursuing learning and truth with openness, transparency and honesty; 
acknowledging our shared pXUVXLWRI µWKH FRPPRQJRRG¶ LQ WHUPVRI*RG¶VXOWLPDWH
telos for us;  acting and speaking with respect and giving assurances to uphold mutual 
undertakings.      
 All of these, says MacIntyre, are the common sense preconditions for all 
effective human relationships, and so therefore of shared rational enquiry of every sort 
± from enquiry conducted within traditions, through to that between, for example, 
moral philosophers of widely differing perspectives.  Furthermore, he argues, they 
FRQIRUPWR$TXLQDV¶SULmary precepts of natural law, being of universal application, 
exceptionlessness, self-evident for everyone, and presupposed rather than derived 
from enquiry.287  The indispensible value of these in promoting dialogue between 
those who do not come from commensurable communities of tradition is something to 
which I shall return in chapter 6. 
Interfaith Dialogue 
 Recent Christian-Muslim exchanges illustrate how such an approach can work 
where there is a realisation that, though there is much in common, the precise breadth 
and depth of this is less assured and less well understood and acknowledged.  That 
there is indeed expectation that it is possible to proceed on a basis of considerable 
VKDUHGJURXQGLVHYLGHQWHYHQIURPWKHWLWOHRIWKHOHQJWK\PHVVDJHµ$&RPPRn Word 
%HWZHHQ8VDQG<RX¶ZKLFKZDVLVVXHGE\DEURDGFURVV-section of Muslim scholars 
LQ2FWREHUZLWKWKHVWDWHGLQWHQWLRQRIµGHFODU>LQJ@WKHFRPPRQJURXQGEHWZHHQ
&KULVWLDQLW\DQG,VODP¶288  In July 2008 Williams, as Archbishop of Canterbury, made 
a substantive response.289  The tone and content of both documents, with the way each 
attempts to engage with the other, through exploring issues from both their own and 
WKH RWKHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH distinctly reflects the sort of processes that MacIntyre 
advocates be followed between two traditions.   
:LOOLDPV¶FKRLFHRIWLWOHµ$&RPPRQ:RUGIRUWKH&RPPRQ*RRG¶HFKRHG
WKH HDUOLHU GRFXPHQW¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV RI FRPPRQDOLW\ DQG WKHQ GLUHFWHG GLVFXVVLRQ
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towards consideration of how human flourishing is understood within the two 
traditions.  This is, of course, one of the two key issues (the other being evaluative 
standards) around which the potential for substantive engagement hinges, according to 
MacIntyre.  Within the paper, he focused on five areas of the Muslim text which he 
considered might be fruitfully for further consideration:   
1. the love and praise of God, including for all of creation;   
2. ORYHRIQHLJKERXUURRWHGLQWKHORYHRI*RGZKLFKVD\V:LOOLDPVµVXJJHVWV
that we share a clear passion for the common good of all humanity and all 
creation¶;  
3. for each faith community to share from the heart of its tradition how they 
understand, study and use their Scriptures; 
4. KRZ KRZHYHU PXFK RU OLWWOH µFRPPRQ JURXQG¶ LV LQLWLDOO\ VHQVHG WR EXLOG
practices of relating to each other, each from the heart of their own faith, 
µUHVSHFWLQJ DQG GLVFXVVLQJ GLIIHUHQFHV UDWKHU WKDQ LPSULVRQLQJ RXUVHOYHV LQ
mutual fear and suspicion¶; 
5. DFNQRZOHGJLQJDQGEXLOGLQJWRJHWKHURQWKH0XVOLP¶VWHQWDWLYHLGHQWLILFDWLRQ
RIµWKHFHQWUHRID VHQVHRIVKDUHGFDOOLQJDQGVKDUHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶LQORYLQJ
God and neighbour.  
It is not hard to see in these a focus on questions around human flourishing here and 
now and its relationship with an ultimate, God-focussed, telos, and around evaluative 
standards (including the scriptural hermeneutics of both traditions); and on promoting 
a productive context for taking forward such explorations together.  It is also 
important to note that Williams calls on each side to enter the debate on its own terms, 
and for debate to begin by working to enable each side to understand the other, from 
WKDWRWKHU¶VRZQSHUVSHFWLYH7KHUH LVH[SOLFLWUHMHFWLRQRIDQ\DWWHPSWWRVHDUFKIRU
µOHDVW FRPPRQ GHQRPLQDWRU¶ DJUHHPHQW UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW WKLV LV WRR RIWHQ URRWHG LQ
awNZDUGFRPSURPLVHWKDWWDNHVHDFKFRPPXQLW\WRWKHµPDUJLQV¶RIZKDWLWKROGVWR
EHWUXH$OOWKLVDFFRUGVZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSURDFK 
The potential for broader assumptions of commensurability in Christian-
Jewish relations is exemplified by Williams¶ LQYLWDWLRQ WR WKH &KLHI 5DEEL RI *UHDW
Britain to give a keynote address on the subject of Covenant, from the perspective of 
his own faith, at the 2008 Lambeth Conference.290  The generally informal tone of 
:LOOLDPV¶  OHFWXUH DJDLQ DURXQG WKHPHV RI &Rvenant, at a conference at the 
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Centre for the Study of Jewish Christian Relations,291 points to greater ease, in this 
particular forum at least, between Jews and Christians, than is reflected in the far more 
careful language employed by both Muslims and Williams in the 2008 exchange.  
Once again, reflection considers not only the ostensible subject matter under debate, 
but also processes of reflection, and attempts to offer perspectives, including of points 
of disagreement, from both sides.  Difficulties are honestly described, and the 
dynamics of promoting trusting debate are affirmed.  The final passage of the address 
exemplifies a comprehensive EUHDGWKRIWKHHOHPHQWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VUDWLRQDOPRUDOLW\ 
as they are pursued in the best of dialogue between traditions: 
«RQO\ WKH HQRUPRXVDQG WUDJLF WHQVLRQVRIDFWXDODQG ORFDOKLVWRU\FDQVD\
what covenant really means ... Covenant promises one world, not a totalising 
conformity enforced by central power, but a mutual recognition of the debt of 
honour and love, and a search for ways in which the good of each and the 
good of all may coincide.  And the Christian and the Jew stand face to face, 
expressing to each other the most serious challenge to such a hope that can be 
conceived; we could almost say they defy one another to maintain faith in one 
God and one divine purpose.  If that face to face challenge is truly a matter of 
fraternal love, undertaken as a sort of mutual human covenant ± if we as Jews 
and Christians can be faithful to each other ± we ought to be able to leave 
behind something of the bitter legacy of what Christians see as Jewish 
rejection and Jews see as Christian oppression and murder.  We ought to be 
able to be amazed at each other and in that amazement to find something of 
God; and from that will flow a strange but real shared testimony to the world, 
about God's nature and our own. 
All this is not to say that there are not considerable differences between Christians and 
both Jews and Muslims.  However, in both cases, these are being addressed within the 
context of an unfolding substantive dialogue based on shared assumptions of adequate 
commensurability between the respective pairs of faiths which allow them to proceed 
with hopefulness, itself a factor that contributes to the likely success of the 
undertaking.   
 Thus we see that, despite the difficulties apparent in the strict application of a 
µXWRSLDQ¶ YHUVLRQ RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ DQG RI possibilities for 
                                                             
291
 5RZDQ:LOOLDPVµ$OHFWXUHJLYHQDWDFRQIHUHQFHRQ³7KHSODFHRI&RYHQDQWLQ-XGDLVP
Christianity and Jewish-&KULVWLDQUHODWLRQV´¶'HFHPEHUDFFHVVed 15 May 2011, 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2103/a-lecture-given-at-a-conference-on-
the-place-of-covenant-in-judaism-christianity-and-jewish-christia.  
110 
 
dialogue between members of different communities of tradition, in practice his 
approach offers productive avenues to follow in seeking to maximise the engagement 
and understanding between these communities.     
 However, in other cases, it may not be possible to go forward with such 
confidence.  It may be that either or both RIDVHFRQGFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQ¶Vtelos or 
LWVHYDOXDWLYHWUDGLWLRQVDUHWRRGLYHUJHQWIURPWKDWRIWKHILUVW¶VDQGWKDWDWWHPSWVE\
those who are bilingual to bridge the gap fail.  In this case epistemic crisis, as 
mentioned above, may follow, or the parties may have to resort to alternative 
strategies for communication at a more simple, basic level.  Such strategies will also 
need to be pursued when it is not possible to go on and go further, because the second 
community has an insufficiently developeGWUDGLWLRQDVVHWRXWLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VWHUPV
to be able to sustain the sort of dialogue which he commends.  Before addressing what 
alternative strategies for debate might be adopted in such circumstances (the substance 
of chapter 5), I offer some comments on what makes a tradition sufficiently developed 
to be able to engage in rational ethical debate. 
Beyond Traditions 
,W IROORZV IURP 0DF,QW\UH¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW UDWLRQDOLW\ LV RQO\ WR EH IRXQG
within traditions which subsist in communities that those who belong to no tradition-
bearing community cannot effectively engage in questions of practical rationality.292  
He asserts that the theses of a particular tradition can only be weighed when framed in 
UHODWLRQWRµWKHVSHFLILFFKDUDFWHUDQGKLVWRU\RIWKDWWUDGLWLRQ¶)XUWKHUPRUHWKH\FDQ
only be weighed by individuals who belong to a specific tradition, and so are 
habituated into its character and practices ± whether of the tradition whose theses are 
XQGHUGHEDWHRURIDQRWKHUEXWEHLQJHIIHFWLYHO\µELOLQJXDO¶LQWKHODQJXDJHLQXVHRI
the former.   
And, while those who are members of a functioning community of tradition 
are thus trained in the evaluative processes necessary to weigh human cultures and 
SUDFWLFHVWKDWGRQRWPHHW0DF,QW\UH¶V criteria for constituting such a community, the 
reverse is not true.  Those who do not belong to any community of tradition not only 
have no rationally sound means of evaluation, they do not have the skills that would 
allow them to become bilingual, in the sense of being able to grasp the language-in-
use of a community of tradition, given its embeddedness in a comprehensive context 
of ethical understanding and practice. 
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But if this is the case, how then can any community of tradition show itself to 
be superior to a person whRLVWRXVH0DF,QW\UH¶VODQJXDJH, µDOLHQDWHG¶IURPWKHZD\V
of such traditions?  How specifically can the person of no tradition, perhaps a speaker 
RI WKH GHUDFLQDWHG µLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG ODQJXDJHV RI PRGHUQLW\ WKH ODQJXDJHV RI
HYHU\ZKHUH DQG QRZKHUH¶293 engDJH XSRQ WKH µGLDOHFWLFDO HQJDJHPHQW¶ UHTXLUHG IRU
judging the merits of a tradition?  7KLVLVDYLWDOTXHVWLRQJLYHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLPWKDW
his approach provides for a moral and rational community to be able to demonstrate 
such superiority.  
The answer he provided in 1988 implied that the gulf is so great that any such 
alienated individuals would have to undergo a radical movement, a sort of 
µFRQYHUVLRQ¶ LQRUGHUWREHEURXJKWLQWRDFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQ6XFK LQGLYLGXDOV
should then confirm (or otherwise) their assumptions of the tradition they have joined, 
by learning how to apply the processes of rational enquiry within the tradition, and 
then, as they are now enabled so to do, assessing whether this tradition itself, or some 
other, gives the best account of how the world is, and how life within it should be 
lived.  Others may have no such sudden moment of what is essentially irrational 
LQVLJKWVLQFHWKH\KDYHQRDGHTXDWHVNLOOVRIUDWLRQDOLW\DQGPD\UHVRUWWRµDQDFWRI
DUELWUDU\ZLOO¶ WREULQJ them into engagement with a community of tradition, where 
they can similarly be trained to judge the strengths of that tradition and others, 
WKURXJK DW WKH YHU\ OHDVW EHKDYLQJ µDV LI¶ WKH\ ZHUH ZKROO\ FRPPLWWHG WR WKH
tradition.  And since a mature tradition of enquiry should be able not only to give an 
account of the shortcomings of other traditions, it should also be able to explain the 
failings of the world outside traditions, uncommitted individuals will then be provided 
with the resources of one or more traditions, both to understand their own situation, 
and to consider, by means of dialectical engagement, the claims of the various 
traditions in their own terms.294 
 And similarly it will not do to attempt to resort to discussing substantive 
moral questions in any of the internationalised languages of modernity.  For it is not 
possible, argues MacIntyre, adequately to translate moral concepts into these, since 
WKH\DUHRQO\µWLHGYHU\ORRVHO\WRDQ\SDUWLFXODUVHWRIFRQWHVWDEOHEHOLHIVEXWDUHULFK
in modes of characterisation and explanation which enable texts embodying alien 
VFKHPHVRIV\VWHPDWLFEHOLHIWREHUHSRUWHGRQ«LQGHWDFKPHQWIURPDOOVXEVWDQWLYH
FULWHULD DQG VWDQGDUGV RI WUXWK DQG UDWLRQDOLW\¶  7KLV IROORZV IURP WKH µPLQLPDO
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presuppositions¶WKHVHODQJXDJHVKDYHLQUHVSHFWRIULYDOEHOLHIV\VWHPVZKLFKUHVXOWV
LQWUDQVODWLRQVEHLQJµSUHVHQWHG LQDZD\WKDWQHXWUDOL]HVWKHFRQFHSWLRQVRIWUXWKDQG
UDWLRQDOLW\DQGWKHKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W¶295   
 This gives rise to WKHSRVWPRGHUQLVWYLHZWKDWµWKe understanding of the text is 
not controlled by authorial intention or by any relationship to an audience with 
VSHFLILF VKDUHG EHOLHIV IRU LW LV RXWVLGH FRQWH[W H[FHSW WKH FRQWH[W RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶
DQGWKXVDQµLQGHILQLWHPXOWLSOLFLW\¶RIERWKLQWHUSUHWations and translations is possible.  
This holds for all translation, not only of written texts.  Thus very little counts as 
mistranslation, not least since it is only through the tools of a tradition that one is able 
adequately able to gauge the accuracy of any translation, or even constructively pursue 
the process of translation in the first place.296  MacIntyre rejects this entire stance as 
wholly inadequate for an enquiry into moral rational living, and for judgments on truth 
and falsity ± UHIOHFWLQJ D µFHUWDLQ URRWOHVV FRVPRSROLWDQLVP « >RI@ FLWL]HQV RI
QRZKHUH¶297, which is the consequence of modernity.   
%XWDOOWKLVOHDYHVXVZLWKDSRWHQWLDOSUREOHP)RUDFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQ¶V
claims to be able to demonstrate its rational and moral superiority are pretty empty, if 
they are dependent upon those outside any such community either experiencing 
radical conversion or committing themselves to walk so closely in the ways of a 
FRPPXQLW\¶VWUDGLWLRQWKDWWKH\FDQVHHWKHZRUOGWKURXJKWKDWFRPPXQLW\¶VH\HV It 
is akin to the Anglican Bishops declaring that those who are rooted in secular modern 
society must first become, or at least learn fully to behave as, a Christian, an Anglican, 
in order to see the sense of the positions for which they argue in public debate ± and 
that if they do not, they are so to speak doomed to remain for ever in ignorance.  It is 
hardly an approach one can convincingly espouse in contemporary pluralist discourse 
(though, alas, there are some Christians, particularly of a more fundamentalist turn, 
who seem to take such a stand)! 
Good Enough Traditions 
The first steps towards a remedy lie within MacIntyrH¶V RZQ DSSURDFK DQG
specifically in consideration of wider applications of the supple relationship between 
µXWRSLDQ¶WKHRU\DQGFRQFUete practice, as described above in relation to bilingualism.  
For it is not the case that in practice, the only choice is between fully fledged and 
wholly morally rational communities of tradition on the one hand, whose membership 
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is entirely clear cut and fully committed, and extreme modernity on the other where 
people live utterly random and incoherent lives.  Rather, there is a continuum across 
this spectrum.  Even MacIntyre allows for people who may be at the margins of some 
community of tradition or oWKHUZKR µXSRQ HQFRXQWHULQJD FRKHUHQWSUHVHQWDWLRQRI
RQH SDUWLFXODU WUDGLWLRQ RI UDWLRQDO HQTXLU\ « ZLOO RIWHQ H[SHULHQFH D VKRFN RI
UHFRJQLWLRQ¶DV WKH\ILQGD FRQWH[WZLWKLQZKLFK WKHLUSULRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJVµIDOO LQWR
SODFH¶DQGPDNHVHQVHLQDZD\DW which they had previously only grasped.298   
Others may be members of communities where traditions, practices, 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVPD\QRWEHDVGHYHORSHGDV0DF,QW\UH¶VDEVWUDFWDFFRXQWGHPDQGVEXW
ZKLFKPD\WXUQRXWLQSUDFWLFHWREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶WRDOORZIRr at least attempting to 
µJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ZLWKVRPHGHJUHHRIVXEVWDQWLYHUDWLRQDOPRUDOGLDORJXH7KH
key question to which I turn in the next chapter is whether, and under what 
circumstances, contemporary westernised society, and particular the practices of 
democratic debate, might have the capacity WR EH µJRRG HQRXJK¶ LQ WKLV VHQVH ± a 
position that, as go on to explore, is particularly argued by Stout.299  
And where such attempts to go on and go further fail, we shall also find, 
perhaps rather more surprisingly given the tenor of his major volumes, that MacIntyre 
himself offers in later writings a further level of resources on which to fall back, which 
DUHURRWHG LQ$TXLQDV¶SULPDU\SUHFHSWVRIQDWXUDO ODZZKLFKZHKDYHDOUHDG\VHHQ
are of relevance to engagement in dialogue.  These are the subject of chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 ± Working with MacIntyre 
  7KH VWDUWLQJSRLQW IRU0DF,QW\UH¶V ZKROH µSURMHFW¶ EHJXQ LQ After Virtue, is 
the assertion that the contemporary world (by which he largely means Euro-Atlantic 
society ± though there are occasional references e.g. to African and Asian cultures and 
philosophy) has lost touch with its historic traditions.  Instead, he argues, we have 
inherited a jumble of fragments of past conceptual moral schemes, but have lost sight 
of the contexts in which they were framed.  Living in different contexts, and without 
proper knowledge of what went before, we are unable to apply them in anything but a 
IUDJPHQWDU\ DQG LQFRKHUHQW ZD\  µ:H SRVVHVV LQGHHG VLPXODFUD RI PRUDOLW\, we 
continue to use many of the key expressions.  But we have ± very largely, if not 
entirely ± ORVW RXU FRPSUHKHQVLRQ ERWK WKHRUHWLFDO DQG SUDFWLFDO RI PRUDOLW\¶ 
Striking examples of this incoherence range across currently popular but incompatible 
views on just war, abortion and public services such as health and education.  Neither 
analytical nor phenomenological philosophical analysis can help us, being internal to 
WKHµFDODPLW\¶%XWZHDUHQRWOHIWKHOSOHVV7KHVROXWLRQ, he says, is to go back and 
rediscover the historic traditions, as best as we are able.300 
 Each of the three volumes contains a great, if selective, historic sweep, at the 
end of which, broadly speaking, he concludes that there are only three options before 
us.  These are what he WHUPV µWKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW SURMHFW¶ RU µHQF\FORSDHGLD¶
µHPRWLYLVP¶RUµJHQHDORJ\¶ZKLFKKHDUJXHV WRDFRQVLGHUDEOH H[WHQW LVPHUHO\ WKH
REYHUVHRIWKHVDPHFRLQDQGµWUDGLWLRQ¶± the last being a contemporary version of 
Thomistic Aristotelianism, which he asserts is the only approach with moral rational 
integrity.   
 ,Q WKLV FKDSWHU P\ LQWHQWLRQ LV WR DGGUHVV 0DF,QW\UH¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH
enlightenment, modernity and liberal democracy from the perspective of the 
conclusions he draws about the possibilities ± or lack of them ± for substantive moral 
debate within contemporary society, and specifically the public arena.  For the most 
part I shall leave to one side detailed questions about the accuracy of his historic 
account and analysis301; and about the extent to which he is or is not either a historicist 
or a communitarian as these terms are generally understood ± both of which charges 
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he denies302 ± and address these only insofar as they relate to the possibilities of public 
ethical debate.   
 Here, in 0DF,QW\UH¶V YLHZ WKH IDLOLQJV LQ UDWLRQDOLW\ DQG PRUDOLW\ RI µWKH
(QOLJKWHQPHQW SURMHFW¶ DUH FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH QDWLRQ VWDWH  )RU KH
argues, in consequence of these failings, of its inability to retain any primary 
commitment to the virtues, of its size, and of its responsibilities for governance and 
upholding security (even through forceful means), it is unavoidably susceptible to the 
DUELWUDU\ DQG LQFRKHUHQW H[SUHVVLRQ RI µZLOO¶ DQG µGHVLUH¶ ± whether found in 
bureaucratic individualism, managerial utility, economic instrumentalism, or the 
SXUVXLW RI HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO SRZHU IRU LWV RZQ VDNH  µ([WHUQDO¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
µLQWHUQDO¶JRRGV LQHYLWDEO\GRPLQDWHWRWKHGHWULPHQWRIWKH ODWWHUDQGRIWKHYLUWXHV
they embody.  And so the state is incapable of providing a context for rational debate 
DERXWWKHQDWXUHRIZKDWLWLVWREHKXPDQDQGWRHQTXLUHDIWHUDQGSXUVXHKXPDQLW\¶V
proper telos.  The contemporary liberal democratic state cannot, he argues, orient itself 
towards delivering the common good for its citizens.   
 However, it is my contention that, while, to a considerable degree, MacIntyre 
is right to point to the considerable weaknesses of liberalism and of the nation state, in 
typical fashion his denial of the possibilities of substantive discussion of moral 
questions goes too far ± not least, because, as before, in practice there is considerably 
more FDSDFLW\WRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶WKDQKLVPRUHVWDUNSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHWKHRU\
if strictly applied, might suggest.  I shall also intURGXFH 6WRXW¶V µVHOHFWLYH UHWULHYDO¶
DQG GHYHORSPHQW RI HOHPHQWV RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK EXLOW XSRQ KLV ODUJHO\
HPSDWKHWLF YLHZ RI0DF,QW\UH¶V DQDO\VLV RI OLEHUDOLVP  His contention is that those 
expressions of liberalism that are found in particular democratic practices ± which 
FRQIRUPVXIILFLHQWO\DGHTXDWHO\WR0DF,QW\UH¶VVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGSURPRWHFRQFHSWV
of a broad common good ± may indeed be viewed as akin to a tradition, in 
MacIntyrean terms.   
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MacIntyre on Liberalism 
  MacIntyre gives lengthy, if selective, historical accounts of the emergence of 
the Enlightenment in his three major volumes, aiming to provide a narrative account 
of how liberalism came to occupy such a dominant position in the late twentieth 
century world.   
  However, his argumeQWVIRUµ:K\WKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW3URMHFWKDGWRIDLO¶ ± the 
title of Chapter 5 of After Virtue ± come after a relatively short (by his standards!) 
historical appraisal, and are, for the most part, not dependent on the accuracy of his 
narrative description, or his analysis of the interrelationship of events.  Rather, it is the 
goal, and underlying philosophy which is presupposed, which is, he argues, fatally 
flawed.  For in its assumption of a context neutral, objective, impersonal rationality, 
liberalism shares the same irremediable defects as analytical philosophy, which he 
equally rejects ± regardless of the context, or period of history, in which it is 
H[SUHVVHG :RUVH WKURXJK ZKDWKH GHVFULEHV DV WKH µLQYHQWLRQ¶ RI WKH µLQGLYLGXDO¶
who is able to decide XSRQKLVRUKHURZQµJRRG¶DFFRUGLQJWRSHUVRQDOFKRLFHUDWKHU
WKDQWKURXJKDQ\µQRWLRQRIDtelos¶LWIXQGDPHQWDOO\µFKDQJHGWKHPHDQLQJ¶RIZKDW
had been understood as morality over long centuries, making a decisive disjunction 
with the past.  He describes the consequences thus:   
 6R WKH ³1R µRXJKW¶ FRQFOXVLRQ IURP µLV¶ SUHPLVHV´ SULQFLSOH EHFRPHV DQ
inescapable truth for philosophers whose culture possesses only the 
impoverished moral vocabulary which results from the episodes I have 
recounted.  That it was taken to be a timeless logical truth was a sign of a deep 
lack of historical consciousness which then informed and even now infects too 
PXFKRIPRUDOSKLORVRSK\«>2@QFHWKHQRWLRQRIHVVHQWLDOKXPDQSXUSRVHV
or functions disappears from morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat 
moral judgements as factual statements.303  
7KHUHDIWHU KH VD\V WR VSHDN LQ WHUPV RI µ<RX RXJKW WR GR VR-and-VR¶ EHFRPHV QR
PRUHWKDQµIRUPVRIH[SUHVVLRQIRUDQHPRWLYLVWVHOI¶304  In the following chapter he 
goes on to say that resultant attempts to approach ethical questions either in terms of 
XWLOLWDULDQLVPVXFKDVµPD[LPLVLQJWKHKDSSLQHVVRIWKHJUHDWHVWQXPEHU¶RUWKURXJK
GHYHORSLQJ V\VWHPVRI µULJKWV¶ FDQ HTXDOO\EH VKRZQ WREH DUELWUDU\ 7KH\DUH WKXV
open to contestation, with no means of arbitrating between, for example, criteria of 
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modes of practice, or those drawn from aesthetic or bureaucratic perspectives.  This is 
true for us as we face choices both as individuals and within wider society.   
 Citizens of modernity are thus left in a state of moral incoherence, from which 
we are unable to rescue ourselves, because we have lost the capacity for moral rational 
evaluation.  He spells out the arguments for this particularly starkly in the following 
passage from Whose Justice?  Which Rationality?  
«LWLVDQLOOXVLRQWRVXSSRVHWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHQHXWUDOVWDQGLQJJURXQGVRPH
locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for 
enquiry independent of all traditions.  Those who have maintained otherwise 
either have covertly been adopting the standpoint of a tradition and deceiving 
themselves and perhaps others into supposing that theirs was just such a 
neutral standing ground or else have simply been in error.  The person outside 
all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources for enquiry and a fortiori for 
enquiry into what tradition is to be preferred.  He or she has no adequate 
relevant means of rational evaluation and hence can come to no well-
grounded conclusion, including the conclusion that no tradition can vindicate 
itself against any other.  To be outside all traditions is to be a stranger to 
HQTXLU\LWLVWREHLQDVWDWHRILQWHOOHFWXDODQGPRUDOGHVWLWXWLRQ«305 
Context and Tradition 
One of the fundamental objectives of liberalism is to seek µVRPH QHXWUDO
tradition-independent standard of a rationally justifiable kind to which we may 
DSSHDO¶306 when weighing alternative approaches to moral questions.  On the face of it, 
that might seem a not unreasonable aspiration.  It is therefore worth considering in 
PRUHGHWDLOWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRIZK\VXFKDQREMHFWLYHLV
not achievable (given his assertion that moral rationality is found within a community 
of tradition that exists within a particular historic and cultural context), and his 
conclusion that liberalism cannot be considered as a tradition. 
 In Whose Justice?  Which Rationality?  MacIntyre assesses two candidates 
that might at first appear to offer a plausible tradition-neutral approach.  The first is 
WKDWHPERGLHG LQ WKHµFRPPRQVHQVH¶RI7KRPDV5HLGDQGµWKHIXQGDPHQWDO ODZVRI
KXPDQEHOLHI¶RI'XJDOG6WHZDUW+RZHYHUKHDUJXHVQHLWKHUZDVDEOHWRDFFRXQWIRU
moral error within communities in general terms, and both specifically failed to 
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provide any basis for judging between pro- and anti-slavery views.307  The second is 
SUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJIURPµthe facts themselves¶RQZKDWPLJKWFRQVWLWXWHULJKWFRQGXFW
justice, and the consequent human actions.  But this approach also founders, since 
there is no agreed theory of theorising, which sets out which are the relevant facts of 
any matter, and how they are to be construed.  All that can be achieved is a set of 
explanations of what follows when we adopt this or that theory for assessing a 
situation ± but with no neutral means of judging their choice of theory, the adequacy 
of the rationality with which it is pursued, and the concept of justice it delivers.308  
 0DF,QW\UHFRQFOXGHVWKDWµWKRVHFRQFHSWLRQVRIXQLYHUVDOLW\DQGLPSHUVRQDOLW\
which survive this kind of abstraction [i.e. specifying and furnishing a tradition-
independent moral standpoint] from the concreteness of traditional or even non-
traditional conventional modes of moral thought and action are far too thin and 
meagre to supply what is needHG¶309 to provide grounds for judging between 
competing traditions.  Kant and his heirs, says MacIntyre, have failed in this respect, 
for, though they provide sophisticated accounts of various moral and philosophical 
issues, showing what logical or conceptual commitments are incurred by asserting or 
GHQ\LQJDSDUWLFXODU WKHVLV WKH\KDYHQRWSURYLGHGDQ\µJHQHUDOVKDUHGVWDQGDUGVE\
ZKLFKWRMXGJHZKHWKHURUQRWLWLVUDWLRQDOWRLQFXUWKHP¶310  +HDGGVWKDWµLQUHVSHFW
of the ineradicability of disagreement so-called continental philosophy does not differ 
VLJQLILFDQWO\IURPDQDO\WLFDOSKLORVRSK\¶311 
 Thus liberalism, in its social, cultural, legal and political expressions as well 
DV WKHSKLORVRSKLFDOKDVDFRQFHSWLRQRIµKXPDQJRRG¶ZKLFK LV OLWWOHPRUH WKDQ the 
H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKHSUHIHUHQFHVRI LQGLYLGXDOV RURI JURXSVRI LQGLYLGXDOV µVXPPHG LQ
VRPH ZD\ RU RWKHU¶312  Indeed, the individual has no systematic means of ordering 
their own preferences (which are arbitrary expressions of their personal desires), and 
VROLYHVµZLWKQRRYHUDOOJRRGVXSSO\LQJDQRYHUDOOXQLW\WR OLIH¶RQHRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
fundamental tenets for a rational and well-lived life.  This is in sharp contrast to John 
5DZO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWµDOWKRXJKWRVXERUGLQDWHDOORXUDLPs to one end does not strictly 
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VSHDNLQJYLRODWHWKHSULQFLSOHVRIUDWLRQDOFKRLFH«LWVWULNHVXVDVLUUDWLRQDORUPRUH
OLNHO\DVPDG¶313 ± a stance which MacIntyre regards as a recipe for chaos at best.   
 7KHTXHVWLRQWKHQDULVHVDVWRZKHWKHUWKHSUDFWLFHVRIµSUDFWLFDOUHDVRning of 
OLEHUDOPRGHUQLW\¶FRQGXFWHGE\µWKHLQGLYLGXDOqua LQGLYLGXDO¶314 can in any way be 
judged to be a tradition in the sense MacIntyre describes.  MacIntyre argues that one 
consequence of the lack of any overarching ordering principle is that reaching a 
particular judgement does not lead automatically to implementing action, since other 
options may arise, and other preferences present themselves in the interim.  
Furthermore, while it may be possible to exercise some degree of practical rationally 
(through ordering preferences, translating them into decisions and actions through 
VRXQG DUJXPHQWV DQG DFWLQJ WR µPD[LPLVH WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI WKRVH SUHIHUHQFHV LQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHLURUGHULQJ¶315), this rationality does not necessarily entail justice, 
since µWKHFRQFHSWLRQRI MXVWLFH LV LQWKLVOLEHUDOFXOWXUHQRPRUHDQGQROHVVWKDQWKH
need for some set of regulating principles by which cooperation in the implementation 
of preferences may be so far as possible achieved and decisions made as to which 
kinds RISUHIHUHQFHKDYHSULRULW\RYHURWKHUV¶316     
 Considering the way that debate on matters of justice are conducted within a 
OLEHUDOV\VWHP0DF,QW\UHFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHµIXQFWLRQDQGQRWLRQRI MXVWLFH LQVXFKD
FXOWXUHDQGVRFLDORUGHU¶317 rests within its OHJDOV\VWHPVXFKWKDWµWKHRYHUULGLQJJRRG
of liberalism is no more and no less than the continued sustenance of the liberal social 
DQGSROLWLFDORUGHU¶318  Thus it is self-contradictory ± having denied the existence of 
any overall theory of the good, it in practice operates by appealing to premises that 
presuppose the upholding of liberalism, which thus provides an overarching theory.   
 )URPWKLV0DF,QW\UHLQIHUVWKDWµOLEHUDOWKHRU\LVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGQRWDWDOODV
an attempt to find a rationality independent of tradition, but as itself the articulation of 
an historically developed and developing set of social institutions and forms of 
DFWLYLW\ WKDW LVDV WKHYRLFHRID WUDGLWLRQ¶319  Furthermore, liberalism is shaped by 
WKRVH ZKR KDYH WKH SRZHU µWR GHtermine what the alternatives are between which 
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FKRLFHV ZLOO EH PDGH¶ DQG VR µWKH FRVPHWLF DUWV¶320 ± those which operate through 
persuasion ± are highly prized.   
 MacIntyre draws two conclusions from this.  First, within human history, 
liberalism has offered the best attempt at providing a neutral standpoint for rationality 
and justice ± DQG WKHUHIRUH LWV IDLOXUH µSURYLGHV WKH VWURQJHVW UHDVRQV WKDW ZH FDQ
actually have for asserting that there is no neutral ground, that there is no place for 
appeals to a practical-rationality-as-such or a justice-as-such to which all rational 
SHUVRQVZRXOGE\WKHLUYHU\UDWLRQDOLW\EHFRPSHOOHGWRJLYHWKHLUDOOHJLDQFH¶321 
 Second, viewed against the criteria for a tradition that MacIntyre has 
previously developed, liberalism has significant, even fatal, problems in dealing with 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVZLWKLQLWVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWKHOLEHUDOVHOI¶DQGRIµWKHFRPPRQJRRG
LQ D OLEHUDO VRFLDO RUGHU¶  )RU ILUVW RI DOO LW ERWK UHTXLUHV WKH LQGLYLGXDO WR SUHVHQW
WKHPVHOYHVDVDµVLQJOe, well-RUGHUHGVHOI¶DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHDVVHUWVWKDWFKRLFHVDUH
µLUUHGXFLEO\KHWHURJHQHRXVDQGZLWKRXWDQ\RYHUDOORUGHULQJ¶322  Likewise, liberalism 
on the one hand claims that no goods can be treated as overriding all others ± \HWµLI
the good of libeUDOLVP LWVHOI WKH JRRG RI WKH SOXUDOLVW GHPRFUDWLF SROLW\ « LV WR EH
achieved, it will have to be able to claim an overriding and even a coerced 
DOOHJLDQFH¶323   
 In his judgement, any search for some neutral tradition-independent standard 
of a rational morality is doomed to futility.  The reader of Whose Justice?  Which 
Rationality?  should not be misled by the title given to Chapter XVII ± µ/LEHUDOLVP
7UDQVIRUPHG LQWR D7UDGLWLRQ¶ ± into thinking that MacIntyre accepts that liberalism 
does or even could operate as a tradition of enquiry, meeting his criteria for moral 
rationality.  The reverse is true.  It is his contention that liberalism, through pointing to 
its historic evolution, may lay claim to being such a tradition, but is wrong to do so 
(hence his UHIHUHQFHDERYHWRµFRYHUWO\«DGRSWLQJ¶WKLVµVWDQGSRLQW¶324).  So although 
LQ&KDSWHU;9,,KHPD\ZULWHRIOLEHUDOLVPDVEHLQJµWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIDQKLVWRULFDOO\
developed and developing set of social institution and forms of activity, that is, as the 
vRLFHRIDWUDGLWLRQ¶325 in the following three chapters, through the arguments outlined 
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in the foregoing paragraphs, he makes it clear that in practice, liberalism inevitably 
and utterly fails to operate as the sort of tradition within which he believes moral 
enquiry can, and must, be pursued.   
Traditions and Traditionalism 
 %XWFRQIXVLRQVRYHU0DF,QW\UH¶VGHSLFWLRQRIOLEHUDOLVPDVWRVRPHGHJUHHD
tradition, are a reflection of the inconsistency with which he uses the latter term.  And 
this reflects the ODFNRI D FOHDU DQVZHU WR WKH IXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQRIKRZ µJRRG¶ D
WUDGLWLRQKDVWREHKRZFORVHO\LWKDVWRFRQIRUPWR0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWHULDLQRUGHUIRULW
to deliver the sort of moral rationality he describes as subsisting in the practices of 
communities of tradition. 
 Stout highlights this when he refers to various precursors of contemporary 
HWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHDVµWUDGLWLRQV¶DQGDGGLQJWKHH[SODQDWLRQWKDWµDOO,PHDQE\WKHWHUP
³WUDGLWLRQ´ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LV D GLVFXUVLYH SUDFWLFH FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKH Gimension of 
KLVWRU\¶326  He points out that at times this is the sense in which MacIntyre also uses 
the term, while at others it is far more narrowly defined.  He quotes Susan Moller 
2NLQ ZKR KH VD\V µULJKWO\ REVHUYHV WKDW >0DF,QW\UH@ HTXLYRFDWHV EHWZHHQ the two 
VHQVHV¶6KHZULWHVWKDW0DF,QW\UHµJLYHVFRnflicting accounts of what a tradition is.  
At times he describes it as a defining context, stressing the authoritative nature of its 
³WH[WV´DWWLPHVKHWDONVRIDWUDGLWLRQDV³OLYLQJ´DVD³QRW-yet-FRPSOHWHGQDUUDWLYH´
DV DQ DUJXPHQW DERXW WKH JRRGV WKDW FRQVWLWXWH WKH WUDGLWLRQ¶327  She also voices 
IHPLQLVW FRQFHUQV WKDW WR VWUHVV WRR µFRQVHUYDWLYH¶ a view of continuity within a 
tradition brings the specific dangers of sustaining oppressive attitudes and behaviour 
towards women.  This is merely symptomatic of a greater risk that biases, prejudices, 
and other failings within any historic tradition can become institutionally entrenched.  
6WRXWWRRLVFRQFHUQHGWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSURDFKIDOOVLQWRWKLVtrap, with its stress on 
UDWLRQDOLW\¶VµHPERGLPHQWLQLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWDUHFDSDEOHRIVHFXULQJDJUHHPHQWRQWKH
doctrine of the human good (presumably, by means of catechism directed at new 
comers and a combination of magisterial suasion, discipline, and excommunication 
GLUHFWHGDWGLVVHQWHUV¶328      
 But my own view is that if MacIntyre overstates these aspects, then, with his 
propensity for sweeping assertions, he similarly overstates the counterbalancing 
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criteria.  This ranges across his stress on, for example, never-ending dialectic 
(including engagement with all possible criticisms);329 through the permanently 
SURYLVLRQDO DQG HYROXWLRQDU\QDWXUHRI DQ\ µWUDGLWLRQ¶ DQG WKH FRPPLWPHQW UHTXLUHG
for everything, even the most central texts, tenets and practices, to be always open to 
question and revision;330 through to the need of a community of tradition always to be 
alert to the corrupting dynamics of the institutionalisation that it inevitably needs in 
order to sustain itself, which include the possibility of inappropriately over-
emphasising external goods ± such as privileging certain individuals at the expense of 
others.331  Indeed, it is this last concern on which, as we shall see later, that Stout 
GUDZV LQ GHYHORSLQJ KLV µVWHUHRVFRSLF FULWLFLVP¶ ZKLFK LV so central to his own 
processes of conducting ethical debate in the public sphere.  In all of these areas, one 
might ask whether MacIntyre is sitting so light to the question of historical continuity 
WKDWKHMHRSDUGLVHVKLVRZQGHVFULSWLYHXVHRIµWUDGLWLRQ¶ 
 Thus we again find that what at first may appear to be a clear cut and decisive 
description of theory, turns out in practice to be rather more fluid.  This is not only in 
relation to the possibilities for bilingualism and translation, as I argued in the previous 
FKDSWHUEXWDFURVVPDQ\RWKHUDVSHFWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHSXUVXLWRIPRUDO
rationality.  This is also the case when it comes to identifying workable communities 
of tradition.  As I shall argue in greater detail in the next chapter, here too it is only 
WKURXJKPDNLQJWKHDWWHPSWLQSUDFWLFHWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ZLWKRXUHQJDJHPHQW
with potential dialogue partners ± while continuing to reflect and evaluate on both 
ones processes and what they deliver ± that one can hope to discern in any given case 
with what degrees of flexibility his criteria for effectively functioning communities of 
tradition should be interpreted. 
 If MacIntyre is not so tightly wedded as might first appear to a narrowly 
conservative view of upholding tradition, it is also the case that he is not as wedded to 
the past as some might consider ± DQG DV PLJKW VHHP WR EH LPSOLHG E\ 6WRXW¶V
description of him, particularly in Democracy and Tradition DV D µWUDGLWLRQDOLVW¶332  
But Stout himself had recognised this earlieUZKHQWKRXJKUHIHUULQJWRWKHµVHQVHRI
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EHODWHGQHVV¶ LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VZULWLQJVhe acknowledged that he did not see MacIntyre 
FDOOLQJIRUDUHWXUQWRVRPHLGHDOLVHGJRRGROGGD\V6WRXWFULWLFLVHV5RUW\¶VFODLPWKDW
0DF,QW\UH¶V FDOO IRU D QHZ 6W %HQHGLFW, at the end of After Virtue is no more than 
PLVSODFHGµWHUPLQDOZLVWIXOQHVV¶DQGDUJXHVWKDWDQ\ZLVWIXOQHVVLVµUDWKHUDIXQFWLRQ
RIHYHU\ERG\¶VLQDELOLW\WR LPDJLQHDIXOO-blown alternative to our society that would 
be both achievable by acceptable meaQVDQGFOHDUO\EHWWHUWKDQZKDWZHKDYHQRZ¶333  
It is easy enough to conceive that society might be better ± but it is the harder work of 
seeing how to go forward and persuading others to join in doing so, to which Stout is 
prepared to commit himself, and for which he believes MacIntyre provides effective 
resources.  
 Pinkard WDNHV D VLPLODU OLQH LQ KLV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI µ0DF,QW\UH¶V&ULWLTXH RI
0RGHUQLW\¶ DUJXLQJ WKDW WR OD\ WKH µFKDUJH RI QRVWDOJLD¶ DJDLQVW 0DF,QW\UH µLV D
serious misreading of his key idHDV¶334  +HJRHVRQ WR VD\µ:KDWVHHPVWRSURYRNH
0DF,QW\UH¶VLUHLVWKHXQVSRNHQDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHSRLQWDWZKLFKZHKDYHHQGHGXS
± in the triumph of global capitalism and the widespread affirmation of the market as 
the only proper social institution to deal with our problems ± is necessary (that we had 
to end up in this place in history), is the only proper or authentic expression of 
unalloyed human nature (that it is the only social system that fits human nature instead 
of being at war with it), or represents progress RYHUWKHSDVW¶335  But, says Pinkard, a 
µFORVH UHDGLQJ RI KLV ZRUN EHOLHV¶ DQ\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI KLV µVXVWDLQHG DWWDFN RQ WKH
QRWLRQ WKDW³WKHSUHVHQW LVSURJUHVV´¶DV LQGLFDWLQJ WKDWKH LV µVRPHNLQG of nostalgic 
SUHPRGHUQ WKLQNHU¶  RatheU KLV µPDMRU FULWLFLVP RI PRGHUQLW\ KDV WR GR ZLWK LWV
underlying individualism, the practical failures of that form of individualism, and the 
social structures and modern philosophies that systematically distort our abilities to 
comprehend any real alterQDWLYHWRWKHPVHOYHV¶However, he continues, µ0DF,QW\UH¶V
SURSRVDOKDVQHYHUEHHQ¶IRUXVWRDWWHPSWWRµWXUQEDFNWKHFORFN¶«µKHKDVLQVWHDG
suggested what alternative process would be necessary for a new, nonindividualist 
society of the future to take shape.¶7KLV OHDGVKLP OLNHRWKHUVWRDFRQFOXVLRQWKDW
UHIOHFWV KRZ IDU0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN UXQV FRXQWHU WRSUHGLFWDEOHGHEDWH  µIf anything, 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLTXHRIPRGHUQLW\ LVEHWWHUFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVUHYROXWLRQDU\ rather than 
UHDFWLRQDU\¶336  
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A Reasonable Liberalism? 
 :HPXVWFRQVLGHUZKHWKHU0DF,QW\UHKDVIDLUO\DQGDFFXUDWHO\GHSLFWHGµWKH
(QOLJKWHQPHQWSURMHFW¶OLEHUDOLVPDQG their consequences for contemporary western 
moral debate, or whether he has drawn an exaggerated caricature which is no more 
than a straw man easily demolished. 
 Commentators are often more ready to accept his account of present-day 
ethical discourse than his analysis of how we arrived at this state.  David Solomon 
DVVHUWVWKDWµWKHGHVFULSWLRQKHJLYHV>RIWKHFKDUDFWHURIcontemporary culture and the 
state of contemporary moral discourse] rings true at least in broad outline to many 
UHDGHUV¶337  He notes that other philosophers, including Bernard Williams and Charles 
7D\ORUWKRXJKWKH\PLJKWµGLVDJUHHZLWKPDQ\RWKHUIHDWXUHVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VYLHZDUH
LQEURDGDJUHHPHQWZLWKKLVFODLPVKHUH¶ 
 6WRXWSXWVKLVHPSKDVLVHOVHZKHUHµ,DPKDSS\WRJUDQWLQGHHGWRDIILUPWKDW
0DF,QW\UH¶V QDUUDWLYH LV WR EH SUHIHUUHG WR WKH VHOI-congratulatory stories the 
Enlightenment told about itself ± WKH .DQWLDQ¶V HVVHQWLDOO\ XQLIRUP VWRU\ RI PRGHVW
progress toward perfect rationality, for example, or the standard utilitarian story of 
triumph over traditional superstition «Fontemporary reformulations of these stories 
tend either to gloss over evidence of moral diversity and conceptual change or to make 
our ancestors and distant cultures look unduly irrational. MacIntyre, in contrast, is able 
WR WDNHHYLGHQFHRIPRUDOGLYHUVLW\DQGFRQFHSWXDOFKDQJHVHULRXVO\«0DF,QW\UH LV
hardly the first to GHFODUHWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWSURMHFWDIDLOXUH¶338   
 In fact, Stout sees MacIntyre as being somewhat sympathetic to the efforts of 
(QOLJKWHQPHQWWKLQNHUVWRWDFNOHWKHFKDOOHQJHVEHIRUHWKHPDGGLQJµKHWDNHVSDLQVWR
show how reasonable human agents, under such circumstances, could have found that 
project a plausible response to the problems at hand. They were right, for instance, in 
finding fault with received Aristotelian tradition, and MacIntyre feels compelled to 
correct those faults, in his own selective retrieval and reconfiguration of traditional 
FRQFHSWVDQGDUJXPHQWVEHIRUHKHFDQOD\FODLPWRWKDWWUDGLWLRQDVDOLYLQJOHJDF\¶339    
 6WRXW DGYLVHV KLV UHDGHUV µ*UDQW WKHQ WKDW 0DF,QW\UH¶V YHUGLFW RQ WKH
(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶VIRXQGDWLRQDOLVWSURMHFWLVFRrrect.  Grant, as well, that his explanation 
RI WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW¶V IDLOXUH WR VHFXUH DQ DKLVWRULFDO IRXQGDWLRQ IRU PRUDOLW\ LV
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QHLWKHUXQGXO\ UHGXFWLYH QRUXQFKDULWDEOH¶340  It is on this basis that he proceeds to 
construct his selective retrieval and deveORSPHQW RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN ± though he 
GRHV VR UDWKHU OHVV FRQYLQFHG RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH FROODSVH RI FRKHUHQW
PRUDO GHEDWH 5DWKHU KLV LQWHQWLRQ LV WR µERUURZVRPH WHUPV IURP KLP GLVFRQQHFW
them from his story of decline and fall, and try to show how they might contribute to a 
PRUHSHUFHSWLYHDFFRXQWRIRXUVRFLHW\WKDQKHKLPVHOISURYLGHV¶341 
Liberalism and Communitarianism 
 Insofar as MacIntyre is open to accusations of presenting liberalism in 
somewhat stark, even overstated, terms, then it is perhaps because political theorists 
are prone to do the same, as Stout claims of both supporters and critics of liberalism.  
6WRXW¶VLQWHQWLRQLVWRUHMHFWµwhat both liberals and communitarians often accept, our 
society pictured as a way of managing conflict of interest among individuals utterly 
unconnected by agreement about the good.  Liberals like what they see in this picture.  
&RPPXQLWDULDQVGHVSLVHZKDW WKH OLEHUDOV OLNH¶342  In this sense, they are alternative 
sides of the same coin.  MacIntyre largely shares this view,343 though he would place 
himself at a greater distance from what is generally recognised as communitarianism 
than Stout depicts him.  At this point it is worth saying something more about 
0DF,QW\UH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFRPPXQLWDULDQLVP and why he views his own stance as 
distinct.  
 Commenting on this lack of agreement about the common good which he sees 
across contemporary society, MacIntyre scathingly asserts that modern, heterogeneous 
JRYHUQPHQWµERWKQHHGVDQGKDVDQDVVRUWHGUDJEDJof values, from which it can select 
in an ad hoc ZD\¶ WR PHHW WKH FKDOOHQJHV RI WKH PRPHQW ± DQG ZLWKLQ WKLV µUDJEDJ¶
both liberal and communitarian values coexist.  He claims that for the most part this 
suits both parties, since they participate in the shifting coalitions of interest and power 
that come into play when conflicts arise over policy questions.  The communitarian 
conception of the common good differs significantly from his, as it fails to build a 
µFRPPXQLW\RISROLWLFDOOHDUQLQJDQGHQTXLU\SDUticipation in which it is necessary for 
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LQGLYLGXDOV WR GLVFRYHU ZKDW WKHLU LQGLYLGXDO DQG FRPPRQ JRRGV DUH¶344  The 
elusiveness of the communitarian concept of the common good and how it is derived 
KH SXWV GRZQ WR WKH DFFRPPRGDWLRQ RI FRPPXQLWDULDQV ZLWK µWhe realities of 
FRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFV¶  Thus he sees communitarianism as very differently oriented 
and conducted to his own description of communities and the traditions of excellence 
in pursuit of an authentic common good that is concerned that the well-being of the 
community should not be at the expense of the individual, as well as vice versa.   
 6WRXW¶VFRQFHUQVabout communitarianism, its relationship with liberalism, and 
the critique they give of each other, highlight further weaknesses:   
The main problem with communitarian criticism of liberal society then, is its 
implicitly utopian character.  The critics do succeed, at times, in articulating 
quite reasonable misgivings many of us feel concerning life in our society.  
Yet they very rarely give us any clear sense of what to do about our 
misgivings aside from yearning pensively for conditions we are unwilling or 
XQDEOH WR EULQJ DERXW  :KHQ \RX XQZUDS WKH XWRSLD WKH EDWWHULHV DUHQ¶W
included.  Liberal responses to communitarian criticism, on the other hand, 
often show what seems to be smug insensitivity.345 
6WRXW¶V conclusion is that we should ± and can ± draw a picture of contemporary 
GHEDWH µLQ ZKLFK WKH RSSRVLWLRQ³OLEHUDOYHUVXV FRPPXQLWDULDQ´ LV EHVLGH WKHSRLQW¶
+H VD\V ZH FDQ µredescribe pluralistic society and reappraise its characteristic 
SUREOHPVEUHDNLQJ IUHH IURPERWK WKH ³WHUPLQDO ZLVWIXOQHVV´RI WKH FRPPXQLWDULDQV
DQG WKH FRPSODFHQF\ RI OLEHUDO DSRORJLVWV¶ DQG FDQ GR VR XVLQJ WRROV SURYLGHG E\
0DF,QW\UH SDUWLFXODUO\ GUDZLQJ RQ KLV µFRQFHSW RI VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV¶ DQG KLV
µGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO JRRGV¶ WKRXJK ZH VKRXOG µGLVSHQVH ZLWK
KLVVHQVHRIEHODWHGQHVVDQGKLVDFFRXQWRIPRUDOGLYHUVLW\¶346 
Family, Community and Nation State 
 If MacIntyre is often thought to be a communitarian in the generally accepted 
VHQVH LW LV EHFDXVHRI WKHQDWXUH RI WKH µQRQLQGLYLGXDOLVWLF VRFLHW\¶KHSURSRVHV.  In 
arguing that the nonindividualistic societies which provide the best means of 
answering fundamental questions RI µKRZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH"¶ are constituted as 
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µFRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ¶, he insists that local community provides the necessary 
scale for pursuing the moral rational life.  Neither the smaller unit of the family, nor 
the larger structure of the state, is as capable of delivering this outcome. 
 0DF,QW\UH UHDFKHV WKLV FRQFOXVLRQ WKURXJK DVNLQJ µ:KDW DUH WKH W\SHV RI
SROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOVRFLHW\«WKURXJKZKLFKRXULQGLYLGXDODQGFRPPRQJRRGVFDQEH
DFKLHYHG"¶347  7KLV LV D µFRPPRQ JRRG¶ QRW RI DEVWUDFW WKHRULVLQJ EXW RQH ZKLFh 
HPERGLHV µUHODWLRQVKLSV RI JLYLQJ DQG UHFHLYLQJ¶ DQG LQFOXGHV WKH µYLUWXHV RI
DFNQRZOHGJHG GHSHQGHQFH¶348 which reflect the realities of human living, from the 
most vulnerable baby through the various capacities and capabilities of adulthood to 
the frailties of age ± DVSHFWV RI RXU WUXH µPHWDSK\VLFDO ELRORJ\¶ WKDW KH SDUWLFXODUO\
considers in Dependent Rational Animals  +H SUHVHQWV WKLV YROXPH DV µQRW RQO\ D
FRQWLQXDWLRQRIEXWDOVRDFRUUHFWLRQ¶RIWKHZRUNLQKLVWKUHHPDMRUYROXPHVRQYLUWXH
and ratioQDOPRUDOLW\ KDYLQJFRQFOXGHG WKDWKHZDVµLQ HUURU LQVXSSRVLQJDQHWKLFV
LQGHSHQGHQW RI ELRORJ\ WR EH SRVVLEOH¶ DQG KDG LQDGHTXDWHO\ WDNHQ DFFRXQW RI WKH
realities of human life and society, particularly the realities of dependence.349   
 In seeking appropriate forms of society for realising our individual and 
common goods, MacIntyre points to three conditions that must be satisfied.  First, 
VXFKVRFLHWLHVPXVWµDIIRUGH[SUHVVLRQWRWKHSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQ-making of independent 
reasoners on all those matters on which it is important that the members of a particular 
community be able to come through shared rational deliberation to a common 
PLQG¶350  +H JRHV RQ WR VD\ µWKHUH ZLOO KDYH WR EH LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG IRUPV RI
deliberation to which all those members of the community who have proposals, 
objections and arguments to contribute have access.  And the procedures of decision-
making will have to be generally acceptable, so that both deliberation and decisions 
DUHUHFRJQL]DEOHDVWKHZRUNRIWKHZKROH¶$VDEURDd summary of what we aspire to 
in democratic processes, this seems generally uncontentious, and one might expect it 
to be shared by people across the spectrum of contemporary westernised society.    
 His second condition, however, is less likely to receive such widespread 
DIILUPDWLRQ  µLQDFRPPXQLW\ LQZKLFK MXVWJHQHURVLW\ LVFRXQWHGDPRQJWKHFHQWUDO
virtues the established norms of justice will have to be consistent with the exercise of 
WKLV YLUWXH¶ )XUWKHU µQR VLQJOH VLPSOH IRUPXODWLRQ ZLOO EH FDSDble of capturing the 
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GLIIHUHQWNLQGVRIQRUPWKDWZLOOEHQHFHVVDU\IRUGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRIMXVWUHODWLRQVKLS«
Between those capable of giving and those who are most dependent and in most need 
of receiving ± children, the old, the disabled ± the norms will have to satisfy a revised 
YHUVLRQRI0DU[¶VIRUPXODIRUMXVWLFHLQDFRPPXQLVWVRFLHW\³)URPHDFKDFFRUGLQJWR
KHU RU KLV DELOLW\ WR HDFK VR IDU DV LV SRVVLEOH DFFRUGLQJ WR KHU RU KLV QHHGV´ «¶
MacIntyre recognises that the finitude of economic resouUFHV µDOORZ RQO\ IRU LWV
DSSOLFDWLRQLQLPSHUIHFWZD\V¶EXWLQVLVWVWKDWµZLWKRXWLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ«HYHQLIvery 
imperfectly, we will be unable to sustain a way of life characterized both by effective 
appeals to desert and by effective appeals to need, and so by justice to and for both the 
LQGHSHQGHQW DQG WKH GHSHQGHQW¶351  In this way, for MacIntyre, the common good 
truly expressed entails a radical justice of a very particular fairness and equality for 
DOOWKDWLVDOVRUHIOHFWHG LQKLVWKLUGFRQGLWLRQ µthe political structures must make it 
possible both for those capable of independent practical reason and for those whose 
exercise of reasoning is limited or non-existent to have a voice in communal 
deliberation about what these norms of justice require.  And the only way in which the 
latter can have a voice is if the role of proxy is given a formal place in the political 
VWUXFWXUH¶352 
 0DF,QW\UH¶V REMHFWive, he says, is no more than a society which adequately 
takes account of the inevitable disability and dependence of some of its members.  
Justice requires that this is not a case of µWKH LQWHUHVWRI RQHSDUWLFXODUJURXS UDWKHU
WKDQ RI RWKHUV¶, but rather that µWKH LQWHUHVW RI WKH ZKROH SROLWLFDO VRFLHW\¶ PXVW EH 
µLQWHJUDO¶ WR WKLV VRFLHW\¶V µFRQFHSWLRQRI WKHLU FRPPRQ JRRG¶ +H WKHQDVNV µZKDW
kind of society might possess the structures necessary to achieve a common good thus 
FRQFHLYHG"¶+LVFRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWERWKWKHPRGHUQVWDWHDQGWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\IDPLO\
DUHYDULRXVO\µLQFDSDEOHRISURYLGLQJWKHNLQG of communal association within which 
WKLVW\SHRIFRPPRQJRRGFDQEHDFKLHYHG¶   
 )RURQWKHRQHKDQGWKRXJKµIDPLOLHVDWWKHLUEHVWDUHIRUPVRIDVVRFLDWLRQLQ
which children are first nurtured, and then educated for and initiated into the activities 
of an aGXOWZRUOG¶LQFOXGLQJ LQLWLDOWUDLQLQJ LQ the virtues and µVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶\HW
µWKH IDPLO\ IORXULVKHV RQO\ LI LWV VRFLDO HQYLURQPHQW DOVR IORXULVKHV¶ )Rr individual 
PHPEHUVRIIDPLOLHVDOVRSDUWLFLSDWHLQUHODWLRQVKLSVLQµDYDULHW\RIRWKHr institutions 
and associations:  workplaces, schools, parishes, sports clubs, trade union branches, 
DGXOW HGXFDWLRQ FODVVHV DQG WKH OLNH¶  ,W LV KHUH WKDW WKH\ DUH SRWHQWLDOO\ DEOH µWR
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UHFRJQL]H DQG SXUVXH WKH JRRGV LQWHUQDO WR WKH SUDFWLFHV¶ RI WKHVH ERdies, which 
FRQWULEXWH WR WKHJRRGVRIFRPPXQLW\ OLIH 0DF,QW\UH FRQFOXGHV WKDW µJHQHUDOO\DQG
characteristically then the goods of family life are achieved in and with the goods of 
YDULRXVW\SHVRIORFDOFRPPXQLW\¶ 
 Yet, if the family is too small a unit to be able to sustain pursuit of the 
common good as MacIntyre conceives it, then it is not merely the case that the nation 
state operates on too great a scale.  Nor is it the case that, of necessity operating 
through institutions, the state has merely fallen wholesale into its traps of corrupting 
power against which MacIntyre has warned.  There are more fundamental problems.  
The modes of operation of the modern state have become so entangled with the 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQV RI OLEHUDOLVP WKDW LW LV µJRYHUQHG WKUough a series of compromises 
EHWZHHQDUDQJHRIPRUHRIOHVVFRQIOLFWLQJHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOLQWHUHVWV¶DVDUDQJH
RISROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFSUHVVXUHVDUHEURXJKWWREHDUµ7KHRXWFRPHLVWKDWDOWKRXJK
most citizens share, although to varying extents, in such public goods as those of a 
minimally secure order, the distribution of goods by government is no way reflects a 
common mind arrived at through widespread shared deliberation governed by norms 
RIUDWLRQDOHQTXLU\¶353    
 This claim, that the modern nation state as constituted, not only does not, but 
cannot, be a vehicle for widespread shared deliberation about the common good, 
governed by norms of rational enquiry, if correct, has far-reaching implications for 
such aspirations as of the Anglican Bishops to engage in effective advocacy within the 
public sphere.  It is therefore necessary to consider further what he sees as the fatal 
flaws of contemporary government.  To do this, I turn to the particularly 
comprehensive analysis of the contemporary western nation state which MacIntyre 
JDYHZKHQZULWLQJRQµ7ROHUDWLRQDQGWKH*RRGVRI&RQIOLFW¶354    
State Neutrality and its Problems 
 MacIntyre begins with the crucial development of the concept and exercise of 
tolerance, not least religious tolerance, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
He highlights /RFNH¶VassertLRQWKDWLWZDVµWKHIXQFWLRQDQGGXW\RIWKHPDJLVWUDWHWR
promote the security, order, and harmony of a people, but not to attempt to regulate or 
HYHQWRLQIOXHQFHWKHLUEHOLHIV«H[FHSWZKHQ«EHOLHILWVHOIRUWKHODFNRILWWKUHDWHQV
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VHFXULW\ RUGHU DQG KDUPRQ\¶355  Thus he sees Locke as advocating the essentially 
OLEHUDOSRVLWLRQRIµWKH OHJLVODWLYHHQIRUFHPHQWRIWROHUDWLRQ¶ZLWKWKHVWDWHEHLQJµDV
neutral as possible between differenWSRLQWVRIYLHZ¶ « µRQTXHVWLRQVRIUHOLJLRQDQG
PRUHJHQHUDOO\RQTXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJ WKHKXPDQJRRG¶ 1HLWKHUVWDWHQRUDQ\RQH
HOVHPD\FRHUFLYHO\LPSRVHDQ\RQHYLHZRQRWKHUVDQGSURYLGHGWKHµVHFXULW\RUGHU
DQGKDUPRQ\RIVRFLHW\¶DUHQRWWKUHDWHQHGµDOPRVWQROLPLWLVSODFHGRQWKHPHDQVRI
SHUVXDVLRQWKDWDUHRWKHUZLVHDOORZHG¶356   
On the face of it, a neutral state so constituted might be thought to offer a 
constructive context in which rival traditions of enquiry can debate the common good.  
0HQGXVLQWHUSUHWV0DF,QW\UH¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWDVEHLQJRQHWKDWµHQGRUVHVPDQ\RIWKH
FRQFOXVLRQVRI OLEHUDOLVP¶,357 DQG LQSDUWLFXODUWKDWKHµDJUHHVWKDWWKHVWDWHRXJKWQRW
WRLPSRVHDQ\FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHJRRGRQWKRVHZKROLYHXQGHULW¶%XWVKHSRLQWs out, 
µKHGHQLHVWKDWWKLVUHIXVDOWRLPSRVHLVDPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIQHXWUDOLW\2QWKHFRQWUDU\
he argues, the vocabulary of the modern liberal state is the vocabulary of rights and 
utility, and thus the liberal state, far from being neutral, is committed to certain sorts 
RIYDOXHV¶,WLVWKHVHWKDWWKHVWDWHSURPRWHV± as I shall go on to recount below.  As 
0HQGXV SXWV LW µ0DF,QW\UH GRHV QRW FRQVWUXH WKLV IDLOXUH RI QHXWUDOLW\ DV VLPSO\ D
IDFHWRIWKHVWDWH¶VUROHLQHQFRXUDJLQJLQGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\IRU³WKHVWDWHFDQQRWEH
WUXVWHG WR SURPRWH DQ\ ZRUWKZKLOH VHW RI YDOXHV´ « LQ KLV H\HV WKHQ WKH DOOHJHG
neutrality of the state is simply a charade ± and a dangerous charade, when it takes 
upon itself a role it can never fulfil, the role of promoting autRQRP\¶ 
0HQGXV KDV KLJKOLJKWHG D YLWDOO\ LPSRUWDQW DPELJXLW\ LQ D VWDWH¶V FODLPV WR
promote neutrality.  For it is one thing to create a climate in which competing 
traditions, including religious traditions, can engage together in debating the common 
good on a level playing field.  It is quite another to pretend to neutrality between 
ethical, particularly religious, perspectives, while imposing a value structure 
ostensibly based in objective technical considerations, in which a raft of 
presuppositions and assumed evaluative criteria are in fact implicit but 
unacknowledged.   
One concrete way in which these tensions play out is in relation to the 
neutrality often claimed by secular society in respect of religious belief.  Rowan 
Williams contrasts µWKH GLVWLQFtion between the empty public square of a merely 
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instrumental liberalism, which allows maximal private license, and a crowded and 
argumentative public square which acknowledges the authority of a legal mediator or 
broker whose job it is to balance and manage real difference.¶358  Unsurprisingly, he 
favours the latter, a public space where each can argue their own position on the basis 
of their own convictions, with no exclusion of religious justifications in favour of 
VRPHµSXEOLFUHDVRQ¶ +H provides a helpful distinction, to which we shall return in 
later chapters, when he warns that µZH LQ (QJODQG QHHG WR EH PXFK PRUH FDUHIXO
distinguishing between what I sometimes call Procedural Secularism, which is, the 
state steps back but allows debate to go on and the state itself stays neutral, and 
Programmatic Secularism, where the state drives an agenda to push religion out of the 
SXEOLF VSKHUH¶359  From an American perspective, Nicholas Wolterstorff similarly 
argues for a form of secularism that is neutral in the sense of being impartial between 
the different faiths, as well as between those with and without religious convictions; 
but says that in practice the interpretation of neutrality as separation of state and 
religion, rather than as some form of impartiality, discriminates against people of faith 
and undermines the principles of equality to which liberalism is committed.360  Stout 
likewise DUJXHV WKDW D 5DZOVLDQ µQHXWUDOLW\¶ ZKLFK H[FOXGHV UHOLJLRXV UHDVRQLQJ LV
unrealistic, irrational, and diminishing to all, in expecting FLWL]HQV WR µEUDFNHW¶
µZKDWHYHUSUHPLVHVDFWXDOO\VHUYHDV UHDVRQV¶ IRU WKHLUFRPPLWPHQWVDQG WKHFODLPV
they make in public debate.361  I shall return to these discussions of the possibilities for 
promoting constructive forms of such neutral secularism, with specific reference to 
secularism and the place of religion in public debate, along with a Thomistic 
understanding of secular governance on the basis of natural law, in chapters 6 and 7. 
The Expanding State 
 The ambiguities of so-called neutrality become evident when we look at a 
VWDWH¶VZLGHUUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVIRUSROLF\PDNLQJEH\RQGWKRVHRIXSKROGLQJDFRQWH[W
of security, order and harmony in which various communities can debate their 
perspectives on an equal footing.  Regulation of various aspects of life inevitably 
reflects presuppositions about how life should be led which in practice are far from 
neutral ± and, worse, may not admit this is so, instead taking refuge in language that 
pretends to some objective neutrality.  Thus MacIntyre claims that, in practice, the 
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PRGHUQVWDWHDVLWHPHUJHGµZDVQHYHULWVHOIQHXWUDOLQWKHFRQIOLFWVWKDWFRQWLQXHGWR
divide the society over which it presided.  Here we need only note that the conceptions 
which the state principally championed were particular and highly contestable 
FRQFHSWLRQVRIOLEHUW\DQGRISURSHUW\DQGRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHP«DQGLW
systematically favoured those groups and parties whose understanding of the human 
JRRGZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHVWDWH¶VRZQFRQFHSWLRQVRIOLEHUW\DQGSURSHUW\¶362   
In the centuries since Locke, not only has politics has become increasingly 
secularised, as MacIntyre notes, but WKHVFRSHRIWKHVWDWH¶VDFWLYLWLHVµKDVEHHQJUHDWO\
HQODUJHG DV KDV WKH HIIHFW RI WKRVH DFWLYLWLHV RQ WKH HFRQRP\¶  7Krough the 
EXUJHRQLQJ RI VWDWH DJHQFLHV DQG FRPSOH[ OHJLVODWLRQ µLWV DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHJXODWLRQV
are such that to grasp their detail is now generally beyond the reach of ordinary 
FLWL]HQV¶ KH FODLPV µD IDFW ZKRVH VLJQLILFDQFH LW LV GLIILFXOW WR RYHU-UDWH¶  For 
0DF,QW\UH WKHRPLQRXVFRQVHTXHQFH LV WKDW WKHVWDWH µKDVEHFRPHPRUHDQGPRUHD
VHWRI LQVWLWXWLRQV WKDWKDYH WKHLURZQYDOXHV¶ ± by implication these µvalues¶ UHIOHFW
neither the virtues nor WKHFRPPRQJRRG,QDGGLWLRQµWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\VWDWHLV to a 
remarkable degree united in an indissoluble partnership with the national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHW¶:KLOHWKHUHPD\EHµRQJRLQJ LGHRORJLFDOGHEDWHVDERXWZKHUH
the boundaries between public and government corporate activity and private 
corporate actLYLW\ DUH WREHGUDZQ« WKH DJUHHPHQWVXQGHUO\LQJ WKRVH FRQIOLFWV DQG
the shared presuppositions of those debates reflect the common needs of state and 
market for capital formation, for economic growth, and for an adequately trained by 
disposable labor force, whose members are also compliant consumers and law-abiding 
FLWL]HQV¶363    
 From this sweeping and negative description, MacIntyre concludes that we 
VKRXOGWKLQNRIµWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\VWDWHDQGWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\QDWLRQDOHFRQRP\DVD
huge, single, complex KHWHURJHQHRXV LPPHQVHO\ SRZHUIXO VRPHWKLQJ RU RWKHU¶
:KDW LV SDUWLFXODUO\ WURXEOLQJ IRU KLP LV WKDW WKLV VWDWH µJLYHV H[SUHVVLRQ WRERWK LWV
SRZHU DQG LWV YDOXHV LQ WZR YHU\ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V¶ ± ways he sees as ultimately 
duplicitous, which he proceeds to spell out in detail:  µ2Q WKH RQH KDQG WKHUH LV WKH
mask that it wears in all those everyday transactions in which individuals and groups 
are compelled to deal with a heterogeneous range of public and private corporate 
DJHQFLHV¶VRPHRIZKLFKKHOLVWV  These transactions are governed by administrative 
regulations, the complexity of which means that they too often have to be left to 
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µH[SHUWV¶ WR KDQGOH LQWHUSUHW DQG DSSO\ DQG ZKLFK FDQ JHQHUDOO\ RQO\ EH SXW LQ
question by engaging with them through thH µVDPH LGLRPV DQG W\SHV RI DUJXPHQW¶
with which they are justified in the first place ± WKLV LV WKH UHDOP µRI utility and of 
rights¶DQGRIFRVW-benefit analyses.  It is those who hold power who decide how costs 
and benefits are to be measured, and weighed against various rights of individuals and 
groups that may be concerned.  The key point to note is that, in such processes of 
PHDVXULQJZHLJKLQJDQGEDODQFLQJ LQWHUHVWVDQGXWLOLWLHVµWKHUHDUHQRVFDOHV«QRW
only is there no rationally justifiable general rule by which claims about utilities can 
be evaluated as over-riding or as failing to over-ride claims about rights, but in each 
particular context what decides how such claims will be adjudicated will always 
depend upon who it is that in that particular context has the power to adjudicate, and 
how this power to adjudicate is related to distribution of economic, political and social 
SRZHUPRUHJHQHUDOO\¶364   
0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLFLVPVJRIXUWKHU  $ORQJVLGH WKLVVWDWHV µZHDUTXLWHDQRWKHU
mask and speak with quite another voice when they justify their policies and actions in 
their role as FXVWRGLDQV RI VRFLHW\¶V YDOXHV¶  ,Q GRLQJ VR WKH\ SUHVHQW µthe state as 
JXDUGLDQRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VLGHDOVDQGWKHFDUHWDNHURILWVKHULWDJHDQGWKHPDUNHWDVWKH
institutionalized expression of its liberties.  It is in this guise that the state from time to 
time invites us to die on its behalf and that the market fosters through is advertising 
agencies fantasies about well-being.  This type of rhetoric relies not on the idioms of 
utilities and rights, but on the persuasive definition and redefinition of such terms as 
³OLEHUW\´³GHPRFUDF\´³IUHHPDUNHW´DQGWKHOLNH¶  +HDGGVµLWLVDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRU
achieving certain kinds of status within the apparatus of state and market that one 
VKRXOGEHDEOHWRPRYHHIIHFWLYHO\EHWZHHQWKHRQHUKHWRULFDOPRGHDQGWKHRWKHU¶365 ± 
LQ RWKHU ZRUGV RQH VKRXOG EH DGHSW DW ZHDULQJ ERWK µPDVNV¶ DV KH FDOOV WKHP DQG
swapping between them.  Yet however fluent one may be in these modes of rhetoric, 
says MacIntyre,  
«what the modes of justification employed in and on behalf of the activities 
of the state and market cannot give expression to are the values that inform 
just those ongoing argumentative conversations through which members of 
local communities try to achieve their goods and their good.  The values of 
state and market are not only different from, but on many types of occasion 
incompatible with, the values of such local community.  For the former, 
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decision-making is arrived at by a summing of preferences and by a series of 
trade-offs, in which whose preferences are summed and what is traded off 
against what depends upon the political and economic bargaining power of the 
representatives of contending interests.  For the latter, a shared understanding 
of the common good of the relevant type of activity or sets of activities 
provides a standard independent of preferences and interests, one by reference 
to which individual preferences and group interests are to be evaluated.  For 
the former there is no consideration that may not under certain circumstances 
be outweighed by some other consideration.  For the latter there are 
conclusive considerations, those that refer us to goods that cannot be 
sacrificed or foregone without rendering the activity in which the community 
is engaged pointless.  For the former, a gift for flexibility and compromise, for 
knowing when and how to exchange one set of principles for another, is 
accounted a central political virtue.  For the latter, a certain moral 
intransigence of a kind that is apt to prevent success in the larger worlds of the 
state and the market is accounted among the political virtues.366   
This lengthy quote serves to illustrate how adamantly MacIntyre believes that the 
workings of the contemporary state are irretrievably caught up with the external goods 
of power, wealth, and status, together with instrumentalist criteria, the predominating 
pursuit of which inevitably is at odds with the furtherance of the internal goods of 
excellence which rational morality demands.  On his account, rationality, morality, 
ethics, and the virtues, all as properly understood and contextualised within the social 
practices and language-in-use of a community of tradition are entirely alien, even 
incomprehensible, to tKHUKHWRULFRI WKHVWDWHZKLFKHYHUµPDVN¶ LWZHDUV )URPWKLV
perspective, it is unsurprising that MacIntyre draws the following stark conclusion: 
It is a consequence of these features of the social life of advanced modernity 
that there is always tension and sometimes conflict between the demands of 
state and market on the one hand and the requirements of rational local 
community on the other.  Those who value rational local communal enterprise 
are therefore wise to order their relationships with state and market so that, as 
far as possible, they remain able to draw upon those resources that can only be 
secured from state and market, while preserving their own sufficiency, their 
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self-reliance, and their freedom from constraint by either.  They must treat the 
agencies of the state with unremitting suspicion.367 
$V )HUJXVVRQ SXWV LW 0DF,QW\UH¶V µIXQGDPHQWDO REMHFWLRQ LV WKDW WKH PRGHUQ QDWLRQ
state cannot sustain the common good.  By virtue of its presumed neutrality and its 
attempt to mediate between irreconcilables, the state lacks the moral commitment and 
UHVRXUFHVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHFRPPRQJRRG¶368   
  0DF,QW\UH¶VSHVVLPLVPLVQRWFRQILQHGWRSXUHO\SROLWLFDOGHEDWH  He sees all 
institutions of the contemporary state as likely to be fatally flawed in the same way.  
Thus, for example, he devotes the final chapter of Three Rival Versions to the failings 
of contemporary academia (and writes similarly elsewhere).  In similar vein, 
Hauerwas (who, as Stout considers in some detail,369 draws heavily on MacIntyre) 
frequently brings a very similar critique to bear particularly upon the field of 
medicine.370    
An Alternative Account 
 If justified, this pessimism seems to offer little promise to the Anglican 
Bishops in their attempts to promote social justice through advocacy in the public 
sphere.  But it is my view that the situation is far less dire than it is presented.  With 
Stout, I contend that though the concerns MacIntyre raises are valid, and significant, 
WKH\ DUH QRW WKH ZKROH VWRU\  , VKDUH 6WRXW¶V YLHZ WKDW WKHUe is more than enough 
evidence to support the argument that: 
x the contemporary nation state is not so wholly in the thrall of external goods of 
power, status and wealth that all understanding of the virtues and of internal goods 
of excellence has been lost;  
x nor is it so atomised that individualism has destroyed the capacity of various 
networks and relationships to play a genuine and constructive role in shaping our 
common life; 
x concepts of the common good, human flourishing and our appropriate telos still 
retain some currency; and 
x to a considerable extent, democratic debate functions as a social practice 
sufficiently well to allow some degree of substantive moral debate.   
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Many of the essential building blocks of traditions of enquiry are to be found, even if 
in rough and ready form.  So the question is how, and how far, we can utilise them in 
pursuit of ethical living.    
 I shall now consideU6WRXW¶VDSSURDFKLQIXOOHUGHWDLODQGdiscuss his reasons 
for drawing these conclusions; and then, in the following chapter, explore some of the 
ways these may make a concrete difference in practice.  As in the previous chapter, I 
shall argue that we need to work not with the utopianism of theory (though here 
MacIntyre paints D G\VWRSLDQ SLFWXUH EXW LQ SXUVXLW RI D µJRRG HQRXJK¶ SUDFWLFDO
instantiation, which we discover, and indeed promote, through applying ourselves as 
EHVWZHFDQWRµJRLQJRQDQGJRLQJIXUWKHU¶,WLVRQO\E\DWWHPSWLQJWRGRWKLVWKDWZH
find the limits of what can be achieved ± and we may often find we can achieve far 
more than we had anticipated.   
 $V KDV EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ QRWHG 0DF,QW\UH¶V RZQ SUDFWLFH LQGLFDWHV WKDW KH
believes that this is an effort worth making, and worth persevering with, in the way he 
persists in engaging in debate within the context of the academy in particular.371  The 
same is true of Hauerwas, who is generally characterised as being similarly negative, 
IRUH[DPSOHZKHQKHPDNHVVXFKVWDWHPHQWVDVµat times and in some circumstances 
Christians will find it impossible to participate in government, in aspects of the 
HFRQRP\RULQWKHHGXFDWLRQDOV\VWHP¶372  Yet he too is a prolific speaker and writer, 
often engaging more directly in the political arena.  
Going on and Going Further with Stout 
 Writing DV µDQ HWKLFLVW DQG D SKLORVRSKHU RI UHOLJLRQ E\ WUDLQLQJ¶ 6WRXW¶V
SULPDU\ FRQFHUQ LV WR DGGUHVV µGLVFRQWHQWV DERXW REMHFWLYLW\ DQG UHODWLYLW\ LQ HWKLFV
about the possibility of understanding or criticizing culture unlike our own, about how 
secular morality relates to the religious traditions concerning which philosophers 
nowadays say so little, and about the health of a culture like our own, in which we 
VHHP DW WLPHV WR KDYH WRR PDQ\ PRUDO ODQJXDJHV IRU FRKHUHQW SXEOLF GLVFRXUVH¶373  
7KRXJKKHUHMHFWVPXFKRI0DF,QW\UH¶VµVWRU\RIGHFOLQHDQGIDOO¶in ethical debate, in 
other areas (not only criticism of the Enlightenment) KHVKDUHVPDQ\RI0DF,QW\UH¶V
fundamental assumptions, from the importance of a telos grounded in the reality of 
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what it is to be human (including both our finitude and fallibility)374 through to the 
contextual nature of all moral reasoning.  There are parallels between his concept of 
µPRUDO ODQJXDJHV¶ IRXQG ZLWKLQ VRPH VRUW RI UHODWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH RU SUDFWLFH DQG
0DF,QW\UH¶VODQJXDJHV-in-use of communities of tradition ± though the latter are more 
narrowly defined through stricter criteria.  Like MacIntyre, he believes that, 
appropriately pursued, rational morality can be asserted that overcomes accusations of 
relativism.375  Though not a theist, he believes there is a necessary place for religious 
perspectives to be voiced within public discourse, and that this should be done on their 
own terms ± since it is the attempt of faith communities to speak in the moral 
languages of secularisation (which suffer from all the failings associated with the 
HQOLJKWHQPHQWSURMHFW¶VDWWHPSWDWFRQWH[WQHXWUDOREMHFWLYHGLVFRXUVHZKLFKKDVEHHQ
the major factor in their marginalisation in recent decades.376  He sums up his reasons:   
My own argument for putting the critical study of religious ethics back on the 
LQWHOOHFWXDODJHQGDLVWKUHHIROG)LUVW«ZHFDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGHYHQWKHPRVW
secularized forms of moral discourse in contemporary society without 
understanding how the fate of religious ethics has played a role in their 
formation. Second, even if we are not persuaded to accept theological 
conclusions, the study of religious traditions may still teach us something of 
PRUDOLPSRUWDQFH«DQGILQDOO\WKHVHFXODUL]DWLRQRISXEOLFPRUDOGLVFRXUVH
± which has meant that most attempts at moral persuasion presented under the 
aegis of certain public institutions do not presuppose the truth of specific 
theological beliefs, given the religiously plural nature of the audience being 
addressed ± does not mean that religious assumptions and categories play no 
essential role either in what people actually say as participants in public 
discourse or in the moral deliberations of many people in our society. If we 
ZDQWWRXQGHUVWDQGRXUIHOORZFLWL]HQV«ZHKDGEHWWHUGHYHORSWKHPHDQVIRU
understanding the moral languages, including the theological ones, in which 
they occasionally address us and in which their deliberation is couched.377 
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To put it in MacIntyrean terms, Stout is arguing that to assert moral rationality 
requires those of no faith to engage with the faith communities, including on their 
terms.  In doing this himself, Stout reaches some important ± even if, for a non-theist, 
rather startling ± conclusions: 
«people can be justified in believing something even if they are unable to 
produce positive justifying arguments for believing it or arguments that can 
justify that belief to others.  It also follows that two people can be justified in 
believing quite different sets of propositions. So if I am right about such 
matters, the problem of public theology in our day should not be conflated 
with problems pertaining to the rationality of religious individuals or the 
justification of particular beliefs they hold. I have been addressing the 
problem of public theology.378 
Furthermore, while he says tKDWµI have not been trying to demonstrate that theologians 
are irrational or that they are unjustified in believing what they believe about God¶ 
within a footnote he goes far further, in concurring that µ7KHH[WHQWRIP\DJUHHPHQW
with Wolterstorff in epistemological matters allows me to accept most of what the best 
proponents of [this particular reformed theological approach to faith and truth] have 
been saying recently about the rationality of religious belief (for some people) without 
accepting their rHOLJLRXVDVVXPSWLRQV¶379 
In summary, therefore, 6WRXW¶VREMHFWLYH DQG WKH FRQWH[W LQ DQG UHDVRQV IRU
which he pursues it, align closely with mine, of enunciating philosophical resources to 
assist those such as the Anglican Bishops in promoting, and participating fully in, just 
such public moral discourse. 
6WRXW¶V3UDJPDWLVP 
 $VZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDWZH WDNH WLPHWRµVLQJ WKHEOXHV¶ WKRXJK
6WRXWFDOOVIRUXVWRGRRXUEHVWLQHQVXULQJZHKROGMXVWLILHGPRUDOEHOLHIVµDSSO\LQJ
WKHVWDQGDUGVZH¶YH got as rigorously as we can, all the while trying to improve them 
DVZH JR¶ KH DOVR LV FOHDU WKDW WKH VWDQGDUGVRIRXUSUDFWLFHV µFDQQRWEH LPSRVVLEO\
XWRSLDQ RU XQFRQQHFWHG ZLWK RUGLQDU\ EHOLHI ZLWKRXW EHFRPLQJ LUUHOHYDQW¶380  His 
answer to this tension EHWZHHQ LGHDODQGSUDFWLFH LVWRWDNHDPXFKPRUHµSUDJPDWLF¶
approach ± one that deems phronesis, practical wisdom, DVDHYHQWKHµFDUGLQDOPRUDO
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YLUWXH¶ZKLFK, when it comes to matters of fact and truth, LVµDVLPSRUWDQWWRVFLHQFH
as it is to textual LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRUWRHWKLFDOGLVFHUQPHQW¶381   
 MacIntyre accords a similarly central place to phronesis XVLQJ $ULVWRWOH¶V
term in his contemporary account of ethical, moral living, though tending towards the 
utopian ideal in the way that he presents his arguments.  In contrast, Stout grapples 
with the messy complexities of actual contemporary society, an approach he describes 
as bricolage.  By this, he ± approvingly ± PHDQVµHYHU\PRUDOLVW¶VQHHGWRHQJDJH LQ
selective retrieval and eclectic reconfiguration of traditional linguistic elements in 
KRSHRIVROYLQJSUREOHPVDWKDQG¶DQG, in doing so, developing a moral language that 
finds expression within a community.382  It is thus a much more ragged bottom-up 
XQGHUWDNLQJ WKDQ ZKDWZH PLJKW FDOO0DF,QW\UH¶V WRS-down approach, and therefore 
might be seen as falling far short of the sort of criteria and standards to which 
MacIntyre points.   
 But 6WRXW¶V insistence on, within reason, always working from where one 
finds oneself towards a higher degree of morality, rationality, and effective action, 
EULQJV KLP RQWR D FRQYHUJHQW SDWK ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK ZKHQ SUDFWLFDOO\
instantiated.  Indeed, he describes both Aquinas and MacIntyre as, in their own ways, 
effectively bricoleurs.383  And though MacIntyre may set out a systematic method for 
engaging with alternative perspectives and changing context and taking account of 
what is pertinent to our circumstances, his requirement that we do so comprehensively 
± testing our convictions against all possible alternatives ± is little different in 
substance from Stout¶VEULFROHXUZKRVLIWV through anything and everything that can 
come to hand with considerable thoroughness so that whatever is useful may be 
identified and incorporated.  Though Stout insists that bricolage is the work of an 
individual, while MacIntyre requires critical evaluation and revision to be conducted 
within a community of tradition, Stout makes it clear that bricolage does not take the 
place of the development of moral languages in a community (however loosely that 
FRPPXQLW\ DFFRUGV ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V µFRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ¶  5DWKHU µDFWV RI
bricolage¶FDQµQXGJHWKHFRPPRQPRUDOODQJXDJH¶7KHVHDUHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQVWKDW
individuals can make to the wider pursuit of moral rationality within the community, 
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even loosely defined, to which they belong.384  (Indeed, this account is valuable in 
DGGUHVVLQJ FULWLFLVPV RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURSULDWLRQ RI $TXLQDV ZKR ZRUNHG ODUJHO\
alone, though within the wider context of a religious community of tradition.)     
 Given this degree of coherence between the two approaches, I shall consider 
6WRXW¶V µVHOHFWLYH UHWULHYDO¶ RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI DVVHVVLQJ
ZKHWKHU LW SURYLGHV D µJRRG HQRXJK¶ EDVLV IRU WKRVH VXFK DV WKH $QJOLFDQ %LVKRSV
effectively to attempt to µJR on and go further¶ LQ SXEOLF GHEDWH ZLWKLQ OLEHUDO
democratic society.   
6WRXW¶V3UDFWLFDO2SWLPLVP 
 Despite Stout¶V considerable sympathy with the analysis of the Enlightenment 
project offered by MacIntyre, he believes this does not automatically lead to the 
SHVVLPLVWLFFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµPRGHUQPRUDOGLVFRXUVHKDVVXIIHUHGDJUHDWFDWDVWURSKH
OHDYLQJXV LQ FRQFHSWXDOGLVDUUD\¶ +H WDNHV LVVXH ZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶V FODLP WKDW µWKH
³QHZGDUNDJHV´KDYHFRPHWRSDVVWKDWWKHRQO\ZD\WRUHVWRUHWKHFommon good and 
the virtues to their proper place is to withdraw into small communities not divided by 
IXQGDPHQWDOPRUDOGLVDJUHHPHQWVDQGFRPSHWLQJPRUDOFRQFHSWV¶385  
  6WRXW FKDOOHQJHV 0DF,QW\UH¶V QHJDWLYLW\ RQ WKH EDVLV RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V RZQ
arguments, poinWLQJ RXW WKDW ZKLOH KH EHZDLOV WKH FXUUHQW ODFN RI D µVKDUHG SXEOLF
UDWLRQDOMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUPRUDOLW\¶KHGRHVQRWFRQFOXGHIURPWKLVWKDWµWKHUHFDQEHQR
such thinJDVPRUDONQRZOHGJH¶)RUWKHIDFWWKDW, in earlier periods of history, there 
has beeQFRQVLGHUDEOHDJUHHPHQWRQDV0DF,QW\UHSXWVLWµPDQ-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realized-his-telos¶, demonstrates that it has been possible to sustain rational discourse 
µRQFRQGXFWFKDUDFWHUDQGFRPPXQLW\¶LQWKHSXEOLFDUHQD,WLVEHFDXVH LWKDVEHHQ
posVLEOHLQWKHSDVWVD\V6WRXWWKDW0DF,QW\UHDLPVDWµUHFRYHULQJVRPHWKLQJOLNHDQ
$ULVWRWHOLDQWHOHRORJLFDOIUDPHZRUNDQGWDLORULQJRXULQKHULWHGPRUDOODQJXDJHVWRILW¶
LQRUGHUWRµUHQGHUPRUDOGLVFRXUVHUDWLRQDODJDLQ¶386     
 Stout is prepared to agreHWKDWTXHVWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\¶Vtelos or common good 
are central to moral debate, and that these are not merely for philosophical 
GHOLEHUDWLRQ EXW DUH EHVW µHPERGLHG LQ WKH KDELWV GLVSRVLWLRQV VKDUHG DVVXPSWLRQV
and goals of a living community dedicated WRWKHFRPPRQJRRG¶± which is a far cry 
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IURPFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\DWODUJH+RZHYHUKHEHOLHYHVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWHULDIRU
communities of tradition, and requirement for a high degree of commensurability in 
relation to telos and evaluative practices, are far more stringent than necessary for 
substantial and effective dialogue to take place.  In a key passage, he writes:  
I am prepared to agree that complete absence of agreement on the good would 
render rational moral discourse impossible. I am also prepared to grant that 
our agreement on the good falls well short of perfect harmony. Furthermore, 
liberal institutions are plausibly viewed as an attempt to manage collective life 
LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI SHUIHFW DJUHHPHQW RQ ³PDQ-as-he-would-be-if-he-realized-
his-telos.´%XW0DF,QW\UHGRHVQRWH[FOXGHLWVHHPVWRPHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW
moral discourse in our society can itself be understood as held together by a 
relatively limited but nonetheless real and significant agreement on the 
good.387 
For, Stout goes on to DUJXHZKLOHµZHDUHQRWXQLWHGLQFRQVHQVXVDURXQGDSDUWLFXODU
WKHRU\ RI KXPDQ QDWXUH RU PDQ¶V XOWLPDWH telos, and so our disagreements about 
FHUWDLQ PRUDO LVVXHV KDYH SURYHG HVSHFLDOO\ GLIILFXOW WR UHVROYH¶ LW PXVW QRQHWKHOHVV
DOVREHUHFRJQLVHGWKDWµour disagreement about what human beings are like and what 
LVJRRGIRUXVGRHVQRWJRDOOWKHZD\GRZQ¶388   
 His reasons for this echo the arguments recounted in the last chapter, that to 
disagree about something entails at least a degree of agreement about the contested 
VXEMHFW  µ&RPSOHWH GLVDJUHHPHQW DERXW VRPHWKLQJ OHDYHV XV XQDEOH WR LGHQWLI\ D
common matter to disagree over.  It therefore makes sense to speak of disagreement, 
in morals as much as elsewhere, only if we are prepared to recognize a background of 
agreement.  It would be a mistake, then, to think that our disagreement on the good is 
total or that the areas of apparently intractable moral disagreement to which MacIntyre 
FDOOVDWWHQWLRQFRXOGEHWKHZKROHVWRU\¶389  In his Postscript to the second edition of 
Ethics after Babel6WRXWGHIHQGVKLPVHOIDJDLQVW+DXHUZDV¶FKDUJHWKDWKHUHKHµOHDQV
WRRKHDYLO\RQ'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ¶VSKLORVRSK\RIODQJXDJH¶390  While to some degree 
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accepting the criticism, he stresses that his underlying concern is to bring the focus 
onto the point at which incommensurability occurs (in other words, to serve as a 
diagnostic tool, much as I proposed in the previous chapter).  He is well aware that 
disagreements can arise in different ways, because of different propositions, different 
perspectives, or different cultures, and that often debate can be about the criteria for 
making moral judgements.391  In response to Hauerwas he says µ,IGLVDJUHHPHQWLVWKH
key concern, then it falls to MacIntyre to say how much and what kind of disagreement 
LW WDNHV WR PDNH D GLVFXUVLYH SUDFWLFH KRSHOHVVO\ XQVWDEOH RU XQVXVWDLQDEOH¶392  His 
FRQFHUQ LV WKDW 0DF,QW\UH µVKDUHV WKH VNHSWLFV¶ WHQGHQF\ WR PRYH WRR TXLFNO\ IURP
specific instances of disagreement to the conclusion that all is lost¶393 and so fails to 
grasp ± and indeed deters others from grasping ± the very real opportunities that exist 
for taking debate forward.  
  And so Stout offers evidence for sufficient common ground for some degree 
of effective debate over differences on moral questions having historically existed, and 
been sustained.  This is certainly true of Western European history over recent 
centuries and the context of evolving liberal society.  While the extent of debate and 
depth of agreement reached through it may have been very limited, it has proved itself 
WREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶ 
 «HYHQWKRXJKZHQRORQJHUVKDUHDVLQJOHWKHRU\RIKXPDQQDWXUHZKHQGLG
ZHH[DFWO\"«PRVWRIXVGRDJUHHRQZKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGWKHSURYLVLRQDO
telos of our society.  What made the creation of liberal institutions necessary, 
in large part, was the manifest failure of religious groups of various sorts to 
establish rational agreement on their competing detailed visions of the good.  
It was partly because people recognized putting an end to religious warfare 
and intolerance as a moral good ± as rationally preferable to continued 
attempts at imposing a more nearly complete vision of the good by force ± that 
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liberal institutions have been able to get a foothold here and there around the 
globe.394 
He goes on to say that at the broad level of society, we may well have managed better 
through having only a loosely defined shared view of the good, recognising that to 
attempt too tight a definition might actually have been detrimental to stable society.  
µ:H can define our shared conception of the good as the set of all platitudinous 
judgments employing such terms as good, better thanDQGWKHOLNH¶395 
 ,WLVWKXVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI6WRXW¶VDSSURDFKWRJUDVSZKDWHYHU LVRIIHUHGZLWK
both hands, and to see what can be made from it.  Even agreement over platitudes can 
EHFRPHDQHIIHFWLYHEDVLVIRUWKHQWDFNOLQJVKDUSHUTXHVWLRQVµ$GPLWWHGO\LWGRHVQRW
extend far enough to eliminate disagreement on many matters of importance.  Where 
we do disagree on such matters, that is where we should expect the complexity of our 
FRQFHSWXDOKHULWDJHWRVKRZLWVHOIERWKDVDUHVRXUFHDQGDVDSUREOHP¶396  Stout thus 
challenges the faith communities to resource ethical debate, through, in MacIntyrean 
terms, giving as good account of ourselves as we can, on our own terms ± but also 
HPSOR\LQJµELOLQJXDOLVP¶DVIDUDVZHFDQ in terms that our interlocutors can grasp.   
 Stout LVDOVRSUHSDUHGWRZRUNZLWKDJUHHPHQWVRQKXPDQLW\¶VJRRGRU other 
moral questions, that are reached for differing UHDVRQV  µFOHDUO\ QRW HYHU\RQH ZKR
participates in the consensus would offer the same sorts of reasons for the particular 
judgments we in fact share.  But that does not make the consensus ineffective or 
LQVLJQLILFDQW¶  $QG LW PD\ QRW HYHQEH necessary for us to give the reasons for our 
FRQFOXVLRQVZKHQZHUHDFKDJUHHPHQWµ)XUWKHUPRUHZKLOHWKHUHDUHWLPHVZKHQLQ
UHVSRQVHWR6RFUDWLFTXHVWLRQLQJRUDQHVSHFLDOO\NQRWW\GLOHPPDZH¶UHXQVXUHKRZWR
carry on with our reason-giving, there are vast regions of moral terrain in which we 
FDUU\RQSHUIHFWO\ZHOO¶ 
 Where there is some degree of agreement, for whatever reasons, it offers us 
the chance to go forward together in pursuing this shared practical goal for living, and 
to do so with a degree of confidence about our way of living harmoniously through 
our diversity:   µ,I VRPHWKLQJ OLNH WKLV DOWHUQDWLYH SLFWXUH FRXOG EH VXVWDLQHG ZH
should be less tempted to see moral discourse in our culture as simply incapable of 
supporting rational argumentation.¶397  Our confidence in working with what 
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agreement we can muster, for whatever reasons, should not be undermined by 
differences of fundamental approach.  For we must recognise that these are likely to 
exist, especially in relation to longstanding conflicts, and are not easily reconcilable or 
ZHZRXOGKDYHVROYHGWKHPµStrict consensus on the good would, in some respects, 
be very good to have¶ KH DGPLWV EXW HYHQ ZLWKRXW LW µRverlapping consensus, 
however, remains substantial enough to do a lot of ordinary justificatory work that 
MacIntyre tends not to mention ± the sort of work we tend to undervalue precisely 
EHFDXVHLWSURYLGHVDEDFNJURXQGDJDLQVWZKLFKRXUGLVDJUHHPHQWVRFFXU¶ 
 Stout therefore warns against setting too stringent conditions for 
FRPPHQVXUDELOLW\ DQG VWUHVVHV WKDW WKRXJK µRQO\ YHU\ UDUHO\ LI HYHU DUH KXPDQ
societies of any size and complexity united in perfect agreement on the common 
JRRG¶QRQHWKHOHVVZHKDYHVWLOOPDQDJHGWRVXVWDLQFRQVLGHUDEOHDJUHHPHQWRYHUKRZ
we handle IXQGDPHQWDOGLIIHUHQFHVHVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKHUHOLJLRXVDUHQDZKHUHµPRVWRI
us agree that extending legal protection to peaceful fellow citizens who disagree with 
XVUHOLJLRXVO\LVEHWWHUWKDQVWDUWLQJWKHUHOLJLRXVZDUVXSDJDLQ¶398 
 Stout concedes that at a philosophical level it could be argued that agreement 
DWWKLVOHYHORIµSODWLWXGHV¶PLJKWQRWDPRXQWWRYHU\PXFK%XWLQSUDFWLFHLWLVKXJHO\
significant that we can in this way step back from such potential conflict.  Thus he 
concludes that, when it FRPHV WR DJUHHPHQWVEDVHG RQ VXFKSODWLWXGHV µZH KDYH QR
choice but to treat them as justified, as ways in which we construe ourselves and our 
world, at least until we come up with something clearly better.  Without some such 
platitudes in place, we could not even make sense of the doubts we have about this or 
WKDWGHWDLO¶,QFRQFUHWHWHUPVZHVKRXOGQRWGHVSLVHWKHHIIHFWRIHYHQWKHVHOLPLWHG
levels of agreement.  And while he nonetheless calls on competent philosophers and 
theologians to work at deepening and broadening the basis of our mutual 
understanding, he insists that we should not deride less than perfect attempts to tackle 
issues of disagreement. 
Democracy Viewed as a Tradition 
 7KHUHIRUH 6WRXW¶V XQGHUO\LQJ FRQFOXVLRQ IURP Ethics After Babel is that, 
ZKLOH0DF,QW\UHLVE\QRPHDQVZURQJLQKLVQHJDWLYHDFFRXQWRIµWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW
3URMHFW¶ KH JRHV WRR IDU LQ KLV VZHHSLQJ FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ QDWLRQ
state as a locus for pursuing ethical debate and human flourishing.  Not all present day 
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liberalism reflects a fully-blown Rawlsian social-contract position399 (and Stout 
criticises both liberal and communitarian or traditionalist theorists for feeding off 
H[DJJHUDWHG YHUVLRQV RI HDFK RWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQV400).  A pragmatic approach, rooted in 
careful reflection on how contemporary western societies largely do manage to 
operate, should, says Stout, lead us to conclude that to a considerable degree, 
contemporary liberalism when expressed through this sort of democracy is indeed a 
tradition in the EHVW RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V VHQVHV IRU democratic debate operates as an 
effective enough social practice through which we can, rather more than cannot, 
debate and pursue what it means for human beings to flourish.  And within such a 
context ± a context that is pluralist in nature ± there is a necessary place for the 
contribution of self-aware, well-considered, religious perspectives.   
 Stout is therefore committed to µWKH UROH RI IUHH SXEOLF UHDVRQ LQ D SROLWLFDO
culture that includes conflicting religious concHSWLRQV RI WKH JRRG¶ DV KH SXWV LW LQ
ZKDWKHFDOOV µ5DZOVLDQ WHUPV¶.  This is at the heart of his second book, Democracy 
and Tradition.  He offers the following useful summary: 
 Democracy, I shall argue, is a tradition.  It inculcates certain habits of 
reasoning, certain attitudes towards defence and authority in political 
discussion, and love for certain goods and virtues, as well as a disposition to 
respond to certain types of actions, events, or persons with admiration, pity or 
horror.  This tradition is anything but empty.  Its ethical substance, however, is 
more a matter of enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of 
FRQGXFWWKDQ LWLVDPDWWHURIDJUHHPHQWRQDFRQFHSWLRQRI MXVWLFHLQ5DZOV¶
sense.  The notion of state neutrality and the reason-tradition dichotomy 
should not be seen as its defining marks.  Rawlsian liberalism should not be 
seen as its official mouthpiece.401   
Alongside the various MacIntyrean fundamental building blocks listed here, Stout 
adds the need for debate to be matched with action; for mutual holding to account, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ RI WKRVH LQ OHDGHUVKLS UROHV IRU DOO FLWL]HQV WR µDFFHSW VRPH PHDVXUH RI
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHFRQGLWLRQRIVRFLHW\¶ LQFOXGLQJRQµWKHSROLWLFDODUUDQJHPHQWVLW
PDNHV IRU LWVHOI¶ DQG WR µUHIOHFW SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ RQ WKHLU FRPPRQ OLIH¶  and for 
QRUPDWLYHFRPPLWPHQWVWREHµFRQVWDQWO\LQGLVSXWHVXEMHFWWRUHYLVLRQDQGQRWIXOO\
GHWHUPLQDWH¶ 
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 He points also to the capacity of contemporary discourse to speak out against 
the dominance of self-VHUYLQJµH[WHUQDOJRRGV¶RIZKLFK0DF,QW\UHZDUQV± the undue 
influence of money, power and the narrow interests of institutions and interest groups, 
DQGDGGVµ7KHGHPRFUDWLFSUDFWLFHRIJLYLQJDQGDVNLQJIRUHWKLFDOUHDVRQV,DUJXHLV
where the life RI GHPRFUDF\ SULQFLSDOO\ UHVLGHV¶402  The parallels with MacIntyrH¶V
moral rationality are extensive, and on this basis Stout asserts that µ3XEOLFSKLORVRSK\
DV,FRQFHLYHRILWLVDQH[HUFLVHLQH[SUHVVLYHUDWLRQDOLW\¶ 
  6WRXW VXPV XS µWKH SROLWLFDO YLVLRQ¶ in WKLV YROXPH E\ SRLQWLQJ WR µWZR
thoughts¶ from the writings of John Dewey.  The first is found in the following quote: 
The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is not 
apt it if means that the evils may be remedied by introducing more machinery 
of the same kind as that which already exists, or by refining and perfecting 
that machinery.  But the phrase may also indicate the need of returning to the 
idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it, and of 
employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and remake its political 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQV  WKHSULPHGLIILFXOW\«LV WKDWRIGLVFRYHULQJ WKHPHDQVE\
which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to 
define and express its interests.  This discovery is necessarily precedent to any 
fundamental change in the machinery.403 
In this way, Stout affirms the prime role, as identified by MacIntyre, played by 
KXPDQLW\¶V FRPPRQ JRRG IRU LW LV LQ WKLV VHQVH WKDW 'HZH\ VSHDNV RI WKH SXEOLF¶V
µLQWHUHVWV¶7KLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQKLVVHFRQGµWKRXJKW¶IURP'HZH\WKDWµGHPRFUDF\LV
D³VRFLDOLGHD´DVZHOODVDV\VWHPRIJRYHUQPHQW³7KHLGHDUHPDLQVEDUUHQVDYHDVLW
LVLQFDUQDWHGLQKXPDQUHODWLRQVKLSV´¶404 
 7KDW HYDOXDWLRQ RI KXPDQLW\¶V JRRG DQG Rf our evaluative processes for 
refining our understanding of this, is the second anchoring concern for Stout, again as 
for MacIntyre, is reflected in a quote from Rebecca Chop:  
 « GHPRFUDF\ LV QHYHU MXVW D VHW RI ODZV DERXW HTXDO DQG IDLU WUHDWPHQW
Rather, it is an ongoing interpretation of itself, an ongoing production of new 
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practices and narratives, of new values and forms of social and personal life 
that constitute a democracy.405 
Stout pulls these thoughts together with a further quote from Dewey that roots 
GHPRFUDF\ZLWKLQFRPPXQLW\OLIHDQGLWVOLYHGUHDOLWLHVLQRUGHUWRµUHDFKDQ LGHDRI
GHPRFUDF\ZKLFKLVQRWXWRSLDQ¶406   
  Stout FRQFOXGHV KLV DUJXPHQW ZLWK WKH DVVHUWLRQ µ'HPRFUDF\ LV D FXOWXUH D
WUDGLWLRQLQLWVRZQULJKW¶DQGVXPVXSKLVRZQpractically based approach by adding 
µ3UDJPDWLVP LV EHVW YLHZHG DV DQ DWWHPSW WR EULQJ WKH QRWLRQV RI GHPRFUDWLF
deliberation and tradition together in a single philosophical vision.  To put the point 
aphoristically and paradoxically, pragmatism is democratic traditionalism.  Less 
paradoxically, one could say that pragmatism is the philosophical space in which 
democratic rebellion against hierarchy combines with traditionalist love of virtue to 
IRUPDQHZLQWHOOHFWXDOWUDGLWLRQWKDWLVLQGHEWHGWRERWK¶407 
 In his later volume, Stout ILQGV 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI PRUDO UDWLRQDOLW\
rooted in communities of tradition, as expounded in Whose Justice?  Which 
Rationality? rather more satisfying than that in After Virtue alone, and to a significant 
degree affirms what MacIntyre affirms.  But he takes issue, as before, with much of 
what MacIntyre denies, in relation to the possibility of substantive moral rational 
discourse within the public arena.  My contention is that, as before, we have 
misunderstood what MacIntyre LVDVNLQJRIXVLIZHWU\WRDSSO\KLVµXWRSLDQ¶WKHRU\
LQ DOO LWV DEVROXWHQHVV WR SUDFWLFDO VLWXDWLRQV  6WRXW¶V µKDQGV-RQ¶ DSSURDFK LV LQ
practice building on precisely what MacIntyre advocates ± as is reflected in how the 
essential elements MacIntyre promotes are all incorporated, in much the ways that 
MacIntyre outlines.  As I shall describe further in the following chapter, such 
IOH[LELOLW\ LQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV UDWKHU PRUH LPSOLFLW ZLWKLQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW WKDQ
Stout seems to have recognised (though he is right to have serious misgivings over the 
SRWHQWLDO RI0DF,QW\UH¶VVZHHSLQJO\GLVPLVVLYHUKHWRULF to undermine the committed 
practice of democratic debate). 
  Thus, in contrast to the apparent pessimism that comes from viewing 
0DF,QW\UH¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI LGHDOLVHG WKHRU\ ZH ILQG 6WRXW¶V
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pragmatic, practically based, approach prepared to work with, and build on, even the 
most slender grounds for agreement and commensurability ± grounds that he 
nonetheless defines in terms compaUDEOH ZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶V.  This, he says, can have 
significant tangible results.  The lesson he advances is that one should always attempt 
µWR JR RQ DQG JR IXUWKHU¶ LQ SUDFWLFH EHFDXVH LW LV RQO\ WKHQ RQH ILQGV RXW ZKDW LV
possible and what is not.  Often we will find that live options are far more extensive 
than we might have imagined.  Further, he points to the resources that are offered by 
those who are prepared to engage in such debates ± that through engaging, especially 
where we are able to give a good account of our own perspectives, we make a 
concrete contribution to both the conduct and content of debate, and can potentially 
enrich the substance of what is agreed, including through promoting better evaluative 
practices.  In this way, he is advocating we treat the practice of democracy as 
potentially able to RSHUDWHDVDµJRRGHQRXJK¶WUDGLWLRQE\0DF,QW\UH¶VGHILQLWLRQ for 
sustaining substantive debate about and promotion of the common good ± something 
that neither he nor MacIntyre appear to have explicitly in these clear terms.   
 In the next chapter I turn to consider what this means in practice, and shall 
argue at greater length for proceeding on a basis of always engaging optimistically (all 
other considerations being equal), as the best means of promoting the greatest, and the 
most justifiable, agreement on the common good, and, in addition, as the best means 
of contributing to the development of a context in which ethical and moral debate can 
most fruitfully taken forward.  Specifically, I shall ORRNDWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI6WRXW¶V
µVHOHFWLYHUHWULHYDO¶RI0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLQWKHZD\VKHVD\VµZHFDQEHQHILWJUHDWO\
from his concept of social practices, his understanding of their relation to institution, 
and his distinction between internal and e[WHUQDOJRRGV¶408  
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  Chapter 5 ± MacIntyre against MacIntyre 
 ,QFKDSWHUVDQG,PDGHWKHFDVHWKDWWKHUHQHHGVRQO\WREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶
commensurability for communities of tradition to pursue substantive ethical 
deliberations. When it comes to meetinJ0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSDUHQWO\VWULQJHQWFULWHULDIRUD
high degree of compatibility between conceptions of telos and evaluative practices, 
we409 ZLOOILQGLQSUDFWLFHWKDWWREHµJRRGHQRXJK¶LVTXLWHVXIILFLHQW:KDWSUHFLVHO\
µJRRGHQRXJK¶PHDQVFDQ ,DUJXHG RQO\EH LGHQWLILHG WKURXJKDWWHPSWLQJ WR µJRRQ
DQGJRIXUWKHU¶ until we encounter its limits.  And I asserted that, furthermore, through 
DWWHPSWLQJWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶WRJHWKHUWKHWZRFRPPXQLWLHVFRQFHUQHGQRWRQO\
discover how great their capacity is for mutual engagement, they also contribute to 
broadening and deepening both the moral rationality of each and the scope of what it 
is possible for them to agree upon.  The corollary also holds:  to refrain from making 
an attempt at dialogue (unless there are good reasons to do so on other grounds) 
undermines our assertion of moral rationality.  For this excludes alternative 
perspectives of which we ought to take account, and impedes the potential of the 
parties concerned to go forward into greater understanding of each other, and of what 
it means to live well.  
 The task of this chapter is to explore parallel practical possibilities for ethical 
debate and democratic discourse, where one or all of the parties are not members of 
fully fledged communities of tradition.  I do so against the background of the more 
theoretical considerations explored in the previous chapter.  What is at issue is the 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK HYHQ WKRXJK WKH\ IDOO VKRUW RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V GHVFULSWLRQV RI ZKDW LV
required to pursue the morDO UDWLRQDO OLIH µJRRG HQRXJK¶ DSSUR[LPDWLRQV WR
communities of tradition and all that they embody are readily to be found  throughout 
contemporary Western society ± contrary to what he appears to assert, particularly in 
his major volumes.  This is so because within contemporary society, in various ways, 
people can, and many do, enjoy a degree of appreciation of the virtues, excellence and 
the distinction between internal and external goods, and share some understanding of 
genuine human flourishing.  This provides a context for sufficiently developed 
conceptually-rooted languages-in-use that are capable of sustaining an effective level 
of moral debate, through habits of democratic discourse that reflect a MacIntyrean 
social practice to at least some adequate degree.  Through positive engagement, I shall 
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DUJXH ZH VKDOO ILQG WKDW ZH FDQ µJR RQ DQG JR IXUWKHU¶ LQ HWKLFDO GHEDWH WKDQ
MacIntyre suggests is possible.  More than this, in doing so we can contribute to 
enhancing the ability of other members of our societies, and the institutions through 
which they operate, better to understand what it means to live with moral rationality 
and promote the common good.  Furthermore, particularly through the application of 
6WRXW¶VµVWHUHRVFRSLFVRFLDOFULWLFLVP¶LQZKLFh he advocates particular application of 
the concepts of internal and external goods, we can help guard ourselves and warn 
others against the traps which come with the institutionalisation that is (as MacIntyre 
acknowledges) an inevitable part of the ordering of society and nation.410 
 7KHUHLVPXFKDWVWDNH$V6WRXWSXWVLWµKXPDQVRFLHWLHVKDYHDOZD\VVKRZQ
great diversity in moral belief, language and practice.  Whatever the extent of present-
day diversity, however, modern conditions confront us with it close up every day.  We 
PXVWHLWKHUGHYLVHPHDQVIRUOLYLQJZLWKWKLVIDFWRIPRGHUQOLIHRUEHDWHDFKRWKHU¶V
WKURDWV¶411  For such as the Anglican Bishops, it is not good enough merely to live 
with the facts of religious pluralism and multiculturalism.  Their commitment is to 
engage in public discourse as fully as possible, by the most appropriate means, in 
order to pursue not only peaceful coexistence, but also communication of their own 
beliefs and their reasons for them, and, in addition, to promote social justice and in 
other ways contribute to human flourishing across the whole of society as best they 
can.   
 This is no easy task.  Neither effective communication nor fundamental 
agreement on heartfelt issues is guaranteed, no matter how hard we try.  To quote 
6WRXWDJDLQµ:HGRQ¶WDOZD\VNQRZZKDWWRVD\QH[WWRHDFKRWKHUKRZWRNHHSWKH
DUJXPHQWJRLQJLQWKHIDFHRIVRPHRQHHOVH¶VEHZLOGHUHGVWDWHRUSHUVLVWHQWREMHFWLRQV
$W WLPHV WKHUHVHHPVQRDOWHUQDWLYH WRFRHUFLRQ $OO WKLVVHHPVFOHDU¶412  But, like 
6WRXW , DP FRQFHUQHG WKDW ZH VKRXOG QRW ORVH KHDUW ZKHQ IDFHG ZLWK 0DF,QW\UH¶V
GLVSLULWLQJ DFFRXQW RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ VRFLHW\ µ, ZRUU\ WKDW 0DF,QW\UH DOWKRXJK QR
VNHSWLF KLPVHOI PLUURUV WKH VNHSWLF¶V KDVW\ SDVVDJH IURP H[DPSOHV RI SURWUDFWHG
disagreement to an excessively bleak prognosis concerning the possibility of rational 
moral discourse.  I suspect that, in reaching his conclusions, he both underestimates 
the level of agreement on the good actually exhibited by our society and overestimates 
the level required for us to reason coherently with each other on most matters of 
FRPPRQFRQFHUQ¶ 
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 I turn now to consider not just the levels of agreement required for, and found 
LQVRFLHW\¶VHWKLcal discourse, but also the characteristics of MacIQW\UH¶VRWKHUFULWHULD
for functioning communities of tradition and the moral rationality they support.  As 
has been noted before, there are several strands that are intimately interrelated, which 
is reflected in the interwoven account that follows.  My general approach is to use 
MacIntyre against himself, through pointing up unacknowledged implications of his 
descriptions of moral deliberation or setting the more subtle and textured accounts that 
are to be found within his writings against the starker assertions for which he is better 
known.  In more recent articles he largely takes up his own repeated challenge that 
WKHUHLVµZRUN\HWWREHGRQH¶413, and, through providing more detailed arguments and 
explanations (often in response to the critiques of others ± and in this, he is modelling 
the processes he advocates), he gives grounds for a more nuanced interpretation and 
application of his theory. 
Good Enough Communities 
 I shall begin by reviewing in more detail at what it means in practice to belong 
to a community of tradition, before moving to consider associations that are not fully-
IOHGJHGFRPPXQLWLHV LQ0DF,QW\UH¶V strict sense, and the possibilities for substantive 
ethical discourse with, or between, these.  As we have seen, his position, broadly 
stated, is that to be truly rational and moral, an individual must belong to a 
µFRPPXQLW\RI WUDGLWLRQ¶DQGSXUVXHD OLIH WKURXJKZKLFKUXQRYHUDUFKLQJFRKHUHQFH
and singleness of purpose, directed towards an appropriate telos.  However, the 
detailed picture he presents provides a rather more complex and finely-tuned account.   
 In chapter 2, I recorded how MacIntyre argues that it is our all-encompassing 
teleology that allows us to reach such coherence in the complexities of life.  MacIntyre 
FLWHV $TXLQDV¶ GHVFUiption of how we inevitably live by juggling various limited or 
short-term goals within the wider goal of our lives.  We manage, with greater or lesser 
success, to perform a balancing act of pursing multiple goods, multiple ends, within 
the multiplicity of the contexts and opportunities available to us.  Our ability to 
organise our priorities is conditioned, Aquinas says, by our overarching end, and it is 
in the light of this that we are able to order our concerns.414  This underlines the 
fundamental importance of discerning the truth of our telos as far as we are reasonably 
able, since it is to such a significant degree the touchstone of whether or not we do live 
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µZHOO¶ )XUWKHUPRUH DV$ULVWRWOH KDG HDUOLHU DUJXHG VXFKD UDQNLQJRIJRRGV LV QRW
done by individuals apart from the wider community, and though the particular goods 
of particular individuals will differ according to their circumstances, they are to be 
discovered alongside the process of identifying and pursing the good of the overall 
community.415  In this way, sub-narratives are integrated into fuller narratives, as we 
FRQWLQXHWRDVNRXUVHOYHVµ2IZKDWVWRU\RUVWRULHVGR,ILQGP\VHOIDSDUW"¶416   
 In practice this means that we are likely to find ourselves members of various 
different, often overlapping, groupings or sub-groupings devoted to the furtherance of 
some or other genuine good ± since it is through such sustained relationships that these 
internal goods of excellence, and the social practices that support them, are 
predominantly to be found.  Both MacIntyre and Stout see some sort of intermediate 
structure lying between family and nation-state in size as the best locus for this.  
MacIntyre considers at some length417 the importance of various types of local 
FRPPXQLWLHV DV WKH YHKLFOHV IRU µVKDUHGGHOLEHUDWLYH UDWLRQDOLW\¶ HYHQ WKRXJKJLYHQ
the realities of humanity, this will inevitably be less than wholly perfect (and he warns 
against assuming that community-level organisations are automatically directed 
towards the genuine good).  NonetheOHVV DW WKHLUEHVW WKH\DUH µPRYLQJ LQ WKH ULJKW
GLUHFWLRQ¶ LQ WKHLU DELOLW\ WR FRQFHLYH RI DQG SXUVXH D FRPPRQ JRRG LQ ZKLFK
individual and corporate life can thrive with an expectation of both giving and 
receiving.  And they are able to make provision for their vulnerable members ± also a 
prerequisite of fully rational and moral life.  They are sufficiently small-scale to allow 
HIIHFWLYHQHWZRUNVRIµIDFH-to-IDFHHQFRXQWHUVDQGFRQYHUVDWLRQV¶\HWVXIILFLHQWO\ODUJH
to allow a certain degree of self-sufficiency.  This is the context in which individuals 
and the community are to work out the precise form of Thomistic Aristotelianism 
appropriate to their historical and geographical situation ± even though they remain in 
touch with the broader tradition through time and space. 
 In this way we may find ourselves members of chess clubs, music societies or 
sports teams, of volunteer groups and parent-teacher associations, of trade unions or 
professional organisations; we may be members of civil society bodies or local activist 
networks, and we may belong to our local church or another faith community.418  On 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWWKHODVWRIWKHVH LVOLNHO\WREHWKHFRPPXQLW\ZLWKLQZKLFKZH
can most fully find our overall telos and which provides us with an overarching 
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narrative for the ordering of our lives.  Insofar as we allow ourselves to be guided by 
the best practices of such a community of tradition, we can and should judge between 
WKHYDULRXVµJRRGV¶WKDWDUH available to us in this way.  We are thus, he says, able both 
to make choices between what might appear to be competing goods, and to integrate 
our various different allegiances within a coherent whole.419   
This is easier said than done.  Stout doubts that, in practice, ordering among 
rival goods is straightforward, citing Martha Nussbaum on the all too often competing 
demands of professional and family life.420  &OHUJ\ ZKR RXJKW RQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V
analysis, to be better than most at weighing proximate options against ultimate ends, 
are notoriously bad at balancing church and domestic commitments!  The situation is 
further complicated by the lack of homogeneity even within well-articulated and 
mature traditions, since every individual member brings their own particularities, such 
as age, ability, experience, and character, as well as through differing roles in public 
and private, such as parent / spouse, our profession, our hobbies and so forth.  Each 
PXVWILQGWKHLURZQSDWKVLQFHWKHUHDUHQRµRQH-VL]HILWVDOO¶DQVZHUV± though there 
may well be considerable consensus in many areas that not everything that is 
permissible is necessarily wise (for example, the risks that come with pursuing a 
genuine skill in playing poker).  We need to keep our choices under review, and allow 
ourselves to be held accountable by others (particularly those skilled members of our 
communities who, while sharing our overarching goals, live them out in different 
ways ± and this points to the inevitability of some level of ongoing debate over limits 
of acceptable diversity within the community).   
But it seems that most of us, whether members of communities of tradition 
(and thus trained in the practices of how best to orient our lives) or not, most of the 
WLPH DUH µJRRG HQRXJK¶ DW WKLV EDODQFLQJ DFW  2XU IUXVWUDWLRQV ZKHQ ZH FDQQRW  
manage to do so reflect some apprehension that it is worth striving to find such 
FRKHUHQFHDQGWKDWWKLVLVSUHIHUDEOHWRWKHGLVMXQFWLRQVRIWKHµFRPSDUWPHQWDOL]DWLRQ¶
RI µUROH-VWUXFWXUHG DFWLYLW\¶ ZKLFK VD\V 0DF,QW\UH GLVSDUDJLQJO\ LQFUHDVLQJO\
prolLIHUDWH LQ µPRGHUQ¶ :HVWHUQ VRFLHW\  ,Q WKLV VFHQDULR WKH YLUWXHV DQG DOO WKDW
IROORZ IURP WKHP DUH UHSODFHG E\ DUELWUDU\ µFRVW-EHQHILW DQDO\VLV¶ VWDQGDUGV RI
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evaluation which differ between discrete roles, and also leave us with no rational 
means of judging between the various demands on our time or options open to us.421   
 But the reality is nowhere near so bleak.  For, as MacIntyre has himself 
insisted, within contemporary society we find many activities and groupings which do 
deliver internal goods of excellence through well-developed social practices.  They are 
able to train young people, or other new members, and promote their primary 
purposes.  In order to do this, they must have developed some practice-embedded 
language-in-use, to articulate and communicate such matters.  Though these 
languages-in-use are underdeveloped in relation to those of fully-fledged communities 
of tradition, the continuance of the grouping indicates that they must nonetheless be 
µJRRGHQRXJK¶WRVXVWDLQVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGLnternal goods, and thus also some sense 
of the virtues and moral perspectives that underlie these.  
,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKH\DUHFORVHWRZKDW6WRXWGHVFULEHVDVWKHµPRUDOODQJXDJHV¶
RIµVXE-FXOWXUHV¶ZKLFKPD\EHJLQDVµPRUDOSLGJLQ¶EXWEHFRPHVXIILFLHQWO\ enriched 
to be able to sustain some degree of moral reflection.422  Writing when only After 
Virtue RI0DF,QW\UH¶V WULORJ\ZDVSXEOLVKHG6WRXWGHVFULEHGKLVPRUDO ODQJXDJHVDV
lying between the two poles MacIntyre appeared to offer, of, on the one hand, the 
fully-IOHGJH µODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶RI D FRPPXQLW\RI WUDGLWLRQZLWK LWV VSHDNHUV VKDULQJ
an extensive common outlook, or, on the other, the sort of largely deracinated speech 
of the public space which, he held, was unable to sustain substantive moral 
discourse.423  2QFHDJDLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VVWDUNGLFKRWRP\PXVWEHWDNHQZLWKDSLQFKRI
VDOW)RUZKLOH6WRXWDFFHSWV0DF,QW\UH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHODQJXDJHRI, say, playing 
the violin, or medicine, or education LV QRERG\¶V µILUVW ODQJXDJH¶424 with all the 
consequent inadequacies for addressing the whole of life, nonetheless, competence in 
a social practice ± of which MacIntyre gives many examples ± requires there to be an 
adequate language-in-use with adequately fluent speakers within the ambit of the 
practice in question.  Indeed, where people are members of a number of such 
organisations, they will learn to speak a number of moral languages. 
Among the members of a fully-fledged community of tradition, at least some 
will be able to develop translational fluency between the well-developed language-in-
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use of the community, and various less-developed moral languages.425  The former ± 
with its implicit comprehensive telos ± provides us with our touchstone for assessing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the sub-cultures as expressed on their own terms.  In 
this way it is open to us to weigh their various merits, and decide on our priorities and 
commitments in a more fully rational way than those who do not have such a single 
appropriate telos to guide them.  (This includes our judgements about which groups 
we shall not join.)  Nonetheless, even the partial appreciation of genuine goods of 
excellence and so forth that such people enjoy means that they will have some basis 
for appropriately judging between various groupings, that LV IDU IURPWKHµDUELWUDU\¶
µcosts-EHQHILWDQDO\VHV¶WKDW0DF,QW\UHVXJJHVWHG 
Of course, though it is morally rational to give our loyalty to those groupings 
ZKLFK FRQWULEXWH WR D PRUH DGHTXDWH DQVZHU WR µ+RZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH"¶ all of us 
sometimes make poor choices, or deliberately decide to become involved in activities 
and groups that are not actually in our, or others, best interests.  This may be, so to 
speak, the result of ignorance, weakness or deliberate fault.  It is part of the fallibility 
and moral irrationality that are an inevitable part of our human make up. 
Nonetheless, from the foregoing we can conclude that there are far wider 
possibilities in practice for some who are members of communities of tradition to 
engaging in various ways with organisations that are less than fully realised 
FRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ WKDQ DQ LQLWLDO UHDGLQJ RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DSSURDFK PLJKW
suggest.  It will not always be easy, and the conclusions we should draw may 
sometimes be ambiguous at best.  But, once again, tKHUHLVIDUJUHDWHUVFRSHIRUµJRLQJ
on and going further¶WKDQPHUHO\WZRVWDUNO\GUDZQRSWLRQV 
Engaging with Sub-Cultures 
Important corollaries follow from the preparedness of those of us who have 
some training in the conduct of some community of tradition to engage with these 
organisations and activities.  For we are able to contribute from across the breadth of 
our skills to help other members of these organisations improve everything from their 
abilities to grasp more fully what constitutes true human flourishing and to refine their 
goals in this light, through to identifying genuine internal goods and unmasking 
external goods and other risks from over-institutionalisation; from enriching the moral 
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language as a vehicle for moral debate through to promoting associated practices of 
ethical rational enquiry.   
For it cannot be the case that those who are not members of fully-fledged 
communities of tradition, but who participate in such activities, are incapable of some 
recognition of genuine goods, and how to maintain them through social practices 
embedded in human associations.  If that were so, then such associations and activities 
could not be sustained ± as they clearly are, in all manner of ways in our societies.  
Even if their abilities are underdeveloped, they already have some awareness of moral 
ODQJXDJH DQG ZKDW LW LV WREH PRUDO DQG UDWLRQDO DFFRUGLQJ WR0DF,QW\UH¶V FULWHULD
They are not the wholly alienated individuals who, according to MacIntyre, would 
have to undergo radical conversion in order to be able to grasp the moral rationality of 
a community of tradition (as described above in chapter 3).  Indeed, given the 
widespread nature of bodies that promote social practices, the number of such people 
who exist in practice is likely to be very small indeed.  (I discuss how we conduct 
debate with such people in the following chapter.)   
The contribution that we can make in many respects parallels bringing up 
young people within communities of tradition.  Through the clear teaching of parents 
and other skilled practitioners, but also through example and through being drawn in 
to participate ever more fully in the rational moral life, children of a community grow 
in understanding and ability.  Generous engagement with associations promoting 
social practices can offer similar training opportunities, through exposure to best 
practice.   
,Q WKHSUHYLRXV FKDSWHU , QRWHG6WRXW¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW LW LV SRVVLEOH IRU WZR
people to be justified in believing quite different sets of propositions, a view which 
elsewhere he recalls that Hauerwas also espouses.426  It is thus possible for others to 
accept that a religious perspective is rational, without being required to accept the 
underlying religious assumptions.  Christians such as the Anglican Bishops should 
therefore not feel inhibited in communicating their beliefs explicitly on their own 
termsIRUIHDUWKLV LV LQHYLWDEO\µLPSRVLQJ¶WKHLUFRQYLFWLRQVRQRWKHUV.  Rather, they 
should see, and explicitly present, this as the best way of demonstrating what it means 
to have justifiable convictions, and of encouraging others to aspire to moral rational 
living through similar processes.  Of course, the ultimate objective of the Churches is 
that others should also come to share the Christian faith, but within mainstream 
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$QJOLFDQ WUDGLWLRQ µVHHNLQJ WR WUDQVIRUP XQMXVW VWUXFWXUHV RI VRFLHW\¶427 through 
effective argument is itself regarded as a valuable achievement. 
Yet to communicate what we believe and how, the most effective way is the 
dual approach of both speaking in our own language-in-use, and also using our 
translational skills to engage others on their own terms, through the moral language of 
their grouping (which of course also encompasses the whole conceptual framework in 
which it is embedded).  In order to express more fully the breadth and depth of moral 
rationality, we are likely to KDYH WR SURYLGH µHQULFKPHQW¶ RI WKH PRUDO ODQJXDJH LQ
much the same ways that MacIntyre has described for exchanges between traditions.  
(And, as before, this may be a task for particular individuals in relation to particular 
moral languages.)  Whatever level of awareness, ability and fluency we find, we can 
ZRUN ZLWK LW WR HQKDQFH LW  ,Q WKLV ZD\ ZH DUH DEOH WR KHOS RWKHUV µJR RQ DQG JR
IRUZDUG¶ WRZDUGV D IXOOHU UHDOLVDWLRQ RI DOO that human flourishing means, in both 
theory and experience.  Furthermore, these are transferrable skills, in that abilities 
developed within one sub-culture ± for example, having increased clarity about how to 
identify internal and external goods of excellence ± can find application in other areas 
RIWKRVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶OLYHV7KLVH[WHQGVERWKWRZDUGVKDYLQJDIXOOHUDSSUHKHQVLRQRI
an overarching telos and so finding a greater narrative unity in the ordering and 
SULRULWLVLQJ RI RQH¶V RZQ OLIH WKURXJK WR the critique one is able to make of other 
spheres of society, including the conduct of politics, business and so forth. 
The other side of the coin is that to decline to engage in this way leaves the 
grouping and its members where they are, and deprives them of opportunities to 
develop their moral rationality.  Indeed, it effectively withholds vital and necessary 
resources for resisting the growing tendencies in Western society towards promoting 
external goods and instrumentalism which MacIntyre is right to identify, even if 
wrong in his assessment of its current pervasiveness.  Insofar as moral rationality 
requires us to pursue genuine flourishing not only for ourselves but for all humanity, it 
is my contention therefore that for communities of tradition to fail to encourage at 
least some of their members to engage in this way is actually a failing in their own 
moral rationality.  To use more biblical language, there is an obligation on Christians 
to act in ways that enable us to be salt and light in the world.  It is of course the 
decision of others whether they heed us, but that is a separate matter from it being 
incumbent upon us to shoulder this responsibility.  This is the task of both individuals, 
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and the churches as institutions, in collaborating with other bodies, appropriately 
chosen within society.   
A Pragmatic Approach 
 We find many different forms of human association proliferate across 
contemporary society, promoting social practices and internal goods to a greater or 
lesser extent.  This is a very different situation from merely a choice between so-called 
µFRPPXQLWDULDQ¶ DQG µOLEHUWDULDQ¶ SRVLWLRQV ZKLFK VD\V 6WRXW SDUWLFXODUO\ DV
enunciated at academic and theoretical levels, are mutually-fuelling polarised 
exaggerations of what actually happens today.  On this basis he argues that while 
contemporary western democratic tradition entails a pluralism within which we 
experience considerable diversity and disagreement, such disagreement is by no 
means as far reaching or insuperable as MacIntyre tends to assert.   
For though 6WRXWDFFHSWV0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHIODZVRI OLEHUDOLVPKLV
claim is that it does not so wholly dominate our lives that we are left with rational and 
moral incoherence, and no alternative but to withdraw into our ghettoes.  Rather, in 
the way we order our lives and in our democratic practices, we are able to engage in 
effective ethical debate.  To achieve this Stout advocates a PRUHµSUDJPDWLF¶DSSURDFK
(which draws on, but in important ways differs from, his understanding of the 
pragmatism espoused by Rorty428), which sits between the two extremes.  This 
however, should not be seen as merely trying to draw some median compromise, but 
rather as moving away from the language and concepts that sustain this binary 
opposition, and instead building on the ways that in practice we can and do use 
various moral languages in varying circumstances ± and particularly those which have, 
even if in some partially realised form, the key elements of communities of tradition, 
as described by MacIntyre.    
6WRXW¶V6WHUHRVFRSLF&ULWLFLVP 
 There are, as we have seen, many associations that, though they may not be 
VXIILFLHQWO\ GHYHORSHG WR EH UHJDUGHG DV D FRPPXQLW\ LQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V WHUPV RU
perhaps are too narrowly drawn or too loosely held together), nonetheless have the 
ability to recognise and promote internal goods over external goods, and to some 
degree resist the pressures of external goods, bureaucratisation and financial 
dominance which they risk facing as a consequence of necessary institutionalisation.  
This they do through discussion in their own moral language ± Stout gives as an 
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example medical ethics, and the tensions that arise between treatment options and 
managerial and financial concerns.429  Another example might be the debate around 
whether the vast salaries, and lucrative sponsorship and advertising deals, available to 
VRPH 3UHPLHUVKLS IRRWEDOOHUV DFWXDOO\ XQGHUPLQH WKHLU DELOLW\ WR SOD\ µWKH EHDXWLIXO
JDPH¶IRULWVRZQVDNH 
 It is this ability to recognise internal and external goods ± an ability which, I 
argue, engagement by members of communities of tradition can help enhance ± on 
which Stout builds in his selective retrieval from MacIntyre.  Stout fully concurs on 
the corrosive effect of the pursuit of the external goods for their own ends, and sees 
invaluable resources for countering this tendency in the concept of social practices, 
and in the distinction between goods internal and external to a practice to which it 
gives rise.  From this he develops his concept RIµVWHUHRVFRSLFVRFLDOFULWLFLVP¶430   
6WRXW¶VµVWHUHRVFRSLFVRFLDOFULWLFLVP¶LV,FRQWHQGDpowerful tool with wide 
application across all manner of bodies and activities, that range from helping the 
church face its own institutional pressures, through to promoting the best of public 
and political democratic debate.  
Stout proposes that we develop practices of analysis that look from both 
perspectives:  from that of internal goods, and from that of external goods (though 
here he WHQGVWRFRQIODWH0DF,QW\UH¶V definition of external goods, which, it should be 
remembered, are genuine goods ± even if prioritising their pursuit can bring 
destructive distortions ± with the rather more dubious objectives of bureaucracy and 
market and other forms of instrumentalism).  µ7KH DGYDQWDJH RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V
GLVWLQFWLRQV¶KH VD\V µLV WKDW WKH\ PDNHSRVVLEOH D VWHUHRVFRSLF VRFLDO FULWLFLVPRQH
which brings social practices and institutions, internal and external goods, in to focus 
DWWKHVDPHWLPH¶431  Considering how both factors are at play in whatever situation, 
allows for a realistic apprehension of the necessary aspects of institutionalisation, 
rather than either providing an overly romanticised and impractical ideal or falling into 
cynicism and disillusionment at the inescapability of some organisational burden.  
7KLV µDIIRUGV D YDQWDJH SRLQW IURP ZKLFK WKH VWUHQJWKV DQG ZHDNQHVVHV RI HDFK
approach can be explained, and it enables us to enjoy the benefits of each approach 
without simply switching back and forth from one to the other.  It brings social 
practices and institutions, internal and external goods, into a single frame rather than 
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relying on a montage WRFUHDWHDQRYHUDOOHIIHFWRIXQLW\¶432  From this we can engage 
constructively with the institutional bureaucratic and market-driven components of 
organisations supporting social practices, so working to keep in check their inherent 
propensities towards the pursuit of external goods and other distortions, and to ensure 
that structures are procedures are shaped in the service of internal goods.   
 More than this, Stout advocates applying this approach across all areas of the 
public sphere.  He believes this is possible, through building on the skills most people 
acquire to some degree or other through their involvement with the various groupings, 
pervasive through society, that support social practices.  He describes these as 
µIHDWXUHVRIRXUVRFLHW\«WKDWKROGRXWVRPHKRSHRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQIURPZLWKLQ¶433  
It is, he says, possible to learn how appropriately to apply the skills they provide in 
other forums.   
 In the final chapter of Ethics after Babel, Stout summarises his conclusions in 
this area as follows: 
A stereoscopic social critic would be inclined to concentrate on factors like 
these:  the tendency of the capitalist marketplace and large-scale bureaucracies 
to provide material conditions that permit social practices to flourish, while at 
the same time they undermine the moral conditions needed to achieve goods 
internal to such practices; the tendency of professionalisation and bureaucratic 
enforcement of rights, in some instances, to mitigate the bad effects of the 
market place on specific social practices and the people participating in them; 
the tendency of particular social practices, especially within the professions, to 
become all-consuming, thus making it increasingly difficult to be both a full-
fledged participant in the practice and good at anything else; the partial and 
ever-vulnerable secularization of linguistic transactions taking place under the 
aegis of certain institutions; and the inability of religious practices to serve as 
a unifying ideological center around which whole societies could order 
various goods, practices, and institutions.434 
Stout believes that we will find that the general abilities within society are, more often 
than not, µJRRGHQRXJK¶WRZDUUDQWWKHHIIRUWRIDWWHPSWLQJVXFKDQDO\VLVZLWKDIDLU
expectation that others with share our identification of the influences at work.  
Through opening up such areas of debate, we will find fertile ground for working to 
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promote genuine internal goods, and therefore also the common good that is implicit 
within them.  In effect, he is arguing for us to make what attempts ZHFDQWRµJRRQ
and go further¶ in this way.          
 Stout believes this is not only possible but necessary.  We have no alternative, 
he says, but to develop these tools of immanent, realist, criticism for the pursuit of 
such constructive engagement across all levels of society.  For the alternative of 
withdrawal (which MacIntyre too often appears to espouse435), is to acquiesce in the 
increasingly untrammelled dominance of external goods and instrumentalism even 
where we seek to pursue social practices and their genuine goods.  The churches, 
which share his objectives, should take heart from his analysis, and deploy his 
approach.   
The Church and Stereoscopic Social Criticism 
 The first area where the Churches must apply stereoscopic social criticism is 
within their own structures, where, as previously noted, the pressures of 
institutionalisation inevitably arise (as of course, do the temptations from external 
goods).  This might afford illumination from the level of parishes (where it could offer 
insights into the dynamics of church councils, for example through opening up honest 
debate around LQVWUXPHQWDOLVWSUHVVXUHVRIWHQIHOWLQµPRQH\YHUVXVYLVLRQ¶IULFWLRQV
through to the operation of national and global ecclesial bodies.  Theo Hobson has 
KLJKOLJKWHG WKH WHQVLRQV ZLWKLQ 5RZDQ :LOOLDPV¶ RZQ PLQLVWU\ WKDW DULVH IURP KLV
personal, more apophatic and kenotic theology and ecclesiology, and his 
responsibilities for a weighty institution, as Bishop of Monmouth, Archbishop of 
:DOHV DQG PRVWRI DOO DV$UFKELVKRSRI&DQWHUEXU\ +REVRQ GHVFULEHV WKLV DV µWKH
FHQWUDOSUREOHPRI:LOOLDPV¶WKHRORJ\, the one he returns to in almost everything he 
ZULWHV¶  ,Q HVVHQFH µHYHU\ LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKXUFK QRW RQO\ H[SUHVVHV HYHU\ &KULVWLDQ
vision, but also obscures and distorts it.  Every institutional church not only serves 
Christ, but, in one of his most viviGSKUDVHV ³GHVHUYHV WREHEURNHQ RQ WKH URFNRI
&KULVW´¶436  While there is something of an insoluble inevitability at the heart of this, 
my proposal would be that conscious application of stereoscopic social criticism 
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could, through bringing greater clarity to the factors at play, at least assist with the 
practicalities of living within this paradox.   
7XUQLQJ WR WKH FKXUFK¶V UROH LQ WKH ZLGHUZRUOG Dn illuminating example of 
this stereoscopic social criticism, and of µELOLQJXDO¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKDVXE-culture in 
order to promote valuable social practices and their sustaining in the face of other 
pressures, is offered by the sermon preached by Williams as Archbishop of 
Canterbury at a service to mark the 400th anniversary of the granting of the Royal 
Charter to the Inns of Court, on 24 June 2008.437  Dr Williams told me in private 
conversation that he was not consciously pursuing a MacIntyrean approach.  That he 
does so, and with, in my view, such success, illustrates, and reinforces, my contention 
that such an approach is entirely feasible in practice. 
   Williams begins by stressing that the law D VRFLDO SUDFWLFH E\ 0DF,QW\UH¶V 
definition) cannot EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI µWKH PHUH PDQDJHPHQW RI UXOHV¶, but 
rather µH[LVWV WKDW SRZHU VKDOO QRW EH HYHU\WKLQJ LQ KXPDQ VRFLHW\¶ ± thus 
bureaucratisation and external goods are named and given explicit secondary 
LPSRUWDQFH  +H TXRWHV 3ODWR¶V FRQFHUQ IRU µD training in disinterested vision and 
YLUWXH IRU DOO ODZPDNHUV DQG ODZ SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ ± YDOXHV WKDW 0DF,QW\UH¶V social 
practices equally require/DZVD\VWKH$UFKELVKRSUHIOHFWVµVRPHRUGHURIUHDOLW\LQ
ZKLFK WKH ZRUWK RI SHUVRQV LV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ WHUPV WKDW DUHQ¶W YXOQHUDEOH WR «
VWUXJJOLQJULYDOULHV¶± and so he places law at the service of a common good in which 
all humanity is valued over narrow interest-groups.   
 Williams then turns to understandings of law drawn from the Old Testament, 
EHJLQQLQJZLWK6RORPRQ¶V7HPSOHVRPRYLQJIURPVSHDNLQJ WKHPRUDO ODQJXDJHRI
the legal sphere to the language-in-use oI&KULVWLDQWUDGLWLRQ+HµDQFKRUV¶KXPDQLW\¶V
nature and worth ± our common good ± LQ WKH XOWLPDWH JRRG RI D µWUDQVFHQGHQW
GLPHQVLRQ¶WKDWOLHVLQILQGLQJKRZµDOOWKLQJVH[LVWHGILUVWLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLU&UHDWRU
LQZKRVHZLOOOD\WKHLUSHDFH¶7KLVµDQLPDWHVDOLNHODZPDWKHPDWLFVDUWDQGPXVLF¶
± DOO H[DPSOHV RI VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV ZLWK LQWHUQDO JRRGV RI H[FHOOHQFH  7KLV µLV WKH
IRXQGDWLRQ RI D WUXO\ VKDUHG KXPDQ MR\ DQG IXOILOPHQW¶, while the earlier picture of 
IORXULVKLQJODZµRIIHUVDIDLQWHFKRRI the promise of universal joyful interdependence 
WKDWLVWKHYLVLRQRIWKH-HZLVKDQG&KULVWLDQKHDYHQV¶± human flourishing is thus to 
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be found by individuals-in-community, in the promise of this fully comprehensive 
telos, towards the achievement of which more immediate genuine goods contribute.                   
 Extrapolating from a parable of Jesus, the Archbishop then challenges the 
assembled lawyers to move from asking the managerial-EDVHGTXHVWLRQ RI µZKDW DUH
WKH OLPLWV RI P\ GXW\"¶ WR WKH EURDGHU DQG GHHSHU LVVXH RI µWR ZKRP GR , KDYH DQ
REOLJDWLRQ"¶  -HVXV¶ DQVZHU KH VD\V LV WKDW µWKHUH LV QR OLPLW Wo the obligation of 
FRPSDVVLRQ¶ and he seeks to subvert the idea of mercy being opposed to justice by 
DUJXLQJ WKDW µPHUF\ WKH SDVVLRQDWH FDUH IRU « HYHQ « WKH OHDVW GHVHUYLQJ LV D
XQLYHUVDOVXPPRQV¶ +H WKXVprioritises genuine human well-being of all, no matter 
KRZ YXOQHUDEOH RU H[FOXGHG DV WKH ODZ¶V XOWLPDWH JRDO over instrumentalist 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIOHJLVODWLRQDUJXLQJµWRXVHWKH ODZIRUWKe wellbeing of all, to use 
even its penal provisions for the general good and for the restoring of shattered 
UHODWLRQVLVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWZKDWODZLVDERXWLVVLPSO\WKHVHFXULQJRISHRSOH¶V
dignity, not because they have earned it but because their hXPDQLW\LVYDOXHGE\*RG¶
The proximate goals of law are only morally rational insofar as they are directed 
WRZDUGVKXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWHWHORV 
 Williams returns to stereoscopic social criticism in his penultimate paragraph, 
advising that assiduous attention be paid to recognising the inevitable influences of 
external goods and according them an appropriately limited role, in order to ensure 
WKDW LQWHUQDO JRRGV DUHSULRULWLVHG  µ7KH VDFULILFHG/DPE RI*RG UHPLQGs us that in 
this world truth and thus lawfulness may be vulnerable.  The challenge is to hold the 
eyes of violence without flinching, even to humiliation and death, and not to surrender 
WR QDNHG SRZHU¶  +H FRQFOXGHV E\ DJDLQ SURYLGLQJ WKH FRPSUHKHQVLYH FRQWH[W IRU
being able to conduct such criticism and then having the courage to live by it, saying 
µZH OHDUQ WR KROG WKH H\H RI YLROHQFH WR NHHS \RXU YLVLRQ VWHDG\ LI ZH LQGHHG
remember that the foundation of law is where Solomon sought it, in the contemplation 
RI*RG¶VIDLWKIXOVHOI-consistency «¶It is God who enables us to live as those who 
DQGKHHQGVE\TXRWLQJ6FULSWXUHµMXGJHWKHSHRSOHULJKWHRXVO\¶ 
 Thus Williams moves between speaking on his own terms and those of his 
listeners, encouraging them in various ways to make connections between their own 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGµJRRGV¶RI ODZDQG WKH IDU IXOOHUSLFWXUHRI
the common good and its pursuit through the virtues of a community of tradition 
GLUHFWHG WRZDUGVKXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWH telos.  It is additionally noteworthy that he has 
tackled a particular concern of MacIntyre, that liberalism disconnects rationality from 
justice, with justice reduced to a matter of conformity with the legal preferences of the 
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system.438  Williams has argued that, contrary to this, justice can only be properly 
understood from the perspective of the virtues and genuine human flourishing.   
Diversity, Pluralism and their Limits 
Stout contends that we must apply such stereoscopic social criticism across all 
public discourse (and, while law may be seen as a social practice, the judiciary is, of 
course, one of the pillars of the contemporary democratic state, alongside legislature 
and executive).  It DOORZV XV WR ZRUN IRU D ZRUOG LQ ZKLFK µWKH SUROLIHUDWLRQ
distribution, and merchandizing of external goods is subject to political control and in 
which goods internal to worthy social practices, including the practice of self-
JRYHUQPHQWDUHJUDQWHGWKHULJKWWR OLIHDQGJLYHQURRPWRIORXULVK¶439  In this way, 
authentic and hopeful discourse of substance on moral questions can be, and indeed is, 
pursued, says Stout, on the basis of shared conceptions of the common good that may 
EH WKLQ E\ 0DF,QW\UH¶V VWDQGDUGV EXW ZKLFK QRQHWKHOHVV SURYH µJRRG HQRXJK¶ LQ
practice. 
 But before moving to consider how democratic debate can be seen, as Stout 
claims, as a form of social practice to be upheld through stereoscopic social criticism, 
I want first to comment further on the extent to which, even within communities of 
tradition, we learn how to live comfortably with a far greater degree of diversity than 
PD\VHHPDSSDUHQW IURP0DF,QW\UH¶V LQLWLDO GHVFULSWLRQV  ,QRWHGHDUOLHU WKH ODFNRI
homogeneity, and of one-size-fits-all answers to many of the choices individuals must 
make about their lives.  Additionally, a community needs a breadth of capacities in 
order to be able to self-sustaining.440   
 In our discourse with one another, diversity is a given ± that we require one 
another to give an account of how we live implies a range of perspectives.  We 
improve our rationality by honing our understanding against that of others.  Alongside 
those inclined to orthodoxy and conformism, we also need some mavericks within, 
ZLWK0DF,QW\UHVD\LQJWKDWµEDUGVSULHVWVSURSKHWVNLQJVDQGRQRFFDVLRQIRROVDQG
jesters will all bHKHDUG¶441  Further, as described in chapter 2, rationality that aspires 
to overcome relativist or perspectivist criticisms demands we engage with standpoints 
from outside our community.  When there is substantive debate between communities, 
the moral rationality of both is likely to be improved.  Chapter 3 showed how the 
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opportunities for this are far greater than might initially be anticipated, and are 
enhanced by making the effort even where at first the potential for commensurability 
seems too limited.  
 Within our multiple sub-cultures we similarly stand to learn from one another, 
especially through inviting one another to give account of how we answer within any 
SDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WTXHVWLRQVWKDWUHIOHFWWKHXOWLPDWHTXHVWLRQRIµ+RZWKHQVKDOOZH
livH"¶7KRVHRIXVZKRDUHPRUHVNLOOHGLQVXFKPDWWHUVFDQRIIHUFULWLTXHLQZD\VWKDW
enhance the capacities of those involved to learn from one another ± ourselves 
included.  This will include sharing what we have learnt, as members of a community, 
of how to pursue a suitable balance that best delivers the unfolding good of both 
individuals and the community as a whole.442  This is one aspect of living well with 
appropriate diversity.      
 Considering groupings which acculturate young people into their social 
practices and so to some degree operate as traditions in the MacIntyrean sense, Stout 
QRWRQO\FRQFOXGHVWKDWµVXFKDFFXOWXUDWLRQGRHV,WKLQNRIWHQVXFFHHGLQEULQJLQJ LW
about that particular groups of individuals are justified in believing things that their 
QHLJKERUVHLWKHU MXVWLILDEO\GLVEHOLHYHRU MXVWLILDEO\ LJQRUH¶DVSUHYLRXVO\QRWHGEXW
JRHVRQWRQRWHµ7KHUHOHYDQWHSLVWHPLFVLWXDWLRQIRUVXFKVHOYHVLQRWKHUZRUGVWXUQV
out to be much more specific and variable than the hypercontext, modernity, allows us 
WRDFFRXQWIRU¶443  Recognising explicitly that this is so is an important aspect of our 
ability to live with diversity outside our communities of tradition and sub-cultures.  As 
6WRXW VD\V µLW LV SUHFLVHO\ WKH FRH[LVWHQFH RI PXOWLSOH VXE-cultures, all of which 
succeed at some level in acculturating the young, that constitutes the all-important fact 
RISOXUDOLVPLQPRGHUQGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHWLHV¶444   
 But none of this is to say that anything goes.  We can and should still demand 
of others, whether or not members of a community of tradition, their best possible 
account of their position ± which we can critique, particularly using the approach of 
stereoscopic social criticism.  And we should be open to similar critique from others.  
This can help us all in identifying both positive and negative factors at play.  It can 
assist us in understanding our various conceptions of human well-being, and the 
grounds on which we hold them; or clarify our shared concerns over particular moral 
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problems and the reasons we hold in common or otherwise for taking such stances.  
These highlight the grounds on which we will want to take decisions, as individuals 
and as churches, about how closely to collaborate with other groups.  We shall also 
want to take into account the way that stereoscopic social criticism can also unmask 
both the distortions that can come with institutionalization, and suspect motivations 
that are at play, perhaps even deliberately so.   
 Precisely in such areas, MacIntyre argues, it can become a virtue to exercise 
intolerance, and to exclude individuals or perspectives from moral rational discourse, 
VLOHQFLQJ WKHLU YRLFH  7KLV PLJKW UDQJH IURP µWKUHDWHQLQJ DQG LQVXOWLQJ XWWHUDQFH¶
through to promoting views which reflect, or are rooted in, a morally rational 
XQDFFHSWDEOHYLHZRIµKXPDQIORXULVKLQJ¶IRUH[DPSOHDQWL-Semitism), or who deny 
clear facts (Holocaust deniers).445      
 But when, and how, to exercise a virtuous intolerance is not easy.  Freedom of 
speech is generally a genuine good, and so MacIntyre admits that though he believes 
Holocaust denial should not be tolerated, he is uneasy with legislation that makes its 
public assertion a criminal offence.  Such matters take us from the realm of sub-
cultures and community-level organisations through to the level of the state, and wider 
and more formal public discourse.  They raise questions about how nation states shape 
the public space and control what may or may not be said, and the ways in which 
debate itself is conducted.  Some of these implications I will address in the next 
chapter, but I now turn to consider in what ways democratic reasoning can be 
FRQVLGHUHG D µVRFLDO SUDFWLFH¶ LQ WKH 0DF,QW\UHDQ VHQVH DV 6WRXW FRQWHQGV DQG WKH
appropriate place of the voices of faith communities within this.    
The Practice of Democracy 
 As described in the previous chapter, iQHVSRXVLQJµD WUDGLWLRQRIGHPRFUDWLF
UHDVRQLQJ GLVSRVLWLRQV DQG DWWLWXGHV¶ 6WRXW DUJXHV WKDW LW LV WKH KROGLQJ RI VXFK
µactivities LQ FRPPRQ¶ WKDW LV µFRQVWLWXWLYH RI WKH SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\¶446  Using 
ODQJXDJHZKLFK LVUHGROHQWRI0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHSUDFWLFHVQHFHVVDU\IRU
rational enquiry within traditions,447 Stout says these processes of reasoning not only 
JXLGHGLVFXVVLRQEXWDUHWKHPVHOYHVµFRQVWDQWO\LQGLVSute, subject to revision, and not 
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IXOO\GHWHUPLQDWH¶ 7KHUHIRUH KH VD\V WKH\DUHEHVWXQGHUVWRRGZLWKLQ WKH µKLVWRULF
FDWHJRU\RI³WUDGLWLRQ´¶448   
 The practical approach that he proposes builds on the application to the 
broader public canvas of the moral languages and the developing skills in using them 
which he describes in relation to sub-cultures.  In this way Stout speaks of a public 
philosophy that is µDQ H[HUFLVH LQ H[SUHVVLYH UDWLRQDOLW\¶449 transcending the impasse 
µEHWZHHQ VHFXODU OLEHUDOV DQG WKH QHZ WUDGLWLRQDOLVWV¶450 while borrowing from both.  
He upholds the acquisition of virtues through participation in social practices which 
pursue excellence and intrinsically valuable internal goods.  He describes the 
µGLVFXUVLYH SUDFWLFHV RI HWKLFDO GHOLEHUDWLRQ DQG SROLWLFDO GHEDWH¶ DV µWKH VRFLDO
SUDFWLFHVWKDWPDWWHUPRVWGLUHFWO\WRGHPRFUDF\¶451  Evoking MacIntyrean arguments, 
6WRXWVD\VµGHPRFUDWLFTXHVWLRQLQJDQGUHDVRQ-giving are a sort of practice, one that 
involves and inculcates virtues including justice, and that becomes tradition, like any 
VRFLDO SUDFWLFH ZKHQ LW PDQDJHV WR VXVWDLQ LWVHOI DFURVV JHQHUDWLRQV¶452  On these 
JURXQGVKHFRQFOXGHVWKDWµFRPPLWPHQWWRGHPRFUDF\GRHVQRWHQWDLOWKHUHMHFWLRQRI
tradition.  It requires jointly taking responsibility for the criticism and renewal of 
WUDGLWLRQDQGIRUWKHMXVWLFHRIRXUVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDODUUDQJHPHQWV¶453 
Given these conclusions ± which draw so heavily, even if selectively, on 
0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN ± 6WRXW DUJXHV DW VRPH OHQJWK WKDW µQHZ WUDditioQDOLVWV¶ VXFK DV
MacIntyre and Hauerwas, as well as others like John 0LOEDQN DUH µZURQJ« when 
they imagine modern democracy as the antithesis of tradition, as an inherently 
GHVWUXFWLYH DWRPL]LQJ VRFLDO IRUFH¶454  His fear is that tKHLU µWUDGLWLRQDOLVW SURJUDP¶
FRQWULEXWHV WR D ZHDNHQLQJ LQ µFRPPLWPHQW WR GHPRFUDF\ LQ WKH SXEOLF DW ODUJH¶
ZKLFKKDV WKHSRWHQWLDO WRµVSHOO WURXEOH¶455  He contrasts their position with that of 
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theologians such as Wolterstorff who espouse far greater engagement within the 
public sphere, and explicit commitment towards democracy.456  He underlines his 
EHOLHI WKDW VHFXODULVHG PRGHUQ GHPRFUDF\ µLV QRW HVVHQWLDOO\ DQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI
VHFXODULVP¶ DQG LQ WKH IRUP IRU ZKLFK KH DUJXHV FHUWDLQO\ GRHV QRW UXOH RXW WKH
µH[SUHVVLRQRIUHOLgious premises or the entitlement of individuals to accept religious 
DVVXPSWLRQV¶457  
 I shall return to questions of secularism in the next chapter, but here we 
should note that 6WRXW LV DJDLQ DWWHPSWLQJ WR VHSDUDWH ZKDW KH VHHV DV 0DF,QW\UH¶V
exaggerated DQG XQWHQDEOH FULWLTXH RI µOLEHUDO GHPRFUDF\¶ DQG WKH FRQFRPLWDQW
collapse of moral discourse, from what, in his own view, is a more constructive 
consideration of the nature of tradition, and of values within it.  This analysis can 
contribute to the understanding and strengthening of a pragmatic practice of 
democracy, as it is actually grounded in the realities of contemporary western nations.      
All traditions, faith communities included, need to take their place within 
democratic discourse if it is to be conducted, as it ought, through marshalling the 
widest resources across our complex society in support of maintaining and developing 
a public space which promotes the best understanding and pursuit of human 
flourishing, in all its legitimate variety.  GiYHQ 6WRXW¶V HDUOLHU DVVHUWLRQV RQ WKH
possibilities of different convictions being legitimately held alongside one another, it 
is unsurprising that he includes an explicit place for those with religious commitments.  
In place of the standoff that there can often be between believers and non-believers 
HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ DV ZLWK WKH VWDOHPDWH EHWZHHQ µOLEHUDOV¶ DQG µFRPPXQLWDULDQV¶ RU
µWUDGLWLRQDOLVWV¶ LW FROODSVHV LQWR PXWXDOO\ H[FOXVLYH FDULFDWXULQJ DQG SRODULVLQJ KH
DUJXHV IRU RQJRLQJ µFRQYHUVDWLRQ « LQ which the respective parties express their 
premises in as much detail as they see fit and in whatever idiom they wish, try to make 
VHQVH RI HDFK RWKHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYHV DQG H[SRVH WKHLU RZQ FRPPLWPHQWV WR WKH
SRVVLELOLW\ RI FULWLFLVP¶458  This parallels, even LI LQ WKLQQHU IRUP 0DF,QW\UH¶V
descriptions of how different communities of tradition engage with one another, with 
the expectation that parties speak, and be heard, in their own language-in-use or moral 
language ± that is, on their own terms ± being particularly important.  In this way, 
6WRXW SURPRWHV WKH µYDOXH RI FDUU\LQJ RQ D SXEOLF FRQYHUVDWLRQ RI WKLV NLQG ZLWK
UHOLJLRXV WUDGLWLRQDOLVWV¶459  It is an approach that applies comprehensively, since, he 
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contends, µDOO GHPRFUDWLF FLWL]HQV VKRXOG IHHO IUHH in my view, to express whatever 
SUHPLVHVDFWXDOO\VHUYHDVUHDVRQVIRUWKHLUFODLPV«LQWKHNLQGRIH[FKDQJHZKHUH
HDFKSHUVRQ¶VGHHSHVWFRPPLWPHQWVFDQEHUHFRJQL]HGIRUZKDWWKH\DUHDQGDVVHVVHG
DFFRUGLQJO\¶460   
 Just as I have argued that the generous participation of members of 
communities of tradition can enhance and enrich the capacity for morally rational 
debate and all that it entails (including mature process for just such assessment of 
commitments) within sub-cultures, so I now argue that a similar commitment to 
engagement can enhance public discourse and the practice of democracy.  On the 
same grounds as before, it is both possible and necessary to grasp opportunities to 
promote the realisation of human well-being, and in particular by helping foreground 
the common good and its achievement within society.  This focus ± which echoes 
0DF,QW\UH¶V RZQ µFHQWUDOGHOLEHUDWLYH TXHVWLRQ¶ ± is one to which Stout also points, 
DGYLVLQJ WKDWZHQHHG WR DVN µKRZ WR OLYH KHUH DQGQRZXQGHU WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQ 
ZKLFK ZH DFWXDOO\ ILQG RXUVHOYHV¶461 ZDUQLQJ WKDW µLI ZH IDLO WR SURWHFW¶ VRFLDO
SUDFWLFHVGLUHFWHG WRZDUGV H[FHOOHQFHGHPRFUDF\ LQFOXGHGµLW LV IRROKDUG\ WR H[SHFW
FRQFHUWHGGHPRFUDWLFDFWLRQWRUHPDLQSRVVLEOHIRUORQJ¶462   
Democracy, the Church and Human Flourishing 
 As Archbishop Desmond Tutu used to remind his clergy ± particularly when 
exercising his episcopal authority, and so not entirely in jest ± the Anglican Church 
does not operate as a democracy.463  Nonetheless, the Anglican Church in Southern 
Africa,464 though not the largest denomination in South Africa, has long provided a 
voice of faith in public discourse, and particularly through the Archbishop of Cape 
Town.  Archbishop Geoffrey Clayton, Primate when the Nationalist government took 
power, is famous for signing a letter in 1957 opposing draft legislation to segregate 
congregations ± he dropped dead the following day.  His successor, Archbishop Joost 
GH %ODQN ZDV NQRZQ DV WKH µVFRXUJH RI DSDUWKHLG¶ DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\ WKHQ %LVKRS 
Tutu was awarded the Nobel peace prize two years before becoming Primate.     
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 Since the advent of democracy in1994, there has remained an expectation that 
Archbishops of Cape Town will play a significant role in national discourse, which is 
now often directed at promoting democratic practices.  Njongonkulu Ndungane, 
Archbishop from 1996 to 2007, frequently argued that the churches, and other 
religious traditions, have a key role to play in helping strengthen democracy, not only 
in South Africa, but across the young democracies of the continent.  Thus, for 
example, in a speech at an Inter-Faith Summit in Washington, in 2006, he directed his 
words not only to the public sphere,465 but also to educating faith communities as to 
why he believed this was so.466  In citing Reinhold 1LHEXKU¶VPD[LPµ0DQ¶VFDSDFLW\
IRU MXVWLFH PDNHV GHPRFUDF\ SRVVLEOH EXW PDQ¶V LQFOLQDWLRQ WR LQMXVWLFH PDNHV
GHPRFUDF\ QHFHVVDU\¶467 KH DUJXHV WKDW µIDLWK FRPPXQLWLHV PXVW EH DW WKH KHDUW RI
«GHEDWHRQ WKHJRDOVRIVRFLHW\¶DQG WKDW µRXUFRQWULEXWLRQ LQFOudes arguing for the 
DSSURSULDWH IORXULVKLQJ RI HDFK LQGLYLGXDO HDFK KXPDQ SHUVRQ¶  7KXV KH SXWV
KXPDQLW\¶V telos at the centre.  He asserts that democracy has the capacity to offer 
µFRQVWUXFWLYH GLDORJXH DURXQG PRUDO LVVXHV¶ LQ ZKLFK µWKH VWUHQJWKV RI Ueligious 
traditions offer checks against unfettered relativism, and against the blind imperatives 
RIXQEULGOHGFDSLWDOLVP¶+HUHZHILQGHFKRHVRIVWHUHRVFRSLFFULWLFLVP$PRQJWKH
eight areas he highlights where he believes a particular contribution can be made are 
promoting good governance and reconciliation, combatting corruption, modelling 
µVHUYDQW¶ UDWKHU WKDQ VHOI-serving exercise of power, and equality for women.468  
Within these we find elements of the good social practices which should be found 
within effective democracy.   
 2ISDUWLFXODULPSRUWDQFHWRQRWHLVDQRWKHURI1GXQJDQH¶VHLJKWDUHDVWKDWRI
strengthening civil society in its dialogue with government.  In retirement he heads 
µ$IULFDQ0RQLWRU¶ DQ1*2 LQWHQGHG WR HQVXUH $IULFDQFLYLO VRFLHty and grass-roots 
voices are adequately heard in national and international debate around poverty 
alleviation.469  Effective civil society bodies are vital to fully functioning democracy.  
For though, with Stout, I have argued that democracy has the capacity to operate as a 
tradition, what I have not considered is the extent to which it is sustained ± as is 
LQWULQVLF WR 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI UDWLRQDOLW\ ± by its own tradition-bearing 
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µFRPPXQLW\¶$QGDV0DF,QW\UHULJKWO\SRLQWVRXWWKHVFDOHDWZKLFKGHPocracy is 
practiced makes participation by all in rational deliberation exceedingly difficult at 
best: 
 Consider first the absence from contemporary political society of arenas of 
rational debate and deliberation which are open to everyone in the course of 
their everyday lives.  That absence is the counterpart to the restriction of 
effective political debate to privileged elites.  Every citizen does indeed get to 
vote at periodic intervals.  But the vast majority have no say as to the 
alternatives between which they are permitted to choose.  And there is no way 
in which the elites that determine those alternatives can be effectively 
challenged or called to account.  So the ordinary citizen rarely becomes more 
than a political spectator.470 
But in drawing these stark conclusions, MacIntyre is, in my view, excessively ± and 
dangerously ± pessimistic.  Fostering civil society bodies ± as particular examples of 
WKHµVXE-FXOWXUHV¶ZLWKµPRUDOODQJXDJHV¶DQGODWHQWFDSDFLWLHVIRUGHYHORSLQJJHQXLQH
social practices, promoting internal goods, and building on stereoscopic social 
criticism, all as outlined earlier in this chapter ± provides contexts in which individuals 
can develop precisely the skills required for pursuing genuine democracy.  These 
bodies can also offer public platforms for airing important issues, for example, 
leveraging space within the media for their perspectives.  Individually, and together ± 
HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHUH WKH\ DUH DEOH WR DFW DV µFRPPXQLWLHV RI FRPPXQLWLHV¶ WKURXJK
sufficiently shared concepts of the centrality of human flourishing, the virtues, and so 
forth ± they can have significant impact in debate with government.  The Jubilee 2000 
and Make Poverty History campaigns, both church-led initiatives which drew in other 
faiths and also non-religious bodies and individuals, illustrate what can be achieved in 
changing policies within the G8 and Bretton Woods institutions.  The alternative ± to 
DGRSW 0DF,QW\UH¶V QHJDWLYLW\ DQG ZLWKGUDZ UHVRXUFHV RI WLPH DQG HQHUJ\ IURP
democratic discourse ± is to leave the lobbying of governments to narrowly drawn 
interest groups, such as those promoting financial gain of the few over the common 
good.  
 In the same speech, directed towards faith communities, Ndungane offers only 
OLPLWHG H[DPSOHV RI WKH µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ demonstrated by Williams earlier in this 
FKDSWHU VSHDNLQJ LQ PRUH WKHRUHWLFDO WHUPV  1GXQJDQH¶V VXFFHVVRU the current 
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Archbishop, Thabo Makgoba, makes a far more concrete contribution to promoting 
effective civil society participation in democracy in, for example, a speech given as 
part of a lecture series aimed at improving communications between government and 
communities ± which is if course indispensible for effective democracy.471  This 
UHIOHFWV PDQ\ DVSHFWV RI 6WRXW¶V FRQVWUXFWLYH SUDFWLFDO UHZRUNLQJ of MacIntyrean 
principles.  The Archbishop directs his speech towards democratic processes that 
deliver the provisions of the Constitution, which he sees as µJURXQGHG LQ WKH
IXQGDPHQWDOHVVHQFHRIZKDWLWLVWREHDKXPDQEHLQJ¶± the common good of all, as 
we were created to be.  He allies his theological understanding of human flourishing 
with constitutional KXPDQ ULJKWV ZKLFK PLJKW VHHP XQH[SHFWHG JLYHQ 0XUSK\¶V
GHVFULSWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VYLHZRIKXPDQULJKWVDVµQRQVHQVHRQVWLOWV¶472  But, while 
acknRZOHGJLQJ WKDW µFRQWHPSRUDU\KXPDQULJKWV WKHRULHVDUHRIWHQJURXQGHG LQ«D
concept of what it is to be human that is greatly at odds with the understandings of the 
PDMRUUHOLJLRQV¶KHQRQHWKHOHVVDUJXHVWKDWVRFLHW\UHOLJLRXVRURWKHUZLVHFDQµDJUHH
on these end goals of human well-EHLQJ¶  7KLV UHIOHFWV 6WRXW¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW it is 
SRVVLEOHIRUµSHRSOHZLWKGLYHUJLQJFRQFHSWLRQVRIWKHJRRGWRLGHQWLI\WKHVDPHPRUDO
SUREOHPVDQGFROODERUDWHLQFRPPRQFRQFHUQ¶473   
 Having drawn this parallel, Makgoba pXWV IOHVK RQ LW WKURXJK µELOLQJXDOLVP¶
across a range of understandings of the common good, beginning with the Christian 
community.  He cites JeVXV¶ SURPLVH RI µOLIH LQ DEXQGDQFH¶ ZKLFK µVSDQV RXU
emotional, spiritual, mental or intellectual, physical and material needs, as well as our 
WKULYLQJ ERWK DV LQGLYLGXDOV DQG PHPEHUV RI VRFLHW\¶.  In alluding to the two Great 
Commandments he provides a comprehensive picture of human flourishing, including 
a right balance of individual and community.  He then aligns himself with other faith 
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FRPPXQLWLHVVSHDNLQJDVWKHFKDLURIWKH:HVWHUQ&DSH5HOLJLRXV/HDGHUV¶)RUXPRQ
whose behalf he challenges government to improve their delivery of basic services:  
that is, provide the common good.  He then places the faith cRPPXQLWLHV¶VXSSRUWIRU
the South African Constitution and its description of human well-being ± to which he 
holds the government accountable ± in the wider context of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.  He notes its specific provisions (in Article 25) include such 
essentials as µDGHTXDWH IRRG DQG FOHDQ ZDWHU KRXVLQJ FORthing, heath care and so 
forth¶DOORIZKLFKKHVD\VDUHIRXQGLQEXWQRWH[KDXVWHGE\WKHIDLWKFRPPXQLWLHV¶
and specifically Christian, views of the common good ± and, in a passage devoted to 
Biblical views on human flourishing, he provides this fullest picture of our right telos, 
on his own terms, offering it for others to draw on.  He argues that the common good 
PXVWEHWKHWRXFKVWRQHRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGFLWL]HQU\IRUµto be a responsible citizen is 
WRRULHQWRQH¶VOLIHLQDOLJQPHQWZLWK>WKHVH@SURYLVLRQVRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶474   
  Makgoba also employs stereoscopic social criticism.  He stresses the virtues 
and internal goods which democracy ought to demonstrate ± good governance through 
µRSHQQHVV WUDQVSDUHQF\KRQHVW\DQG WKHKLJKHVW HWKLFDOVWDQGDUGVIURPHYHU\VHFWRU
RI VRFLHW\¶ ZLWK µUHVSHFWIXO WUDQVSDUHQW VSHDNLQJ DQG OLVWHQLQJ¶ ZKHUH HYHU\RQH LV
given opportunity to voice their perspectives, and on their own terms (for, though he 
encourages faith communities and civil society organisations to help give the most 
GLVDGYDQWDJHGDYRLFHKHVWUHVVHVµLWLs not our job to speak for them¶).  He argues that 
these practices DUHQRWRQO\ULJKWLQWKHPVHOYHVEXWWKHRQO\ZD\µWo make the difficult 
MRXUQH\« WRZDUGV KXPDQ IORXULVKLQJ¶  And while he acknowledges the inevitable 
and legitimate difficulties that government faces from the legacies of the past and 
limited resources, he warns against allowing other goals to detract from pursuing 
human flourishing:  
 In our choices, in our decision-making, in the way we conduct our daily 
business, we must ask what promotes the greater fulfilment of these principles 
«:HPXVWDOVREHDOHUWWRDQGUHMHFWRSWLRQVWKDWXQGHUPLQHRUGLVWRUt the 
delivery of Constitutional provisions ± no matter how expedient, or how far 
they further our own narrowly defined and short term interests «LWZLOO QRW
do «to respRQGWKDWWKHWDVNLV³too difficult´, and can therefore be set a little 
to one side and dealt with on the margins, while we focus on matters closer to 
our own interests.  We must get our priorities right.475    
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The risks of bureaucratic expediencies are thus highlighted.  He also warns against 
more malicious distortions, though acknowledging WKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQµ
«there tend to be many competing interests at play ... frankly, some individuals and 
groups have destructive objectives, including personal or political power for its own 
sake, economic exploitation, and even competinJ FULPLQDO LQWHUHVWV¶  +H implicitly 
invites civil VRFLHW\JURXSVWR MRLQIDLWKFRPPXQLWLHVDVKHVD\VµRXUUROHVKRXOGDOVR
EHWRKHOSXQPDVNWKHVHIDFWRUV¶ 
 Elsewhere, Makgoba calls for &KULVWLDQV¶ participation in democratic 
processes on the basis oI 6W 3DXO¶V DGPRQLWLRQ µlet every person be subject to the 
JRYHUQLQJ DXWKRULW\¶ 5RP  DUJXLQJ WKDW µZKHQ RXU JRYHUQLQJ DXWKRULW\ LV
participative democracy, to be subject means to promote the effective participation of 
DOO DW HYHU\ OHYHO¶476  He speFLILFDOO\ SRLQWV WR WKH QHHG IRU SDUWLFLSDWLRQ µEHWZHHQ
HOHFWLRQV¶ ± RQH RI0DF,QW\UH¶V FRQFHUQV +LV DQVZHU LV RQJRLQJ µDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶ ± 
one of the touchstones of the life of a community of tradition, for, as he says 
µDFFRXQWDELOLW\ QRW RQO\ FRPHV WKURXgh the ballot box ± though it certainly comes 
here.  Accountability also comes through continuing open debate, and through 
strengthening the effective functioning of robust and independent civil society and 
SULYDWHVHFWRUV¶ 
 In such way, Makgoba gives reasons to those of his own and other faith 
communities to have confidence that their own more fully drawn understandings of 
KXPDQLW\¶Vtelos are to be furthered through supporting constitutional democracy, and 
indicates ways they can do this.  He also offers WKH µVXE-FXOWXUHV¶ RI FLYLO VRFLHW\
organisations a wider appreciation of moral rationality directed towards human 
flourishing as understood by the faith communities and specifically his own:  a goal 
they can share even if construed on different grounds.  He highlights ways of 
SURPRWLQJ WKH µVRFLDO SUDFWLFH¶ RI GHPRFUDWLF GHEDWH LQFOXGLQJ JRLQJ VRPH ZD\
towards what Stout sees as the possibility of µUHFRQFHLYLQJ WKHYLUWXHV LQGHPRFUDWLF
WHUPV¶477  He indicates ways for constructive collaboration across civil society groups, 
in holding the government and other bodies to account, another aspect of ethical 
debate.  And he explains the need for stereoscopic social criticism that acknowledges 
the proper role of state and its difficulties, while being alert to the dominance of 
external goods or other distortions.  In all these ways he offers resources to other 
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Christians, faith communities, civil society sub-cultures, and even those in 
government, to draw on, in order to work more effectively together so that the 
TXHVWLRQRIµKRZWKHQVKDOOZHOLYH"¶PLJKWPRUHMXVWO\EHUHDOLVHGIRUDOOFLWL]HQV 
Lessons for the Church in the World 
 Let me sum up some key elements by which the churches may be guided.  
Their starting point should be to have confidence that, as communities of tradition, 
they have the capacity to pursue a high degree of moral rationality, and to 
communicate clearly their processes for pursing this and the conclusions that they 
draw.  Not only should they assume a greater potential for substantive dialogue which 
µJRHV RQ DQG JRHV IXUWKHU¶ ZLWK RWKHU FRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ EXW EH\RQG VXFK
communities they can also engage meaningfully with a wide range of groupings or 
sub-cultures, which, to a greater or lesser degree provide their members with some 
apprehension of social practices and genuine internal goods of excellence, and some 
level of moral language through which to pursue such ends.  From the perspective 
purely of moral rationality (though recognising other considerations will need to be 
taken into account), through generous engagement with such groups and their 
members, churches and Christian individuals will be able to discover, through 
attempting to go on and go further, how developed such moral rationality is.  Further, 
through communicating not only on their own terms in their own language-in-use, that 
is, in theological terms, but also through bilingualism, in the moral languages and 
from the perspectives of those with whom they engage, those who are suited to taking 
up this task can help such groups and their members enrich these moral languages and 
develop their abilities both in practical rationality and rational enquiry; and in how to 
engage with and learn from others through the growing bilingual fluency of some of 
their own members.   
It is particularly valuable to employ, and to help others to learn how to 
HPSOR\6WRXW¶VVWHUHRVFRSLFVRFLDOFULWLFLVP, and so explore a textured understanding 
of the interplay of both internal goods of excellence and external goods together with 
the bureaucratic and economic pressures that are an inescapable part of the 
institutionalisation necessary to sustain social practices.  Such awareness can help 
promote and sustain social practices, and the internal goods of excellence which are so 
vital to human flourishing, in the face of the destructive forces within contemporary 
society.  This can be complemented by focussing debate around central questions of 
the common good, human flourishing and what it means to live well.  For churches 
can contribute a fullHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI KXPDQLW\¶V XOWLPDWH telos, and the way in 
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which it can become a touchstone for the ordering of goods of more limited scope 
within the lives of individuals and the organisations in which they participate.  Given 
that to fail to engage in such a way is to deprive others of such resources for 
improving their ability to live moral rational lives and to resist the pressures to do 
otherwise, it is the case that, other considerations being equal, it is therefore the 
morally rational obligation RI WKH FKXUFKHV WR GHYRWH µJRRG HQRXJK¶ UHVRXUFHV RI
personnel, time and energy to such engagement.    
Of course, it is up to others whether, and how far, they are prepared to receive 
these contributions.  But if they too are committed to pursuing the best possible 
answers to questions of how humanity should live, we should expect an openness to 
our arguments, given the fact that it is possible to recognise the justification of 
DQRWKHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHZLWKRXWEHLQJUHTXLUHGWRDGRSWLWRQHVHOI± and, specifically, to 
acknowledge the moral rationality of faith communities without being required also to 
acknowledge for oneself their religious assumptions.   
This last conclusion is one of the starting points for the churches engagement 
in the practices of democratic debate.  It gives us justifiable grounds for arguing that 
we can step aside from sterile arguments about whether, for example, the existence or 
otherwise of God has first to be settled before anything else can be said.  The ability of 
democracy to function as a tradition lies in the capacity to build on the experiences of 
moral rationality, even in limited form, that comes from participation in bodies 
promoting social practices and internal goods and employing moral languages to do 
so.  That so many people are members of a number of such bodies, alongside others 
who share some but not all of their allegiances and commitments, also enhances our 
ability to live comfortably with pluralism.       
 With one mark of the rationality of a tradition being its ability to muster all 
available evidence and take account of all possible alternative perspectives requires 
that well-functioning democratic processes ensure that all voices are adequately heard 
in public debate.  This also provides good reason for churches to ensure they 
contribute their views, and give good account of them.  Indeed, the churches benefit 
from the expectation that each should be able to give an account of why it is they hold 
WKHLUFRQYLFWLRQVIRUWKH\KDYHDµJRRGVWRU\¶WRWHOO3URPRWLQJKabits of holding one 
another to account in this way provides the churches with increased opportunities to 
H[SRXQG WKHLU FRQYLFWLRQV  'RLQJ VR µELOLQJXDOO\¶ ERWK LQ WKHLU RZQ WHUPV DQG
language-in-use and through bilingualism in the moral language of that particular 
democratic context, offering enrichment as appropriate, can help others in two ways.  
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First, it enhances their own capacity for moral rationality within the public space, and 
second it increases their understanding of the specific beliefs of Christian faith which, 
as we believe and MacIntyre argues in relation to Thomistic Aristotelianism, actually 
provide the best possible way to live.     
 In short, the practical consequence of what has been said previously in this 
chapter and in the previous chapter is that, contrary to what might be expected, a 
MacIntyrean approach to moral rational living offers an invitation to faith 
communities to play a full part in public discourse, participating on their own terms 
within democratic processes which operate as a tradition, in order to contribute to the 
necessary tasks of furthering practices which promote virtues and the good of 
excellence and all that contributes to human flourishing, and of limiting the influence 
of all that diminish these.   
 But we will find limits on what we can achieve using this approach.  We will 
QRW DOZD\V EH DEOH WR µJR RQ DQG JR IXUWKHU¶ IRU WKHUH ZLOO EH VRPH SHRSOH ZKRVH
capacity for moral language is too limited to be able to grasp the account we give of 
ourselves either on our own terms or through attempting to communicate on their 
terms through enrichment.  Or we may find ourselves speaking in contexts where 
bureaucratic and market considerations dominate, or where there are assumptions of a 
secularism that does not acknowledge religious commitments.  We will then have to 
resort to different means for promoting effective moral debate.  These are the subject 
of the following chapter.   
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Chapter 6 ± MacIntyre beyond MacIntyre 
 In earlier chapters, I argued that it was only by WU\LQJWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶
that we would discover where the limitations lie in our efforts to engage in various 
levels of rational moral debate with others.  On encountering such limits we should 
then adopt alternative approaches to discussion.  Thus, where with those we had 
assumed to be members of communities of tradition we find insufficient 
FRPPHQVXUDELOLW\ LQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIKXPDQLW\¶V ULJKW telos and the evaluative 
standards we use in pursuing it through moral rational living, as in chapters 2 and 3, 
we can instead attempt to move the exchange forward through employing the methods 
outlined in chapter 5.  But here too, in engaging with more limited moral languages 
DQGVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVZHPD\ILQGRXUVHOYHVXQDEOHWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶  It may 
be that we are engaging with individuals whose understanding of social practices and 
genuine goods that contribute to human flourishing, and how they are sustained 
through shared moral languages, is so limited that they cannot grasp the rationality of 
a community of tradition.  It may be their conceptual language is so far from that of a 
community of tradition that no matter how extensive our attempts to communicate 
through enrichment, it cannot convey moral rationality.  Or it may be that we find 
ourselves speaking within arenas ± increasingly pervasive within contemporary 
society, as MacIntyre is right to argue ± where acceptable discourse is couched in 
solely managerial and economic terms, with as good as no acknowledgement of the 
validity of other perspectives, religious commitments among them.  
 As noted in chapter 2, the account given by MacIntyre in Whose Justice?  
Which Rationality?478 seems to insist that since such people or contexts are so wholly 
cut off from, or exclude, the practices and languages in which his tradition-based 
morality is couched, all attempts at genuine rational ethical discourse are impossible.  
Concepts of human worth and ethical evaluation that can only be expressed in terms of 
the market or bureaucratic efficiency are likely to be so far from Christian 
understandings of our right telos, and so utterly flawed, that some might be tempted to 
draw the conclusion that there is little purpose in people of faith engaging directly.  
Such interlocutors and decision-making processes are likely to be incapable of 
comprehending Christian arguments and perspectives as voiced on our own terms:  
they have no means of grasping them since their languages are unable to support such 
concepts.  The possibility of agreeing any starting point from which discussion can 
proceed is so slender as to be not worth making the effort.  Time and energy would be 
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better spent in solely pursuing the sort of stark evangelism that works for the µDKDK¶
moment of radical conversion brought about by the Holy Spirit, without recourse to 
logical persuasion.    
 %XW WKLVZRXOG ,FRQWHQGEH WRPLVUHDG0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVGUDZLQJIDOVH
implications from what he has argued.  Certainly, he maintains in WJWR that it is 
futile to attempt substantive moral debate through attempting bilingualism with, and 
enrichment of, a language that does not of itself have the capacity to encapsulate 
concepts like the virtues, internal goods of excellence, a human telos and so forth.  He 
equally argues that we cannot pursue such debate on the basis of accepting the 
possibility of a neutral, objective, perspective on ethical questions.  But this does not 
mean that we are left entirely resourceless in our attempts to engage on moral 
questions, where we cannot go on and go further using the approach of the previous 
chapter. 
 And though this may appear strongly counter what we might expect from 
reading his major volumes, it is MacIntyre himself who provides the resources to 
which we should look.  These are to be found in his considerations RI $TXLQDV¶
writings on natural law, particularly its primary precepts, and how these relate to our 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH FRPPRQ JRRG  7KHVH SURYLGH WKH IRFXV IRU µGURSSLQJ GRZQ
DQRWKHU JHDU¶ ZKLOH QRQHWKHOHVV FRQWLQXLQJ WR HQJDJH RQ PRUDO TXHVWLRQV DQG Wo 
attempt to move debate forward.  This chapter considers how this might be so, 
EXLOGLQJ RQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW SODLQ SHUVRQV E\ YLUWXH RI WKHLU KXPDQLW\
retain a capacity to recognise the primary precepts and, on the basis of these, what it is 
to pursue truth, including what constitutes a right understanding of the common good.  
Thus all are potentially able to hold to account their rulers ± whether rule is vested in 
individuals or some system of governance ± over the content and conduct of the rule 
they exercise.  This provides, at the very least, the legitimation of debate around a 
Thomistic basis of morality within public discourse, and, further, as I go on to show, 
offers far more specific resources for engaging with ethical questions in national and 
international forums.  It also points to ways for working to shape the nature of such 
discourse so that we are better able to speak about and pursue the common good, 
significant though the obstacles are.  
Natural Law and the Common Good 
 It is MacInW\UH¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKH SUHFHSWV RI QDWXUDO ODZ DUH LPSOLFLWO\
upheld far more widely than is generally acknowledged.  His starting point for this is 
to look to philosophical debate around the human good.  Here he notes that amongst 
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Thomists who may differ greatly on other questions there is nonetheless general 
DJUHHPHQWWKDWµKXPDQJRRGFDQEHDFKLHYHGRQO\WKURXJKDIRUPRIOLIHLQZKLFKWKH
positive and negative precepts of the natural law are the norms governing our 
UHODWLRQVKLSV¶479  Such a contention can not only be supported by arguments drawn 
from Aristotle, Aquinas and others, but, more importantly and also more surprisingly, 
FDQEHUHLQIRUFHGE\DVHFRQGVHWRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQVµZKLFKFRQFHUQQRWVRPXFKWKH
theories, but rather the practices of their anti-7KRPLVWLFSKLORVRSKLFDOFULWLFV¶)RUKH
FODLPVµVXFKDQWL-Thomistic philosophers inadvertently give evidence by and in their 
activities of the truth of just that Thomist view of the practical life which as theorists 
they suppose themselves abOHWRUHJXODWH¶ 
 His grounds for asserting this are to argue that it can be observed that these 
SKLORVRSKHUV µJHQHUDOO\ DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\ SXUVXH WKH WUXWK DERXW PRUDO DQG
philosophical matters in a way and with a dedication that acknowledges the 
achievement of that truth as one aspect at least of what seems to be being treated as a 
final and unconditional end.  They do so moreover generally and characteristically 
under constraints imposed by rules which prescribe unqualified respect for those with 
whom they enter into debate, precisely as enjoined by the primary precepts of the 
QDWXUDOODZ¶480  7KXVKHVD\VµZHILQGWKDWUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKLQSKLORVRSKLFDOGHEDWH
about morality are themselves governed to a surprising extent among a variety of non-
Thomists and anti-Thomists by a practical recognition of exceptionless norms whose 
point and purpose is the achievement of the final end of that activity, thus 
exemplifying something that Thomists take to be characteristic of well-ordered human 
activity in geQHUDO¶ 7KLV LVVRVLQFHµLW LV LQGHHGD7KRPLVW WKHVLV WKDWDOOSUDFWLFDO
reasoners, often unwittingly, and often very imperfectly, exhibit in significant ways 
the truth of the Thomist account of practical reasoning by how they act, even when, as 
in this case, they are engaged in an enterprise of constructing anti-Thomistic 
SKLORVRSKLFDOWKHRULHV¶ 
 In this way MacIntyre argues that among moral philosophers, despite 
thorough-going disagreement over the relationship between humanity and morality, 
there is nonetheless considerable accord over the conduct of these debates.  Such 
agreement has two particular elements.  The first is that they are united in a common 
telos, which is the search for the untrammelled truth, as the goal of their processes of 
enquiry.  The second is their mode of engaging with one another.  Despite all their 
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disagreements on substance, they nonetheless interact in ways that demonstrate mutual 
µXQTXDOLILHG UHVSHFW¶481  This encompasses the honesty, truthfulness, generosity of 
spirit, frHHGRP IURP YLFWLPLVDWLRQ DQG VR IRUWK ZKLFK KH FLWHV DV ILUVW µWKH
UHTXLUHPHQWV LPSRVHGE\ WKHSUHFHSWV RI QDWXUDO ODZ¶ WR ZKLFK , UHWXUQ LQ WKH QH[W
section) and characteristic of a culture or community of tradition, and, second, the 
precondition of all rational conversation.  
 But this is a long way from saying that the company of those engaged in moral 
philosophy equates to a community of tradition, or even a sub-FXOWXUH ZLWK D µJRRG
HQRXJK¶ PRUDO ODQJXDJH  7KH\ PD\ VKDUH DQ LPSOLFLW FRPPRQ JRDO WKe pursuit of 
µWUXWK¶DQGVKDUHVWDQGDUGVIRUJXLGLQJWKHLUGHOLEHUDWLRQVERWKRIZKLFKDVZHKDYH
previously noted, MacIntyre sees as being at the heart of substantive ethical debate.  
%XWWKHH[WHQWRIWKHDJUHHPHQWLVIDUWRRWKLQIRUµJRLQJRQDQGJRLQJIRUZDUG¶RQWKLV
basis.  For some implicit agreement with each other, and, indeed, Aristotle482 and 
Aquinas, that truth is the proper goal of rational enquiry, does not inevitably lead to 
agreement on what constitutes truth and how it is to be conceptualised, let alone 
agreement on the proper telos of humankind; nor on the nature of what it is to be 
human and to flourish (or even on what constitutes the virtues and internal goods of 
excellence of human practices); nor on the pursuit of life as a teleologically ordered 
unity.  Second, though they may agree on guiding principles for their relationships 
within debate, they have neither shared evaluative standards, nor shared concepts of 
rationality, when it comes to the substance of the debate.  And so MacIntyre 
enumerates various errors into which these anti-Thomistic philosophers fall, through 
HVSRXVLQJ XWLOLWDULDQ DSSURDFKHV DQG IDLOLQJ WR JUDVS WKDW µWKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI D ILQDO
good of human beings is that of a good that cannot be weighed against any other «¶483   
 MacIntyre subsequently lists other ways in which, particularly in Western 
society, natural law and its relationship with human good can be misunderstood not 
only in philosophical debate but in wider moral and ethical argument.484  But this does 
not detract from his description of the thin sort of commonality that does exist within 
the very limited social practice that is this particular area of philosophical enquiry.  
And this he presents as evidence in support of his contention that these fundamental 
precepts of natural law are those to which not only anti-Thomistic philosophers, but 
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LQGHHG DOO UDWLRQDO SHUVRQV ZLOO DVVHQW VXEMHFW WR WKH FRQVWUDLQWV RI KXPDQLW\¶V
inevitable cultural, intellectual, and moral errors and our distortions of 
understanding.485 
 Let me now turn to a more detailed account of what precisely constitute the 
fundamental ± or primary ± precepts of natural law, and their significance for moral 
debate. 
The Primary Precepts of Natural Law  
 As MacIntyre acknowledges, to assert that the primary precepts of natural law 
are eminently knowable by all rational persons gives direct rise to the question of why 
it is that such extensive moral disagreements nonetheless persist.486   
 The starting point for answering this question is, says MacIntyre, to recognise 
that the primary precepts of natural law are what give direct µexpression to the first 
principle of practical reason¶, which is µthat good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
avoided.¶487  It is open to humans to pursue such good in three areas:  the goods that 
relate to our physical, animal and rational natures, the last including the goods of 
knowledge.  Of these we can assert with Aquinas that they are not derived from any 
more ultimate precept, that they are known inferentially, and that it is characteristic of 
them that they are one and the same for everyone; that they are unchanging and 
unchangeable; that they are known to be what they are by all rational human beings; 
and that knowledge of them cannot be abolished from the human heart.488 
The primary precepts find differentiated expression according to context, 
through secondary precepts.  So though we may agree that taking innocent life or 
inflicting gratuitous harm is wrong, and that property should be respected, ignorance 
shunned, and understanding cultivated, how precisely we interpret these tenets in 
practice may in some circumstances be open to debate.489  Further, such debate often 
reduces to the sterility of competing incommensurable claims over some conceptions 
of what exactly are the µILUVW SULQFLSOHV¶ WKDW PLJKW DSSO\  %XW GRHV WKLV PHDQ
0DF,QW\UHDVNVWKDW$TXLQDV¶DFFRXQWRIQDWXUDOODZDVWKHJXLGHIRUUDWLRQDOHQTXLU\
LV LQDGHTXDWH"  +LV DQVZHU LV WKDW WKLV LV QRW WKH FDVH LI RQH FRQILQHV RQH¶V FODLPV
about natural law, as he does, to the primary precepts as understood above, rather than 
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considering the broader scope which natural law is sometimes understood to 
encompass.490   
 Even on this basis, says MacIntyre, Aquinas expects disagreement to arise.491  
Since the primary precepts are rooted in the first principle of good being done and evil 
being avoided, we must understand that the questions answered by these precepts, at 
the most fundamental level, relate to the ultimate good of humankind.  Therefore, 
unless we share a right understanding of our telos, then it is more than likely that we 
will disagree on specific practical questions.492  And it is indeed the case, says 
Aquinas (according to MacIntyre), that humanity has a general tendency to disagree 
over our ultimate human end.493 
 However, we cannot debate ultimate ends as we might a practical ethical 
question, says MacIntyre.  A different approach is required.  For when we address 
practical ethical issues, we engage on questions about means, and this presupposes 
that we are in agreement over the particular ends that relate to the subject under 
debate.  And so, where we find sustained disagreement on practical matters, i.e. about 
µPHDQV¶ZHVKRXOGH[SHFWWRILQGWKDWWKLVLV, far more often than not, a consequence 
of underlying disagreement about ends.494  Therefore, if we want to engage with those 
RI GLIIHULQJ YLHZV RQ TXHVWLRQV DERXW XOWLPDWH HQGV ZH FDQQRW XVH WKH µSUDFWLFDO
UHDVRQLQJ¶ WKDW LV FRQGXFWHG EHWZHHQ WKRVH ZKR VKDUH DJUHHPHQW RQ VWDQGDUGV RI
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evaluation and the common good, but must proceed by a different course that focuses 
RQZKDW0DF,QW\UHLQWKLVSDUWLFXODUDUWLFOHWHUPVµWKHRUHWLFDOHQTXLU\¶495 
 This is the same distinction that MacIntyre has previously drawn between 
GHEDWH DV µSUDFWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ¶ ± as conducted within communities of tradition, and 
between communities of tradition with sufficiently commensurable conceptions of 
telos and standards of rational evaluation ± DQG GHEDWH DV µWKHRUHWLFDO HQTXLU\¶ ± 
conducted by members of a tradition with those of other traditions where there is 
insufficient commensurability in these two areas, as first outlined in chapter 2.  And 
while, as I argued in subsequent chapters, the possibilities for practical rationality are 
likely to be far more extensive than at first appears, situations will nonetheless arise 
where we have effectively no shared telos or shared standards of rational enquiry and 
evaluation.  MacIntyre asks, to what then, do we resort, as resources for theoretical 
enquiry, and his answer is the precepts and norms arising from natural law.  
 He reaches this position by arguing that the first plank for dialogue of any sort 
between those of contesting views must be shared agreement that we are each singly 
and together in pursuit of the truth.  For, MacIntyre asserts, µQRDFFRXQWRIWKHKXPDQ
good can be adequate that is not vindicated and sustained by continuing enquiry that 
WDNHV WUXWK WR EH LWV HQG DQG JRRG DQG « WKHUHIRUH WKH JRRG RI WUXWK PXVW EH D
FRQVWLWXWLYHSDUWRI WKHKXPDQJRRG¶496  Ultimate truth and humanit\¶V ILQDO HQGDUH
WKXVLQH[WULFDEO\LQWHUZRYHQ+HFRQFOXGHVWKDWµVKDUHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHSUDFWLFHRI
HQTXLU\SUHVXSSRVHVDW OHDVW WKLVPHDVXUHRIDJUHHPHQWDERXW WKHKXPDQJRRG¶ $V
IRUZKDWPLJKWEHPHDQWE\ WUXWKKHSRLQWV WR$TXLQDV¶H[SUHVVLRQ adequatio rei et 
intellectusZKLFKKH LQWHUSUHWVDV µWKHDGHTXDF\RIDPLQG WRDVXEMHFWPDWWHUDERXW
ZKLFKLWHQTXLUHVDQGRIWKDWVXEMHFWPDWWHUWRWKDWPLQG¶497    
The pursuit of truth requires various conditions to be satisfied.  First, we are 
required WRµDFFRUGWRWKHJRRGRIWUXWKDSODFHWKDWGRHVQRWDOORZLWWREHRYHUULGGHQ
E\RWKHUJRRGV¶VD\V0DF,QW\UHZKLOHDWRQFHTXDOLI\LQJWKLVEDOGDVVHUWLRQZLWKWKH
UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW LWZRXOGEH µDEVXUG¶ WR PHDQ WKDW µWKHSXUVXLW RI WUXWK DOZD\V WDNHV
prHFHGHQFH RYHU DOO RWKHU W\SHV RI DFWLYLW\¶  1RQHWKHOHVV WR DGGUHVV TXHVWLRQV RI
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GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKDQ\GHJUHHRIVHULRXVQHVVµHQTXLU\KDVWRILQGsome continuing and 
VLJQLILFDQW SODFH LQ RXU OLYHV¶498  Second, all those who commit to pursuing truth 
together must also agree to set aside any distorting influences such as particular 
µPDWHULDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHUHVWVWKDW«DUHQRXULVKHGE\RXUGHVLUHVIRUSOHDVXUH
PRQH\DQGSRZHU¶499  Third, we must be able to trust one another, through respecting 
each otKHU¶V OLYHV OLEHUW\ DQG SURSHUW\ DQG PDNLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWV IRU FRPPXQDO
security.  Furthermore, in the conduct of our discussions, we must also expect one 
another to speak the truth; to avoid deceptive or intentionally misleading speech; and 
to keep all commitments and promises made.500 
All of these, says MacIntyre, are the preconditions for shared rational enquiry 
of every sort.  They are precisely the same as those outlined above in his reflection on 
Veritatis Splendor for enquiry as conducted both within traditions, and also between, 
for example, moral philosophers of widely differing perspectives.  Furthermore, he 
DUJXHV WKH\ DOVR FRQIRUP WR $TXLQDV¶ SULPDU\ SUHFHSWV RI QDWXUDO ODZ KDYLQJ WKH
same four characteristics as listed above:  they are of universal application, 
exceptionlessness, self-evident for everyone, and presupposed rather than derived 
from enquiry.501  $VKHSXWV LW µLW LVDFRQGLWLRQRI WKH UDWLRQDOLW\RIVKDUHGHQTXLU\
that the social relationships of those engaged in it should be structured by certain 
QRUPVQRUPVWKDWILQGWKHLUH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHSULPDU\SUHFHSWVRIWKHQDWXUDOODZ¶502   
The important conclusion to be drawn here is that these conditions hold for 
all able adults, regardless of whether they belong to any or no community of tradition. 
 Here it is worth underlining what MacIntyre claimed at the beginning ± that 
the good that we are to pursue includes the goods of our rational nature.  Therefore the 
pursuit of truth, though not human good in all its fullness, is intrinsic to the ultimate 
telos to which natural law directs us.   
 Thus, when we fail to find agreement, in diagnosing why this is so, alongside 
considering such questions as whether our conception of telos differs too radically, we 
can also ask whether we are falling short in any of the necessary conditions outlined 
above:  one or other of the participants in enquiry may not be wholly dedicated to 
truth, there may be unacknowledged ulterior motives at play, we may be unwilling to 
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be wholly honest, perhaps through lack of trust since we together have failed to 
provide a context of sufficient respect and security.  Failure to abide by the primary 
precepts is likely to lead to failure to pursue truth in relation to whatever issue is at 
stake between us, and so MacIntyre conFOXGHVµ$TXLQDV¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHSUHFHSWVRI
natural law, far from being inconsistent with the facts of moral disagreement provides 
WKHEHVWVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUWKHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHVHIDFWV¶503   
 It may seem that MacIntyre began by making quite a limited claim for the 
scope of natural law and its primary precepts, and now his conclusion is also modest ± 
that they explain moral disagreement.  This nonetheless has a number of significant 
implications for the ability of members of a community of tradition to assert 
rationality and pursue moral debate within pluralist or secular contexts, within which, 
all too often, moral disagreement abounds.  
 First, let me recall that one of the marks of the rational superiority of a 
community of tradition is that when it encounters alternative perspectives, it should be 
able to give an account, from within its own resources, of why such differing views 
arise, and should then go on to offer remedies for overcoming disagreements.  
MacIntyre has hereby shown that his Thomistic-Aristotelianism, in which this 
conception of natural law is an intrinsic element, fulfils the demand for explaining 
moral disagreement in whatever context we find it.  He also shows that the means for 
addressing disagreement on moral questions (though without offering any guarantees 
that it will be RYHUFRPH OLHV LQ IROORZLQJ WKHVH µHQDEOLQJ¶504 rules or norms that 
reflect the primary precepts.  Further, where progress is difficult, he points to the need 
for parties to the disagreement to consider in what ways these norms might not be 
being upheld.  And he implicitly directs the focus of debate according to these norms 
towards the question of what is the good for humanity, as the first step on the journey 
towards wider agreement ± for, I would argue, as common ground begins to be 
HVWDEOLVKHGDURXQGWKHLVVXHRIKXPDQLW\¶VJRRGVRGLDORJXHFDQEHJLQWRPRYHIURP
µWKHRUHWLFDO HQTXLU\¶ WRZDUGV TXHVWLRQV RI µSUDFWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ¶ RI KRZ VXFK JRRG
might be pursued in concrete terms within the given context.  For here too, we can 
DSSO\WKHDSSURDFKRIDWWHPSWLQJWRµJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶XVLQJZKDWHYHURSWLRQVDUH
available to us ± and through these attempts, actually contribute to being able to 
achieve far more than if we had not done so, by bringing clarity to the central issues at 
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stake and providing constructive means for ourselves and others with whom we 
engage to address them.   
Natural Law, Plain Persons and Governance  
 It is not only the case that we can make this contribution to going on and 
going further in contexts such as the academic philosophy which MacIntyre used as an 
H[DPSOH  )RU KH VD\V ZH µFRPH WR NQRZ¶ WKH SULPDU\ SUHFHSWV µSUDFWLFDOO\ DV
precepts whose binding authority is presupposed in any situation in which learning 
and enquiry between rational individuals about their individual and common goods 
can be advanced and by any relationship in which individuals can conduct themselves 
ZLWK UDWLRQDO LQWHJULW\¶505  Therefore the same arguments as above also apply not 
merely at a scale that equates to communities of tradition, but potentially at every 
level of human interaction from individual relations through to the nation state and 
international institutions.  And where matters of governance are concerned, MacIntyre 
insists that the primary precepts of natural law are not merely available to the ruling 
DQGHGXFDWHGFODVVHVEXWDOVRWRDOOµSODLQSHUVRQVZKRVHFDSDFLW\IRUSUXGHQFHDQG
ZKRVHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHQDWXUDOODZLVWKHLUVLQYLUWXHRIWKHLUKXPDQQDWXUH¶506  Thus 
very much the same considerations apply, when it comes to debating disagreements in 
the political sphere, particularly those with an ethical or moral dimension, as well as 
when considering the wider status of the rule of law.  In arguing this, MacIntyre 
begins by remarking that it is at first intriguing, to say the least, to note that Aquinas, 
in considering the role of the state, concludes in the Summa Theologiae that it is not 
WKHUROHRIKXPDQOHJLVODWLRQWRµVXSUHVVDOOYLFH¶5DWKHULWLVLWVWDVNWRµPDNHKXPDQ
beings good, by habituating them in the performance of those types of actions which 
DUHUHTXLUHGE\WKHYLUWXHV¶507  But though Aquinas judges that the law should play its 
SDUWLQµPRUDOHGXFDWLRQ¶KHFRQFOXGHVWKDWµWRRPXFKVKRXOGQRWEHDVNHG>RIWKHP@
WRR VRRQ¶ JLYHQ WKDW SHRSOH DUH JHQHUDOO\ µVWLOO GHHSO\ LPSHUIHFW LQ WKH YLUWXHV¶
Further, Aquinas recognises that human nature is often so perverse that legislating in 
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too much detail can also provoke what it aims to prevent!  I shall consider how the 
church can indeed be part of precisely this gradual and careful habituation in chapter 
7. 
All this is consonant ZLWK$TXLQDV¶ assertion, as recounted by MacIntyre (and 
noted previously) WKDW E\ DQG ODUJH SHRSOH IDLO DGHTXDWHO\ WR JUDVS KXPDQLW\¶V
ultimate telos, and thus what is their genuine good.  Nonetheless, the degree of 
KXPDQLW\¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU NQRZOHGJH RI WKH QDWXUDO ODZ LV VXIILFLHQW IRU $TXLQDV WR
µDSSHDOWRQDWXUDOUHDVRQQRWRQO\IRUKLVDFFRXQWRIWKHSXUSRVHDQGIXQFWLRQRIODZ
but also for the standard to which all positive legal enactments and administrative 
measures must confirm, if they are to be appropriate law rather than merely an 
H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH ZLOO DQG LQWHUHVW RI WKRVH ZKR DFW DQG DGPLQLVWHU¶508 it, says 
MacIntyre.   
&RQFOXGLQJ WKDW µKXPDQ ODZ LV IURP QDWXUDO ODZ¶ LQ WKLV ZD\ µKDV UDGLFDO
LPSOLFDWLRQV¶509  7KHILUVWFRUROODU\ LVWKDW LWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\DFFRUGLQJWR$TXLQDV¶
reasoning, for a ruler to be a Christian in order to rule legitimately from a Christian 
perspective.  A second corollary is that the legitimacy of the ruler, and of the 
legislation of governance, depends on how far these conform to natural law ± and, 
VD\V 0DF,QW\UH WKH µNQRZOHGJH WKDW HQDEOHV XV WR >VD\ ZKDW WKH QDWXUDO ODZ LV@ LV
possessed by any person capable of adequate reasoning and, so far as common 
SULQFLSOHVRIWKHQDWXUDOODZDUHFRQFHUQHGE\HYHU\UDWLRQDOEHLQJ¶510  (I shall return 
to the question of the legitimacy of the rule of law later in this chapter, in considering 
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRf Aquinas for how the church engages 
in public moral discourse around the question of the shape of public space.)  
 0DF,QW\UHUHPLQGVKLV UHDGHUV µZKDW WKHJURXQGVDUHRQ$TXLQDV¶YLHZIRU
respecting the precepts of the natural law and how it is that, on that view, we come to 
know those precepts.  We come to know them practically as precepts whose binding 
authority is presupposed in any situation in which learning and enquiry between 
rational individuals about their individual and common goods can be advanced and by 
any relationship in which individuals can conduct themselves with rational 
LQWHJULW\¶511  The particular circumstances that prevail will influence which of the 
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SUHFHSWV KDYHSDUWLFXODU UHOHYDQFHEXW LW UHPDLQV WKH FDVH WKDW µWKH YLRODWLRQ RI any 
SUHFHSWRIQDWXUDOODZDOZD\VFRQVWLWXWHVDWKUHDW¶WRWKHµUDWLRQDOSRVVLELOLWLHV¶RIWKH
situations and relationships in question.     
 And echoing his comments on the way that anti-Thomistic philosophers abide 
by this Thomistic understanding in the way that they conduct their academic 
arguments, MacIntyre here DVVHUWVWKDWµ-XVWEHFDXVHHYHQLQVLWXDWLRQs in which there 
is serious, even skeptical enquiry about the precepts of the natural law, willing 
conformity to those precepts is a precondition of rational and serious enquiry, it turns 
RXW WKDW ZH FDQQRW EXW SUHVXSSRVH DOOHJLDQFHV WR WKHP LQ RXU DFWLYLWLHV¶512  The 
SUHFHSWV DUH SULPDULO\ NQRZQ KH VD\V DV µSUHVXSSRVLWLRQV¶ RI RXU DFWLYLWLHV RI
OHDUQLQJDQGHQTXLU\µLQVRIDUDVWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHRUDVSLUHWRUDWLRQDOLW\¶$SSO\LQJ
WKLVWRTXHVWLRQVRIMXVWLFHPHDQVWKDWµQDWXUDOODZGHILQHVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIMXVWLFH
DQGXQMXVW ODZ IDLOV DV ODZ¶ 7KXV µZKHWKHU DSDUWLFXODUSRVLWLYH ODZ KDV DXWKRULW\
over us is therefore something to be discerned E\ UDWLRQDOSHUVRQV¶ 2XUUDWLRQDOLW\
OLHVLQRXUFDSDFLW\WRUHFRJQLVHWKDWµJRRGLVWREHGRQHDQGSXUVXHGDQGHYLOLVWREH
DYRLGHG¶  ,QRWKHUZRUGVVD\V0DF,QW\UH µWKH H[FHSWLRQOHVVSUHFHSWVRI WKHQDWXUDO
law are those which, insofar as we are rational, we recognize as indispensable in every 
society and in every situation for the achievement of our goods and our final good, 
EHFDXVHWKH\GLUHFWXVWRZDUGVDQGSDUWLDOO\GHILQHRXUFRPPRQJRRG¶513 
 $QG ZKLOH LW LV µWR UXOHUV WKDW D FDUH IRU WKH FRPPRQ good is especially 
HQWUXVWHG¶514 VD\V0DF,QW\UH DQG ZKLOH $TXLQDV DJUHHVZLWK $ULVWRWOH WKDW µWKHUH LV
LQGHHGDSDUWLFXODUYLUWXHRUH[FHOOHQFHVSHFLILF WRUXOLQJ¶QRQHWKHOHVV$TXLQDVDOVR
DUJXHVWKDWµHYHU\KXPDQEHLQJLQVRIDUDVUDWLRQDOKDVSDUWLQ ruling according to the 
MXGJPHQWRIUHDVRQ¶)RUµWKHYLUWXHRIDJRRGKXPDQEHLQJDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHYLUWXHRI
D JRRG UXOHU¶ DQG WKHUHIRUH µLQVRIDU DV KXPDQ EHLQJV KDYH WKH FDSDFLW\ WR EHFRPH
good, they also have the capacity to exercise the prudence of D UXOHU¶515  And so 
MacIntyre concludes that, as referred to at the beginning of this section, it is as a 
consequence of our being human ± RXUEHLQJµSODLQSHUVRQV¶± that all able adults have 
such a capacity for knowledge of natural law, for rationality and for prudence.   
 Natural law, therefore, says MacIntyre, provides the justification for, and the 
basis upon which, citizens hold their rulers to account ± over the legitimacy of their 
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UXOH DQG RYHU ZKHWKHU WKHLU ODZV DUH µFRQGXFLYH WR WKH FRPPRQ JRRG¶ or whether, 
WKRXJKRVWHQVLEO\SURPRWLQJWKHFRPPRQJRRGµWKH\SODFHDGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHEXUGHQ
RQVRPHIRUWKHEHQHILWRIRWKHUV¶516  7KXVWKHµNQRZOHGJHRIWKHQDWXUDOODZZKLFK
plain persons possess provides them with the grounds to which they need to appeal in 
debates with other plain persons about how they should respond to the enactments of 
SRVLWLYHODZ¶517 
 In other words, MacIntyre has come to the far-reaching conclusion that, 
regardless of whether or not individuals are members of communities of tradition, and 
UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH QDWXUH RI WKH SXEOLF VSDFH LW LV DOZD\V SRWHQWLDOO\ RSHQ WR µSODLQ
SHUVRQV¶WRHQJDJHZLWKRQHDQRWKHUDQGZLWKZKDWHYHULVWKHJRYHUQLQJDXWKRULW\RQ
questions around how rule is exercised.  And we do so, on the basis of the primary 
precepts of the natural law, and what constitutes the common good.  
 Thus it seems that, in stark contrast to what MacIntyre has argued elsewhere, 
it is in fact possible to engage on ethical questions even within the worst sorts of 
liberal systems, as he has described them.  
Recognising the Good 
 However, though the potential for such debate exists in theory, whether it can 
be conducted with any tangible measure of success remains a fraught question.  For 
KXPDQLW\¶V DELOLW\ WR JUDVS DFFXUDWHO\ WKH Srimary precepts of natural law, like our 
capacity to understand rightly what is our common good, can be liable to error in 
many ways.  MacIntyre offers as an example the distortions to both that arise from 
giving undue authority to administrative or legal FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG FRPPHQWV µLW
follows that those who do not recognize what the natural law is and how it functions 
FDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGZKDWWKHFRPPRQJRRGLVHLWKHU¶518  How then, are plain persons 
able to recognise that they have rightly understood both the common good and the 
right operation of natural law?  MacIntyre acknowledges that Aquinas does not 
explicitly address what seems to be the implication in the Summa Theologiae that only 
those who have been educated to do so, are in practice actually able WRµMXGJHZKHWKHU
DJLYHQSUHFHSWLVRULVQRWDSUHFHSWRIWKHQDWXUDOODZ¶519  However, this point, says 
MacIntyre, has been considered by Suarez, who ± following Aquinas¶ conclusions 
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directly, he argues ± DSSHDUV WRFRPHWR WKHYLHZWKDW µMXGJHPHQWVDV to morals and 
ODZDUHWKHSUHVHUYHRI«DWKHRORJLFDOHOLWH¶520   
 But MacIntyre believes this is to draw a too sweeping, and therefore 
HUURQHRXV YLHZ RI 6XDUH]¶ DUJXPHQW  +H ILUVW QRWHV WKDW 6XDUH] µFRQVLGHUV WKH
precepts of the natural law to belong to WKUHH GLIIHUHQW FODVVHV¶521  First, what 
MacIntyre describes as WKHµSULPDU\DQGJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHV¶QDPHO\WKDWJRRGLVWREH
done and evil avoided, and that one should not treat others as one would not wish to be 
treated;522  VHFRQG µWKHUHDUHPRUHGHILQLte and specific precepts which enjoin a life 
ZKLFKHPERGLHV MXVWLFH WKHZRUVKLSRI*RG WHPSHUDWHQHVVDQG WKH OLNH¶DQG WKLUG
WKHUH LV D FDWHJRU\ ZLWK WZR VXEGLYLVLRQV  7KHVH DUH WKH SUHFHSWV µZKLFK DUH QRW
evident without a certain amount of rational reflection and inference, and they are 
GLYLGHG LQWR WKRVH ZKLFKDUH PRUH HDVLO\ UHFRJQLVHG DQG WKHVH OHVV VR¶  ,Q WKH ILUVW
category are those which are fairly generally and widely recognised, such as 
prohibitions on theft and so forth.  But, says MacInt\UH6XDUH]DOVRZULWHVRI µRWKHU
SUHFHSWV WKH DSSUHKHQVLRQ RI ZKLFK LV ³QRW HDVLO\ ZLWKLQ WKH FDSDFLW\ RI DOO´¶  +H
QRWHV WKDW 6XDUH] JLYHV WKUHH H[DPSOHV  µWKDW IRUQLFDWLRQ LV LQWULQVLFDOO\ HYLO WKDW
usury is unjust, and that lying can never be justifLHG¶ 
 MacIntyre argues that what these have in common is that they are all 
µH[DPSOHV RI H[FHSWLRQOHVV SUHFHSWV WR ZKLFK REMHFWLRQ KDG SHUHQQLDOO\ EHHQ PDGH
that there occur hard cases in which exceptions to them ought to be excused or 
permitted or requireG¶ DQG LQGHHG ZKLFK DUH WKH VXEMHFW RI FRQWLQXLQJ GHEDWH LQ
ZKLFK WKHQ DV QRZ µSODLQ SHUVRQV QHHGHG WR ILQG DQ DQVZHU WR VRSKLVWLFDWHG
REMHFWLRQV WR WKHVH H[FHSWLRQOHVV SUHFHSWV RI WKH QDWXUDO ODZ¶523  MacIntyre draws 
attention to the fact that Suarez sa\V WKDW WKHVH SUHFHSWV DUH µQRW HDVLO\ ZLWKLQ WKH
FDSDFLW\RIHYHU\RQH¶UDWKHUWKDQµQRWZLWKLQWKHFDSDFLW\RIHYHU\RQH¶DQGSRLQWVWR
WKHH[SODQDWLRQ6XDUH]VXEVHTXHQWO\SURYLGHV7KLV LVWRDVVHUWWKDWRQO\WKRVHµZKR
had never been exposed to the relevant counterarguments on behalf of the precepts of 
natural law, arguments that they would have been incapable of thinking up for 
WKHPVHOYHV¶FDQEHMXGJHGWREHVRµXQVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶LQWKHLULJQRUDQFHDVWRGHQ\WKH
SULPDU\ SUHFHSWV µZLWKRXW FXOSDELOLW\¶  $QG WKH YLWDO FRUROODU\ LV WKLV  µZKDW WKH\
would need, in order for their hitherto invincible ignorance to be overcome, is just that 
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and no more than that:  a sound argument or a set of sound arguments, to whose 
conclusions they would then be able to gLYHUDWLRQDODVVHQW¶ 
 In this way, says MacIntyre, Suarez is not, as some mistakenly deduce, 
DVVHUWLQJ µDQ\WKLQJ ZKLFK HQWDLOV D GHQLDO RI WKH FDSDFLW\ DQG DXWKRULW\ RI SODLQ
SHUVRQVDV UDWLRQDOEHLQJV¶EXW UDWKHUKH LVFODULI\LQJµWKH7KRPLVWLF FODLP¶ WKDW µDOO
plain person as such have the capacity for recognizing the truth of the premises for 
which Aquinas argues [in relation to the primary precepts of natural law] and, 
confronted by these arguments for the conclusions at which Aquinas arrives, plain 
pHUVRQV KDYH WKH FDSDFLW\ IRU UHFRJQL]LQJ WKHLU VRXQGQHVV¶524  In other words 
everyone has the latent capacity to recognise a sound explanation if sufficiently clearly 
made. 
 )URPWKLV0DF,QW\UHGUDZVWZRFRQFOXVLRQV7KHILUVWLVWKDWWKHµUROHRIWKH
philosopher and the theologian in supplying the needed arguments is therefore an 
LPSRUWDQW DQG HYHQ LQ VRPH FDVHV DQ LQGLVSHQVDEOH RQH¶ DQG VHFRQG µSKLORVRSKHUV
and theologians are themselves in respect of the natural law no more than unusually 
reflective plain persons, able to present their reflections to others for the rational 
YHUGLFW RI RWKHUV¶525  It is on these foundations that the faith communities can and 
should build. 
Engaging for Good 
 These two conclusions are of fundamental importance to my argument that the 
Anglican Bishops and those they lead can, and furthermore (generally speaking) 
should, engage in discussing moral issues, even in wholly secular national and 
international contexts (such as the United Nations).  They also indicate how such 
engagement can be most profitably pursued.   
 For, first, this means that all plain persons, no matter what their background, 
QR PDWWHU KRZ µGHUDFLQDWHG¶ DQG µDOLHQDWHG¶ IURP FRPPXQLWLHV RI WUDGLWLRQ KDYH D
latent capacity to recognise and grasp the primary precepts of natural law and a 
concomitant concept of the common good, provided that they are presented with clear 
arguments and explanations.  Armed with such knowledge, they have the capacity to 
judge how adequately, how justly, and with what authority, the political system in 
which they find themselves promotes the common good.   
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 Who is to offer such clear arguments and explanations?  They are best made 
by those who most fully grasp both the primary precepts of natural law and 
KXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWH telos ± in other words, by members of communities of tradition 
WKDWDUHRULHQWHGWRZDUGVVHHNLQJWKHIXOOHVWDQVZHUVWRTXHVWLRQVRIµ+RZWKHQVKDOO
ZHOLYH"¶)RUWKHDQVZHUWRWKLVTXHVWLRQLVDOZD\VDUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHFRPPRQJRRG
as instantiated within the particular context in which the question is posed.  All other 
considerations being equal (for example, political and tactical concerns, as noted in 
earlier chapters), it is always more morally rational to work for a fuller instantiation of 
the common good.  In the long run this is to be achieved through drawing the greatest 
possible number of people into the best possible recognition of the common good, and 
with this the recognition that it is to be sought, at least in the first instance, through the 
enabling practices of the primary precepts of natural law. 
 Therefore it must be the task of the Anglican Bishops, in their leadership of 
the church, to ensure adequate resources are devoted to engaging in this way in all 
appropriate contexts, as far as is practically possible.  This is rooted not only in a 
general concern to pursue rational morality.  For it is also the case that, as MacIntyre 
SRLQWV RXW WKHRORJLDQV DQG VLPLODUO\ SKLORVRSKHUV µKDYH D VSHFLDO LQWHUHVW LQ DQG
also a special knowledge of the application of the natural law through its secondary 
SUHFHSWVWRWKHDUHDVRIWKHLURZQSURIHVVLRQDODFWLYLWLHV¶526 which specifically include 
both teaching (of how to live, alongside academic teaching) and moral enquiry.   
 In this way, MacIntyre has, contrary to what might have been expected, 
SURYLGHG D MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU LQVLVWLQJ WKDW GHEDWH DERXW ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV KXPDQLW\¶V
good should be returned to the public arena, and a basis for doing so.  Further, it seems 
that we who have the requisite skills, through our own membership of communities of 
tradition devoted to the pursuit of moral rationality and of human flourishing, have a 
particular obligation so to engage, even though we do so while realistically 
recognising that disagreement on the good is to be expected.  Our approach should be 
to focus on the twin issues of the common good and the primary precepts as the 
necessary starting point for all theoretical enquiry. 
Debating the Good 
All this returns us to what MacIntyre considers the central deliberative 
quesWLRQQDPHO\µ+RZWKHQVKDOOZHOLYH"¶0\FRQWHQWLRQLVWKDWDOOWKDWLVUHTXLUHG
for the most basic conversation of any sort to begin, is agreement that this is in some 
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sense a common question that is open to discussion.  This is the starting point from 
ZKLFKZHFDQDOZD\VµJRRQ¶HYHQLIZHPD\QRWEHDEOHWRJRYHU\PXFKIXUWKHUIRU
H[DPSOHZLWKWKRVHOLNH5DZOVZKRDUJXHDVTXRWHGSUHYLRXVO\WKDWWKHµDLPVRIWKH
VHOIDUHKHWHURJHQHRXV¶DQGWKHUHIRUHLWLVµLUUDWLRQDORUPRUH OLNHO\«PDG¶DQGµto 
YLRODWH WKH SULQFLSOHV RI UDWLRQDO FKRLFH¶ WR DWWHPSW WR FRQFHLYH RI DQ\ VLQJOH
RYHUDUFKLQJ YLHZ RI KXPDQLW\¶V telos.527  But, as I have noted that Stout and others 
argue, Rawlsian liberalism is not how the vast majority of people in western society 
live, and therefore we can expect at least some possibilities of debate.     
7KDWVDLG WRUDLVH WKH LVVXH LQ WHUPVRI WKHµFRPPRQJRRG¶PD\ LWVHOIEH WR
employ what is seen in some quarters as loaded vocabulary, given its association with, 
for example, Catholic social teaching.  But rephrasing the central question in such 
catch-all terms as µ&DQ RU VKRXOG WKLQJV EH EHWWHU"¶ ZLOO DOPRVW LQHYLWDEO\ EULQJ D
SRVLWLYHUHVSRQVH %\ WKHQDVNLQJµ$QG LIVR KRZ"¶ FRQFHSWVRIKXPDQIORXULVKLQJ
are brought to the surface.  For it cannot reasonably be argued that there is no room for 
warranted improvement in the lot of all citizens of whatever is our nation ± and even 
more so if one considers the entire global community.  Here too (as was previously 
argued by Stout, as noted in chapter 4) we can make significant progress through 
beginning with what amounts to little more than platitudes.       
Of course, some may want to answer that for themselves and those like them, 
life is pretty good ± and that the lot of others is not something for which they have any 
responsibility.  The response to this is to draw on the primary precepts, for example, to 
ask questions that raise issues of at whose expense ± i.e. at the price of whose 
diminishment ± is such a restricted view of human flourishing achieved (are 
agricultural workers adequately compensated? at what environmental costs is cheap 
food being produced and transported?).   
Questions arising out of the primary precepts can helpfully open up debate in 
RWKHU ZD\V  7KXV 0DF,QW\UH¶s first concern that the good of truth (not merely 
propositional truth, but a truth that encompasses ultimate human good) is accorded 
primary place can point us to questions around the aims of particular structures within 
society, and whether drawing them too narrowly distorts or undermines more 
fundamental goals of human flourishing.  We can then go on to ask whether the 
flourishing of some is pursued at the expense of others.  We can invite examination of 
whether the goals and their pursuit are honestly drawn, or whether ulterior motives are 
concealed.  We can query how far the conduct of debate promotes honesty and trust, 
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or whether deceptive or misleading speech and actions are present.  We can question 
the degree to which trust is built or undermined, the safety of participants in debate is 
guaranteed and their dignity respected.  We can raise the need for processes of 
accountability, inter alia to ensure that commitments are upheld in both letter and 
spirit.  We can draw attention to the influences of status, money and power.   
7KHUH LV D VWURQJ SDUDOOHO EHWZHHQ WKLV DSSURDFK DQG 6WRXW¶V VWHUHRVFRSLF
social criticism, though now applied to a far more basic level of discourse.  Where 
Stout directs our attention to internal goods of excellence and all that is associated 
with them (which of course contribute towards our achieving of our good), here we 
look to questions of what constitutes the common good itself.  And where Stout calls 
for the unmasking of and honest dialogue around the potentially undue influences of 
external goods, bureaucratic and economic factors, and more malign factors such as 
naked pursuit of power, status and wealth, here we bring a focus onto how faithfully 
the primary precepts of natural law are upheld ± including such issues as the honesty 
ZKLFK LVSDUWRI6WRXW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\2IFRXUVH in both cases, the two threads will 
be inextricably interwoven.     
 An example of how this might operate in practice is illustrated in the 
reasoning employed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, in his 
contribution to the House of Lords debate, on 15 January 2008, on the Human 
)HUWLOLVDWLRQ DQG (PEU\RORJ\ %LOO  +HUH KH UDLVHV WKH FRQFHUQ WKDW OHJLVODWLRQ µLV
gradually but inexorably moving towards a more instrumental view of how we may 
WUHDWKXPDQRUJDQLVPV¶+LVFDOOIRUµFODULW\LQWKLVDUHD¶VKRXOGEHVHHQDVDGHPDQG
for honest and open debate about both what it means to be human, and the tension 
EHWZHHQ µLQWHUQDO¶ DQG µH[WHUQDO¶ JRRGV RU LQ WKLV FDVH PRUH EODWDQW IDFWRUV RI
eFRQRPLFDQGEXUHDXFUDWLFµHIILFLHQF\¶WKDWDUHSUHVHQWDQGDUHLQGDQJHURIGLVWRUWLQJ
our concept of proper human living.528 
 This approach also allows us ± and all plain persons ± to engage on the more 
fundamental question of the legitimacy of an entire system of law.  It is this that the 
former Archbishop of Cape Town, Njongonkulu Ndungane has attempted to do in the 
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critique he has offered in various forums of the World Trade Organisation.529  The 
main thrust of his argument is that, in failing to place human rights concerns ± which 
KH DOLJQV ZLWK KXPDQLW\¶V telos ± above particular concepts of market economics 
which benefit some at the unjust expense of others, the WTO is in breach of even the 
simplest concepts of justice, and contravenes the spirit, and quite probably also the 
letter, of customary international law designed to promote human flourishing.  In 
failing rightly to uphold the common good of all, and in its distortions of the primary 
precepts of natural law, it thus lacks legitimacy. 
The linguistic strategies Ndungane employs to convey such concepts in 
contexts in which commercial criteria dominate, are illuminating.  In speaking under 
the heading, µ$ 4XHVWLRQ RI 9DOXHV¶, at a dinner held for the Motorola Business 
Leadership Competition in 2006,530 Ndungane began his critique with reference to a 
ZLGHO\ KHOG FRQFHSW RI EDVLF MXVWLFH  µTake the World Trade Organisation.  A 
simplistic application of the Golden Rule might suggest that market liberalisation 
DFURVV WKH ERDUG LV WKH DQVZHU¶  7KXV KH TXHVWLoned how widely held, largely 
incontestable, assumptions of fairness are reflected in practice in a very particular 
context ± the fundamental issue of how primary precepts are appropriately instantiated 
in secondary principles.  His claim is then that when expressed within a framework 
wholly driven by certain narrowly-drawn politico-economic assumptions, the 
fundamental tenets of fairness (and by implication, the primary precepts) are in fact 
QRWXSKHOG+HDUJXHVWKDWLQVWHDGµH[SHULHQFHVKRZVWKDWWKLV has all too often been 
a charter for the strong to exploit the weak, the rich to benefit at the expense of the 
SRRU¶  7KH RVWHQVLEOH FRPPLWPHQW WR IDLUQHVV LV KH VD\V D VPRNHVFUHHQ IRU WKH
ulterior motives of the powerful in pursuing their own self-interest (a breach of the 
primary precepts).  He then links the concepts of fairness and the common good, 
through aligning them with human rights.  Not unlike his successor as Archbishop of 
Cape Town (as noted in the previous chapter) he grounds human rights not in a 
particular form of contestable political theory, but in a second sweeping assertion of 
ultimate fairness ± the equal worth of all humanity, which he depicts as a fundamental 
assumption of theistic IDLWKFRPPXQLWLHV  µ*RG¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVD\V WKDWHvery human 
being is of equal value, and so should have equitable access (in achievable practice, 
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not in abstract theory) to the fundamental rights of life, for example, those listed in the 
8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶531 
Ndungane then offers an alternative approach to instantiating justice that 
might be taken within the trade context ± defining it not in the narrow terms of the 
trade efficiencies of liberal market economics, but in the wider concepts of human 
fairness he has referenced, arguing thaW µSRRU FRXQWULHV VKRXOG KDYH WKH FKDQFH WR
develop their own economy for the wellbeing of their population, and not be forced to 
RSHQXSPDUNHWVIRUH[WHUQDOH[SORLWDWLRQ¶%\ZD\RIRIIHULQJDQH[DPSOHRIKRZD
GHOLEHUDWH µXQIDLUQHVV¶ FDQ DFWXDOO\ GHOLYHU JUHDWHU µIDLUQHVV¶ LQ RUGHU WR SURYRNH
consideration of how a similar approach to trade might provide a greater overall 
MXVWLFH KH VD\V µ3HRSOH RIWHQ VSHDN RI ³OHYHO SOD\LQJ-ILHOGV´  , SUHIHU D JROILQJ
metaphor when it comes to the wisest solution for differentiated trade.  The handicap 
system enables a weak golfer to play against a strong opponent, with equal chances for 
ERWKWRZLQ,ZDQWWRVHHJOREDOHFRQRPLFV\VWHPVWKDWDOORZIRUVXFKUHVXOWV¶ 
The Archbishop more directly addressed the same question of competing 
justices, and the inadmissibility of giving human rights a secondary place to the 
QDUURZHULQVWLWXWLRQDOREMHFWLYHVRIWKH:72LQDQDGGUHVVLQ6W3DXO¶V&DWKHGUDOLQ
DVSDUWRIWKHLUµ:KDWFDQRQHSHUVRQGR"¶VHULHV532  Here he argued: 
 All World Trade Organisation member states are obliged to observe and 
uphold the standards of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
domestically, bilaterally, and in all international organisations in which they 
participate.  Not every country may have signed up, but over half a century it 
has become part of international customary law.  Now, you might say to me 
that there are some forums which are specifically designed to focus on human 
rights issues.  That is so.  But it does not mean that bodies with other primary 
objectives can ignore or neglect the human rights dimension, as if it were not 
their concern.  Upholding human rights must be integral to all policy making, 
in every sector, in every organisation, the WTO included. 
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In this way he privileges our ultimate human ends, which are inextricably bound up 
with ultimate truth, as MacIntyre has argued, citing Aquinas, that we must do, if we 
are to be morally rational.  More than this, he demands, rightly in MacIntyrean terms, 
that any political or economic institution claiming legitimacy must demonstrate that it 
adequately gives overriding priority to promoting the genuine common good, through 
means that reflect the primary precepts of natural law.  
Speaking of the Good 
 %XW1GXQJDQH¶VDWWHPSWVto bring questions of the common good, and aspects 
of the primary precepts of natural law, into forums which generally recognise only the 
language of bureaucratic efficiencies, and of treaty law that provides its own authority, 
indicate the enormity of the challenge of finding appropriate language for engaging 
deeply on ethical questions.  For, as noted earlier in this thesis, MacIntyre is right to 
assert that there is no universal neutral language which we can employ in such 
GLVFXVVLRQVDQGWKDWWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG(QJOLVK¶VXFKDVLVXVHGLQJOREDOWUDGHDQG
politics is both too rooted in concepts of modernity, and too conceptually thin in 
relation to internal goods and the social practices that support them, to be able to 
provide a conceptual framework for sustaining the sort of moral rational debate that is 
IRXQGLQFRPPXQLWLHVRIWUDGLWLRQ6WRXWVLPLODUO\LQVLVWVWKDWDVSLULQJWRVRPHµPRUDO
(VSHUDQWR¶LVIXWLOH533 ± LQGHHGWKLVLVµLWVHOIDV\PSWRP¶RIWKHSUREOHPVRIWKHZRUVW
forms of secular libHUDOLVP DQG µLQYLWHV XV DOO WR VSHDN WKH ODQJXDJH RI WKH PDUNHW
SODFHDOO WKH WLPH¶DQG LQVRGRLQJ µDLGVDQGDEHWV WKH W\UDQQ\RI H[WHUQDOJRRGV¶534  
(YHQLQDµPRUHPRGHVWDQGOHVVKDUPIXO¶.DQWLDQIRUPµLWVWLOOFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\DLPV
to occupy the entire moral landscape, but it achieves this result by excluding most 
DVVHVVPHQWRIFRQGXFWFKDUDFWHUDQGFRPPXQLW\IURPYLHZ¶,QWKLVZD\LWµSURYLGHV
no means for surveying the dangers that ensue when its central concepts begin to 
pervade the entire culture, eroding not only the capacity to acquire virtues that go 
beyond minimal decency but also the ability to understand a kind of justice that does 
QRWFRQVLVWLQSURFHGXUDOIDLUQHVV¶ 
 It is precisely this genuine justice that Ndungane has attempted to describe 
and promote.  But is his effort bound to be futile, given the limitations that MacIntyre 
and Stout identify in the normative language used in contexts such as the World Trade 
Organisation?  How then can MacIntyre assert that plain persons are not left 
resourceless in such circumstances?  For if it is indeed the case that plain persons have 
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DNQRZOHGJHRIQDWXUDOODZE\µYLUWXHRIWKHLUKXPDQQDWXUH¶DQGVRµFDQQHYHUORVH
WKHLU FDSDFLW\ IRU MXGJLQJ¶ WKHLU UXOHUV DQG WKH UXOHV WKH\ SURPXOJDWH535 then there 
must be some mode of discourse in which these plain persons are able to articulate 
something of this knowledge and these judgements.  And this will be a mode of 
discourse which those from communities of tradition can employ and build upon in 
their pursuit of moral rational life for all.   
 Yet MacIntyre is not wrong to deny the existence of a universalised language 
for such discourse.  For just as the primary precepts of natural law find particular 
application and expression in the secondary precepts, which differ from context to 
context, circumstance to circumstance,536 so too, I contend, it must be the case that the 
discussion of natural law and its application will also differ from context to context, 
and circumstance to circumstance.  Just as each community of tradition has its own 
conceptual language-in-use (as MacIntyre argues); and, at a less developed level, each 
VRFLDO SUDFWLFH LWV RZQ PRUDO ODQJXDJH 6WRXW¶V XVDJH ZKLFK LV UDWKHU WKLQQHU EXW
nonetheless adequate for sustaining the promotion of its associated internal goods of 
excellence; now we find that each human context has, at an even more basic level, 
what might be described as the raw materials necessary for constructing the barest 
skeleton structure to support expression of the primary precepts of natural law as they 
might there find secondary application, and articulation of associated contextualised 
DVSHFWV RI WKH FRPPRQ JRRG  7KLV VHHPV WR PH WR EH LPSOLFLW LQ 0DF,QW\UH¶V
arguments, even though I am unaware of any place where he indicates that this is so.   
Thus, I propose, each context has the potential for its own specific linguistic 
expression of natural law and the primary precepts ± what we might term an 
HPEU\RQLFµFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH¶ 
 What precisely such a communal language may be will be best understood 
within any given context by those within it whom MacIntyre has described as 
µSKLORVRSKHUV DQG WKHRORJLDQV¶ DQG ZKR VR RSHUDWH DV µXQXVXDOO\ UHIOHFWLYH SODLQ
SHUVRQV¶  , WDNH LW WKDW E\ WKLV KH PHDQV PHPEHUV RI FRPPXQLWLHV RI Wradition 
GHGLFDWHG WR SXUVXLQJ PRUDO UDWLRQDOLW\ GLUHFWHG WRZDUGV KXPDQLW\¶V XOWLPDWH JRRG
and who find themselves within some wider socio-economic context.  It is for those of 
us who fit this description (or at least some of us ± and our communities should ensure 
that adequate provision is made for this) to make the imaginative connections between 
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the assumptions of the arena in question and the primary precepts, in order find some 
points of contact with potential expression of the secondary precepts.   
IQRWKHUZRUGVLIWKHSULPDU\SUHFHSWVDUHLQIHUHQWLDOO\DYDLODEOHWRDOOµSODLQ
SHUVRQV¶WKHQWKHVHµSODLQSHUVRQV¶PXVWKDYHVRPHPHDQVRIH[SUHVVLQJWKHP(YHQ
if only in embryonic form, there should be a language-in-use for the articulation of the 
primary precepts of natural law within each specific context ± DµFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH¶
which potentially can find ever fuller expression through the development of the 
SDUWLFXODU µFRPPXQDO SUDFWLFHV¶ VWUXFWXUHG DURXQG WKHVH SUHFHSWV ZLWKLQ WKRVH
circumstances.  Such discourse, when in promotion of the instantiation of the first 
principles of natural law within communal practices appropriate to the context, may be 
seen as an internal good (as Stout argues).  Thus democratic debate of this sort can be 
considered a social practice embedded in tradition (even if it is to some degree a 
tradition-in-the-making as we pursue ever more fully realised communal practices), 
RQH LQ ZKLFK ZHFDQSXUVXH DV IDUDVSRVVLEOH WKH ODWHQWSRWHQWLDO WR µJRRQDQG JR
IRUZDUG¶DGHTXDWHly enough.    
 Optimistic engagement can always potentially strengthen what is present, and 
promote a continuing dynamic from the less adequate to the more adequate in public 
debate around moral questions, rooted in concepts of human flourishing.  The reverse 
is also true.  Pessimistic disengagement contributes to the undermining of the 
SRVVLELOLWLHV DQG SUDFWLFHV RI GLVFRXUVH ZHDNHQLQJ GHPRFUDWLF GHEDWH¶V DELOLW\ WR
function as a tradition, and leaving internal goods unsupported in the unavoidable and 
unrelenting contest with external goods, and the pressures of market and management.  
 Therefore, as I argue further below and in the following chapter, within our 
own public life, those of us who are skilled in the practices of a community of 
tradition should see it as an obligation to use these skills for promoting the 
development of communal practices, and of a communal language for expressing 
them, so that the primary precepts of natural law can indeed thus be increasingly well-
instantiated ± even though this is likely to be a less fully realised community of 
tradition than full-blown Thomistic Aristotelianism, or even than the sort of groupings 
with social practices and moral languages of chapter 5.  Those of us who belong to a 
community of tradition can also work to draw our fellow-citizens into increasing 
IOXHQF\DURXQGTXHVWLRQVRIKRZZHEHVWXQGHUVWDQGKXPDQLW\¶s ultimate good and its 
pursuit.  From there, we would hope, we can go on to attempt to convince them of our 
own views on moral reasoning and praxis. 
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 Thus Ndungane, in attempting to introduce a more widely grounded ethical 
GHEDWH LQWR D WUDGH FRQWH[W ZDV ULJKW WR VWDUW E\ VHWWLQJ DORQJVLGH WKH :72¶V
ideological commitment to market economics, expressed through the upholding of 
concomitant legislation, alternative concepts of justice rooted in human well-being 
WKDWPLJKWµULQJEHOOV¶ZLWKKLVKHDUHUV7KHVHKHGUHZIURPWKH*ROGHQ5XOHIURPD
different cost-EHQHILW FDOFXODWLRQ IURP QRWLRQV RI KXPDQLW\¶V HVVHQWLDO HTXDOLW\ DQG
value, from the alternative legislative framework of human rights, and even from the 
VXEYHUVLYH µMXVWLFH¶ RI JROILQJ KDQGLFDSV ± with which no doubt many senior trade 
experts are more than familiar!  It was an appropriate first step towards supplying the 
µFOHDUH[SODQDWLRQ of sound arguments¶ which, according to Aquinas, plain persons are 
capable of grasping.   
But the greater goal of Anglican Bishops, in committing themselves to 
lobbying and advocacy in support of social justice and equitable human flourishing, is 
to sustain and develop this toe-hold approach, in order to influence, and where 
necessary change, discourse, policies and programmes.  While Ndungane may have 
planted seeds through largely one-off speaking invitations, these need to be watered 
and nurtured.  The wider strategy of the churches should be that whatever initial points 
of contact are identified, must be broadened and deepened through persistent 
engagement.  Whatever purchase or traction we can get, we should use, and work to 
H[SDQGWKHµWKLFNQHVV¶RIERth the content of our dialogue and the way we frame our 
discourse, always attempting to move it towards greater moral rationality.  In doing 
WKLV ZH SXUVXH WKH WZLQ FRQFHUQV RI ILUVW DVNLQJ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV KXPDQLW\¶V ZHOO-
being, and second, raising in parallel broader questions about the conduct of debate 
and how it can be shaped in ways that better promote the discussion and pursuit of 
such flourishing (we all want to live with justice, in safety, and so forth).   
The object of this will be precisely to OD\ ILUP IRXQGDWLRQV RI µWKHRUHWLFDO
HQTXLU\¶ LQRUGHU WKHQ WRJRRQ WREXLOGµSUDFWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ¶XSRQWKHP ± with both 
being context-appropriate.  For where practical reasoning cannot be sustained, we do 
indeed resort to theoretical enquiry, as MacIntyre says we must ± but we do so in 
RUGHUWRZRUNZLWKWKH ODWHQWFDSDFLW\RI µSODLQSHUVRQV¶WRUHFRJQLVHFRQFHSWVRIWKH
FRPPRQJRRGDQGRIQDWXUDOODZ¶VSULPDU\SUHFHSWVVRWKDWZHPD\WKHQLQFUHDVLQJO\
provide the wherewithal that makes practical reasoning possible within those 
particular circumstances.   
We can do so through employing a similar, but more basic, approach of 
bilingualism to that commended in chapter 5 for enriching the moral languages of 
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social practices.  Those of us who take on this task will be able, through the skills and 
insights acquired by virtue of membership of our community of tradition, to analyse 
the dynamics and influences at work within the milieu with which we are dealing, and 
from this to develop context-appropriate ways of speaking clearly about our telos and 
about the primary precepts, and how we can construe and pursue them, and then to 
promote debate in such terms.  We also aim to identify what are, perhaps only in 
embryonic form, or could potentially become, internal goods and their associated 
social practices ± even if they are not recognisable as such within the conceptual 
framework of the context on its own terms.  (For example, there may be habits of 
cooperation within fiscally driven environments that go unnoticed as they do not 
µFRXQW¶LQHFRQRPLFWHUPV$URXQGWKHVHZHDLPWRHQULFKWKHFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH
into a moral language which can highlight and promote them.  Ultimately, the goal is 
to work from theoretical enquiry to practical reasoning; and from communal 
languages and practices to moral languages and social practises, and then through to 
developing fuller realisation of communities of tradition.   
In line with what MacIntyre argues, we will certainly find that the most 
amenable contexts for pursing these goals are those which in scale lie between the 
family and the entire nation state.  But, just as I argued in the last chapter that through 
helping strengthen civil society bodies so that they mature in their use of moral 
language to something closer to a language-in-use, as the best means of promoting the 
effective operation of democracy as akin to a tradition, so too, faith communities and 
other communities of tradition should particularly work with networks or alliances of 
µSODLQSHUVRQV¶ZKHUHDSSURSULDWH as potentially the most fertile settings for promoting 
communal languages that might subsequently be developed to sustain increasing 
levels of moral rationality.  But though it will undoubtedly be harder to do this on a 
larger scale, the latent capacity of plain persons to comprehend and enunciate concepts 
of the common good and primary precepts means that we should not be so wholly 
negative as MacIntyre.537  To write off all hope of rational ethical public discourse at 
the wider level, such as state or international institution, is to be complicit in its 
failures.     
Pursuit of our goal may thus be seen as part of the responsibility that comes to 
communities of tradition, and specifically the theologians within faith communities, 
who have a specialist expertise in teaching, particularly in relation to the instantiation 
of the primary precepts of natural law through secondary precepts.  This task cannot 
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be shirked by the whole community, without impairing its moral rationality and claim 
thereto.      
Furthermore, MacIntyre draws a specific link between education and the 
starting point of theoretical enquiry in questions around how rule ± or, depending on 
context, the regulatory structure of the institution in question ± is exercised, and how it 
conforms to natural law and the delivery of the common good.  For, having earlier 
UHIHUUHGWR$TXLQDV¶YLHZWKDWWKHUROHRIODZLVSURSHUO\µPRUDOHGXFDWLRQ¶as noted 
DERYH DW WKH FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKLV HVVD\ KH UHPLQGV XV WKDW µWKH IXQFWLRQ RI ODZ LV
primarily to educate, and education is a matter of transformation of the passions, so 
WKDWWKHKDELWVWKURXJKZKLFKWKH\UHFHLYHH[SUHVVLRQLQDFWLRQDUHYLUWXHV¶538  It is no 
VXUSULVHWKDWKHFRQWLQXHVµ6XFKHGXFDWLRQWDNHVSODFHRQ$TXLQDV¶$ULVWRWHOLDQYLHZ
in and through ongoing communal practices, and the recognition of natural law is a 
PDWWHURIKRZVXFKSUDFWLFHVDUHVWUXFWXUHG¶ +LVFRQFOXVLRQ LVSUHFLVHO\ WKDWZKLFK
we have sought to provide through the development of the building blocks of a latent 
moral language, QDPHO\WKDWµ7KHUDWLRQDOLW\RISODLQSHUVRQVLVWREHHOLFLWHGE\DQG
exhibited in their participation in communal practices, practices which require a 
VKDUHGUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLUFRPPRQJRRGDVDSROLWLFDOERQG«¶ 
Education into communal practices is of course at the heart of how 
communities of tradition bring up their children ± and such teaching is not merely 
confined to the theologians amongst us.539  Children begin with no relevant prior 
understanding.  It is through exposure to good practices and their language-in-use, and 
through being drawn to emulate them, that they become able to understand and 
practice for themselves such ways of reflecting on, and living with, moral rationality.  
7KLV SDUDOOHOV WKH ZD\ WKDW DV WKH &KXUFK RI (QJODQG¶V UHVHDUFh during the 1990s 
Decade of Evangelism indicated, many ± and probably most ± people (in England, at 
OHDVW FRPH WR WKH &KULVWLDQ IDLWK WKURXJK D JUDGXDO MRXUQH\ UDWKHU WKDQ DQ µDKDK¶
moment of conviction.540  Often this begins with deepening friendship with believers, 
ZKLFKGHYHORSVLQWRZKDWKDVEHHQWHUPHGµEHORQJLQJWKHQEHKDYLQJWKHQEHOLHYLQJ¶
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as a member of the community of faith.  Learning appropriate praxis may well come 
before a fully enunciated theological justification is grasped and consciously owned ± 
much as with bringing up children within a community of tradition. 
Acting to bring people into some level of fluency in our language-in-use 
(including greater understanding of the praxis of the church, as a community of 
tradition) should therefore inevitably be part of the wider mission of the church, as 
part of its evangelistic vocation.  For it is a primary goal of churches that others should 
come to commit to and share fully in what they see as the riches of their faith.  But the 
fact that the rational morality of others can be appreciated without the need to adopt 
their stance for oneself means that promoting understanding of Christian beliefs and 
behaviour is also of value (though differently, and perhaps more secondarily, directed) 
in what it can achieve in terms of advocating a place for Christian engagement in 
pluralist public discourse ± a place which can then be utilised to promote the social 
justice of moral rational living on a wider scale.  Furthermore, the more that others can 
grasp how our community of tradition operates, even if they do not want to become 
Christians themselves, the more they nonetheless are likely to enhance their 
understanding of what it means to pursue tradition-based moral rationality as a 
contextually rooted practice for living well, and so be encouraged to pursue such 
living themselves through joining some community of tradition.  This will include 
issues of what it means to pursue ethical questions as best as one is able, that is, 
through dialectical engagement, recognition of which has significant implications for 
the shaping of debate in the public arena.   
Shaping the Debate 
The task of moving from theoretical enquiry to practical reasoning, and of 
working to establish a communal language, developing this into a moral language and 
then promoting, as far as possible, a fully-fledged language-in-use (together with 
associated ways of living through pursuing social practices, internal goods, virtues, the 
common good and so forth), therefore applies at every level from smaller scale 
institutions, through to government and international legislative bodies.  Inevitably 
there will be limitations, often severe, on how much can be achieved, not least because 
some bodies do not have the capacity to operate as communities of tradition (perhaps 
due to the narrowness of their objectives, or because of their size) but we should 
nonetheless try to push them as far as they can go.  
Thus, in relation to smaller institutions, MacIntyre gave the specific example 
of the University of Paris in the thirteenth century (this being part of the context in 
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ZKLFKKHGHYHORSHGKLVDUJXPHQWDERXWSODLQSHUVRQV¶FDSDFLW\WRJUDVSWKHFRPPRQ
good and the primary precepts).  This was, by his account, an arena where political 
tensions played out between the French king, on the one hand, and the Dominicans 
and Franciscans on the other, and on other occasions between the Dominicans and the 
Bishop of Paris.  In these, conflicts between feudal rights and local customary law, 
royal sovereignty, and papal authority often threatened to eclipse the ostensible 
primary aims of the university itself.541  Nonetheless, it was possible to recall the 
XQLYHUVLW\ WR LWV SURSHU SULRULWLHV VLQFH 0DF,QW\UH DUJXHV µLW ZDV JHQHUDOO\ LI QRW
always, recognized by the participants in those conflicts that only by appeal to the 
FRPPRQJRRGFRXOGDVWDQGDUGRI ODZEHXSKHOGZLWKLQ WKHXQLYHUVLW\¶ HYHQ WKRXJK
WKLVZDVµVRPHWKLQJWKDWVLQFHWKHWKLUWHHQWKFHQWXU\KDVEHHQSHUHQQLDOO\IRUJRWWHQRU
ignored both by governments and by XQLYHUVLW\DGPLQLVWUDWRUV¶542  That this could be 
GRQHUHVWHG LQ WKHXQLYHUVLW\¶VEHLQJDµFRPPXQLW\¶RI µPDVWHUVDQGVFKRODUV¶ZKLFK
µQRWRQO\VHUYHVWKHJRRGRIWKHZLGHUFRPPXQLW\EXWDVDFRPPXQLW\LWKDVLWVRZQ
specific and particular good, the commRQJRRGRIWKHXQLYHUVLW\¶0DF,QW\UHDUJXHV
WKDWµLWLVWKLVODWWHUJRRGZKLFKFDQEHDSSUHKHQGHGSUDFWLFDOO\RQO\E\WKRVHHQJDJHd 
LQWKHUHOHYDQWVHWRISUDFWLFHVRIWHDFKLQJDQGHQTXLU\¶$QGEHFDXVHWKH8QLYHUVLW\
of Paris, he claims, was able to continue to assert these practices and the good end 
ZKLFK WKH\ VHUYH µDOWKRXJK SDVVLRQV DQG LQWHUHVW ZHUH DV WKH\ DOZD\V DUH DSW WR
distract and corrupt, the subsequent history of the university was marked by 
continuing debate and conflict over how the common good of the university is to be 
XQGHUVWRRGDQGZKDWLWVUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHODUJHUFRPPRQJRRGLV¶ 
Returning debates around the larger common good and its right understanding 
and pursuit to the centre of contemporary university life is a theme to which 
MacIntyre devotes consideration in the final chapter of each of Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry and, more recently, God, Philosophy, Universities.  In the former he 
argues that there must be a return to debate about the nature of enquiry, that honestly 
OD\VRQWKHWDEOHFRPSHWLQJFRQFHSWVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHµ(QF\FORSDHGLD*HQHDORJ\DQG
7UDGLWLRQ¶ZKLFKDUH WKHVXEWLWOHRI WKHYROXPH +HDFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW µSUH-OLEHUDO¶
universities were in the past guilty of injustices against certain groups and 
perspectives, but argues that the response has been to turn to a flawed version of 
liberalism with a false concept of a religious and moral neutrality, in which both 
VFLHQFHV DQG KXPDQLWLHV KDYH µFRQIHUUHG SUHVWLJH¶ RQ µZKDW FDQ EH UHGXFHG WR
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technique and SURFHGXUH¶543 and in which subjects are taught in unconnected 
departments with their own arbitrary standards and ethics, abstracted from more 
IXQGDPHQWDO DQG RYHUDUFKLQJ TXHVWLRQV  +H SURSRVHV WKDW µWKH FRQWHPSRUDU\
university can perhaps only defend that in itself which makes it genuinely a university 
by admitting these conflicts to a central place both in its enquiries and in its teaching 
FXUULFXOXP¶544  In other words, he calls for open debate around both what constitutes 
KXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWHJRRGDQGKRZ it is best construed and pursued, as well as around 
how such enquiry is conducted.  Controversy would be deliberately explored, with 
protagonists expected to argue on their own terms, as the means of presenting each 
perspective.  He even speculates that rival traditions should set up their own 
universities,545 and suggests that: 
wider society would be confronted with the claims of rival universities, each 
advancing its own enquiries in its own terms and each securing the type of 
agreement necessary to ensure the progress and flourishing of its enquiries by 
its own set of exclusions and prohibitions, formal and informal.  But then also 
required would be a set of institutionalized forums in which the debate 
between rival types of enquiry was afforded rhetorical expression.546 
:LWKLQ WKHVH µLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG IRUXPV¶ KH VD\V WKDW LW LV WKH WDVN RI &DWKROLF
philosophers (for whom specifically he is writing here ± though the same is largely 
true for philosophers and also theologians of other Christian traditions including 
Anglicanism) to be ready to give a good account of what it means to be fully human 
and of what the implications of this are in metaphysical, ethical and, indeed, all other 
fields of human enquiry and endeavour.  This must include understanding the 
arguments of other perspectives, and how these can be overcome.  A more theological 
account of what this might mean, in the specific context of Christian universities of 
the United States, is given by Nicholas Wolterstorff, who has drawn consistently on 
MacIQW\UH¶VFRQFHSWRIVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVLQKLVZULWLQJVRQHGXFDWLRQ6RIRUH[DPSOH
KHFDOOVIRUWUDLQLQJVWXGHQWVIRUµFULWLFDOLQYROYHPHQW¶LQZLGHUVRFLHW\± avoiding the 
twin pitfalls of either non-involvement with contemporary culture or non-critical 
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involvement.547  He similarly argues that in place of the compartmentalising of 
disciplines, each with their internal professionalised ethics, Christians should work for 
broader integration of life through considering the touchstone of what norms of 
modern human life apply in each area.  As part of this he calls for justice, peace 
(specifically shalom), and even such things as empathy and delight as intrinsic to 
human living, and to the training of young people, that is pursued through praxis-
oriented theory ± DOORIZKLFKHFKR0DF,QW\UH¶VXQGHUO\LQJHPSKDVHV 
 %XW ZKDW RI WKH µLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG IRUXPV¶ WR ZKLFK 0DF,QW\UH KDV UHIHUUHG"
While making no further direct comment upon them, he does note there is 
µLQHVFDSDEO\DSROLWLFDOGLPHQVLRQ¶ LQDQ\GHEDWHEHWween traditions, and asserts that 
µWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKLWLVGLIILFXOWWRHQYLVDJHWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRIWKHXQLYHUVLW\VRDV
to make systematic debate concerning standards of rational justification between such 
points of view as the genealogical and the Thomistic a central preoccupation of our 
shared cultural and social life, is also the degree to which the structures of present 
society have exempted themselves from and protected themselves against being put in 
question by such systematic and moral enquiry.¶548   Yet despite his pessimism about 
both academia and wider society, he sees the student protests of the late 1960s and 
HDUO\ V DV D µUHMHFWLRQ RI WKH OLEHUDO XQLYHUVLW\¶ DQG WKH µEDUUHQQHVV¶ RI LWV
µVXEVWDQWLYH PRUDO HQTXLU\¶ ZKLFK IDLOV WR DOORZDYoice either for the successors of 
1LHW]VFKHRUIRU µWKLQNHUVRI WKH7KRPLVWLFUHYLYDO¶ $QGVRKH HQGVZLWKDUDOO\LQJ
FU\  µWKDW VXFK SKLORVRSKLFDO FULWLFV VWLOO FDQQRW EH KHDUG LQ DQ\ DXWKHQWLF DQG
systematic way in the central forums of our cultural and social order is a mark, not of 
their irrelevance, but rather of the importance of the task now imposed upon us, of 
FRQWLQXDOO\WU\LQJWRGHYLVHQHZZD\VWRDOORZWKHVHYRLFHVWREHKHDUG¶549      
 What sort of forum might provide a context in which we can devise ways for 
all such voices to be properly heard?   
 Earlier consideration in this chapter of the conduct of academic debate 
between philosophers pointed to the centrality of the primary precepts of natural law.  
To recap, there must be agreement that we are each and together in pursuit of the truth 
± that we are fully committed to this end, and to setting aside any distorting influences 
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such as particular psychological or material interests.  We must establish grounds for 
mutual trust, through respecWIRURQHDQRWKHU¶VOLYHVOLEHUW\DQGSURSHUW\DQGIUHHGRP
of speech550; and through providing a context that guarantees communal security.  
Furthermore, in discussion all parties must be able to expect of one another that we 
speak openly and honestly; that we avoid deceptive or deliberately misleading speech, 
and do not withhold anything pertinent; and that we keep our word and uphold any 
and all commitments that we might make.     
 Where these conditions are genuinely applied, not only within academia but in 
wider socio-political forums, such mutual respect can be expected to promote the sort 
of democratic discourse which allows for all participants not only to bring their own 
perspectives, but also to be able to do so on their own terms.  It is not just that each 
should in this way provide their best arguments for their own convictions, but also that 
there should be proper understanding of the genuine grounds on which people base 
their beliefs and practices (a concern particularly voiced by Stout, as noted in chapter 
4).  For these are the grounds which debate between differing perspectives must 
address if there is to be substantive weighing of convictions and authentic theoretical 
enquiry and practical reasoning.  (It should hardly surprising that Christian beliefs, 
when presented in the ill-fitting clothes of secular humanist liberal discourse, are 
found wanting ± and that the fact of their being found wanting on such a basis has so 
little impact on the convictions of believers themselves.)  Pursuing debate in this way 
will of course require that at least some participants are able to act bilingually, in 
being able to express their own convictions in the language-in-use (or moral language) 
RI FHUWDLQ RWKHUV DQG WR WUDQVODWH VR WKDW RWKHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYHV FDQ be understood by 
members of their own community or group.  Doing this will also help train others 
whose backgrounds have less capacity for developing such skills. 
 Further, those of us who are members of communities of tradition, who are 
competent in bilingualism, will also be able to share this skill of what it means to 
understand others on their own terms.  This too can be considered as a social practice 
delivering an internal good:  one which assists in the pursuit of moral rationality which 
itself promRWHVKXPDQLW\¶VJUHDWHUJRRG  ,W LVRQH WRZKLFKFKXUFK OHDGHUVDUHRIWHQ
particularly called.  Anglican Bishops, and particularly Archbishops, are often 
expected and encouraged to take a fuller role in engaging within the public sphere.  
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The role of certain Church of England Bishops within the House of Lords is a 
particular case in point.   
 Importantly, there is also some acknowledgement and expectation from those 
of other traditions, and even from those of no tradition, that Church leaders should 
take on such roles, as illustrated in the wide-ranging and frequent invitations to 
address events or speak at conferences, that are received by those such as the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and Cape Town.  To some degree it is the office rather 
than the individual who draws the invitation, but where the incumbents are recognised 
DVHIIHFWLYHµWUDQVODWRUV¶EHWZHHQWKRXJKWZRUOds, further doors continue to open.  As I 
shall consider in greater detail in the final chapter, these provide valuable 
opportunities for expanding the capacity for substantive rational ethical exchange. 
 But all this raises the greater question of the nature of neutrality within the 
SXEOLFVSKHUH)RUZKDW,KDYHGHVFULEHGDVIROORZLQJIURP0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVLUHIRUD
context in which all voices can be properly heard on an equal basis is very different 
IURPWKHVRUWRIQHXWUDOLW\DVLWLVXQGHUVWRRGDFFRUGLQJWR0DF,QW\UHE\PRGHUQLW\¶V
liberal society.  This is the neutrality which would be delivered if it were possible to 
adopt an objective, context-free, presupposition-free, stance ± which is of course not 
the case.  Too often, in the public arena as within the university, there are expectations 
that all must operate within the language and thought-ZRUOG RI WKH µHQF\FORSDHGLD¶ 
(with its belief in neutral objectivity), in which inter alia the rationality found in 
communities of tradition and the language of faith is effectively discounted.  And this 
returns us to a concept of the nation state which MacIntyre has declared is incapable 
of orienting itself towards delivering the common good to its citizenry. 
 +RZHYHU WKLV LV QRW DQ LQHYLWDEOH VWDWHRI DIIDLUV HYHQE\0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQ
account.  Certainly, it is the case that governments will suffer the same tensions 
between internal and external goods, together with the pressures of bureaucratic and 
economic efficiencies, which are an unavoidable part of all institutional life.  States 
will also have to face the additional distortions that come from their size, ranging from 
the distancing of the individual from the processes of discourse and decision-making 
through to the necessity of upholding security and defence.  MacIntyre caricatures 
them at their worst thus: 
«PRGHUQQDWLRQ-states which masquerade as embodiments of community are 
always to be resisted.  The modern nation-state, in whatever guise, is a 
dangerous and unmanageable institution, presenting itself on the one hand as a 
bureaucratic supplier of goods and services, which is always about to, but 
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never actually does, give its clients value for money, and on the other as a 
repository of sacred values, which from time to time invites one to lay down 
RQH¶VOLIHRQLWVEHKDOI$V,KDYHUHPDUNHGHOVHZKHUH«LWLVOLNHEHLQJDVNHG
to die for the telephone company.551     
But it does not follow that all nation states inevitably exhibit these traits over all 
RWKHUV,IWKDWZHUHVRZKDWZRXOGEHWKHSRLQWRI0DF,QW\UH¶VFDUHIXODUJXPHQWVWKDW
plain persons can always hold their rulers to account over the delivery of the common 
good and the upholding of the primary precepts of natural law in the way that they 
operate and relate to their citizens?  For if it were the case that all nation states are 
inexorably and irredeemably flawed, then all that plain persons could do would be 
always and everywhere to give the judgement of failure and illegitimacy, and with no 
expectation that doing this would have any impact whatsoever.  MacIntyre says this is 
not so. 
 6RWKHQWKHWDVNRIWKRVHRIXVZKRDUHµXQXVXDOO\UHIOHFWLYHSODLQSHUVRQV¶LV
to contribute what we can to helping the state become a place which is not inimical to 
sustaining the common good.  Our responsibility is to promote forms of political 
engagement that operate as a context for constructive and respectful engagement 
between differing perspectives on the essential questions of what it is to be human and 
to flourish, and for policy formulation and implementation that delivers these goals 
effectively and justly.   
 In the final chapter of this thesis, I turn to consider what this might mean in 
practical terms within some contemporary political contexts. 
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Chapter 7 ± After MacIntyre 
 The previous chapter asked, with MacIntyre, the question of how, within public 
GLVFRXUVH ZH FDQ µGHYLVH QHZ ZD\V WR DOORZ >DOO@ YRLFHV WR EH KHDUG¶  $ORQJVLGH
raising the question of the language in which such voices might pursue dialogue ± for 
ZKLFK ,SRVWXODWHG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI DSSURSULDWH µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ ± this also 
highlighted the issue of how public discourse is currently structured, and the nature of 
seculDULVP DQG RI VWDWH µQHXWUDOLW\¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH H[SUHVVLRQ RI
religious beliefs and practices.  It is with a discussion of different forms of neutrality 
that I begin this chapter, looking at both theory and specific examples, particularly the 
very different contexts offered by the United States, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom.  I then turn to the question of how Christian leaders can in practice engage 
LQGHYHORSLQJDQGVWUHQJWKHQLQJDFRQFHSWXDOµFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ZLWKLQWKHLURZQ
context, drawing on the approaches to theoretical enquiry based in the primary 
precepts of natural law and the pursuit of the common good, as explored in the 
previous chapter.  In doing this, I consider in some detail several speeches by Rowan 
Williams, who has made a number of contributions specifically addressing pluralist 
secularism both within the public sphere and within the Christian community.  I argue 
that though he may do so unconsciously, he reflects to a considerable extent the sort of 
approach which can be developed from my MacIntyrean analysis, and I go on to 
suggest ways in which his way of tackling both the nature of secularism and how to 
address specific issues within its structures might be further strengthened and / or 
broadened.  Though the SUD[LV , SURSRVH LV URRWHG LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQDQDO\VHV LWV
applicability therefore goes far beyond the contexts for which he allows.  This is not to 
say that results will easily be achieved ± but progress is feasible, whereas to fail to 
engage is to be complicit in the failures of public moral rationality.  In addition, I 
indicate some further areas of potential, and necessary, study which, for reasons of 
space, lie outside the scope of this thesis, before offering a summary of my 
conclusions. 
Secularism and Neutrality 
 The term secularism is hard to pin down.  MacIntyre himself appears to use it 
in a breadth of ways.  Thus, for example, as noted in chapter 2, MacIntyre has 
GHVFULEHGKLV µSKLORVRSK\ OLNH WKDWRIPDQ\RWKHU$ULVWRWHOLDQV¶DV µWKHLVWLF¶DGGing 
µEXW LW LV DV VHFXODU LQ LWV FRQWHQW DV DQ\RWKHU¶552  Secularism, in this sense, is not 
automatically incompatible with holding religious beliefs and engaging in public 
                                                             
552
 0DF,QW\UHµ,QWHUYLHZZLWK%RUUDGRUL¶ 
212 
 
HWKLFDOGHEDWHIURPWKDWSHUVSHFWLYH7KLVFDQEHVDLGWRIROORZIURP0DF,QW\UH¶Vown 
DUJXPHQWVRQWKHSULPDU\SUHFHSWVRIQDWXUDOODZZKHUHKHZULWHVWKDWµWKHYLRODWLRQ
of any precept of the natural law always constitutes a threat [to the rational 
SRVVLELOLWLHV RI HDFK VLWXDWLRQ@  IRU H[DPSOH « WKH XQTXDOLILHG UHVSHFW IRU WKH
boundaries between the sacred and the secular which is so necessary for rational 
integrity in relationship to either [is] to be understood as also involving respect for the 
QDWXUDO ODZDV VXFK¶553  This also aligns with Aquinas conclusion from the primary 
precepts that a ruler does not have to be Christian to be legitimate.   
 But where secularism is allied with modernity, MacIntyre adopts a far more 
QHJDWLYHXVDJHµWRDUHPDUNDEOHH[WHQWWKHQRUPVRIRXUVHFXODUL]HGFXOWXUHQRWRQO\
exclude any serious and systematic questioning of oneself and others about the nature 
of the human good and the order of things, but they also exclude questioning those 
dominant cultural norms that make it so difficult to pose these philosophical questions 
outside academic contexts iQDQ\VHULRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLFZD\¶554  Worse, he claims, 
µLQVHFXODUL]HGVRFLHWLHVVXFKDVWKRVHRIPRGHUQ(XURSHZKHUHWKHUHOLJLRXVFRQWH[W
has been largely removed, it is unsurprising that the asking of questions about the end 
of life should have become so often something of an embarrassment something even 
VRPHWLPHVWDNHQDVDVLJQRISV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHU¶555 
 The breadth of understandings of what is meant by secular, secularism and 
secularisation, led Stout, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, to offer the following definitions: 
Secularization (dubious sense):  The irreversible tendency of modern societies 
to produce atheists, make religion utterly irrelevant, and cause existential 
despair; what Harvey Cox used to believe in. 
Secularization (sense discussed in this book):  What happens to the discourse 
produced under the aegis of an institution when speakers no longer 
presuppose the existence of a specific sort of divinity; not something that 
happens in the heads and hearts of individuals but rather something that 
happens in some of the linguistic transactions taking place between them; a 
phenomenon compatible with increases in levels of religious belief and 
feeling.556 
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Even given these distinctions, Stout still tends to use the terms fairly negatively, to 
describe a pRODULVDWLRQRYHUDQGDJDLQVWIDLWKIRUH[DPSOHZULWLQJRIµQHDUO\FRPSOHWH
breakdown of fruitful dialogue between secular philosophical thought and the 
UHOLJLRXV WUDGLWLRQV¶557  Nonetheless, as noted in chapters 4 and 5, he argues for all 
participants in public discourse to be able to express freely the premises that underlie 
their convictions, including religious premises, and believes that contemporary 
SROLWLFDOOLIHFDQDQGGRHVRIIHUVXFKSRVVLELOLWLHV7KXVKHZULWHVµ2QHRIP\FHQWUDO
claims is that modern democracy is not essentially an expression of secularism, as 
some philosophers have claimed and many theologians have feared.  Modern 
democratic reasoning is secularized, but not in a sense that rules out the expression of 
religious premises or thHHQWLWOHPHQWRILQGLYLGXDOVWRDFFHSWUHOLJLRXVDVVXPSWLRQV¶558   
 But when one looks at the international political landscape, it is hard not to 
suspect Stout is rather too optimistic, given the continuing contestation, particularly in 
much of the Western world, over how religion should be treated in public discourse.  
7KHUHFHQW ODXQFKRI WKHZRUOG¶V ILUVWGHJUHH LQVHFXODULVP ± and the commenting it 
provoked on line ± illustrate the importance of understanding this aspect of how we 
conduct our national life, the level of the confusion around the term, and the 
antagonism in some quarters towards any sort of religious perspective beyond a very 
narrowly drawn private sphere.559    
 ,Q FRQWUDVW , VHH :LOOLDPV¶ GHILQLQJ RI procedural, as distinct from 
programmatic, secularism (chapter 4), with its provision for extensive possibilities for 
the voice of faith communities to engage in public discourse on their own terms, as 
indicating the form of secularism that is justified in Thomistic-Aristotelian terms.  
Nicholas Wolterstorff proposes a very similar approach, in an exchange of essays with 
Robert Audi, on µ7KH 3ODFH RI 5HOLJLRXV &RQYLFWLRQV LQ 3ROLWLFDO 'HEDWH¶.560  Here, 
importantly, he argues (on grounds echoing both MacIntyre and Stout) that the 
µOLEHUDO¶WHQGHQF\WRH[FOXGHUHOLJLRXVUHDVRQLQJLVLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKOLEHUDOLVP¶VRZQ
claims to freedom and justice.  Though he addresses (as primarily does Stout) the very 
specific case of the US, the principles at stake have far wider application. 
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$XGL¶V DQG :ROWHUVWRUII¶V FRQWUDVWLQJ SRVLWLRQV DUH UHVSHFWLYHO\ VXPPDULVHG
DV µWKH OLEHUDO YLHZ >ZKLFK@ DUJXHV WKDW JRYHUQPHQW VKRXOG EH neutral towards 
religion and that religion and politics should be ± in certain ways ± separate both at the 
level of church and state and LQ WKH SROLWLFDO FRQGXFW RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ DQG µWKH
WKHRORJLFDOO\RULHQWHGSRVLWLRQ«WKDWJRYHUQPHQWQHHGRQO\EHimpartial towards the 
plurality of religions and that religion and politics should not be separated either at the 
church-state level or in poliWLFDOLQWHUDFWLRQVDPRQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶561  In describing his 
EURDGSRVLWLRQ:ROWHUVWRUIIVD\VµWKH,GHDRI OLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\¶ LVRQHWKDWµ,ILUPO\
HPEUDFH¶562  %\WKLVKHXQGHUVWDQGVµDPRGHRIJRYHUQDQFHWKDWJUDQWVWRDOOSHRSOH
within the territory of its governance equal protection under law, that grants to its 
citizens equal freedom in law to live out their lives as they see fit, and that requires of 
the state that it be neutral among all the religions and comprehensive perspectives 
represented within sRFLHW\¶  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV µequal protection under the law for all 
people, equal freedom in law for all citizens, and neutrality on the part of the state 
with respect to the diversity of religions and comprehensive perspectives ± those are 
WKHFRUH LGHDV¶563  However, in practice these principles are interpreted ± in his view 
both wrongly and unnecessarily ± in ways that, through insisting on a specific sort of 
neutrality in relation to religion, actually limit the freedom of people with faith.  Thus 
they lead to unequal treatment of people of faith and so contradict that to which they 
claim to aspire.  Such limitations are particularly discriminatory as they do not equally 
DSSO\ WR WKRVH KROGLQJ RWKHU µFRPSUHKHQVLYH SHUVSHFWLYHV¶ VXFK DV IRU H[DPSOH
nationalism or utilitarianism. 
These limitations on equality and freedom may be construed in different ways.  
So, for example, neutrality, rather than being interpreted as impartiality between 
different faiths, as well as between those of faith and those of no faith ± the practical 
application for which Wolterstorff argues ± has instead been given what he calls the 
separation LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ µZKLFK VD\V WKDW WKH VWDWe shall do nothing to advance or 
KLQGHUDQ\RUDOOUHOLJLRQV¶7KLVOHDGVLQWKH86WRWKHDQRPDOous position where the 
state aids no school whose orientation is religious ± ZKHUHDV DQ µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQZRXOGKHDVVHUWVµVD\WKDWLIWKHVWDWHLVWRDLGDQ\VFKRROWKHQLWPXVW
aid all schools, and aid them equitably ± no matter what their religious orientation, if 
DQ\¶.564  This, says Wolterstorff, reflects the ambiguity implicit within the First 
$PHQGPHQW LQ WKH 86 %LOO RI 5LJKWV ZKLFK µVSHFLILHV WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW VKDOO
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neither establish any religion, nor infringe on the free exercise oI DQ\¶  This is of 
course a very particular American example, though it illustrates a position advocated 
by some in the UK who oppose state funding of faith schools.565  But the question of 
what we mean by state neutrality in relation to matters of faith has far wider 
application, to which I return later in this chapter.        
Wolterstorff also argues that contemporary expressions of liberalism fall short 
of their own ideal, in discriminating specifically against people of faith, in the 
limitations imposed upon them in public debate, particularly in North America and 
Europe and in international organisations.  The precise nature of the limitations may 
differ, but the EURDG SRVLWLRQ LV RQH RI H[SHFWLQJ UHOLJLRXV SDUWLFLSDQWV µnot to base 
their decisions and / or debates concerning political issues on their religious 
FRQYLFWLRQV¶566   
$V :ROWHUVWRUII SRLQWV RXW WKLV H[SHFWDWLRQ RI µUHVWUDLQW¶ DV KH WHUPV LW
encompasses a great range of specific stances.  Thus some:  
impose the same restraint on personal decision and public debate alike, others 
allow a person to decide issues for himself as he wishes, and impose the 
restraint only on the reasons one offers in public debate.  Again, the restraints 
that some propose are meant for all political issues, whereas othHUV«LQWHQG
WKHLUUHVWUDLQWVRQO\IRU³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LVVXHV´DQG³PDWWHUVRIEDVLF MXVWLFH´
$QG \HW DJDLQ WKH SURSRVDOV GLIIHU ZLWK UHVSHFW WR KRZ RQH¶V QRQ-religious 
UHDVRQV IRU RU DJDLQVW VRPH SROLWLFDO SRVLWLRQ DUH WR EH UHODWHG WR RQH¶V
religious reasons, should one have religious reasons.  Some say that it is 
DFFHSWDEOH IRU RQH¶V UHOLJLRXV UHDVRQV WR PRWLYDWH RQH¶V GHFLVLRQ RU DFWLRQ
provided that one also has a non-religious reason that would be sufficient, by 
itself, as a motive; others insist that whatever religious reasons one may have 
ought not to play any motivating role at all.  Some insist that one should never 
use religious reasons in public debate; others hold that it is acceptable to do 
so, provided one is both able and ready to offer non-religious reasons.  Lastly, 
WKHUHLVDVRQHZRXOGH[SHFWFRQVLGHUDEOHGLYHUJHQFH«DVWRKRZUHOLJLRXV
reasons are to be identified, with the consequence that a reason that is 
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disallowed as religious on one proposal is permitted as non-religious on 
another.567   
The bottom line of all these stances is that one must offer at least some arguments 
URRWHG LQ VRPH XQLYHUVDOO\ DFFHSWHG µLQGHSHQGHQW VRXUFH¶  7R GHEDWH RQ UHOLJLRXV
grounds alone, even if these are the grounds on which one holds a particular 
perspective, though arguably valid in terms of free speech, is viewed by all as 
breaching the ethical standards of good democratic citizenry (which Wolterstorff is at 
pains to pursue), and is to argue on grounds that are held not to count in public 
decision-making.    
   The question then arises of what grounds do count.  Wolterstorff argues that 
the grounds proposed by liberal theorists all fail on their own terms:  µWKH OLEHUDO
position is unacceptable in all its versions.  It is unacceptable not because none of the 
extant versions happens to get all the details right, but unacceptable because no 
rationale offered for the restraint is cogent, and no independent source meets the 
GHPDQGV¶568  In the first instance, this is an epistemological question about 
µDFFHptable versus non-DFFHSWDEOHUHDVRQV¶ IRUKROGLQJEHOLHIV569  But not only have 
WKH µ5HIRUPHG HSLVWHPRORJLVWV¶ DUJXHG WR WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI VXFK QRQ-theists as 
Stout) that religious beliefs can be entitled without having to provide non-religious 
grounds.  It is also the case, argues Wolterstorff ± on grounds that are consonant with, 
though expressed in rather different terms from, those of MacIntyre in relation to the 
Enlightenment project ± that there are no independent, universally agreed, sources on 
which to draw, for secular reasoning and morality.   
But attempts to find even a more limited consensus basis for public discourse 
DUH DOVR IODZHG :ROWHUVWRUIISDUWLFXODUO\ WDNHV LVVXHZLWK5DZOV¶ DLP RI ILQGLQJ µD
source that will yield principles of justiFH ZKLFK LW LV UHDVRQDEOH WR H[SHFW DOO RQH¶V
UHDVRQDEOH DQG UDWLRQDO IHOORZFLWL]HQV WR VKDUH¶570  This is a considerably narrower 
JRDODV:ROWHUVWRUIIVWUHVVHVµWKHVRXUFH5DZOVSURSRVHVLVLWVHOIVRPHWKLQJVKDUHG± 
not those principles themselves, but the shared political culture of an extant liberal 
GHPRFUDF\¶+RZHYHUWKHUHLVQRVXFKXQLYHUVDOO\VKDUHGSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHZLWKLQWKH
US (or indeed anywhere else), and it is unrealistic to expect it, or agreement over any 
RWKHU µFRPSUHKHQVLYH SKLORVRSKLFDO RU UHOLJLRXV GRFWULQH¶ VXFK DV WKH µSULQFLSOHV RI
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MXVWLFH¶ LQ RXU FRPSOH[ DQG YDULHG VRFLHWLHV  7KHUHIRUH 5DZO¶V µH[WUDRUGLQDULO\
LGHDOLVHG¶DVSLUDWLRQLVµKRSHOHVV¶571   
:ROWHUVWRUII¶V FRQFOXVLRQ LV WKDW µZH PXVW OHDUQ WR OLYH ZLWK PXOWLSOH
communitiHV¶DQGWKDW5DZOVLDQOLEHUDOLVPDVLQGHHGDOORWKHUIRUPVRIFRQWHPSRUDU\
liberalism, does not provide a coherent way for us to do this.572  ,QVWHDGZHµQHHGD
politics that not only honours us in our similarities as free and equal, but in our 
particularLWLHV¶573  In words that resonate with 0DF,QW\UH¶V KH DGGV µ)RU RXU
particularities ± some of them ± are constitutive of who we are, constitutive of our 
QDUUDWLYH LGHQWLWLHV¶+HDOVRXQGHUOLQHVWKHQHHGIRUWKHHQULFKPHQWRIVRFLHWLHVDQG
of political debate that can only come from the interaction of differing perspectives, 
understandings and reasonings.  This is in stark contrast with the flawed stance of 
µUHJDUGLQJWKHIHOWQHHGWRDSSHDOWR>GLYHUVHSHUVSHFWLYHV@KHUHDQGWKHUHDVVLPSO\D
lamentable deficiency in the scope and power of public reason ± a deficiency whose 
RYHUFRPLQJZHKDGKRSHGIRU¶ 
:ROWHUVWRUII HFKRHV 6WRXW¶V FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW SDUWLFLSDQWV LQ GHEDWH VKRXOG EH
free to offer their genuine convictions, and offer them on the grounds of their genuine 
UHDVRQV IRU UHDFKLQJ WKHVH FRQYLFWLRQV  $V :ROWHUVWRUII SXWV LW µ,I WKH SRVLWLRQ
adopted, and the manner in which it is acted on, are compatible with the concept of 
liberal democracy, and if the discussion concerning the issue is conducted with 
civility, then citizens are free to offer and act on whatever reasons they find 
FRPSHOOLQJ « /LEHUDO GHPRFUDF\ LPSOLHV DV , VHH LW WKDW WKHUH VKRXOG EH QR
FHQVRUVKLS LQ WKLV UHJDUG¶  %XW WKLV LV QRW PHUHO\ D PDWWHU RI ZKHWKHU D IRUP RI
µFHQVRUVKLS¶LVEHLQJLPSRVHGRQUHOLJLRXVFRQYLFWLRQV6WRXW¶VGHHSHUFRQFHUQLVWKDW
true mutual understanding, and rational debate of differing perspectives, can only 
occur where authentic convictions and their justifications are freely presented (a view 
also implicit LQ:ROWHUVWRUII¶VDUJXPHQWV574$QGRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWLWIXUWKHU
follows that where genuine views and their justifications are open to debate, the 
strength of all, especially those which are not well-based ± not least, through 
attempting the sort of context-neutral justification to which liberalism often turns ± 
can be properly critiqued, not least by those with greater moral rationality.   
  Wolterstorff therefore proposes an alternative form of liberal democracy in 
ZKLFKµFLWL]HQVXVHZKDWHYHUUHDsons they find appropriate ± including, then, religious 
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UHDVRQV¶575  +RZHYHUKHVWUHVVHVWKDWKHLVQRWµLPSO\LQJWKDWQRUHVWUDLQWVZKDWVRHYHU
DUHDSSURSULDWHRQDSHUVRQ¶V UHDVRQLQJIURPKLVRUKHUUHOLJLRQ 5HVWUDLQWVRI WKUHH
sorts pertain to the citizHQRIDOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\¶7KHVHKHOLVWVDVIROORZV 
In the first place, restraints are needed on the manner of debate and discussion 
in the public square «we ought to show respect «Our discussions ought to 
be conducted with civility.  The virtues of civility belong to the ethic of the 
citizen.   
There will be disputes as to what those virtues are.  What does respect 
for the freedom and equality of the other person «>DQG@IRr that which is of 
worth in the particularity of the other person require?  My own view is that 
WKRVH YLUWXHV SURYH FRQVLGHUDEO\ WKLFNHU WKDQ WKH ZRUG µFLYLOLW\¶ ZRXOG
naturally suggest.  They require listening to the other person with a 
ZLOOLQJQHVV WR OHDUQ DQG WR OHW RQH¶V PLQG EH FKDQJHG  ,Q VRPH FDVHV WKH\
require repentance and forgiveness. 
Second, the debates, except in extreme circumstances, are to be 
conducted and resolved in accord with the rules provided by the laws of the 
land and the provisions of the Constitution.  It is certainly not out of place to 
argue for changes in those laws and in those provisions, but, except for 
extreme circumstances, that argumentation is itself to be conducted in accord 
with the extant laws and provisions. 
Third, there is restraint on the overall goal of the debates and 
discussions.  The goal LV SROLWLFDO MXVWLFH QRW WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI RQH¶VRZQ
interests.  Here I side with the liberal position, against the competition-of-
interests position.576  
This description reflects PDQ\RIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIGHEDWH
conducted according to the primary precepts of natural law, as set out in the previous 
chapter.  These include mutual respect and openness to learn, with the implication that 
WKH DQWLFLSDWHG µWKLFN¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH YLUWXHV FDQ RSHQ WKH ZD\ WR SURPRWLQJ
fuller instantiation of the primary precepts.  Justice is to be promoted, though how this 
is understood and pursued is, rightly, also open to further debate and refining.  The 
rejection of narrowly construed interests further underlines the concerns of MacIntyre 
and Stout for promoting internal goods of genuine excellence. 
                                                             
575
 Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion, 112. 
576
 Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion, 112-3 ± emphases in original. 
219 
 
 ,Q KLV UHVSRQVH $XGL DVVHUWV WKDW:ROWHUVWRUII LQSXUVXLQJ µD FRQFHSWLRQ RI
political justice that citizens can appropriately rely on independently of its 
HQGRUVHPHQWE\DUHOLJLRXVYLHZ¶LV µFORse to implying that at least our main reasons 
for socio-political decisions (particularly concerning the legal structure of society) 
VKRXOGEHVHFXODUDQGSUHVXPDEO\LQVRPHVHQVHSXEOLF¶577  But it is not so much that 
:ROWHUVWRUII LQ ORRNLQJ WR µMXVWLFH¶ has managed to identify the sort of universal 
µLQGHSHQGHQWVRXUFH¶ WRZKLFK5DZOVDQGRWKHUVKDYHSRLQWHGEXW UDWKHU WKDWKHKDV
enunciated the justification of a form of secular liberal democracy that closely accords 
ZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH7KRPLstic view of how rule ought to be exercised.  It 
is thus µVHFXODU¶ LQ WKH EHVW VHQVH DQG HQWLUHO\ FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK UDWLRQDOO\ KHOG
religious and moral convictions.  Indeed, Audi himself DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW µVRPH
plausiblH FRQFHSWLRQRI WKHFRPPRQJRRG¶ can provide, alongside political justice, a 
source of criteria for implementing governance within such a form of secular liberal 
democracy,578 which is what we would expect.   
Impartiality, Diversity, and the Common Good  
 
The above constitutional concerns over separation of church and state 
notwithstanding, the Pledge of Allegiance has, since 1954, spoken of the United States 
RI$PHULFDDVµRQHQDWLRQXQGHU*RGindivisible, with liberty and justice for all¶DQG
µ,Q*RGZHWUXVW¶ZDVDGRSWHGDVWKHFRXQWU\¶VRIIicial motto in 1956 after long usage, 
for example, on coinage.  When legally challenged, such phrases have generally been 
DGMXGJHGWRUHIHUWRDWPRVWµFHUHPRQLDOGHLVP¶RIDSDWULRWLFQDWXUHDQGFHUWDLQO\QRW
to uphold any specific religious content.  In contrast, South Africa, while also 
choosing to conclude the Preamble to its post-apartheid Constitution with the words 
µ0D\*RGSURWHFWRXUSHRSOH¶IROORZHGE\µ*RGEOHVV6RXWK$IULFD¶UHSHDWHG LQVL[
different languages, adopted, in the constitutional provisions which follow, a very 
different attitude to the place of religious convictions within the life of the nation from 
that of the US.579  It is this form of secularism which I now consider. 
TKH)RXQGLQJ3URYLVLRQVRI&KDSWHUEXLOGRQWKH3UHDPEOH¶VFommitment to 
DQDWLRQµXQLWHGLQGLYHUVLW\¶DQGµDVRFLHW\EDVHGRQGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHVVRFLDOMXVWLFH
DQG IXQGDPHQWDO KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ WKURXJK WKH µDFKLHYHPHQW RI HTXDOLW\¶ ZLWK FLWL]HQV
µHTXDOO\ HQWLWOHG WR ULJKWV SULYLOHJHV DQG EHQHILWV¶ DV ZHOO DV µGXWLHV and 
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UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶In the tangible pursuit of this vision it stipulates provisions not only 
to promote WKHVWDWH¶VRIILFLDOODQJXDJHVDQGWKRVHRIRWKHUGRPHVWLFFRPPXQLWLHVEXW
DOVRµWRSURPRWHDQGHQVXUHUHVSHFWIRU¶WKHµODQJXDJHVFRPPRQO\XVHG¶by immigrant 
JURXSVWRJHWKHUZLWKµ$UDELF+HEUHZ6DQVNULWDQGRWKHUODQJXDJHVXVHGIRUUHOLJLRXV
SXUSRVHV¶580  This is an unusual level of protection for an aspect of religious life. 
Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights, requires that neither state or anyone else may 
µXQIDLUO\ GLVFULPLQDWH GLUHFWO\ RU LQGLUHFWO\ DJDLQVW DQ\RQH RQ RQH RU PRUH JURXQGV
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
ELUWK¶581  )XUWKHULWJXDUDQWHHVWKHULJKWWRµIUHHGRPRIFRQVFLHQFHUHOLJLRQWKRXJKW
EHOLHIDQGRSLQLRQ¶DQGDOORZVIRUµUHOLJLRXVREVHUYDQFHV>WR@EHFRQGXFWHGDWVWDWHRU
state-DLGHG LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ VXEMHFW WR FHUWDLQ FRQGLWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ WKDW µWKH\ DUH
FRQGXFWHG RQ DQ HTXLWDEOH EDVLV¶ ± a specific form of neutrality between those of 
different faiths and none.   
The Constitution also provides for the regulation of both private and public 
life through traditional,582 community and religious laws, alongside more general 
legislation, insofar as they are compatible with wider provisions of the constitution 
(so, for example, customary or religious traditions in which the nearest male heir 
inherits are trumped by gender-equality, so female relatives may equally inherit).  
Religious convictions are treated much as any other facet of human identity, such as 
language and culture.  There is thus an implicit assumption that citizens can and will 
conduct their life in accordance with their particularities of background, belief and 
opinion, across all aspects of life, both public and private, so long as these do not 
contradict other constitutional stipulations. 
Former Archbishop Ndungane has pointed out that this offers a very differently 
shaped public space to that of most western liberal democracies.  It is well-suited to the 
democratic engagement in debate of all participants speaking from their own particular 
FRQWH[W DQGSHUVSHFWLYH  µ,W LV QRWHZRUWK\ WKDW WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURYLVLRQ IRU GLYHUVH
community, cultural, linguistic and religious expression does not confine these to the 
private realm, but ensures a full place within the public arena.  This contrasts with the 
widespread assumption that seems to dominate in many liberal democracies - that within 
the public sphere, there exists some shared, normative, secular, stance that all players 
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should adopt, with faith perspectives having relevance only on narrowly circumscribed 
faith-UHODWHG LVVXHV¶583  He distinguishes the South African approach from the 
epistemologically flawed assumptions of those forms of liberalism that assume some 
µREMHFWLYH¶ EDVLV IRU SXEOLF GLVFRXUVH DUJXLQJ WKDW µWKHUH LV QR $UFKLPHGHDQ VRFLR-
political fixed neutral place where we can stand, for every starting point comes laden with 
LWV RZQ LGHRORJLFDO EDJJDJH DQG XQDFNQRZOHGJHG DVVXPSWLRQV¶  *LYHQ WKH FULWLFDO
analysis of MacIntyre, Stout, Wolterstorff and others of such a perspective, it is no 
surprise that Ndungane also warns that attempting to seek such criteria can result in the 
substitution of true measures of human well-EHLQJ E\ PHUHO\ ILVFDO FDOFXODWLRQV  µ7R
pretend to this sort of secular objectivity also leaves us dangerously susceptible to 
GRPLQDQFHE\PDUNHWIRUFHVUDWKHUWKDQKXPDQUHDOLWLHVDQGQHHGV¶ 
  It is not just that all voices can thus be heard largely on their own terms ± 
0DF,QW\UH¶V JRDO ZLWK ZKLFK WKLV FKDSWHU EHJDQ  7KH &RQVWLWXWLRQ LQ LWV 3UHDPEOH
FRPPLWV6RXWK$IULFDWRWKHSXUVXLWRIµGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHVVRFLDOMXVWLFHDQGIXQGDPHQWDO
KXPDQULJKWV¶WKURXJKDµGHPRFUDWLFDQGRSHQVRFLHW\¶DQGVRWRµLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\RI
OLIHDQGIUHHWKHSRWHQWLDORIHDFKSHUVRQ¶WKXVSURYLGLQJDYHU\EURDGO\GUDZQFRQFHSWRI
the common good as one of the primary touchstones against which all other provisions 
and tKHLU LQVWDQWLDWLRQ FDQ EH ZHLJKHG  7KLV JLYHV WKH IRFXV WR ZKLFK 0DF,QW\UH¶V
appropriation of Aquinas also directs us.  That this is a potentially fertile point of 
GHSDUWXUH IRU WKH &KXUFK¶V HQJDJHPHQW LQ WKH SXEOLF DUHQD LV QRW ORVW RQ 1GXQJDQH
µ3XEOLF affirmation of diversity allows for a far broader, more textured, debate on the 
goals of society ± the appropriate flourishing of each individual, as part of the wider 
human family, in harmony with creation.  It offers possibilities of constructive dialogue 
around moral issues, without any community feeling under threat or in competition.  The 
strengths of traditions offer checks against unfettered relativism, and the blind 
imperatives of unbridled economics.  Those of us who believe in the revelation of a God 
who is absolute, can in turn stand firm in our faith, while acknowledging that finite 
human comprehension is always challenged to fuller understanding and expression, and 
LVEHVWH[SORUHGLQWKHGLDORJXHVRIWKHZKROHKXPDQIDPLO\¶584   
1GXQJDQH¶VDSSUoach illustrates how public conversation on human flourishing 
can be a vehicle not only for furthering the common good of citizens and society, but also 
for promoting appreciation of a Christian viewpoint, and encouraging substantive 
exchanges of view on how debate between different perspectives are conducted.  
Ndungane thus places on faith communities a strong expectation to engage 
constructively, drawing on the best of their traditions, while encountering others in true 
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dialogue and with humility ± acknowledging that there is always the potential to learn 
from others.   
 In their sermons, speeches and writing, both Ndungane585 and his successor 
Makgoba586 have not been shy to respond to the widely held expectation that, as 
Archbishops of Cape Town, they can anG VKRXOG DGGUHVV DOO PDQQHU RI µSROLWLFDO¶
issues, with questions around the common good (in some guise) more often than not 
serving as their preferred entry point.  So, for example, this was the central argument 
LQ 1GXQJDQH¶V FULWLTXH RI WKH :RUOG 7UDGH 2rganisation, recorded in the previous 
FKDSWHU6LPLODUO\0DNJREDVD\Vµ,KDYHEHHQFRQVWDQWO\FDOOHGWRZULWHDQGUHIOHFW
on what might constitute the common good, human flourishing and human dignity and 
DVZHOODVWKHLQWHJULW\RI*RG¶VFUHDWLRQ± or thHUHLJQRI*RGLQWKHQRZDQGKHUH¶587  
Such reflections often provide the wider context when he addresses human rights, as 
referred to in chapter 5. 
This persistent engagement of the Archbishops of Cape Town is thus rooted in 
a number of important convictions, which it is helpful to summarise.  First, a public 
space so constituted will serve Christianity well, in allowing Christians freely to 
pursue and uphold their faith in both private and public.  Further, such a space will 
EHQHILW&KULVWLDQV¶VHOI-understanding of their faith and how it should be lived within 
their own context, as this will be enhanced through extensive encounters with others 
and their perspectives, experiences and expertise (enunciated first on their own terms), 
so benefiting the broader goal of moral rationality.  Beyond this, it provides for 
Christians, on their own terms, to further their wider objective of promoting the best 
possible flourishing ± the common good ± of all humanity (for example, through the 
lobbying and advocacy to which the Anglican Bishops committed themselves at the 
Lambeth Conference), in which clear communication of Christian beliefs and their 
reasons will form an inevitable part.     
Before commenting on what might be the most effective language for those 
such as the Archbishops to employ in such contexts, I first turn to consider how public 
speaking by Christian leaders not only about the common good and its instantiation, 
but also about the nature of pluralism and the conduct of pluralist democratic debate, 
can of itself promote the most constructive forms of impartial secularism.   
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By the most constructive forms, I mean ± in accordance with the theories of 
MacIntyre and their further development by Stout and Wolterstorff ± practices of 
public discourse which provide for the fullest possible exchange of genuinely held 
convictions and their reasons, in an atmosphere that ensures such conditions as 
honesty, mutual respect, a voice for all, and a shared desire for the truth that is found 
in moral rationality unconstrained by hidden ulterior motives or narrow interests 
drawn at the expense of others.  These are the practices which are best able to promote 
moral rationality ± reflecting WKH VHFRQG DVSHFW RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI SODLQ
SHUVRQV¶ HQJDJHPHQW LQ WKH SXEOLF sphere, namely conformity in the conduct of 
governance and public discourse to the primary precepts of natural law.  My 
FRQWHQWLRQ LVWKDWWRHQFRXUDJHGHEDWHDURXQGWKHVHµEHVWSUDFWLFHV¶RISOXUDOLVPLVLQ
itself a means of educating others about these, and of promoting adherence to them.  It 
is thus morally rational for the churches to ensure that adequate resources are devoted 
to this course of action.  Thus, for example, Archbishops of Cape Town are justified in 
deliberately and consciously devoting particular time and effort to taking up the 
opportunities offered them to participate in public debate in this way. 
 
Pluralism and the Primary Precepts of Natural Law   
 
 The provisions of the South African Constitution exhibit many of the 
characteristics of :ROWHUVWRUII¶V DOWHUQDWLYH IRUPXODWLRQ RI OLEHUDO GHPRFUDF\ ZKLFK
KH WHUPVKLV µconsocial SRVLWLRQ¶588  7KLVKHVD\V µGHSDUWV IURPWKH OLEHUDOSRVLWLRQ
on two defining issues.  First, it repudiates the quest for an independent source and 
imposes no moral restraint on the use of religious reasons.  And second, it interprets 
the neutrality requirement, that the state be neutral with respect to the religious and 
other comprehensives perspectives present in society, as requiring impartiality rather 
than sepaUDWLRQ¶  ,Q SURPRWLQJ SROLWLFDO MXVWLFH DQG WKXV HFKRLQJ HOHPHQWV RI WKH
3UHDPEOH WR WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQ LW µDJUHHV ZLWK WKH OLEHUDO SRVLWLRQ DQG
opposes the competition-of-interests position concerning the goal of political 
discussions, deciVLRQ DQG DFWLRQV¶ ± providing the sort of necessary grounding to 
which Ndungane refers in warning of the dangers of dominance by market forces.  
This is an argument for all forms of pluralism for, Wolterstorff argues, it is 
unnecessary (as well as futile) WR DWWHPSW WR ILQG DQ\ µDELGLQJ VHW RI DJUHHG-on 
principles to which all of us, from day to day and year to year, can appeal in deciding 
DQG GLVFXVVLQJ SROLWLFDO LVVXHV¶589 and specifically those that deal with the bases of 
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justice.  For, he asserts, the purpose of political debate in practice is to reach 
DJUHHPHQWRQVSHFLILFSROLFLHVODZVRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVDQGµRXUDJUHHPHQW
on some policy need not be based on some set of principles agreed on by all present 
and future citizens and rich enough WR VHWWOH DOO LPSRUWDQW SROLWLFDO LVVXHV¶  ,W LV
VXIILFLHQW IRU FLWL]HQV IRU ZKDWHYHU WKHLU UHDVRQV WR DFKLHYH WKH µIDLUO\ JDLQHG DQG
IDLUO\H[HFXWHGDJUHHPHQWRIWKHPDMRULW\¶RQSROLF\IRUWKHWLPHEHLQJIt is only over 
DSSURSULDWH µUHVWUDLQW¶ LQ WKe conduct of debate (as noted above) that agreement is 
necessary.  This reflects a commitment to constitutional democracy itself ± even 
though precise terms of both constitution and its implementation must remain open to 
debate ± as a legitimate instantiation of the primary precepts of natural law. 
 :LWKLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VFRQVLGHUDEOHGLYHUVLW\&KULVWLDQLW\ is by far the largest 
faith community, with close to 80% support according to the 2001 census.  Christian 
leaders such as Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak played a significant role in opposing 
apartheid, in which Christians across the great majority of denominations not only 
worked together, but also forged close links with other faith communities.  A high, 
and very visible, level of inter-faith cooperation has since continued, with religious 
leaders regularly taking a joint stand on issues which address, firstly, aspects of the 
common good (such as poverty alleviation); and secondly, the promotion of practices 
of good constitutional democracy, including tackling corruption, low moral standards 
in public life, inter-ethnic and politically motivated violence, and the conduct of 
debate.  So, for example, in March 2011 the National Religious Association for Social 
Development issued a strongly worded condemnation of racial categorisation, 
following remarks in this vein by an ANC spokesman,590 and the Western Cape 
5HOLJLRXV /HDGHUV¶ )RUXP censured crowd intolerance of a senior opposition party 
speaker (and the failure of the President and ruling party to take effective action 
against this) at a Human Rights Day event.591  Each statement drew attention to the 
importance of aspects of the primary precepts being upheld in the conduct of public 
discourse.  
 I now turn to a broader reflection on how pluralism might best be understood 
and practiced in contemporary politics, given by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Rowan Williams, in his Chevening Lecture at the British Council in New Delhi, 
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during his visit to India in October 2010.592  As the issues it raises range from the way 
that communities of tradition best pursue moral rationality individually and through 
substantive exchange, through to why and how a secular civil space can best promote 
such exchanges with others, including interfaith dialogue ± and so touch on matters 
that span the breadth of this thesis ± I shall consider this in some detail. 
A Secular Context for Religious Pluralism 
:LOOLDPVEHJLQVKLV&KHYHQLQJ/HFWXUHE\JUDQWLQJWKDWµWKHZRUG³SOXUDOLVP´ 
has come to mean an uncomfortable variety of things in both the political and the 
UHOLJLRXVVSKHUH¶+HWKHQH[SORUHVWKHVHSRVVLELOLWLHVE\IRFXVVLQJRQWKHH[DPSOHRI
,QGLDZKLFK µLQGHFODULQJ LWVHOIDVHFXODUVWDWHDW LQGHSHQGHQFHZDVPDNLQJDFOHDU
RSWLRQ IRU D FHUWDLQNLQGRISXEOLF DQGSROLWLFDOQHXWUDOLW\¶ DQG µFRQVLVWHQWO\ WULHG WR
GHILQH D ³VHFXODULVP´ WKDW LV QRW KRVWLOH WR PXOWLSOH UHOLJLRXV LGHQWLWLHV¶  5DWKHU LQ
DFNQRZOHGJLQJµWKDWWREHDFLWL]HQLQ,QGLDFRXOGQRWEHVRPHWKLQJWKDWGHSHQGHGRQ
DQ\SDUWLFXODUFRPPXQDOLGHQWLW\¶LQRWKHUZRUGVUHFRJQising and affirming the need, 
for which Wolterstorff argued, to live with multiple communities) the state pursued a 
IRUPRIQHXWUDOLW\ LQZKLFK µLW FRXOGQRW LQWHUYHQH LQ UHOLJLRXVGLVDJUHHPHQWV H[FHSW
LQVRIDUDVWKH\EHFDPHVRFLDOO\GLVUXSWLYH¶ 
 Williams addresses the implications for both inter-faith relations and wider 
public discourse.  Significant from the perspective of this thesis is the aim he 
H[SOLFLWO\VHWVKLPVHOILQWKHVSHHFKRIµKRS>LQJ@WRVKRZWKDWPRGHUQ,QGLDLVDYHU\
fruitful conWH[WLQZKLFKWRH[DPLQHWKHYDULRXVPHDQLQJVRIWKHZRUG³SOXUDOLVP´± to 
look at how they apply in practice and at some of the questions to which they give 
ULVH¶ 
Williams presents himself as sharing his own exploration of the issues, rather 
than offering an exhaustive or definitive account.  He also suggests that the breadth of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRISOXUDOLVPLQGLFDWHµDQXQH[DPLQHGDVSHFWRIZKDWVRFLDOPRGHUQLW\
PHDQV¶ DGGLQJ WKDW µERWK FRQFHSWXDOO\ DQGSUDFWLFDOO\ WKHUH LV XQILQLVKHGEXVLQHVV¶
which hHGRHVQRWµH[SHFWWRILQLVK«LQDEULHIOHFWXUH¶,QWKLVZD\KHGHVFULEHVKLV
REMHFWLYH DV EHLQJ µWR RIIHU VRPH WKRXJKWV DERXW KRZ UHOLJLRXV SOXUDOLVP PLJKW EH
understood in a fresh way that will not simply leave us with relativism or 
LQGLIIHUHQFH¶DQGDGGVµ,VKDOOEHWU\LQJWRFRQQHFWWKLVZLWKVRPHWKRXJKWVDERXWWKH
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character of a well-functioning modern democracy that seeks to secure equal liberties 
IRUGLYHUVH FRPPXQLWLHV¶ +HFDQ WKXVEH VHHQDV VSHDNLQJ LQRUGHU WR HQKDQFH WKH
level of understanding around the issues at stake in the conduct of pluralism.  It is an 
educative stance.  He sets out his own analysis as persuasively as he can ± hence a full 
and detailed account ± but does so not as political polemic, but in order to 
communicate what he concludes and why, and with an expressed readiness himself to 
learn further.  At various points he invites the response of others, to bring their own 
H[SHULHQFHVDQGLQVLJKWVWRDVKDUHGµFRQWLQXLQJVWUXJJOH¶WRDGGUHVVWKHFKDOOHQJHVRI
µZKDW,KDYHHOVHZKHUHFDOOHG³DUJXPHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\´¶ LQZKLFKKLV µFRQWHQWLRQ
has been that our best political future liHV¶DQGIXUWKHUWKDW µUHOLJLRXVLQWHJULW\LVZHOO
VHUYHGDQGQRWXQGHUPLQHGE\VXFKDYLVLRQIRURXUVRFLHW\¶.  This approach exhibits 
many of the elements MacIntyre describes as characteristic of the conduct of moral 
rational enquiry at all levels. 
 Much of the speech is devoted to pluralism in the context of dialogue between 
faiths, and it advocates many of the practices of debate between communities of 
tradition with a greater, or lesser, degree of commensurability, which were described 
in chapters 3 and 5 respectively.  (There is, as Williams acknowledges, far greater 
diversity among the religious communities of India than among the Abrahamic faiths.)  
The importance of preserving the integrity of each tradition, including its 
embeddedness in the social practices of its community through which adherents 
GHYHORS WKHLU IDLWK LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH $UFKELVKRS¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW µZKLOH LW PD\EH
possible to distil a fairly general core of common wisdom from the diverse languages 
of faith throughout the world, each will provide a different rationale for believing ± 
and, even more importantly, a different discipline of life and practice for becoming 
aligQHG ZLWK LW OLYLQJ LW RXW HIIHFWLYHO\ « 6R D UHOLJLRXV ³SOXUDOLVP´ WKDW VHHNV WR
identify a core of common insights as opposed to a diversity of ways in which these 
are clothed is in danger of ignoring not only the narratives of origin which all faiths 
appeal to but also the narratives of personal development and transformation related to 
EHOLHYHUV¶  )URP WKLV KH GUDZV IXUWKHU LPSOLFDWLRQV WKDW DOVR FKLPH FORVHO\ ZLWK D
0DF,QW\UHDQDQDO\VLVQDPHO\ WKDW µ7KH³FRPPRQFRUH´DSSURDFKFDQQRWEHFRPHDQ
embodied practice, except in terms of ethical recommendations of a pretty 
uncontroversial kind; and such recommendations have usually been regarded by 
religious people as impossible to sustain independently of the practices (and thus the 
narratives) of particular UHOLJLRXV FRPPLWPHQWV¶  ,W IXUWKHU IROORZV WKDW µ,W LV QRW
UHDOLVWLF HLWKHU LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ RU SUDFWLFDOO\ WR VHH UHOLJLRXV ³SOXUDOLVP´ LQ LWV
frequently used sense as a straightforward programme that can guarantee peaceful 
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coexistence between faith communities on the basis that they all come to regard their 
distinctive narratives as non-essential and culturally-FRQGLWLRQHG ³H[WUDV´ WR D EDVLF
FRPPRQYLVLRQ¶ 
 +RZHYHU DV:LOOLDPV LV VZLIW WRSRLQWRXW µWKLV QHHGQRW PHDQ WKDWZHDUH
left either with a world ± or society ± of mutually uncomprehending systems or with a 
ELWWHU FRPSHWLWLRQ IRU VXSUHPDF\ EHWZHHQ WKH ³UHOLJLRQV´¶  5DWKHU HDFK IDLWK must 
make its own contribution to WKLV µFRPSOH[ PDS RI VWRULHV DQG ULWXDOV¶ ZKLFK DUH
µVKDSHG DQG H[SUHVVHG in such a way that they inevitably make implicit or explicit 
claims about what is the fullest or most effective way to secure and understand contact 
EHWZHHQ KXPDQLW\ DQG WKH VDFUHG¶  ,W LV µFDUHIXO DQG DWWHQWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
communities of religiouVSUDFWLFH¶WKDWPXVWEHWKHZD\IRUZDUGJLYHQWKDWWKHUHFDQ
µEHQR³QHXWUDO´HYLGHQFH¶WRVHWWOHTXHVWLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWIDLWKVDV0DF,QW\UHRI
course also argues). 
 :LOOLDPV FRQWHQGV WKDW LW LV D SURSHUO\ SOXUDOLVWLF FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK µWKH
politicDO DQG WKH UHOLJLRXV DVSHFWV « FRQYHUJH¶ ZKLFK EHVW VHUYHV VXFK LQWHUDFWLRQ
+H µVXJJHVWV¶ DQ DSSURSULDWH KXPLOLW\ DQG SURYLVLRQDOLW\ ZKLFK LQYLWHV FRQWLQXLQJ
GLDOHFWLFDO H[SORUDWLRQ WKDW µLQWHUUHOLJLRXV FRQYHUVDWLRQ QHHGV WR EHZDUH RI WZR
misleading perspectives ± on the one hand, the idea that any encounter must always be 
a contest between two or more self-contained rival systems, offering clear alternative 
answers to the same set of questions so that only one of them can be regarded as 
ultimately true; and on the other hand, the belief that all specific narrative and 
doctrinal schemes are variant expression of the same underlying conviction or 
FRQYLFWLRQV¶  ,QRUGHUµWRDYRLGDVVXPSWLRQVERWKRI ³]HURVXP´FRQIOLFWDQGRI WKH
possibility of a final dLVVROXWLRQRIUHDORWKHUQHVV«WKHUHKDVWREHDVHFXUHVSDFHIRU
JHQXLQH H[FKDQJH DQG H[SORUDWLRQ¶ LH ZLWK WKH VRUW RI FRQWH[W RI VDIHW\ WUXVW DQG
honesty to which the primary precepts of natural law point).  And so Williams draws 
the far-reaching conFOXVLRQ WKDW µ7KHUH KDV WR EH D ³FLYLO VSDFH´ IRU UHOLJLRXV
FRPPXQLWLHVWRPHHWHDFKRWKHU¶Not only is it possible for religious communities to 
survive within secular contexts, but such contexts also best provide for substantial 
inter-faith engagement ± the sort of engagement that is necessary to promote moral 
rationality within any given faith community, through extensive dialectical exchange 
ZLWKRWKHUV)XUWKHUPRUHµZKDWWKHQHXWUDORUVHFXODUPRGHUQVWDWHPDNHVSRVVLEOHLV
a deeper and more empathetic encounter between religious discourses and systems.¶
And so he reaches the conclusion we would expect:  µThe secular public sphere 
SURYLGHVWKHVSDFHIRUFLYLODUJXPHQW¶ 
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 Of course, this is not to say that all forms of secularism guarantee such a 
space.  Rather, it is the sort of secularism which Williams outlines within this same 
address ± DVHFXODULVPWKDW µUDWKHU WKDQ WU\LQJ WREXLOGFLYLO OR\DOW\IURPQRWKLQJ«
build[s] on the experience of co-operation and passionate concern for the common 
JRRG¶  /LNH 0DF,QW\UH KH VHHV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI DQG FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH FRPPRQ
JRRGDVEHLQJµQXUWXUHGLQSDUWLFXODUFRPPXQLWLHVHVSHFLDOO\E\DUHOLJLRXVO\IRUPHG
ethic of self-giving, so that this sense of mutual investment and mutually created well-
beiQJFDQFDUU\DFURVVLQWRWKHZLGHUUHDOP¶7RZRUNZHOOVHFXODULVPQHHGVWRGUDZ
on the strengths of communities of tradition, including faith communities, which 
IROORZVIURPWKHPEHLQJDEOH WRRSHUDWHZLWKLQ WKHSXEOLFVSDFHDV µFRPPXQLWLHVRI
habit and FRQYLFWLRQ¶6XFKDVWDWHµWDNHVUHOLJLRXVEHORQJLQJVHULRXVO\DQGVHHVLWVHOI
as a state, as serving the healthy coexistence and interaction of diverse communities of 
FRQYLFWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHIRUHLWPXVWKDYHDµV\VWHPRIOHJDOXQLYHUVDOLVPDQGDPRUDOO\ 
VHULRXV DQG FRPPLWWHG SURMHFW RI VHFXULQJ HYHU\ SDUWLFXODU FRPPXQLW\¶V OLEHUW\ WR
H[SUHVVLWVHOIDQGDUJXHDERXWVKDUHGFRQFHUQVDQGKRSHV¶7KLVVHOI-expression must 
KDSSHQRQHDFKFRPPXQLW\¶VRZQWHUPV± as noted above ± VLQFHµVHFXODUGHPRFUDF\
can perfectly well benefit from the serious arguments that may be generated between 
these communities about shared goods and concerns and the moral and religious basis 
RQ ZKLFK JRDOV DUHSXUVXHG LQ VRFLHW\¶ 2QFH PRUH WKH overarching concern is the 
best possible apprehension and pursuit of the common good for all.  And so Williams 
DUJXHVWKDWµWKHVWDWH¶VMRELVQRWWRVLOHQFHDOOWKLVEXWWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHUHLVDVSDFHLQ
ZKLFKWKHDUJXPHQWFDQEHSXUVXHGZLWKFLYLOLW\¶ 
 6XFK µFLYLOLW\¶ HFKRHV 0DF,QW\UH¶V IRcus on the primary precepts of natural 
ODZ DQG LQGHHG ZKDW:LOOLDPV FRPPHQGV FRKHUHV FORVHO\  $ORQJVLGH µDGHJUHHRI
HTXDO DFFHVV WR VRFLDO JRRGV¶ KH QRWHV µIDLUQHVV EHIRUH WKH ODZ WKH FKDQFH RI
economic liberty and protection from the violence of otheUJURXSV¶DQGSRLQWVWRWKH
QHFHVVLW\ RI VWDWHV KDYLQJ µPRUDO FRPPLWPHQWV¶ WKDW LQFOXGH µVHHLQJ HYHU\RQH DV
deserving of legal protection and capable of sharing in democratic decision-PDNLQJ¶
7KH VWDWH PXVW VXSSRUW µD VLWXDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK JHQXLQH GLYHUVLWy in society can be 
acknowledged and worked with through a shared loyalty to legal institutions that 
SURWHFWDOO¶VRWKDWµDGHJUHHRImutual loyalty develops, a sense of shared interest and 
LQYHVWPHQWLQWKHQHLJKERXU¶VZHOO-EHLQJ¶593  Therefore, he says, µWKHFKDOOHQJHEHIRUH
the healthy pluralist state is to maintain a robust defence of universal civic liberties 
and universal access to legal process and legal protection, while seeking to work with 
the grain of existing loyalties and solidarities [that is, within faith and other 
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FRPPXQLWLHV@ WR VHFXUH D EHWWHU VHWWOHPHQW IRU DOO QRW MXVW D PDMRULW\¶  $QG VR WKH
VWDWH VKRXOG QHYHU EHFRPH µRQO\ D KDUDVVHG UHIHUHH EHWZHHQ VRPHWLPHV YLROHQWO\
FRPSHWLQJ LGHQWLWLHV DQG FODLPV¶ EXW PXVW DOVR EH D SODFH ZKHUH WKH µLVVXHV RI
>UHOLJLRXV DQG SROLWLFDO@ SRZHU DQG DGYDQWDJH¶ E\ ZKLFK µFRQYHUVDWLRQ LV DOZD\V
DIIHFWHGDQGXVXDOO\GLVWRUWHG¶FDQEHRSHQWRµTXHVWLRQ«FKDOOHQJHRUFULWLTXH¶ 
 $QGVR WKRXJK:LOOLDPVDFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW µWKHFLYLFVSDFH LV LQRQHVHQVH
arWLILFLDO¶KHFRQFOXGHVWKDWµLQDFRPSOH[VRFLHW\ LWLVDQHFHVVLW\QRWRQO\IRURUGHU
and social collaboration but also for the intelligent discussion and appropriation of 
PRUH EDVLF OR\DOWLHV DQG DIILOLDWLRQV¶  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV D µSROLWLFDO SOXUDOLVP WKat is 
IXOO\ FRQVFLRXV RI WKH SRWHQWLDO RI LQWHUDFWLYH YDULHW\ « LV D IUXLWIXO FRQWH[W IRU DQ
interreligious encounter that does not compromise convictions but is also ready to 
HQYLVDJHJURZWKDQGFKDQJH¶7KXVKHDUJXHVWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIIDLWKFRPPXnities 
± or certainly, of those faith communities that are committed to the pursuit of truth (in 
its fullest sense, which includes just, moral, rational living) through openness to learn 
from respectful and honest dialogue with others ± is most fully served through this sort 
of secularism.  And by presenting his arguments as he does, he clearly intends to 
contribute to the promotion of such secularism.   
Speaking of Pluralist Secularism         
 +RZHYHU IRU DOO WKDW:LOOLDPV¶ DGGUHVV LOOXVWUDWHV D UDQJH RI close parallels 
ZLWKWKHVRUWRIDSSURDFKWKDW,KDYHGHYHORSHGIURP0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLWDOVRUDLVHV
questions.  The first is the extent to which Williams follows his own advice ± for he 
says almost nothing from within the context of his own faith, barring illustrative 
references to the Nicene Creed and the doctrine of the Trinity, and quotations from the 
-HVXLW VFKRODU )UDQFLV ; &ORRQH\  7KLV IDLOXUH WR VSHDN H[SOLFLWO\ RXW RI µWKH
GLVWLQFWLYH DVVHUWLRQV¶ RI KLV RZQ IDLWK SURPSWV WKH further question of whether, 
notwithstanding all the references to faith communities, the common good, and 
elements of the primary precepts of natural law, his discourse is nonetheless too close 
WRWKHVRUWRIGHUDFLQDWHGµLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG¶RURVWHQVLEO\FRQWH[W-neutral English that, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR 0DF,QW\UH¶V DQDO\VLV LV LQFDSDEOH RI FRQYH\LQJ D IXQGDPHQWDO PRUDO
rationality.  Or are we able to discern, within these references, the seeds (or building 
EORFNVLQWHUPVRIERWKYRFDEXODU\DQGFRQFHSWVRIDIRUPRIµFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH¶
which I postulated in the previous chapter?  
 ,Q:LOOLDPV¶GHIHQFHLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWKHLVVSHDNLQJLQ,QGLDDQGXVLQJ
the Indian context to illustrate his point.  But only in the loosest sense is his 
µFRPPXQLW\RIWUDGLWLRQ¶SUHVHQWZLWKLQIndia, and it is not the public arena of which 
230 
 
KH LV WUXO\ D PHPEHU  $V KH SRLQWV RXW &KULVWLDQLW\ µKDV D SDUWLFXODUO\ YDULHG
H[SHULHQFH¶RIµPRYLQJLQWRDQHZFXOWXUDOVLWXDWLRQDQGVHHN>LQJ@H[SUHVVLRQLQDQHZ
ODQJXDJH¶DQGVRWKHLQVWDQWLDWLRQRI&Kristianity, and particularly Anglicanism ± with 
the Churches of North and South India being United Churches, in which Anglicans 
combined with other denominations ± LVHVSHFLDOO\µ,QGLDQ¶LQLWVFKDUDFWHU:LOOLDPV¶
reflections are consciously intended also for a wider audience, not least within the UK, 
as he said in an interview published in The Hindu later during this visit.594  Here, his 
LQWHUYLHZHU KDG QRWHG KRZ :LOOLDPV KLJKOLJKWHG WKH µGLIIHUHQW VHQVH RI WKH ZRUG
VHFXODULVPKHUHDQGWKHUH¶LHLQ,QGLDDQG%ULWDLQDGGLQJµ,WVLJQLILHVHTXDOUHVSHFW
for all religions and a certain neutrality in religious terms here while in England is 
signifies the principle of separation of matters of Church and state.  Is there a point 
WKHUH WKDW¶V ZRUWK HOXFLGDWLQJ"¶  7R WKLV :LOOLDPV UHVSRQGHG in the terms partially 
quoted in chapter 4:  µZKDW ,¶YH VXJJHVWHG LQ D FRXSOH RI LQWHUYHQWLRQVRYHU WKH ODVW
few years is that we in England need to be much more careful distinguishing between 
what I sometimes call Procedural Secularism, which is, the state steps back but allows 
debate to go on and the state itself stays neutral, and Programmatic Secularism, where 
WKHVWDWHGULYHVDQDJHQGDWRSXVKUHOLJLRQRXWRIWKHSXEOLFVSDFH¶ 
 Nonetheless, to speak in broad terms, as Williams has done in India, 
XQGHUOLQHV WKH GLIILFXOWLHV RI GHYHORSLQJ DQ\ GHSWK RI µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ ZKHUH
there is so little shared on-going context.  This is on a par with the challenges noted, in 
the last chapter, of addressing international political cRQWH[WV VXFK DV 1GXQJDQH¶V
critique of the World Trade Organisation, or, as MacIntyre has argued, within much of 
western academic discourse.  Those, like Williams and Ndungane in these instances, 
ZKRKDYHZKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGµRFFDVLRQDO¶RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR speak into such spaces, 
can probably expect not to be able to do much more than set down the markers of the 
key elements:  citing the vocabulary of the common good and the primary precepts, 
drawing basic connections with the context at hand, and inviting those who more fully 
inhabit those contexts to continue discussion around them.  Those who operate within 
these contexts are better placed to sustain a continuing dialogue in which a more 
textured debate around these elements can be pursued over time ± for it is they who 
have the familiarity with the context that is necessary for seeing how best to develop 
conceptual language suitable for addressing the primary precepts and the common 
good as they are instantiated within these specific circumstances.  This is largely what 
MacIntyre and Hauerwas have done within the academy, as Stout has noted, despite 
persistently expressing negative views of the worth of such endeavours.  This 
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DSSURDFK RXJKW DOVR WR EH DPRQJ WKH SULPDU\ WDVNV RI WKH $QJOLFDQ &RPPXQLRQ¶V
representatives to the United Nations and the European Union, as well as of the 
Provinces of the Communion in their public participation in the life of the nations in 
which they find themselves.  This is illustrated by the continuing engagement of 
Archbishops of Cape Town within the public discourse of South Africa, where they 
utilise a breadth of media from the opinion pieces in newspapers to TV interviews and 
radio phone-in programmes as well as formal sermons and speeches, as part of a 
SHUVLVWHQWµGULSIHHG¶DSSURDFKWRUHWXUQWKHIRFXVRIGHEDWHWRWKHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQRI
µ+RZ WKHQ VKDOO ZH OLYH"¶ DQG KRZ ZH XQGHUVWDQG DQG explore answers to such a 
question. 
 7KHUHIRUH LW LV QRW VXUSULVLQJ WR ILQG LQ :LOOLDPV¶ HDUOLHU VSHHFKHV RQ
programmatic and procedural secularism, made within what he terms the North 
Atlantic, and specifically British, arenas, a much more detailed and contextually 
focussed approach to that he took in India, with far greater reflection of the position 
and practice of his own community of tradition.  Appropriately, these also contain a 
variety of emphases, tailored to the particular circumstances in which he speaks.  
7KHVHUDQJHIRUH[DPSOHIURPWKHHQWLUHO\VHFXODU5D\PRQG:LOOLDPV/HFWXUHµ+DV
6HFXODULVP)DLOHG"¶DWWKH+D\)HVWLYDOLn June 2002 when he was still Archbishop of 
Wales;595 DQG KLV DGGUHVV WR SROLWLFDO OHDGHUV RQ µ5HOLJLRQ &XOWXUH 'LYHUVLW\ DQG
Tolerance ± 6KDSLQJ WKH QHZ (XURSH¶ GHOLYHUHG GXULQJ D YLVLW WR WKH (XURSHDQ
Institutions in November 2005;596 through to talking to academic theologians and 
VRFLDO VFLHQWLVWV RQ µ6HFXODULVP )DLWK DQG )UHHGRP¶ LQ 1RYHPEHU  DW WKH
Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences in Rome;597 or considering 'The finality of 
Christ in a pluralist world' in a meeting with Anglican clergy and laity during a visit to 
the Diocese of Guildford in March 2010.598  I shall consider aspects of each of these in 
turn, to highlight elements either that effectively reflect the praxis I proposed in the 
last chapter, or which could be strengthened by adhering more closely to the approach 
developed from MacIntyre. 
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It should be remembered that it is not merely the task of the Archbishop to 
promote moral rational debate and living within the public sphere ± as is largely the 
focus of the first two of these.  For one lesson RI0DF,QW\UH¶V WUDGition-based moral 
rationality is that Williams, and others like him, must also help members of his own 
community to share in the responsibility, and to take the opportunities that are 
afforded to them ± whether as church leaders, or as engaged Christians in their various 
individual capacities (as William Temple had argued is the task of lay people).  This is 
more the focus of the third, and especially the fourth of these speeches.  And the 
Archbishop, too, must be open to continue learning not only from those outside the 
community, but also from the mutual holding to account and shared dialectic that is an 
LQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VRQ-going pursuit of moral rational living.   
 
Developing a Communal Language for Secularism 
All four of these addresses have as their underlying foundation the same 
VWDQFH DV WKH &KHYHQLQJ /HFWXUH QDPHO\ :LOOLDPV¶ GHVLUH WR HGXFDWH DQG SHUVXDGH
others of the need to work for some form of procedural secularism, through which 
both communities of tradition (including faith communities) and members of society 
as a whole, are best able to pursue authentic flourishing.  However, both the central 
focus and the language which Williams employs varies between them, as we see by 
considering each in turn.   
Thus DW WKH +D\ )HVWLYDO RI /LWHUDWXUH DQG WKH $UWV :LOOLDPV¶ SDUWLFXODU
concern is the failure of programmatic secularism ± too often prevalent in British 
society ± to respond adequately to the common good because of failings in 
understanding the nature of the human person and what true human flourishing 
means.599  Instead, it overly prioritises the functionalism and instrumentalism that are 
UHIOHFWHG LQ µWKH GRPLQDQFH LQ RXU FXOWXUH RI PDQDJHULDO VWDQGDUGV¶ RI EXUHDXFUDWLF
efficiency and of economic criteria, and in consequence also fails morally and 
ethically.  He draws parallels between the ways this threatens both artistic and 
religious life.   
:LOOLDPVEHJLQVE\DUJXLQJWKDWµZHQHHGWRIROORZWKURXJKWKHLPSOLFDWLRQRI
treating secular modernity and functionalism as belonging together; which is that one 
RI VHFXODULVP¶V RSSRVLWHV LV WKH UHVROYH WR UHJDUG WKH HQYLURQPHQW KXPDQDQG QRQ-
KXPDQ DV PRUH WKDQ LQVWUXPHQWDO¶  ,Q WKLV KH LV YRLFLQJ RSSRVLWLRQ WR ZKDW
:ROWHUVWRUIIKDVGHVFULEHGDVWKHµFRPSHWLWLRQ-of-LQWHUHVWVSRVLWLRQ¶EULQJLQJWREHDU
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DQDQDO\VLVWKDWUHVHPEOHV6WRXW¶VVWHUHRVFRSLFVRFLDOFULWLFLVPXQPDVNLQJWKHKLGGHQ
or false, agendas of this form of secularism, as well as focussing on its inadequate, 
HYHQ ZDUSHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V µPHWDSK\VLFDO ELRORJ\¶ DQG KXPDQLW\¶V
common good and right telos  6XFK D VHFXODULVP VD\V :LOOLDPV µLPSOLHV WKDW WKH
GHILQLWLYH ³FXUUHQF\´ RI WKH SXEOLF UHDOP LV WR GR ZLWK FDOFXODWLRQ DERXW IXQFWLRQV,¶
DQG LQ WKH ZD\ LW SURSRVHV ZKDW LV µUXOHG ³DGPLVVLEOH´ LQ SXEOLF GLVFRXUVH¶, it 
µVXJJHVWV WKDW WKH PRVW VXEVWDQWLYH PRWLYDWLRQ RI DW OHDVW D ORWRI DJHQWV DQG JURXSV
ZLOOEHUXOHGRXWRISXEOLFGLVFRXUVHLWZLOOKDYHWRGUHVVLQERUURZHGFORWKHV¶  This 
HFKRHV :ROWHUVWRUII DQG 6WRXW¶V FRQFHUQV RI KRZ rational moral engagement is 
undermined when people cannot engage on the basis of their genuine convictions.   
Williams readily finds common cause with those attending the Festival, as he 
FLWHV WKH µOLIH RI WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ¶ DHVWKHWLFV DQG DUW DV H[DPSOHV RI ZKDW LV µQHYHU
UHGXFLEOHWRDQLQVWUXPHQWDODFFRXQWRIWKHZRUOG¶DOORIZKLFKOLHVDORQJVLGHWKRXJK
is not coterminous with, UHOLJLRXVVHQVLELOLW\+HZDUQVRIWKHµXOWLPDWHO\H[FOXVLYH
even anti-KXPDQLVWFORVXUH¶IRUZKLFKKHVHHVVHFXODULVPµELGGLQJ¶DQGWKHZD\WKDW
µWKHXOWLPDWHVHFXODULW\RI LPDJLQDWLRQ¶HQWDLOVµDFRQGLWLRQZLWKRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
DUW¶DQG WKHQJRHVRQ WRGUDZOLQNVZLWKµDIXUWKHUDQGGLVWXUELQJGLPHQVLRQ WR WKLV
which needs mentioning, and that is the effective secularisation of a great deal of 
UHOLJLRXV GLVFRXUVH¶ +H WKHQ WXUQV WR KLV RZQ FRPPXQLW\ RI WUDGLWLRQ VSHDNLQJRI
aspects of the Christian faith on its own terms though while also employing similar 
vocabulary and concepts to those he has used in relation to the arts.  Thus he talks of 
WKH µLQFRPPHQVXUDEOH¶ QDWXUH RI *RG¶V SHUVSHFWLYH :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V GHVFULSWLRQV RI
UHOLJLRXV ODQJXDJHDQGSUDFWLFH WKH LPSRUWDQFH WR IDLWKVRI µVHOI-imagining and self-
LQWHUSUHWLQJWKURXJKSUD\HUDQGDFWLRQ¶,QWKLVZD\KHXVHV images and language that 
DUH URRWHG LQ IDLWK FRPPXQLWLHV¶ DQG VSHFLILFDOO\ &KULVWLDQ WUDGLWLRQ¶V RZQ VHOI-
understanding, but which resonate with the discourse of literature and the arts.     
 In this substantial speech, Williams moves back and forth between these 
themes, giving various other illustrations of the dehumanising dangers of 
programmatic secularism both to the world of art and literature and, in very similar 
ways, to the world of faith, and offering his solutions.  This is a means of educating 
and encouraging his listeners in the sort of critique of the public space which is the 
right, and latent capacity, of all plain persons, according to MacIntyre.  By drawing 
clear links between the arts and religion (for example, arguing that µWKH VXFFHVV RI 
secularism is not only a problem for modern religion; it is manifestly an issue for the 
DUWV¶KHLPSOLFLWO\LQYLWHVKLVDXGLHQFHWRGUDZUHVRXUFHVIURPKLVRZQIXOO\-realised 
community of tradition on what it is to be human and flourish, and to find tools with 
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which to lay bare the destructive influences too often prevalent in contemporary 
society.   
Though he may do so unconsciously, Williams is in this way, I would 
FRQWHQG ZRUNLQJ WRZDUGV GHYHORSLQJ WKH VRUW RI FRQFHSWXDO µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶
which I proposed in the previous chapter:  the context-specific instantiation of a 
world-view that can sustain at least some degree of discourse around the elements on 
which plain persons can engage their rulers, and which can develop increasing depth 
and texture.  He does so through the skills of what we might describe as 
µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ in relation to both literature and the arts (he has written on 
Dostoyevsky, and published poetry, alongside his theological works) as well as the 
socio-political context of contemporary Britain.  Such bilingualism should work both 
ways, not only speaking into the public space, but also opening the door so those from 
outside his own community of tradition, or indeed any such community, can begin to 
see into ± and perhaps themselves be drawn into ± the operation of rational morality 
through the social practices of his own community, which is directed towards such 
HQGV  ,QGHHG:LOOLDPV LPSOLFLWO\XQGHUVFRUHV0DF,QW\UHDQG6WRXW¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW
true moral languages are to be found within the social practices of communities, when 
KHVD\VWKDWµWKHDVSLUDWLRQ>RIVHFXODULVP@WRXQLYHUVDOGHVFULSWLRQPXVWEHFKDOOHQJHG
E\WKHORFDOLVPVRI³QDWXUDOODQJXDJH´± which for this purpose includes the poetic and 
WKHUHOLJLRXV¶$QGVRKHHQGVZLWKKLVRSHQLQJTXHVWLRQµ+DVVHFXODULVPIDLOHG"7KH
combination of a robust poetics, a self-scrutinising theology and a politics resolved 
against one-dimensionality suggests at least some ways of answering without resort to 
Enlightenment placebos or reVWRUDWLRQLVW UHOLJLRVLW\¶  7KLV QHDWO\ HQFDSVXODWHV ERWK
the concerns of stereoscopic social criticism and their remedies through the 
engagement of plain persons ± the fundamental building blocks for developing an ever 
more fully realised moral, rational, discourse.  
 On turning to :LOOLDPV¶ OHFWXUH WR WKH SROLWLFDO OHDGHUV RI WKH (XURSHDQ
Institutions,600 we find that the focus is unsurprisingly rather more on the locus and 
exercise of legitimate authority and power ± another issue which MacIntyre argues 
that plain persons have the capacity to address.  His particular target seems to be to 
expose and oppose the tendency of the states and institutions of modernity to step 
outside their historic contingency and to arrogate to themselves authority to be arbiters 
their own legitimacy.  He aims instead to offer to those who wield power and 
influence a better way of doing so, to achieve the valid liberal goals of freedom and 
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SURVSHULW\ ZLWK VHFXULW\  ,W LV YHU\ PXFK WKH VDPH FULWLTXH RI PRGHUQLW\¶V SROLWLFDO
strucWXUHV ZKLFK OHG 0DF,QW\UH WR VSHDN RI µEHLQJ DVNHG WR GLH IRU WKH WHOHSKRQH
FRPSDQ\¶ VHH FKDSWHU   <HW :LOOLDPV OLNH 0DF,QW\UH LV DOHUW WR WKH 6F\OOD DQG
&KDU\EGLV RI UHSODFLQJ DEVROXWLVP ZLWK UHODWLYLVP LI µ(QOLJKWHQPHQW OLEHUDOLVP¶ ± 
which he descULEHV DV KROGLQJ µWKDW FXOWXUDO DQG UHOLJLRXV YDULHW\ DUH VXSHUILFLDO
PDWWHUVRIFKRLFHRUFKDQFH¶± LVVHHQDV LW µQRZDSSHDUVDVVLPSO\RQHFXOWXUDODQG
KLVWRULFDO SKHQRPHQRQ DPRQJ RWKHUV¶  +LV µVROXWLRQ UHTXLUHV XV ILUVW WR UHWHOO WKH
history of Europe¶LQZKLFKKHDVVHUWVµWKH&KULVWLDQ&KXUFKLVTXLWHVLPSO\WKHPRVW
H[WHQVLYHDQGHQGXULQJ¶LQVWLWXWLRQ/LNH0DF,QW\UHKHORRNVWRWKH anchor provided 
by a persisting community of tradition, rooted in its unfolding historic narrative and its 
quest for all that is true and good and just, and sees in this an authentication of the 
rightness of its beliefs and practices.  Later in his text he points to other key aspects of 
Christian tradition which parallel IXUWKHU EXLOGLQJ EORFNV RI 0DF,QW\UH¶V WUDGLWLRQ-
based rationality, and presents the Church as the crucible of the virtues of European 
SROLWLFDOOLEHUDOLVP+HDOVRIUHHO\DFNQRZOHGJHVIDLOLQJVLQWKHFKXUFK¶VKLVWRU\IURP
which it has had to learn and move forward ± the proper humility required of a sincere 
community of tradition.        
 $V :LOOLDPV SXWV LW µWKH SRLQW RI WKLV UDWKHU EUHDWKOHVV DQG E\ QR PHDQV
uncontroversial) tour of Western European history is to try and identify what the 
DUJXPHQWLVWKDWKDVPDGH(XURSHWKHZD\LWLV¶+LVDQVZHULVWKDWµWKHFRQIOLFWRIWKH
so-called Dark Ages, the encounter between the tribal kingdoms and the Church, the 
tangled relations of common law, canon law and Romanised civil law guarantee that 
political power in Western Europe was always a matter of negRWLDWLRQDQGEDODQFH¶
6R KH FRQFOXGHV WKDW µ'HVSLWH ZKDW VRPH KLVWRULFDO FDULFDWXUHV KDYH PDLQWDLQHG
sovereign state power in Europe was never consistently treated as a sacred thing.  
Political power is always answerable to law and to God, and it is therefore right in 
VRPHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWRFKDOOHQJHLW¶+HLPSOLFLWO\FKDOOHQJHVWKRVHZKRQRZUXQWKH
states and institutions of Europe to acknowledge that they too are answerable not only 
WRWKHPVHOYHV+HPDNHVH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRKRZ$TXLQDVµUHVHUYHG for citizens the 
right to criticise, and even in some circumstance to replace, a monarch on the basis of 
XQLYHUVDOODZ¶ 
)XUWKHU :LOOLDPV DVVHUWV WKDW µ:HVWHUQ PRGHUQLW\ DQG OLEHUDOLVP DUH DW ULVN
when they refuse to recognise that they are the way they are because of the presence in 
WKHLU PLGVW RI WKDW SDUWQHU DQG FULWLF ZKLFK VSHDNV RI ³DOWHUQDWLYH FLWL]HQVKLS´ ± the 
&KULVWLDQFRPPXQLW\¶IRUµLWLVLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHKHDOWKRIWKHSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\WKDW
it is able to engage seriously with the traditiRQLQZKLFKLWVRZQURRWVOLH¶7KLVLVQRW
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KHVD\V µWRGHPDQGWKH LPSRVVLEOHD UHWXUQ WRVRPHSDVWDJHZKHQWKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
&KXUFK FODLPHG WR GLFWDWH SXEOLF SROLF\¶  5DWKHU KLV SRLQW LV WKDW µZLWKRXW D
willingness to listen to the questions and challenges of the Church, liberal society is in 
GDQJHU RIEHFRPLQJ LOOLEHUDO¶ +HUHLQ OLHV WKH FUX[ RI KLV FRQFHUQ  WKDW WKRVH ZKR
shape and run contemporary European political structures should have better 
understanding of how to do this well; and that they must realise that genuine dialogue, 
especially with those who have the skills and experiences of moral rational enquiry 
intrinsic to successful communities of tradition, is an essential part of this.  Making 
themselves accountable to their citizens, as Aquinas described, will contribute to, 
rather than undermine, both their legitimacy and their capacity to deliver effective and 
truly liberal democracy.   
 ,Q DUJXLQJ WKDW µWKH GLVWLQFWLYHO\ (XURSHDQ VW\OH RI SROLWLFDO DUJXPHQW DQG
debate is made possible E\WKH&KXUFK¶VSHUVLVWHQWZLWQHVVWRWKHIDFWWKDWVWDWHVGRQRW
KDYHXOWLPDWH UHOLJLRXV FODLPV RQ WKHLU FLWL]HQV¶:LOOLDPVDOVR LPSRUWDQWO\ FRPPLWV
the Church to participating in, and promoting best practices of, the necessary dialectic 
for shaping political power rightly$VKHSXWVLWµWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKH&KXUFKDWOHDVW
goes on obstinately asking the state about its accountability and the justification of its 
SULRULWLHV¶7KLVODQJXDJHFORVHO\HFKRHV0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHUROHRIµSODLQ
peUVRQV¶ DQG HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH VNLOOHG LQ WKH PRUDO UDWLRQDOLW\ RI FRPPXQLWLHV RI
tradition.  Williams also stresses the need for states to take account of various 
µLQWHUPHGLDWH LQVWLWXWLRQV JXLOGV XQLRQV FKXUFKHV HWKQLF JURXSV DOO VRUWV RI FLYLO
associDWLRQV¶ZKLFKµKDYHDQDWXUDOOLEHUW\WRH[LVWDQGRUJDQLVHWKHPVHOYHV¶,WLVKH
VD\VµWKHVWDWH¶VUROH«WRKDUPRQLVHDQGWRVRPHGHJUHHUHJXODWHWKLVVRFLDOYDULHW\¶
LQDIRUPRIµLQWHUDFWLYHSOXUDOLVP¶LQZKLFKµGLVWLQFWLYHVW\OHVDQGFRQYLFWLRQVFRuld 
challenge each other and affect each other, but on the basis that they first had the 
IUHHGRPWREHWKHPVHOYHV¶We would expect MacIntyre to endorse his emphasis on 
the important role civil society groupings play as potential arenas for developing the 
practices of moral reasoning, which can then be brought to bear through those 
JURXSLQJV¶HQJDJHPHQWRQWKHLURZQWHUPVLQWKHZLGHUSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W 
Islam and Pluralist Secularism 
 Williams devotes part of this European speech to considering how Islam and 
Muslim communities might find a place within the sort of democratic pluralist 
secularism he describes.  This is an important topic, adequate consideration of which 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  But let me offer some limited comment on how 
an approach rooted in a MacIntyrean justification of appropriate relationships between 
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nation states and their citizens, and as further developed and instantiated through the 
writing and speaking of such as Stout, Wolterstorff and Williams, could make a vital 
contribution to current debates within the UK.   
In his 5 February 2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference,601 British 
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU 'DYLG &DPHURQ GHVFULEHG ZKDW KH VDZ DV WKH µIDLOXUH¶ RI µVWDWH
PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶ LQ WHUPV WKDW GUHZ D VKDUS UHVSRQVH from commenters such as 
Madeleine Bunting in the Guardian, who argued his entire analysis was flawed.602  She 
pointed to the undermining of intermediate institutions; the tendency of individualistic 
consumer capitalism to eliminate identity; and the depersonalising effects of 
globalisation as being far more influential factors in weakening shared senses of 
citizenship and national belonging, than the reasons to which Cameron and his party 
have generally alluded here and elsewhere.  These are all consequences of the sort of 
illiberal secularism which Williams has highlighted in these two speeches.  Procedural 
secularism would challenge Cameron to consider whether the root of the problem lies 
in a misconception of the nation state and how it can with integrity demand allegiance.  
Too great an emphasis on instrumental considerations, as found in the discourse of 
much of Conservative Party politics, delivers an approach little better than asking one 
WRµGLHIRUWKHWHOHSKRQHFRPSDQ\¶ 
There also needs to be better debate around questions of what constitutes 
QDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\DQGWKHVRUWRIµVKDUHGFRPPRQYDOXHV¶which, it is often said, should 
be at the centre of national life.  0XFKRIWKHIXURUHRYHU:LOOLDPV¶µSharia¶5DGLR
interview and lecture603 tended to reject outright the question of whether 
µPXOWLFXOWXUDO¶GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ RI DQ\ VRUW ZDV DSSOLFDEOH LQ %ULWLVKSXEOLF OLIH ± and 
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February 2011, accessed 15 May 2011, 
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µArchbishop's lecture - Civil and Religious Law in England: a religious perspective¶
February 2008, accessed 15 May 2011, 
www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/archbishops-lecture-civil-and-religious-
law-in-england-a-religious-perspective.  Full consideration of these and the responses they 
provoked is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Though I would take issue with some of his 
analysis, there is an overview of the issues in Rupert Shortt, 5RZDQ¶V5XOH (London:  Hodder 
& Stoughton, 2008) 390-402. 
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failed to engage with how the speech sensitively addressed this possibility, or to 
recognise positive examples such as in South Africa.  Confident legitimate diversity ± 
constructive multiculturalism ± within the United Kingdom would be better served by 
having at its foundations a shared commitment to a version of procedural secularism, 
rooted in the genuine values that arise from the appropriate expression of the primary 
precepts of natural law within the British context.604  This would, I contend, provide a 
IDUEHWWHUGHVFULSWLRQ RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV µ%ULWLVKQHVV¶DQG RQH IRUZKLFKDOOHJLDQFH
can justifiably be argued, than producing more arbitrary lists of apparent British 
habits, as some politicians and commentators seem prone to do.  At best, these may 
reflect some secondary characteristics of primary principles that could equally well 
find expression in other authentic ways.  In contrast, the approach I describe would 
PDNHLWIDUHDVLHUWRLGHQWLI\VXFKOHJLWLPDF\µIDLUSOD\¶IRUH[DPSOHPD\WDNHPDQ\
JXLVHV 7KLV FRXOG IRUP WKHEDVLV IRU DSSURSULDWH µELOLQJXDOLVP¶EHWZHHQSDUWLFXODU
communities and the wider national identity, rather than either searching for the 
chimera of a Rawlsian commonality, or expecting everyone to speak a sort of 
FRQFHSWXDO µ%ULWLVK(VSHUDQWR¶ WKH IXWLOLW\ RI ZKLFK 6WRXWKDV LQGLFDWHG FKDSWHU
At worst these lists can be little more than hackneyed and superficial stereotypes, 
RIWHQPHUHO\RIµ(QJOLVKQHVV¶VXFKDV1RUPDQ7HEELW¶VQRWRULRXVµFULFNHWWHVW¶ZKLFK
had little applicability to those of us from much of Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland!   
There is considerable potential for improving the discourse around this vital 
issue.605  :H VKRXOG DOVR FRQVFLRXVO\ DQG LQWHQWLRQDOO\ IROORZ :LOOLDPV¶ DGYLFH LQ
SXUVLQJWKHµDOWHUQDWLYHURXWH¶606 ZKLFKµPDWXUH(XURSHDQSROLWLFVZLOOWDNH¶ZKLFKLV
µVHHNLQJ IRU HIIHFWLYH SDUWQHUVKLS ZLWK WKH FRPSRQHQW FRPmunities of the state, 
including religious bodies.  It will try to avoid creating ghettos.  It will value and 
acknowledge all those sources of healthy corporate identity and political formation (in 
WKH ZLGHVW VHQVH WKDW DUH DURXQG¶  0\ VWURQJ UHFRPPHQGDWion would be that the 
Anglican churches in Britain, through the approach outlined above, can, and must, 
make a focussed, deliberate and persistent contribution to this debate in order to 
promote a healthy British society in which all can freely flourish, in accordance with 
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 Admittedly, Cameron in his speech does point to the importance of commitment to 
universal human rights; equality of all before the law; democracy; freedom of speech and of 
worship; and the right of people to elect their own government. 
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 Further debate was invited in a subsequent speech ± 5RZDQ:LOOLDPVµ0XOticulturalism:  
)ULHQGRU)RH"¶0D\DFFHVVHG0D\
www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1152/multiculturism-friend-or-foe-archbishops-
lecture. 
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the good practices set out in the primary precepts of natural law, appropriately 
instantiated within our public life.      
The scope of what the Church can offer here is indicated well by the closing 
VHFWLRQRI:LOOLDPV¶OHFWXUHWRWKH(Xropean Institutions:  
And perhaps this is the central contribution to be made to a future European 
identity by the Christian tradition.  It challenges the global socio-political 
juggernaut - consumer pluralism combined with insensitive Western 
promotion of a rootless individualism, disguised as liberal democracy.  It 
affirms the significance of local and intentional communities, and their role in 
public life.  It is able to welcome the stranger, including the Muslim stranger 
in its midst, as a partner in the work of proper liberalism, the continuing 
argument about common good and just governance.  When it is allowed its 
proper visibility, it makes room for other communities and faiths to be visible.  
By holding the space for public moral argument to be possible and legitimate, 
it reduces the risk of open social conflict, because it is not content to relegate 
the moral and the spiritual to a private sphere where they may be distorted into 
fanaticism and exclusion.  For Europe to celebrate its Christian heritage in this 
sense is precisely for it to affirm a legacy and a possibility of truly 
constructive pluralism.  And for the Church to offer this to Europe (and from 
Europe to the wider world) is not for it to replace its theology with a vague set 
of nostrums about democracy and tolerance but for it to affirm its faithfulness 
to the tradition of Christian freedom in the face of the world's sovereignties. 
7KXVKHQRWRQO\DIILUPVDµWUXO\FRQVWUXFWLYHSOXUDOLVP¶EXWDOVRLQVLVWVWKDWXQGLOXWHG
orthodox Christianity is at its heart. 
,WXUQQRZWRWKHWKLUGDQGIRXUWKRI:LOOLDPV¶VSHHFKHVDURXQGSOXUDOLVPDQG
secularism, which more directly address the churches, and consider the extent to 
which they encourage, educate and resource Christians in their public engagement.  
For they too need to be convinced of what sort of public space can best serve their 
interests, and learn how they can promote this form of secularism and participate 
effectively within it in pursuit of human flourishing for all. 
 
Christian Tradition Engaging with Pluralist Secularism 
 In his November 2006 lecture to the Pontifical Academy, Williams gives 
KLPVHOIWKHWDVNRIµDUJXLQJWKDW³VHFXODU´IUHHGRPLVQRWHQRXJK¶607  For, he says an 
µDFFRXQW RI WKH OLEHUDO VRFLHW\¶ LQ ZKLFK µDUJXPHQW WKDW DULVHV from specific 
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FRPPLWPHQWVRIDUHOLJLRXVRULGHRORJLFDOQDWXUHKDVWREHUXOHGRXWRIFRXUW¶ZKHQLW
FRPHVWRµSXEOLFUHDVRQ¶«µGDQJHURXVO\VLPSOLILHVWKHQRWLRQRIIUHHGRPDQGHQGVXS
GLPLQLVKLQJ RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH KXPDQ SHUVRQ¶  ([SORULQJ WKH OLQks between 
µ6HFXODULVP )DLWK DQG )UHHGRP¶ EHIRUH DQ DFDGHPLF DXGLHQFH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK
pursuing political and socio-economic questions in close relationship with the Roman 
Catholic Church,608 he explicitly raises the alternatives of programmatic and 
procedural secularism; and then considers the implications of each perspective for 
various contemporary public debates, and the concepts of what it is to be human and 
flourish that these bring into question.  Issues range from abortion, the embryo and 
genetic research, and euthanasia, through to educational systems and the environment.  
Williams argues, in terms already familiar, that these illustrate how programmatic 
VHFXODULVP µWKUHDWHQV WR HQG XS LQ SROLWLFDO EDQNUXSWF\¶  :KLOH LWV µHPSW\ SXEOLF
VTXDUH«LPSOLHV in effect that the almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality 
and the public invisibility of specific commitments is enough to provide sustainable 
moral energy for a properly self-FULWLFDOVRFLHW\¶KHFRQWHQGVWKDWLWLVKRZHYHUµQRW
at all self-evident that people can so readily detach their perspectives and policies in 
social or political discussion from fundamental convictions that are not allowed to be 
PHQWLRQHGRUPDQLIHVWHGLQSXEOLF¶ 
 Williams sets out the justifications for a public space in which such 
FRQYLFWLRQVFDQLQGHHGEHPHQWLRQHGDQGPDQLIHVWHGµWKHDOWHUQDWLYHLVDVLWXDWLRQLQ
which ± for example ± religious convictions are granted a public hearing in debate; not 
necessarily one in which they are privileged or regarded as beyond criticism, but one 
in which they are attended to as representing the considered moral foundation of the 
FKRLFHVDQGSULRULWLHVRIFLWL]HQV¶%XWLWLVQRWMXVWWKDWWKHFKXUFKHVPXVWDUJXHDQG
learn how to argue effectively, using resources such as those he provides) that they 
should be heard on their own terms.  For, like liberals who must learn a new sort of 
secularism (as he argued in the previous two speeches), so too the churches must learn 
what it means to operate within this pluralist space.  He warns them to expect that 
µ7KLV LVDSRWHQWLDOO\DQRLVLHUDQGXQWLGLHUVLWXDWLRQWKDQRQHZKHUHHYHU\RQHDJUHHV
ZKDWZLOODQGZLOOQRW³FRXQW´DVDQLQWHUYHQWLRQLQSXEOLFGHEDWH¶ 
Like Wolterstorff, and MacIntyre in his interpretation of Aquinas, Williams 
commends to the church the touchstone of law, in its most basic sense, that is, as 
UHIOHFWLQJ WKHSULPDU\SUHFHSWV  µZKDWPDNHV WKLVPRUH WKDQDIUHH-for-all where the 
loudest voice wins the right to impose views is the shared recognition of law, that 
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 The role of the Academy is described at  
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdscien/own/documents/passhistory.html. 
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V\VWHP RI GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH OLPLWV RI DQ\ LQGLYLGXDO¶V RU JURXS¶V IUHHGRP ZKLFK
represents the agreement in principle of all groups in a society to renounce violent 
struggle or assertion because of a basic trust that all voices are being heard in the 
proceVV RI ³EURNHULQJ´ KDUPRQ\¶  $QG WKRXJK KH SRLQWV RXW WKH GHWDLO RI WKH ODZ
PD\ QRW DOZD\V DFFRUG ZHOO ZLWK UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV IRU H[DPSOH RQ DERUWLRQ µVXFK
GHFLVLRQV DOZD\V UHPDLQ RSHQ WR DUJXPHQW¶ and therefore, given this possibility of 
future change under the sort of secularism he advocates, µFDQEHOLYHGZLWK¶7KRXJK
having to live with some legislation that is offensive PLJKWEH VHHQDV µD VRPHZKDW
high-ULVN SRVLWLRQ¶ KH ZDQWV WR FRQYLQFH KLV OLVWHQHUV WKDW LQ WKH ORQJ WHUP VXFK D
secularism is far more in the churches' interest than any other )RUKHDVVHUWV µLQD
ZRUNLQJ OLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\RID³SURFHGXUDOO\´VHFXODUNLQG WKHUHFDQEH LQWHUDFWLRQ
and public engagement between varieties of both religious and non-religious 
argument.  Essentially what I am suggesting is that this alone guarantees the kind of 
SROLWLFDO IUHHGRP , DPFRQFHUQHG WR GHILQH DQG WR VHFXUH¶  This reflects the sort of 
shared common commitment of Wolterstorff, rather than Rawls. 
Though on the basis of what has been argued earlier in this thesis, it is clear 
that Williams has a strong argument, I nonetheless wonder whether, given his Roman 
Catholic audience, he might have strengthened his case by making explicit the links to 
$TXLQDV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RIQDWXUDO ODZ, also offering them as resources for others to 
draw on them.609  This would have promoted their µELOLQJXDOLVP¶ in both 
communicating the beliefs and practices of the community of tradition ± here, the 
church ± into the wider secular context, but interpreting the secular context so that it 
can be properly understood in, and so engaged with by members of, the community.  
To some degree this is what Williams does in the immediately subsequent passages.  
Here he roots procedural secularism, and the form of law it embodies, in the life of 
Jesus Christ, the teaching of the 1HZ7HVWDPHQWSDUWLFXODUO\WKHµLPDJHU\RIWKH%RG\
RI &KULVW LQ 6W 3DXO¶V OHWWHUV¶ DQG WKH µFDOO DQG HPSRZHULQJ RI &KULVW¶V 6SLULW¶
µ7KHUHLV¶KHVD\VµQR&KULVWLDQLGHQWLW\LQWKHQHZ7HVWDPHQWWKDW is not grounded in 
«DSDWWHUQRIWKHFRPPRQOLIHOLYHGLQWKHIXOOHVWSRVVLEOHDFFRUGZLWKWKHQDWXUHDQG
will of God ± DOLIHLQZKLFKHDFKPHPEHU¶VIORXULVKLQJGHSHQGVFORVHO\DQGVWULFWO\
on the flourishing of every other and in which every specific gift or advantage had to 
EH XQGHUVWRRG DV D JLIW RIIHUHG WR WKH FRPPRQ OLIH¶  +H WKHUHIRUH GUDZV WKH
LPSOLFDWLRQWKDWµ&KULVWLDQLGHQWLW\LVLUUHGXFLEO\SROLWLFDOLQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWGHILQHVD
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 That said, the current Pope, it has been suggested (not least on evidence from his own 
writings), is far less influenced by Aquinas than his predecessor ± VHHµ3RSH%HQHGLFWRQ6W
7KRPDV$TXLQDV¶7KH%HQHGLFW%ORJ-XO\DFFHVVHG0D\
http://popebenedictxvinews.blogspot.com/2010/07/pope-benedict-on-st-thomas-aquinas.html. 
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politeia, a kind of citizenship (Philippians 3:20); yet is existence and integrity are not 
ERXQGWRDVXFFHVVIXOUHDOLVDWLRQRIWKLVFLWL]HQVKLSZLWKLQKLVWRU\¶DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDW
µWKHUH GRHV QRWKDYH WREH D ILQDO DQG VDFUHGSROLWLFDORUGHU FUHDWHG LQ RUGHU IRU WKH
LQWHJULW\RIWKH&KXUFKWRVXUYLYH¶ 
 This, says Williams LV WKH µIXQGDPHQWDO WKHPH RI $XJXVWLQH¶V &LW\ RI *RG
DQG PXFK RI WKH PHGLHYDO WUDGLWLRQ¶ ± though again he does not name Aquinas 
specifically, and so the potential impact of affirming Thomistic teaching is not 
ensured.  With further examples drawn from the Roman era through the Middle Ages, 
the Lutheran and English Reformations, and on to the French Revolution, the 
Enlightenment, and the 18th and 19th centuries, Williams roots his argument in 
unfolding Christian tradition ± or narrative, as MacIntyre might say ± throughout 
which, he says, there has been recognition of an appropriate separation of church and 
VWDWHµ,QDOORIWKLVWKHRORJLFDODQGSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\«WKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWSRLQWZDV
always the recognition that what the state could properly demand of the citizen was 
OLPLWHG E\ UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG REOLJDWLRQV EH\RQG WKH VWDWH¶V UHDFK¶  $ORQJVLGH
Anglican sources, he draws on a treatise of Carl Theodor von Dalberg, later 
Archbishop-(OHFWRURI0DLQ]LQZKLFKLWZDVDUJXHGWKDWµWKHVWDWHH[LVts because of 
the need of citizens to labour together for their common welfare, and there is therefore 
QR QHFHVVDU\ FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDO DQG WKH VWDWH¶  :LOOLDPV also cites the 
&DWKROLFSROLWLFDO WKLQNHU/RUG$FWRQE\FRLQFLGHQFH'DOEHUJ¶VJUHDW-nephew, who 
ZDVLQIOXHQWLDORQPDQ\$QJOLFDQVDQGFRQFOXGHVµZKDWHPHUJHVIURPWKLVUHDGLQJRI
the Christian contribution to the history of political thought, a reading shaped by both 
5RPDQ&DWKROLFDQG$QJOLFDQWKLQNHUV«LVWKDWWKHUH LVVHULRXVFDVHIRr saying that 
some aspects of liberal politics would be unthinkable without Christian theology, and 
that these are the aspects that offer the clearest foundation for a full defence of active 
SROLWLFDO OLEHUW\¶  $IWHU DJDLQ UHIHUHQFLQJ WKH HDUO\ FKXUFK KH then underlines the 
comprehensive applicability of his arguments for a particular sort of Christian 
engagement in politics by asserting ± with examples that range from education and the 
SURWHFWLRQ RI ZRPHQ DQG FKLOGUHQ WKURXJK WR WKH µPDLQWHQDQFH RI VRPH forms of 
WUXVWZRUWK\ DVVRFLDWLRQDO OLIH¶ ± that the contemporary role of the Church in post-
FRQIOLFW$IULFDµLOOXVWUDWHVZLWKGUDPDWLFDQGSRLJQDQWFODULW\H[DFWO\ZKDW>LW@PHDQV¶
WR VD\ DV KH GRHV WKDW µIDLWK LV WKH URRW RI IUHHGRP DQG SURJUDPPDWLF VHFularism 
FDQQRWGHOLYHUDQ\WKLQJFRPSDUDEOH¶ 
 And, in case he has not already made his points sufficiently clear, Williams 
UHLWHUDWHVKLVFRQFHUQVµ3URJUDPPDWLFVHFXODULVPDVDVKRUWKDQGIRUWKHGHQLDORIWKH
public legitimacy of religious commitment as a partner in political conversation, will 
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always carry the seeds, not of totalitarianism in the obvious sense, but of that 
³WRWDOLVLQJ´VSLULWZKLFKVWLIOHVFULWLTXH E\VLOHQFLQJRWKHUV¶7KLVUHIOHFWV 0DF,QW\UH¶V
FULWLTXH RI WKH FODLPV RI µREMHFWLYH QHXWUDOLW\¶ WKDW GHQ\ DQ\ RWKHU SHUVSHFWLYH  ,Q
FRQWUDVWµ3URFHGXUDOVHFXODULVPLVWKHDFFHSWDQFHE\WKHVWDWHDXWKRULW\RIDSULRUDQG
LUUHGXFLEOHRWKHURURWKHUV¶,QWKLVZD\DV:LOOLDPVVWUHVVHVWKHVWDWHLPSRUWDQWO\
µUHPDLQV VHFXODUEHFDXVH DV VRRn as it systematically privileged one group it would 
DOO\LWVOHJLWLPDF\ZLWKWKHVDFUHGDQGVRGHVWUR\LWVRWKHUQHVV¶ZKHUHDVE\UHPDLQLQJ
SURSHUO\VHFXODU µLWFDQPRYH LQWRDQGRXWRIDOOLDQFHZLWK WKHSHUVSHFWLYHVRI IDLWK
depending on the varying and unpredictable outcomes of honest social argument, and 
can collaborate without anxiety with communities of faith in the provision, for 
H[DPSOH RI HGXFDWLRQ RU VRFLDO UHJHQHUDWLRQ¶  7KHUH DUH FORVH SDUDOOHOV ZLWK
0DF,QW\UH¶V DFFRXQW RI $TXLQDV¶ DVVHUWLRn that a ruler ± or, in the contemporary 
context, a system of governance ± does not need to be Christian to be legitimate.  
While Williams does not directly address international organisations, he does 
allude to the importance of the broader perspective, sD\LQJWKDWµWKHFULWLFDOSUHVHQFH
of communities of religious commitment means that it is always possible to challenge 
accounts of political reasoning that take no account of solidarities beyond those of the 
VWDWH¶ +HJRHVRQ WRUHIHU WR'DOEHUJ¶V µDZDUHness of citizenship in a transnational 
FRPPXQLW\ DQG PHPEHUVKLS ZLWKLQ DQ LQWHUGHSHQGHQW FUHDWHG RUGHU¶ DV RIIHULQJ
µYLYLGLOOXVWUDWLRQVRIWKHPRUDOSHUVSHFWLYHVWKDWVWDWHOR\DOWLHVDORQHZLOOQRWVHFXUH¶
- DQGWKLVSRLQWVKLPWRµDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWLGLRP¶RQHWKDWµSRVHVWKHYHU\VLJQLILFDQW
TXHVWLRQRI KRZ³FLYLO VRFLHW\´ LV WREHXQGHUVWRRG¶  , EHOLHYH KH KDV LGHQWLILHG DQ
area requiring considerably more reflection from Christian tradition when he goes on 
WRVD\µWKHLGHDWKDW>FLYLOVRFLHW\@PLght have a properly international dimension is in 
IDFWPRUHDQGPRUHFRPSHOOLQJLQRXURZQGD\¶7KHVRUWRI0DF,QW\UHDQDSSURDFK,
have outlined can offer considerable resources, in particular through arguing for the 
central question of how we conceive humanity, and the common good, for addressing 
the forms of governance of international bodies ± for example through bolstering, 
sustaining and further developing the sort of lines of argument reflected in 
1GXQJDQH¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQLVDWLRQ   
Tackling the global perspective from another angle, Williams again considers 
Islam.  Worth noting here is the particular challenge Williams poses to the Christian 
community to engage with Muslim theologians and political theorists around issues of 
law, secularism, pluralism within Islam, through the sort of careful attentiveness to 
RQH DQRWKHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYHV WKDW XQGHUOLHV WKH 0DF,QW\UHDQ DSSURDFK WR GLDORJXH
EHWZHHQFRPPXQLWLHVRXWOLQHG LQFKDSWHU)RUKHULJKWO\VD\VµXQOHVVZHDUHDEOH
to argue in ways that engage with the distinctive features of Islamic polity and politics, 
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ZHDUH QRWJRLQJ WR FRQQHFW RU WR PDNHDQ\ GLIIHUHQFH¶ 7KHUH DUH&KULVWLDQVZKR
through developing appropriate bilingualism, can play an important role as an 
interpretative bridge between the best of secularism and Islam. 
Williams concludes his speech by affirming the irrevocable 
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVV RI µSURSHU VHFXODULVP¶ IDLWK DQG IUHHGRP DQFKRULQJ WKLV LQ µD
FRQFHSWRI WKHSHUVRQ¶ WKDW LV µXQDYRLGDEO\UHOLJLRXV LQFKDUDFWHU¶ LQ WKDW µLWDVVXPHV
WKDWZH³DQVZHU´QRWRQO\WRFLUFXPVWDQFHVRULQVWLQFWRUHYHQWRHDFKRWKHUEXWWRD
Creator who addresses us and engages us before we ever embark on social 
QHJRWLDWLRQ¶± noting that this is why we regard the very young, very old, or otherwise 
LQFDSDEOHDVQRQHWKHOHVVµSHUVRQVZKRVHGLJQLWLHVDQGOLEHUWLHVDUHLQDOLHQDEOH¶$QG
so, with the nature of what it is to be human and to flourish emphasised in ways that 
UHVRQDWHVWURQJO\ZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVKHHQGVµ7KHVWUXJJOHIor a right balance 
of secular process and public religious debate is part of a wider struggle for a concept 
of the personal that is appropriately robust and able to withstand the pressures of a 
functionalist and reductionist climate.  This is a larger matter than we can explore 
here; but without this dimension, the liberal ideal becomes deeply anti-humanist.  
$QGOLNHLWRUQRWZHQHHGDWKHRORJ\WRDUUHVWWKLVGHJHQHUDWLRQ¶ 
Yet even though Williams ends by putting theology centre stage, many 
Christians may have a question-mark against whether it is possible with integrity to 
engage with a system that gives no privileged position to any faith or ideology.  For is 
not the implication of accepting pluralist secularism in effect to say that one accepts 
the view that Christianity is only one perspective among many of equal legitimacy?  
As noted in chapter 2, there is considerable concern amongst those characterised as 
conservative that so-called liberals sit far too lightly to the core commitments of 
Christianity, as well as embracing what are in their view unacceptably inclusivist or 
universalist soteriologies; and the Church of England and its Archbishop have been 
criticised for excessive accommodation with contemporary political culture.610  Does a 
MacIntyrean analysis allow us to speak unapologetically of our beliefs in the ultimate 
WUXWK RI -HVXV &KULVW LQ D SOXUDOLVW VHFXODULVW FRQWH[W HYHQ WKH VRUW RI µSURFHGXUDO¶
secularism that, as outlined by Wolterstorff and Williams, provides a place where all 
should be able to speak from their own convictions?  And if so, how do we do so in 
practice? 
                                                             
610
 For example, by the then Primate of Nigeria and the Archbishop of Sydney at the launch of 
the Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans / UK in London on 6 July 2009 ± see Peter Akinola, 
µ*UHHWLQJVIURPWKH$UFKELVKRS$NLQROD¶-XO\DFFHVVHG0D\
www.gafcon.org/news/greetings_from_archbishop_akinola/ and PeteU-HQVHQµ7KH-HUXVDOHP
Declaration - ZK\LWPDWWHUV¶-XO\DFFHVVHG0D\
www.gafcon.org/news/the_jerusalem_declaration_why_it_matters/.   
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 It is precisely to these questions that I now turn, in considering the fourth of 
:LOOLDPV¶ VSHHFKHV LQ ZKLFK KH DGGUHVVHV FOHUJ\ DQG ODLW\ RI WKH 'LRFHVH RI
Guildford RQµ7KH)LQDOLW\RI&KULVWLQD3OXUDOLVW:RUOG¶ 
Ultimate Truth in a Pluralist Context 
 µ7KHFODVVLF&KULVWLDQFRQYLFWLRQ¶VD\V:LOOLDPVLVWKDWµZKDWZHHQFRXQWHU
in Jesus Christ is simply the truth.  It is the truth about God and the truth about 
humanity.  Not living into that truth and accepting it, has consequences because this is 
WKH ODVWZRUGDERXW*RGDQG*RG¶V FUHDWLRQ 6RZH VSHDN RI WKH finality of Christ.  
7KHUH¶V QRWKLQJ PRUH WR NQRZ  2U ZH VSHDN RI WKH XQLTXHQHVV RI &KULVW  1R RQH
apart IURP-HVXVRI1D]DUHWKH[SUHVVHVWKHWUXWKOLNHWKLV¶611  Yet, he acknowledges, to 
VSHDNLQVXFKWHUPVµLVSUREOHPDWLFIRUVRPDQ\SHRSOHLQRXUZRUOGWRGD\¶+HSRLQWV
to three areas of diffiFXOW\ PRUDO µ&DQZHEHOLHYH in a just God who ± in effect ± 
pXQLVKHVSHRSOH« ZKR QHYHU KDGD FKDQFH RI KHDULQJDERXW -HVXV"¶ SROLWLFDO µ,I
\RXFODLPWKDW&KULVW LV WKHILQDO WUXWKDERXW*RGDQG WKHXQLYHUVHGRHVQ¶W WKDWJLYH
\RXDSHUIHFW H[FXVH IRU WU\LQJ WR VKXWXSDQ\RQH ZKR VD\VGLIIHUHQW"«,VQ¶W WKLV D
recLSH IRU FRQWHPSW WRZDUGV D ODUJH SDUW RI WKH KXPDQ UDFH"¶ DQG SKLORVRSKLFDO
µ(YHU\WUXWKLVVSRNHQLQWKHWHUPVRILWVRZQFXOWXUHDQGLWVRZQWLPHV:KDWFRXOG
we possibly mean by saying that truth expressed in the Middle East two thousand 
years ago wDVDWUXWKDSSOLFDEOHWRHYHU\ERG\HYHU\ZKHUH":RXOGQ¶WWKLVEHWROLIW
our claims right out of the realm of ordinary human conversation to claim something 
inhuman DQGDFWXDOO\LQGHIHQVLEOHDQGXQVXVWDLQDEOH"¶  
 While these difficulties echo the twin traps noted before of absolutism and 
relativism, including the absolutism of a programmatic secular position, in what 
Williams goes on to say it is clear that they are felt not only by those outside the 
Church, whether from other faiths or none, but also by those within who, for example, 
PD\EHµXQHDV\DERXWWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWEHOLHYLQJLQDEVROXWHWUXWKQHFHVVDULO\PDNHs 
\RXDELJRWDQG LQWROHUDQW« ,QRWKHUZRUGVEHOLHI LQ WKHXQLTXHQHVVRU ILQDOLW\RI
&KULVWLQWKHZD\LW¶VXVXDOO\EHHQXQGHUVWRRGLVVomething that sits very badly indeed 
not just with a plural society (whatever that means) but with a society that regards 
LWVHOIDVOLEHUDORUGHPRFUDWLF¶ 
 7KRXJK :LOOLDPV DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKHVH DUH µSRZHUIXO REMHFWLRQV¶ KH
insists that the answer is to show what a properly pluralist, liberal and democratic 
society ought to look like, and then to show how these difficulties variously fall away 
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in this context, allowing Christians to speak on their own terms without risk of such 
SLWIDOOV µLI ZH DUH WR FRmmend the Christian faith in our own social and cultural 
FRQWH[WZHQHHG WREHYHU\VXUHZKDWZH¶UHFRPPHQGLQJDQGKRZWRPHHWVRPHRI
WKHVH REMHFWLRQV¶  2QH WKLQJ WKDW KH LV QRW SUHSDUHG WR GR LV µWR JLYH XS RQ WKH
uniqueness or finality of Jesus Christ.¶ 
 I shall not consider his response to the moral objection in detail, given that 
questions of theology per se are not at the heart of this thesis.  But it is pertinent to 
QRWHWKDWLQHQXQFLDWLQJKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIVDOYDWLRQLQWHUPVRIEHLQJµFUHDWHd to be 
VRQVDQGGDXJKWHUVRIWKHKHDYHQO\)DWKHU¶KHVWUHVVHVµ7KDW¶VZKDWKXPDQEHLQJVDUH
made for¶612  ,QRWKHUZRUGVDFOHDUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQLW\¶V telos, so central to 
0DF,QW\UH¶V PRUDO UDWLRQDOLW\ LV DOVR DW WKH KHDUW RI ZKDW :LOOLDPV DIILUPV.  And 
EHFDXVHWKLVDSSOLHVWRDOOKXPDQLW\µXQIDLUQHVVLVQRW*RGDUELWUDULO\GHFLGLQJWKDWLI
\RXGRQ¶WEHOLHYHWKDW\RX¶UHRXW8QIDLUQHVVZRXOGEHQRWWU\LQJWRVKDUHWKDWKXPDQ
SRVVLELOLW\DVEURDGO\DVSRVVLEOH¶,QHIIHFW:LOOLDPVDUJXHVWKDWIRU*RG¶VSHRSOHWR
act justly ± which, according to MacIntyre, is an intrinsic part of pursuing moral 
rationality ± WKH\PXVWSURPRWHKXPDQLW\¶V ULJKW telos as effectively as they can.  In 
this way, a MacIntyrean justification can be shown to underpin the necessity of the 
missionary, even evangelistic, vocation of the Church, enunciated unconstrainedly into 
an appropriately pluralist secular context.      
 :LOOLDPV¶UHVSRQVHWRWKHSROLWLFDOREMHFWLRQUHFDOOV0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRID
Thomistic view of truth, which is, as noted in chapter 2, ultimately to see things as 
they truly are when viewed from the standpoint of God, and to think of them as God 
thinks of them.  For though, says Williams, we speak about God in ways that are 
µFXOWXUDOO\ H[SUHVVHG¶ ZKDW ZH QHHG LV WR µEHOLHYH WKDW *RG UHDOO\ LV *RG¶ DQG WKH
PRUHZHGR WKLV µWKH OHVV>ZH@EHOLHYH*RGQHHGV WREHSURWHFWHGE\KXPDQEHLQJV
IURP WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI KLV RZQ UHFNOHVVQHVV¶  7KRXJK XVLQJ YHU\ GLIIHUHQW
language to MacIntyre, what Williams is sayLQJ FRPHV FORVH WR 0DF,QW\UH¶V
requirement that, in humility, we seek after an ever greater apprehension of the truth 
WKDWLV*RGDQGRIUHDOLW\VHHQIURP*RG¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGWKDWWKLVLVZKDWZHPXVW
aim to convey to others.613  Further, we allow ourselves to be critiqued, and critique 
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 6KRUWWTXRWHV2OLYHU2¶'RQovan as describing Williams, on his appointment as Archbishop 
RI&DQWHUEXU\DVµDWKHRORJLDQZKRGRHVQRWWKLQNLWWKHEXVLQHVVRIWKHRORJ\³WRPDNH
&KULVWLDQIDLWKOHVVRIIHQVLYHWRPRGHUQPDQEXWUDWKHUWRH[SDQGPRGHUQPDQ¶VLPDJLQDWLRQ
to the dimensioQRI7ULQLWDULDQIDLWK´¶6HHH[WUDFWIURP6KRUWW5*RG¶V$GYRFDWHV
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others, on the basis of this truth into understanding of which we grow, but we never 
make ourselves arbiters of the truth in the way that programmatic secularism and the 
µ(QOLJKWHQPHQW3URMHFW¶DVSLUHWRGR  
 The philosophical objection can be similarly tackled.  Williams draws the 
FDUHIXOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQZURQJO\µFODLP>LQJ@«WKDWWKHUHLVDQDEVROXWHO\VDFUHG
IRUP RI ZRUGV WKDW WHOOV XV HYHU\WKLQJ ZH QHHG WR NQRZ¶ DQG ULJKWO\ µVD\>LQJ@
something about human nature which is beyond change and negotiation; something 
DERXWWKHZD\ZHDUHDVKXPDQV¶$VKHVWUHVVHVµFRPSOHWHUHODWLYLVPDERXWKXPDQ
EHLQJV LV QRWDFWXDOO\VRPHWKLQJ WKDWFDQEHVXVWDLQHG¶  ,QRWKHUZRUGVZHFDQSXW
pursuit of a right understanding of what it is to be fully human centre stage ± as 
MacIntyre proposes plain persons should do ± and do so confident that, in the integrity 
of how we practice our own faith, we are ourselves being led ever more fully into an 
answer that reflects the absolute WUXWK)RUDV:LOOLDPVDIILUPVµZHDUHDOZD\VDOVR
WDONLQJ DERXW KXPDQLW\ PDGH LQ WKH GLYLQH LPDJH  :H FDQ¶W SXOO WKRVH DSDUW¶
7KHUHIRUH µ:H FODLP WKDW WKHUH LV DEDVLF GLJQLW\ DQGDEDVLF GHVWLQ\ IRU DOO KXPDQ
beings, and we claim that in relationship with Jesus the world made flesh become fully 
UHDO¶  2Q WKH basis RI WKHVH DUJXPHQWV ZKLFK VR FORVHO\ IROORZ 0DF,QW\UH¶V
reasoning, :LOOLDPVDVVHUWV WKDW µ([SUHVVHG LQ WKHVH WHUPV LW LV , EHOLHYHSRVVLEOH WR
answer some of the moral, political and phiORVRSKLFDOTXHVWLRQV¶ 
 -XVW DV IRU 0DF,QW\UH¶V SODLQ SHUVRQV WKH H[SORUDWLRQ DQG SXUVXLW RI WKH
common good goes hand in hand with the conduct of that exploration and pursuit, so 
too Williams understands that it is not just what Christians assert about humanity, but 
also the way that we do this, that matters in public debate.  This includes being open to 
learn ± a necessity on both theological and philosophical grounds.  As Williams puts 
LW µLQ WUXHGLDORJXHZLWKSHRSOHRIGLIIHUHQW IDLWKVRUFRQYLFWLRns we expect to learn 
VRPHWKLQJ  ZH H[SHFW WR EH GLIIHUHQW DV D UHVXOW RI WKH HQFRXQWHU¶  %XW MXVW DV
MacIntyre says that we need not proceed as though our core tenets were in question 
unless there is good reason so to do, so Williams reassures his listHQHUVµ:HGRQ¶WDVD
rule expect to change our minds.  We come with conviction and gratitude and 
FRQILGHQFH EXW LW¶V WKH FRQILGHQFH WKDW , EHOLHYH DOORZV XV WR HPEDUN RQ WKHVH
HQFRXQWHUV KRSLQJ WKDW ZH PD\ OHDUQ « $QG WR VD\ WKDW , KDYH OHDUQHG IURP D
Buddhist or a Muslim about God and humanity is not to compromise where I began.  
Because the infinite truth that is in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is not a 
matter which can be exhausted by one set of formulae or one set of practices.  I may 
                                                                                                                                                                 
O., 2003, Rowan Williams, The New Archbishop of Canterbury, Pro Ecclesia, 12(1), pp. 5-8, 
available at http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/page.cfm?ID=600. 
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emerge from my dialogue as confident as I have ever been about the Trinitarian nature 
RI *RG DQG WKH ILQDOLW\ RI -HVXV DQG \HW VD\ WKDW ,¶YH OHDUQHG VRPHWKLQJ , QHYHU
GUHDPHGRIDQGWKDWP\GLVFLSOHVKLSLVHQULFKHGLQJUDWLWXGHDQGUHVSHFW¶  
 With various examples from Scripture as well as from the contemporary 
5RPDQ &DWKROLF WKHRORJLDQ *DYLQ '¶&RVWD :LOOLDPV VSHDNV LQ WHUPV WKDW UHVRQDWH
with orthodox Anglican tradition, running these in parallel with his more 
philosophically couched arguments.  He draws his speech to a close saying:  
belief in the uniqueness and finality of Jesus Christ ± for all the assaults made 
upon it in the modern age ± remains for the Christian a way of speaking about 
hope for the entire human family.  And because it's that, we are bound to say 
something about it.  We are very rightly suspicious of proselytism, of 
manipulative, bullying, insensitive approaches to people of other faith which 
treat them as if they knew nothing, as if we had nothing to learn and as if the 
tradition of their reflection and imagination were of no interest to us or God.  
God save us from that kind of approach.  But God save us also from the 
nervousness about our own conviction which doesn't allow us to say that we 
speak about Jesus because we believe he matters.  
Thus Williams argues that the Church should with confidence enunciate its beliefs 
within a pluralist context in ways that can avoid both inappropriate absolutism and 
ERXQGOHVVUHODWLYLVPZKLFKGUDZRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDGYLFHWRSODLQSHUVRQVDQGZKLFK
reflect the processes of theoretical enquiry both within and between traditions.   
Lessons for the Church 
I see the central lessons exemplified in these four addresses as follows.  The 
need for the church is twofold.  First, it must know how to argue for a public space in 
which its own convictions can indeed be mentioned and manifested (to borrow 
:LOOLDPV¶ WHUPLQRORJ\DQGVHFRQG LWPXVWNQRZKRZWKHQ WRXVH WKHRSSRUWXQLWLHV
this offers in order to communicate effectively what it believes about the issues at 
KDQGZLWKLQWKHZLGHUFRQWH[WRIDGGUHVVLQJWKHIXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQVRIµ+RZWKHQ
VKDOOZHOLYH"¶WKDWDUHDWWKHKHDUWRIULJKWKXPDQWHOHRORJ\,QWHUPVRIGUDZLQJWKH
OLQN ZLWK WKH WKHRU\ RI WKH ODVW FKDSWHU GHYHORSHG IURP 0DF,QW\UH¶V DVVHUWLRQs in 
relation to plain persons, this means working for a public space where there is 
agreement that the central focus of debate is around the twin question of what is the 
common good and how it may be achieved, and, further, that this debate is to be 
conducted (and the wider political context shaped) according to the primary precepts 
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of natural law ± and this must include participants being able to communicate from the 
perspective of their own beliefs and practices.  It also means proposing answers to the 
question of what constitutes the common good and its just achievement, in ways that 
most help draw others into the social practices and conceptual language of the best of 
moral reasoning.  This will necessarily include communicating why we believe human 
flourishing, of individuals and of society, is best achieved through authentic Christian 
faith and life. 
  I have considered these speeches by Williams in some detail, because I 
believe that though he may not have done so deliberately, he has in practice come 
close to the sort of approach that follows from the MacIntyrean analysis of previous 
chapters.  For these speeches demonstrate many of the key elements MacIntyre 
describes as necessary, both to communities of tradition in their pursuit of moral 
rationality, and to plain persons acting within public arenas.  Williams has provided 
theoretical justification of what he terms procedural secularism, both to secular 
audiences and in speaking to the church.  He has also offered justification, resources 
(conceptual and linguistic), and methodological guidelines for engaging substantively 
around central questions of the nature of what it is to be human and to flourish, both to 
civil society and to Christian clergy and laity.  There is much here from which others, 
especially within the Church, can learn, and on which they can build.   
That said, Williams deploys his arguments with great subtlety and 
sophistication ± a subtlety that perhaps means that the radical importance and 
fundamental strength of his arguments may sometimes be lost on his listeners, who are 
not aware of the powerful theoretical justifications of MacIntyre and how well the two 
cohere.  My recommendation to those who are engaged in the public discourse of the 
church within the public sphere, would be that, at least sometimes, more of the 
underlying fundamentals provided by MacIntyrean justification could be explicitly 
enunciated, both as a resource on which the churches could draw in their own self-
understanding, and in bolstering the Christian perspective (and confidence in 
deploying it) in pluralist debate.  In particular, I would propose more attention be 
given to the arguments around what constitutes rationality, including moral rationality, 
in relation to human living, and why it is that communities of faith may well have 
VWURQJHUFDVHVWRPDNHWKDQWKHLURSSRQHQWV)RUWKRXJKWKHVWUHQJWKRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
arguments, alongside those of Wolterstorff, and others, in overturning foundationalist 
justification, are understood within the field of philosophy of religion (and also where 
appropriate in philosophy of science), in western public popular discourse there 
remains too widespread a conviction that to have religious faith is to be irrational.  
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Indeed, such is the pervasiveness of this view that even among Christians there can be 
an assumption that rationality and faith are somehow of different orders, and even that 
it is wrong to attempt any sort of rational justification of belief because this will serve 
to undermine true faith.  Both Christians and their interlocutors need to be exposed to 
the clear message that main-line historic Christianity, at least, has high claims to 
rationality.  
 Therefore Christians, especially from historic traditions compatible with 
0DF,QW\UH¶V 7KRPLVWLF $ULVWRWHOLDQLVP RXght to be encouraged to grasp the reality 
WKDWWKH\HQMR\DIDLWKWKHPRUDOUDWLRQDOLW\RIZKLFKLVMXVWLILDEO\µJRRGHQRXJK¶IRU
QRZ DQG FHUWDLQO\ µJRRG HQRXJK¶ WR VHUYH DV D EDVLV IRU HQJDJHPHQW LQ WKH SXEOLF
space.  They should be better resourced to speak about the integrity of the moral 
rationality they espouse, and to counter arguments challenging this; and to address 
questions of substance from this perspective; and to do both with the humble but 
unassailable confidence that, given their own pursuit of the ultimate truth that is found 
in God whose world this is and whose creation we all are, they stand only to gain from 
the sort of honest open exchange with others of which I have written.  (As before, 
there are separate concerns which would apply, from, say, a political perspective over 
the appropriateness of dealing with certain interlocutors or within certain contexts, or 
a tactical viewpoint.) 
A Better Bilingualism 
 This leads me to a further comment on the speeches and writings of Rowan 
Williams, which relates to the extent to which he follows his own conclusions that 
Christians can and should speak from within their own convictions, not only in 
relation to the broad question of a place for a religious perspective in the public arena, 
but also when it comes to discussing specific ethical issues.  For to do this both 
promotes the possibilities of the sort of discourse that is found in procedural 
secularism (including through illustrating what it means to belong to a well-
functioning community of tradition, and so encouraging others to pursue moral 
rationality by similar means), and additionally provides the best possible contribution 
that Christians are able to make (being the product of their best endeavours towards 
moral rationality) on the substance of the matter in question.  Yet there are many 
occasions when Williams confines himself to, at most, implicit allusions to the essence 
of what it is to be human and the common good, without clearly drawing the links 
with the beliefs and practices of faith.  
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 Of course, there are occasions where there is limited opportunity to offer more 
than a very brief contribution, as, for example, in the House of Lords debate on the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (previous chapter).  Though most listeners 
might consider Williams FDOO IRU µIXUWKHU FODULW\¶ LQ UHVSRQVH WR ZKDW KH VHHV DV
µLQH[RUDEOH¶ PRYHPHQW RI OHJLVODWLRQ µtowards a more instrumental view of how we 
PD\ WUHDWKXPDQRUJDQLVPV¶ D IDLU HQRXJKFRPPHQW RQO\ WKRVHSDUWLFXODUO\ DOHUW WR
the philosophical issues are likely to recognise the full import from a Christian 
perspective.  In the considerably longer contribution to the debate on the Good 
&KLOGKRRG ,QTXLU\ 5HSRUW LQ )HEUXDU\  KH RQO\ PHQWLRQV µWKH GLPHQVLRQ RI
UHOLJLRXV IDLWK¶ LQ D VKRUW Vection at the very end, with a single explicit reference to 
µWKH *RVSHO¶V LQMXQFWLRQ WR WDNH H[DPSOH IURP FKLOGUHQ «¶614  And while, after his 
LQWURGXFWRU\ UHPDUNV KH GRHV EHJLQ E\ VD\LQJ µ7KH UHSRUW SDLQWV D YHU\ VREHULQJ
picture of a society that has become clumsy and neglectful in the priority it gives to 
the central task of civilised humanity:  the task of inducting children into responsible 
DQG IXOILOOLQJ OLIH¶ LW LV RQO\ WKRVH DEOH WR UHDG EHWZHHQ WKH OLQHV ZKR ZLOO VHH WKH
potential linkage to issues RIWKHFRPPRQJRRGDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV7KH
rest of the speech could have made been just as readily by someone with no faith 
commitment.  It seems to me that when Williams uses solely such discourse he has 
RYHUO\FKRVHQWRµGUHVVLQERUURZHG FORWKHV¶ZKLFKLVSUHFLVHO\ZKDWKHVSRNHDJDLQVW
in his Hay Festival lecture. 
 7KHVH H[DPSOHVFRQWUDVWZLWKKLV0DUFKVSHHFKRQµ(WKLFV(FRQRPLFV
DQG *OREDO -XVWLFH¶615  This incisive commentary (not addressed to a faith-based 
audience) on the roots of the so-FDOOHGµFUHGLWFUXQFK¶DQGWKHUHPHGLHVLWPRVWQHHGV
contextualises these themes wholly within questions of what constitutes genuine well-
being (including care for the vulnerable) and of the need to maintain trust, 
accountability, respect and other aspects of the MacIntyrean language of plain 
persons.  He also argues against privileging economic-based criteria, especially when 
rooted in false concepts of unlimited natural resources.  Alongside these building 
EORFNVRIDµFRPPXQDOODQJXDJH¶IRr the secular space, there is continuing referencing 
of a breadth of Christian teaching from Scripture and the life of Christ, through the 
monastic era, to the legacy of Roman Catholic social teaching and of Church of 
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England social theologians and Archbishops of the last two centuries.  Taken together, 
these provide the dominant narrative, within which quotations from business analysts, 
academics, political commentators are placed.  It a speech that only a Christian can 
have given; and, further, it seems to me to exemplify what can be achieved, by 
Williams both speaking out of his own tradition, and offering what is in effect a 
µSDUDOOHOWUDQVODWLRQ¶IURPKLVRZQEHOLHIVDQGSUDFWLFHVLQWRWKHEDVLFEXLOGLQJEORFNV
RI D µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ IRU WKH SDUWLFXODr context which he is addressing.  Its 
contribution to the secular arena is analogous to that of his Royal Charter sermon in 
addressing those with WKHEDVLVRIDµPRUDOODQJXDJH¶FKDSWHU:LOOLDPVKDVEHHQ
DEOH WR SUHVHQW &KULVWLDQ DQG µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ DUJXPHQWV LQ SDUDOOHO RQ other 
topics, for example, climate change, whether in the public lecture sponsored by the 
Christian group Operation Noah in Southwark Cathedral616 in October 2009 or in the 
YHU\EULHIVORWDOORWWHGRQWKH7HUU\:RJDQVKRZ¶V3DXVe for Thought617 in December 
later that year.  
 For surely, it is the task of the Christian voice to contribute what cannot, or 
cannot so easily or clearly or justifiably, be said from another perspective.  Bishops 
need to show they have something particular to add, or why should their voice be 
given any particular attention?  Stout criticises the way that, within academic circles, 
there has been an assumption ± false, in his view ± WKDWWKHUHLVµDQH[FOXVLYHFKRLFH
between two foci of loyalty, that one must WXUQRQH¶VEDFNRQWUDGLWLRQLQRUGHUWREH
heard by the educated public at large (and vice versa).¶618  TKLVKDVµWXUQHGWKHRORJLDQV
LQWR PHWKRGRORJLVWV¶ WKH UHVXOW RI ZKLFK LV WKDW µVHFXODU LQWHOOHFWXDOV KDYH ODUJHO\
VWRSSHG SD\LQJ DWWHQWLRQ¶ VLQFH µDFDGHmic theologians have increasingly given the 
LPSUHVVLRQRIVD\LQJQRWKLQJDWKHLVWVGRQ¶WNQRZDOUHDG\¶,ZRXOGZDQWWRDUJXHWKDW
in all areas, on all occasions, we should at least consider seriously the need to go 
EH\RQGVD\LQJµZKDWDWKHLVWVZRXOGNQRZ DOUHDG\¶VRWRVSHDN,QGHHG,ZRXOGZDQW
to suggest that the tendency, particularly since the middle of the twentieth century, by 
many church people to speak only in the language of this sort of secularism (for 
sincere but misguided reasons, generally URRWHG LQ µWKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW SURMHFW¶) has 
H[DFHUEDWHGWKHDVVXPSWLRQE\RWKHUVWKDWWKHFKXUFKKDVµQRWKLQJWRVD\¶ 
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 Of course, there are other pertinent considerations.  Williams engages as the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and an Anglican intellectual of long-standing, and therefore 
he is inevitably seen as speaking from a Christian perspective, and the invitations he 
receives to address various audiences come to him on this basis.  He, like other 
Anglican Bishops in the UK and elsewhere who similarly receive opportunities to 
speak (as do also other clergy and those known to be practicing Christians), will 
encounter far more of an expectation that he will employ faith-based discourse than 
WKRVH LQYLWHG IRU RWKHU UHDVRQV ZKR QRQHWKHOHVV µKDSSHQ WR EH &KULVWLDQV¶  7KLV
should strengthen the arguments in favour of the former speaking explicitly from the 
faith perspective, when balanced against other factors such as the political and tactical 
arguments about where to pitch not only individual speeches but also the overall 
balance of public utterances.  For there will doubtless be occasions where the greatest 
impact can be achieved through concentrating more on building up the communal 
language than on providing a detailed account of aspects of the life of faith, and other 
times when the reverse will be true.    
 A good example of this expectation comes from the retired Conservative 
politician, and Roman Catholic convert, Ann Widdecombe, writing in the Daily 
Express that she had cheered on hearing of the death of Osama Bin Laden ± as no 
doubt did many other of its readers.619  %XWVKHZHQWRQWRVD\WKDWµThe fact that I did 
FKHHU GRHV QRW PHDQ ,¶P XQV\PSDWKHWLF WR WKH VHQWLPHQWV RI WKH $UFKELVKRS RI
Canterbury who professed discomfort at the killing of an unarmed mDQ,W¶VWKHGXW\
of the church to remind us of our obligations towards wrongdoers because nobody else 
will.  An Archbishop of Canterbury should put the gospel first and political 
H[SHGLHQF\VHFRQG,IZHGRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHQVHFXODULVPKDVVRIDUeaten away 
WKH QDWLRQ¶V FRQVFLHQFH WKDW ZH KDYH FRPSOHWHO\ ORVW VLJKW RI WKH WHDFKLQJV RI
&KULVWLDQLW\,¶PVWLOOJODGWKDW%LQ/DGHQKDVJRQHWRMXGJPHQWJODGWKHUHLVRQHDUFK
terrorist less, glad, I even admit, that he probably felt real fear in his last moments but 
Rowan Williams is a representative of Christ not of Barack Obama and his duty is to 
remind us of what we would rather forget: that killing an unarmed man should give us 
SDXVH IRU WKRXJKW¶  7KXV IRU DOO WKDW VKH XOWLPDWHO\ GLVDJUHHV VKH Qonetheless 
considers it both valuable and necessary that the Archbishop speaks µDV$UFKELVKRS¶
in the public arena. 
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 The situation may not be immediately as encouraging for those who are not 
seen as formal representatives of the church in some capacity, but who speak as 
µSULYDWH¶&KULVWLDQV$GHWDLOHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHUDQJHRIRSWLRQVWKDWDUHOLNHO\WR
arise here is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an important area for further work, 
and perhaps the most urgent next step for continuing research.  Simply put, it is likely 
to be easier for Christians participating in arenas where people contribute as 
independent individuals (for example, in a neighbourhood civil society association), 
than when acting within areas where a particular ethos prevails (such as within certain 
areas of employment).  Wolterstorff, who considers this question in some detail, 
concludes that while private citizens, in general discourse, and through democratic 
processes such as elections, should have a high degree of freedom to contribute as 
they wish, legislators and public officials will inevitably find themselves constrained, 
whether by the need to reflect to some degree the views of those who have elected 
them, or in the implementation of policies set through proper democratic means.620  
Even so, as he points out, there will be considerable leeway in putting flesh on the 
detail of how agreed policies are drawn up and implemented.  This may well include 
arguments around upholding the spirit and not merely the letter of legislation, in ways 
that work against overly instrumental interpretations.  My expectation is that fuller 
reflection on these questions would provide greater justification for Christians to 
contribute from their own perspective (even if sometimes primarily in terms of 
ZRUNLQJDW µFRPPXQDO ODQJXDJH¶ WKDQ LV RIWHQDVVXPHG LQFRQWHPSRUDU\SXEOLF OLIH
within the UK, in contrast to prevalent expectations of having to work within the 
severe limitations ± when it comes to moral rational discourse ± RIµPRUDO(VSHUDQWR¶.  
It should also propose appropriate, and differentiated, strategies for making the fullest 
contribution, according to context.   
 It is important to note the differences between the sort of bilingualism I am 
commending and the proposal by Audi (made in debate with Wolterstorff) that one 
RXJKW WR EH DEOH WR JLYH ERWK RQH¶V RZQ UHDVRQV DQG µVHFXODU¶ UHDVRQV IRU RQH¶V
opinions, in public debate.  2ISDUWLFXODUFRQFHUQWRPHLVKLVDVVHUWLRQWKDWµWKHFKLHI
point is not that one cannot have and be motivated by religions reasons but that one 
should have and be motivated by at least one set of evidentially adequate secular 
UHDVRQV¶621  I have emphasised this phrase, because, if the nature of the secular space 
is inimical to religious UHDVRQLQJµFRXQWLQJ¶± some form of programmatic secularism 
± then it is unlikely that any reason which is satisfying within the norms of that 
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context is going to be found morally rational by a faith community with evaluative 
standards as described by MacIntyre.  In this case, what Audi advocates simply cannot 
be done.  One might be able to advance some sort of secular reasons, but to be 
PRWLYDWHGE\WKHPZRXOGEHDOLHQWRRQH¶VRZQDQGRQH¶VFRPPXQLW\¶VFRQYLFWLRQV
Further, it would be the case that to espouse such reasoning in public debate ± for 
example, promoting forms of instrumentalism such as decision-making solely on 
economic criteria or bureaucratic efficiency ± would give entirely the wrong message, 
one of support for such a system of governance.  For this reason, I would be similarly 
KHVLWDQW WR FRPPHQGDQRWKHURI $XGL¶VSURSRVDOVZKLFK LV WKHXVHRIZKDWKH FDOOV
µOHYHUDJLQJ¶ DORQJVLGH RIIHULQJ RQH¶V RZQ JHQXLQH UHDVRQV  7KLV KH VD\V LV
HVVHQWLDOO\ µSRLQWLQJ RXW UHDVRQV WKH DXGLHQFH DOUHDG\ KDV DW OHDVW LPSOLFLWO\ WKDt 
VXSSRUW WKHSROLF\ZKHWKHURQH WKLQNV WKH\DUHJRRG UHDVRQVRUQRW¶  ,QGRLQJ WKLV
µRQHWULHVWRPRYHDQDXGLHQFHWRDYLHZE\QRWLQJRQHRUPRUHUHDVRQVWKHUHDUHIRULW
from WKHDXGLHQFH¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ 7KLV LVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKQRWKROGLQJ WKHSRVLtion 
DQG HYHQ ZLWK WKLQNLQJ WKDW WKH UHDVRQVGR QRW LQ IDFW VXSSRUW LW¶622  While arguing 
DJDLQVWXVLQJOHYHUDJLQJDORQHRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWµWKHDXGLHQFHFDQQRWVHHwho ,DP¶
DQG WKDW WKLV LV µIRU WKHPRVWSDUWQRWDJRRGZD\WR UHODWH WRIHOORZFLWL]HQV¶ IRU µLW
tends to conceal much of my perspective and so does not promote understanding of 
PHRIP\YLHZDQGLWWHQGVWRDURXVHVXVSLFLRQ«¶± views I would wholly endorse, 
on MacIntyrean grounds ± he nonetheless contends that leveraging has an important 
place in political discourse.  But again it would seem disingenuous to appear to 
VXSSRUW UHDVRQLQJ WKDW LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK RQH¶V RZQ; not least as 
RQH¶V JHQXLQH UHDVRQV VKRXOG EH WKRVH ZLWK WKH JUHDWHVW PRUDO UDWLRQDOLW\.  Giving 
parallel reasons in this way is certainly not the sort of bilingualism I am advocating, 
ZKHUHRQHJLYHVRQH¶VRZQUHDVRQVRQRQH¶VRZQWHUPVDQGLQSDUDOOHORIIHUVHQWLUHO\
compatible reasons which draw in simple conceptual language on the instantiation of 
the primary precepts of the natural law and a concept of the common good within that 
specific context. 
 %XW $XGL¶V DSSURDFK VKRXOG QRW HQWLUHO\ EH ZULWWHQ RII  )RU LQ DIILUPLQJ
:ROWHUVWRUII¶VYLHZWKDW µLW LV KRSHOHVVIRUDSOXUDOLVWLFVRFLHW\ WRRSHUDWHDVDVLQgle 
FRPPXQLW\LQWKHVHQVHLQZKLFKWKDWLPSOLHVDVKDUHGRYHUDOOYLHZRIWKHZRUOG¶KH
SURSRVHVGLVWLQJXLVKLQJµILUVW- and second-RUGHUFRPPXQLWLHV¶WKHIRUPHUEHLQJZKDW
we might call communities of tradition, together with associations more loosely by 
social practices with internal goods of excellence; and the second being a far broader 
community made up of these first-RUGHU FRPPXQLWLHV VKDULQJ µD FRPPLWPHQW WR
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liberal (or other) principles of mutual self-JRYHUQPHQW DQG FLYLO DFWLYLW\¶623  At the 
hearWRI WKHVHSULQFLSOHV$XGLZDQWV WRSODFH µWKHDGYRFDF\DQG WKHVXSSRUWRI ODZV
DQG SXEOLF SROLFLHV¶  ,W VHHPV WR PH WKDW ZKHUH WKLV µODZ¶ LV DNLQ WR WKDW :LOOLDPV
espoused in his Chevening Lecture (and thus reflects the essence of natural law), and 
the public space is shaped along procedural lines, then to offer both our own and 
µVHFXODU¶ UHDVRQV LQ SDUDOOHO ZRXOG EH DSSURSULDWH ELOLQJXDOLVP LQ VXSSRUW RI
promoting moral rational public discourse.  There are parallels here with the 
promotion of effective civil society networks, outlined in the previous chapter.   
A related matter is the issue of how often we may find ourselves agreeing with 
others, without noticing that we are doing so on differing grounds.  Stout has 
suggested this may occur rather more than we are prone to recognising.624  I would 
propose that there is value in paying rather more attention to this, given that our 
overall objective is not merely to achieve individual policy objectives that we feel are 
in accord with Christian beliefs and practices, but rather to contribute to a maturing 
SURFHGXUDOVHFXODULVPLQZKLFKWKHUHFDQEHDQLQFUHDVLQJµWKLFNQHVV¶LQWKHFRPPXQDO
language and in the substance of ethical discourse.  Identifying where our grounds 
differ, and why, can highlight fertile areas around which to direct dialogue. 
 These are the sort of areas on which the churches should focus, as they 
consider being more deliberate in training their people to engage in bilingualism and 
stereoscopic social criticism in relation to the practices and subcultures of democracy 
and pluralist secularism.   
Optimism Against the Odds 
 0DF,QW\UH¶V DQDO\VLV RI WKH VFRSH DQG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $TXLQDV¶V DFFRXQW RI
natural law in relation to moral disagreement on one level holds out no new hopes for 
guaranteeing any acceptance of faith-based positions in secular discourse, or of the 
superiority of procedural over programmatic secularism.  It must be acknowledged 
that there can be widespread indifference and even outright opposition towards the 
enunciation of religious perspectives within western public discourse, as illustrated by 
the popularity of the writings of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchins, Anthony 
*UD\OLQJ DQG RWKHUV  +RZHYHU ZKDW 0DF,QW\UH¶V ZRUN GRHV GR LV SURYLGH D
thoroughly justifiable basis for pursuing a far more positive climate in which we can 
relate to those with whom we differ, and stimulate conversations about the nature of 
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our disagreements, not least the central consideration of the essence of what it is to be 
human, and to flourish.  It gives at least some grounds for optimism. 
 And, perhaps often unwittingly, there are significant elements within 
contemporary discourse with which we can work.  Even though there has been rather 
WRR PXFK RI D UHWXUQ WR µEXVLQHVV DV XVXDO¶ LQ UHFHQW PRQths, the credit crunch has 
opened up debate around the dominance of instrumental aspects of finance and 
economics over human considerations.625  In the US, a speech by President Barack 
Obama to George Washington University in April 2011 brought surprised reaction at 
WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK KH WXUQHG WR µTXDVL-political-SKLORVRSKLFDO TXRWHV¶ DURXQG µthe 
FRPPRQJRRGDQGVKDUHGVDFULILFH¶626  ,WLVHQWLUHO\ULJKWWKHUHIRUHWKDWWKHµFRPPRQ
JRRG¶ LQ RQH JXLVH RU DQRWKHU LV D WKHPH WR ZKLFK 5RZDQ :LOOLDPV FRQWLQXDOO\
returns.627  In much the same way, the primary precepts are not so far from the surface 
of the political arena, as MacIntyre similarly asserted in relation to the conduct of 
academic debate.  In the UK, a recent Guardian editorial on the 190th anniversary of 
WKHQHZVSDSHU¶VILUVWHGLWLRQFRPPHQWHGLQWHUPVWKDWUHVRQDWHZLWK$TXLQDV¶SULPDU\
principles, µ,W LV JRRG WR SDXVH DQG UHIOHFW WKDW WKH WKLQJV WKDW PDWWHU PRVW ± 
truthfulness, free thought, honest reporting, a plurality of opinion, a belief in fairness, 
justice and, most crucially, independence ± GR QRW FKDQJH¶628  The tension between 
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combatting anthropogenic climate change and the need to overcome global poverty is 
an area where questions are being raised about justice, on which 0DF,QW\UH¶V µSODLQ
persoQV¶KDYHPXFKWKDWLVSHUWLQHQWWRRIIHU  Earlier, I mentioned the introduction of 
WKHZRUOG¶VILUVWGHJUHHLQVHFXODULVP Intriguingly, the US academic Martin Seligman 
KDV VWHSSHG EDFN IURP KLV HDUOLHU PXFK SXEOLFLVHG IRFXV RQ µKDSSLQHVV¶ VWXGLHV
havinJ FRQFOXGHG µKH ZDV QDLYH LQ WKH SDVW WR WKLQN ZHOOEHLQJ ZDV EDVHG RQO\ RQ
PRRG¶DQGQRZFRQVLGHUVKXPDQµIORXULVKLQJ¶DVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOJRDORIVRFLHW\, and 
so has recently published a best-selling volume of popular psychology, Flourish.629  
All of these are examples of the many toe-holds in contemporary debate for Christians 
to exploit to promote further constructive engagement. 
 Within the ongoing debate on multiculturalism, the growing field of inter-faith 
activity, including the Faith Foundation set up by Tony Blair on retirement, is a 
particular area for potentially fertile engagement.  Here, there may need to be 
particular attention to upholding the integrity of the distinctiveness of each faith (as 
the Foundation asserts, in its affirmation of the OSC(¶V7ROHGR*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV630) 
DQGWRDYRLGWKHVRUWRI LQDGHTXDWHµFRPPRQFRUH¶DSSURDFKDJDLQVWZKLFK:LOOLDPV
warned in his Chevening speech.  The Foundation should therefore be wary of 
VSHDNLQJRIµXQGHUVWDQGLQJUHOLJLRXVIDLWK¶631 as if it were homogenous, or as if some 
µUHOLJLRXV(VSHUDQWR¶H[LVWHG3ULQFH&KDUOHV¶DSSDUHQWLQWHQWLRQWREHWLWOHGµ'HIHQGHU
RI)DLWK>V@¶UDWKHUWKDQµ'HIHQGHURIWKH)DLWK¶DVDQGZKHQKHDVFHQGVWKHWKURQHLV
another area where a MacIntyrean approach could help bring clarity to the issues at 
stake. 
 Thus, the task is not easy.  But it should be tackled with optimism, because 
ready ± even if slender ± opportunities for engagement exist in plenty, and the case 
Christians have to make in response is as good as, and generally better than, the 
alternatives on offer. 
Concluding Summary and Final Reflections 
  Let me end with a broad summary of what I have attempted to argue in this 
thesis.  Its overarching aim was to show that the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, suitably 
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reinterpreted and developed where necessary, could provide essential resources to 
enable the Bishops of the Anglican Communion, and the churches they lead (along 
with those of other religious traditions, though particularly Western Christian tradition 
in the lineage of Thomistic Aristotelianism), to pursue their twin commitments made 
at the 2008 Lambeth Conference to better understanding the contextualisation of their 
faith, and how to promote their beliefs around all that makes for genuine human 
flourishing in todD\¶VZRUOG,KDYHLGHQWLILHGIRXUEURDGDUHDVRIVSHFLILFYDOXH 
x )LUVW WKHVH UHVRXUFHV FDQ KHOS WKHP µUHJDUG ORFDO FRQWH[WV¶ DQG DOORZ WKHVH
DQG WKH LVVXHV WKH %LVKRSV IDFH KHUH WR µLPSLQJH¶ DSSURSULDWHO\ RQ WKHLU
interpretation of the Gospel, with the greatest possible integrity ± not least, 
through helping them to look beyond their own presuppositions and potential 
blind spots and prejudices.   
x Second, these resources help them to engage effectively in advocacy for social 
justice through providing a basis for them legitimately to enunciate their 
perspectives, as fully justifiable within pluralist rational discourse, especially 
on moral and ethical questions.   
x Third, they give convincing grounds not only for this assertion of their own 
position on their own terms (and offering tools for doing this well), but also 
for requiring others to give justification for their own beliefs and practices in 
turn.   
x And fourth, they offer important guidance on how Anglicans can work to 
shape the public space so that it best allows for fertile pluralist discourse in 
pursuit of the flourishing of all citizens. 
Neither we nor other traditions perfectly uphold the rationality (with all that it brings 
of justification, justice, truth, morality, values and so forth) which MacIntyre outlines.  
We are limited by finitude, and by the provisionality and change that is inevitably part 
of temporal life, but also by intrinsic human fallibility and failings.  Our ability to 
share standards of rational evaluation and conceptions of human flourishing and the 
common good will also always be partial and imperfect, but may nonetheless be µJRRG
HQRXJK¶WREHFRQVLGHUHGHQWLUHO\ µDGHTXDWH¶$QGZKLOHLWLVWKHFDVHPXFKRIVRFLHW\
lives with a very limited understanding of the sort of rationality, evaluative processes, 
DQG FRQFHSW RI KXPDQLW\¶V telos which MacIntyre upholds, here too there is a gap 
between theory and practice ± in that moral incoherence and irrationality, and the 
influences of wealth, power and status and fragmentary pursuit of desires of the 
moment, are by no means as all-HQFRPSDVVLQJ DV 0DF,QW\UH¶V FDULFDWXUHV  7KLQ
understandings of internal goods of practices, for which there is widespread evidence 
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within the many different associative groupings and networks of society, may well be 
more adequate as a basis for engaging one another, and with greater substance, than 
MacIntyre realises.    
 We should view all these spaces between theory and practice with optimism 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHSHVVLPLVPZKLFKWHQGVWRFRORXU0DF,QW\UH¶VFonclusions.  For just as 
pessimistic disengagement contributes to the undermining of the possibilities of 
GLVFRXUVHDQGZHDNHQVGHPRFUDWLFGHEDWH¶VDELOLW\WRIXQFWLRQDVDWUDGLWLRQDV6WRXW
fears632), so too optimistic engagement can strengthen what is present and promote a 
continuing dynamic from the less adequate to the more adequate at every level of 
debate of substance around moral questions, rooted in concepts of human flourishing. 
 :HFDQGHGXFHWKDWWKLVLVVRIURP0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQGHVFULSWLRQRIWKe social 
practices of communities of tradition.  The more skilled not only work to hone their 
own skills and understandings (including of our telos), they also endeavour to improve 
the skills and understandings of the less able.  This process of moving from less to 
greater adequacy applies both to the skilled and to their teaching of others.  There are 
no prior criteria the young must meet before such exposure can begin, or begin to take 
effect ± RWKHU WKDQDSUHSDUHGQHVV WREHSDUW RI WKLV SURFHVV  µ$QWKURSRORJLVWV¶ DQG
QHZDGXOWPHPEHUVVLPLODUO\DUHRSHQWREHLQJWUDLQHGLQWKHµODQJXDJH-in-XVH¶RIWKH
FRPPXQLW\ZHOOHQRXJKIRUµNQRZLQJKRZWRJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ 
 In all these cases, training and understanding comes not only through the 
conviction that arises out of rational discourse but through encounter and observation, 
DQGµZDONLQJDORQJVLGH¶6LQFHVXFKSURFHVVHVDSSO\HYHQWRWKRVHHQWLUHO\µDOLHQDWHG¶
IURP WUDGLWLRQV ZKR H[SHULHQFH µUDGLFDO FRQYHUVLRQ¶ WKHUH DSSHDU WR EH QR
circumstances from which it is intrinsically impossible for an individual to come into 
functional fluency within some tradition.  Though not all may be willing to walk 
WKURXJKLW WKHGRRU WRµNQRZLQJKRZWRJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶ LQD WUDGLWLRQDSSHDUV
always to be open.   
 At every level of encounter, those of us who have these competences can 
choose, and choose how far, to share them with others.  For all his pessimism, 
MacIntyre gives grounds, and provides resources, for engaging with others on ethical 
questions at every level ± from the substantive dialogue of commensurate 
communities of tradition with bilingualism across their languages-in-use; to the 
capacity to connect with those who have less fully developed moral languages, 
                                                             
632
 µ:KDWWKH\SUHDFK«PD\ZHOOEHFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHHURVLRQRIKDELWVDQG virtues essential 
WRGHPRFUDF\¶ EaB, 342. 
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particularly as developed by Stout in his stereoscopic social criticism; to the 
engagement of plain persons around the common good on the basis of the primary 
precepts of natural law, working to develop an instantiated communal language as a 
way of addressing ethical questions in contexts that admit no tradition.633  We have the 
choice of whether to employ these approaches with optimism and generosity:  the 
µJHQHURXV PDJQDQLPLW\¶ WKDW -RKQ 6HQWDPX $UFKELVKRS RI <RUN GHVFULEHV DV
characteristic of the best of Anglicanism,634 RU 6WRXW¶V µKHUPHQHXWLFDO FKDULW\¶635  
Drawing others into our habits ± through both our explanations and our 
demonstrations of how we live ± is the primary way of sharing and inculcating what 
we can offer, so that others can come to sufficient understanding of the justification of 
what it is that we believe and practice and promote. 
 Furthermore, this optimism suggests that it is appropriate always to choose to 
assume the existence of greater rather than lesser potential for engagement (all other 
considerations, such as political and tactical, being equal).  For it is only through 
DWWHPSWLQJµWRJRRQDQGJRIXUWKHU¶until we can make no more progress, that we find 
where the limitations lie, and where it is we have no option but to resort to the 
UHVRXUFHV0DF,QW\UHSURSRVHVIRU µWKLQQHU¶ HQFRXQWHUV  And the farther that we find 
we are able to go, the greater the moral rationality that both we and our dialogue 
partners stand to gain.  6XFKRSWLPLVPLQVWDUWLQJZLWKDµWKLFNHU¶PRGHRIGLVFRXUVHLV
also justifiable in that it is the ZD\WREULQJWKDWµVKRFNRIUHFRJQLWLRQ¶WRWKRVHZKR
on strict theoretical analysis, might fall outside of the appropriate category for 
potential engagement in that way, but are nonetheless close enough in practice to find 
that the gap can be bridged.  And, beyond this, in instantiating theory into practice, we 
KDYHQRWKLQJWRORVHE\LQWHUSUHWLQJFDWHJRULHVRIµFORVHHQRXJK¶DQGµDGHTXDWH¶ZLWK
OLEHUDOLW\  ,W LV EHWWHU WR ILQG WKDWZH KDYH KLW WKH OLPLWV RI µJRLQJ IXUWKHU¶ DQG WKHQ
adjust our discourse appropriately to a more simple mode of encounter, than to lose an 
opportunity for substantive and thicker debate through limiting our own participation. 
                                                             
633
 ,QIDFW6RORPRQVHHVJUHDWHULPSOLFLWRSWLPLVPLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNWKDQLVRIWHQJLYHQ
FUHGLWµ0DF,QW\UH¶VRSWLPLVPDERXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIPRUDODJUHHPHQWDFURVVFRPPXQLWLHV
may be one point at which his religious views do influence his moral philosophy.  Mindful of 
the Christian injunction to avoid despair and the centrality of the virtue of hope in the Christian 
life, he surely has resources for expecting things to work out that are denied more secular 
WKLQNHUV,QWKLVUHVSHFWLWLVHDVLHUIRU&KULVWLDQVWR³ZRUNZLWKRXWDQHW´¶6RORPRQ
µ0DF,QW\UHDQG&RQWHPSRUDU\0RUDO3KLORVRSK\¶Q 
634
 -RKQ6HQWDPXµ(SLHLNHVDQG(SLHLNHLD0RUHWKDQMXVWLFH¶ 10 July 2006, accessed 15 May 
2011, www.archbishopofyork.org/articles.php/1737/epieikes-and-epieikeia-more-than-justice. 
635
 EaB, 351. 
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 To engage generously is also to communicate trust.  Trust promotes 
relationship, improving the context of our mutual encounters, which also enhances the 
capacity for communication.  Trust also invites others to come closer to our 
community, increasing their exposure to our own practices.  Trust is particularly vital 
in those encounters where there is least potential for substantive encounter, since trust 
LVDIXQGDPHQWDOHOHPHQWRI$TXLQDV¶SULPDU\SUHFHSWVRIQDWXUDOODZ0RUHWKDQWKLV
where others are able to meet us believing trust is present, the implication they can 
GUDZLV WKDWZHKDYH WKHLU µJRRG¶ at heart ± and thus trust helps open the door more 
widely to exchanges about how we might come more fully to understand what 
FRPSULVHVVXFKµJRRG¶ 
 Wherever possible we can and should at least attempt to establish where the 
potential exists for substantive common ground that rests on foundations to which we 
give allegiance, and then attempt to build upon it.  Engaging with optimistic 
generosity does not guarantee that we will always be met in kind, nor that all 
difficulties in substantive communication will be overcome and others will readily 
admit to the superiority of our views.  However, to fail to engage is to be complicit in 
the persistence and deterioration of the status quo, with all its injustices and failings.  
To engage is always to insist on, and always to promote, the potential for greater 
KXPDQIORXULVKLQJDFFRUGLQJWRKXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWH telos found in the God by whom 
and in whose image we are created.  This is the Anglican way. 
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